Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Timothy Clack, Chingiz Gutseriev Fellow, University of Oxford

Colonialism has been a central part of history around the world, differing only in form over time and space. After all, whenever people have moved from one place to another, they have colonised spaces and other people or forms of life.

In Africa, colonialism has mostly been studied as something imposed from outside, for example from Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries. A recent special issue of the journal Azania sought to address this. Scholars looked at the topic from an angle that’s so far been neglected – the archaeology and history of colonialism from within Africa.

We introduced the journal issue with an essay revisiting basic ideas, reviewing literature and presenting new case studies.

We note, for example, that colonialism has a deep and complex history. There have been different kinds and degrees of colonialism. These range from expansion, trade, exchange and sharing cultural practices to settlement, domination, exploitation, control and imperialism.

These developments have taken place in a myriad of different settings. From Mesopotamia, Ancient Egypt, Phoenicia, Classical Greece and Rome, and China, to multiple locations in the Americas, including the Inka and the Aztecs, and Europeans, especially after 1492.

Global and local factors shape distinctive patterns of power, subjugation, consumption, extraction, exploitation and cultural exchange through time.

Important questions emerge when this is recognised. Examples include:

• what historical justice looks like

• which episodes get remembered and forgotten

• which victims are ignored or compensated

• which colonisers face consequence.

Colonialism from outside

In the 19th and 20th centuries, during the the so-called “Scramble for Africa”, seven European countries colonised almost the whole of the continent. The signatures left behind by Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain were wide and varied. They included:

• drawing national boundaries

• infrastructure geared towards extraction (like megaports, railways and roads)

• administration (like bicameral governments, courts and churches)

• defence (military structures and installations).

European colonialism even shaped the way most of us perceive the world via the instruments used to map time and space.

Earlier, large parts of Africa were colonised by Ottoman and Arab empires. Oman, for example, colonised the Swahili coast in the 18th and 19th centuries across a territory extending from areas of Somalia through to Madagascar.

Parts of Africa which had previously been under Islamic rule, in turn, experienced European colonialism differently. This had long-term implications for education, health and economic growth.

Taken together, these legacies, over time, developed into global organising principles for imagining Africa.

But this formulation ignores African agency and political processes. It is often forgotten, for example, that the Almoravids, a dynasty which rose to power in southern Morocco during the 11th century, exerted control over European soil. Africans have been colonisers too.

Colonialism from within

Africa has also experienced diverse colonial episodes from within. Examples include empires such as Egypt and Kush in north Africa, and Dahomey and Songhai in west Africa.

Rulers of these empires sought to annex territories, establish settlements, subjugate others, control resources and impose laws and customs. The archaeological indications of these can be seen in a number of ways. They include new settlement types, changes in material culture and the adoption of new languages and religions, particularly Islam and Christianity.

Resistance to colonialism is also visible in the historical record and expressed in many ways. This included insurgencies, protests and propaganda as well as myth, art, music, literature and non-cooperation.

In the 19th century, Shaka, for example, transformed a small Zulu chieftainship in southern Africa into an aggressive and successful state that absorbed neighbouring groups. The aftershock of the Zulu expansion was the Mfecane. This was a process that saw leaders establish their own polities. Soshangane, for instance, was a Ndwandwe general defeated by Shaka who established the Gaza state in contemporary Mozambique. It incorporated in it both Shona and Tsonga people.

Another example comes from the Mursi of south-western Ethiopia. They undertook several large-scale migrations over the past 200-300 years. This movement became part of their group identity. They displaced, assimilated and dominated other populations. The material traces they left have been explored by archaeological research. This has helped to interpret their activities, and also challenges their oral histories.

Cultural exchange and innovation

Colonialism is a generative process, with innovation emerging from cultural contact, relationships between colonisers and colonised, and material exchange.

Colonial processes have multi-directional influence. European colonialism, for example, shaped how Europeans dealt with the rest of the world. And, in turn, it contributed to how the western world was constructed. Ideas and materials flowed into the metropolitan centres of Europe as much as from them. In certain respects, Britain was colonised through contact with, for example, Africa, Australasia and North America, as much as those areas were colonial creations.

Colonialism often creates victims and oppressors. But it is also about consumption, innovation and exchange.

Archaeology offers a useful way to study colonialism because it leaves material and intangible indicators which the discipline has methods to interpret.

There is a need for more work on the processes and character of colonialism within Africa. This will enable comparisons and understanding, and correct a skewed picture of world history. A richer understanding of colonialism, including neocolonialism, may also inform debates about its legacy, and about decolonisation and restitution.

– Colonialism in Africa: archaeology offers a deeper view
– https://theconversation.com/colonialism-in-africa-archaeology-offers-a-deeper-view-275495

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By André Wessels, Senior Professor (Emeritus) and Research Fellow, Department of History, University of the Free State

A naval exercise off the South African coast in January 2026, dubbed Will for Peace and involving the warships of South Africa, China, Russia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran, elicited international and domestic controversy. It also contributed to a further souring of relations between South Africa and the US.

Under pressure at home, South Africa’s defence ministry appointed a board of inquiry to investigate whether an instruction by President Cyril Ramaphosa not to involve Iran had been defied.

The exercise and its controversies have placed the spotlight on the South African Navy’s diplomatic role. André Wessels, who has extensively studied the history of the navy, unpacks this role.

What is the Will for Peace 2026 exercise and what is the controversy around it?

Navies traditionally take part in training exercises with other navies. This enhances interoperability and builds mutual trust.

Over time, many foreign warships have visited South African ports, including 23 in 1961, 50 in 1968 and 41 in 1973.

However, in reaction to South Africa’s domestic policy of apartheid, foreign warship visits almost dried up between 1977 and 1989. Once South Africa became a democracy in 1994, foreign warships poured back into the country’s ports, for example 35 from 15 countries in 1997.

New alliances allowed the country’s navy to take part in exercises with the navies of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, Germany, India and Brazil, and Russia and China.

The January 2026 exercise was branded as one of navies belonging to the expanded Brics intergovernmental organisation. But, strictly speaking, Brics+ is not a military alliance. It is significant that India, Brazil, Indonesia and Egypt, which are members, did not send ships to participate, probably so as not to offend the US. But it was the first-ever visit by a UAE warship to South Africa.

Iranian “grey diplomats” (a term used to describe navy warships) had previously visited South African ports in 1970, 1972, 1974, 1975, and in 2016-2017.

The current geopolitical situation is challenging. There are tensions between the US and Iran (for, among other reasons, the latter’s nuclear arms ambitions); the Russia-Ukraine war continues; and diplomatic relations between the US and South Africa are strained (partly because of the Trump administration’s unproven allegations of a white genocide in South Africa). Given this situation, the naval exercise should not have taken place.

South Africa should as far as possible stay neutral in international affairs to, among other things, safeguard its economic interests. Furthermore, its navy had very little to gain and can ill afford negative publicity, especially when it transpired that the government had apparently asked that Iran not participate. The facts in this regard, however, must still be determined by a government-appointed board of inquiry.

What role can and should a navy play in a country’s foreign policy?

The traditional exchange of diplomats between friendly countries, reciprocal visits by heads of states and cabinet ministers, and the holding of summit meetings are not the only means of strengthening relations between countries.

It has been, for example, the practice of seafaring countries to send warships to one another from time to time. The South African Navy is no exception.

Since 1922, South African warships have undertaken numerous flag-showing cruises (meaning diplomatic visits) to many countries. These visits have nothing to do with “gun-boat diplomacy”, which is diplomacy backed by the threat of military force.

Warships play a very important role in diplomacy. The presence of a warship can be the most tangible and visible sign of bilateral and multilateral friendships. When ships of a navy take part in combined exercises or international humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, those ships can generate mutual trust. The warships become diplomatic tools of the highest national value.

It is indeed one of the stated aims of the South African Navy: to conduct, among other things, assistance operations, including diplomatic support.

What phases can be identified in the navy’s diplomatic role?

In 1946, the South African Naval Forces were reconstituted as a permanent part of the Union Defence Force. In 1951, it became the South African Navy.

The period 1946 to 1973 was a phase of normal relations with most countries in the west. There were 37 flag-showing cruises. This included 16 visits to European colonial possessions in Africa, six transoceanic deployments (to South America, Europe and Australia), and visits to many ports during the delivery voyages of 26 new vessels for the navy.

Then followed a phase of growing isolation (1974-1979) because of the internal political situation in South Africa over apartheid. In these years the SA Navy only undertook four flag-showing cruises.

The 1980-1987 period was a phase of total isolation as far as foreign visits by South African warships were concerned. The navy was from time to time (since 1975) deployed in a supporting role for the other arms of the South African Defence Force during the Namibian War of Independence (1966-1989), a conflict that spilled over into Angola.

Then followed a transitional phase (1988-1993), with political negotiations taking place from 1990 onwards. Gradually, ports opened up and no fewer than 19 flag-showing cruises took place.

With the birth of a democratic South Africa in April 1994, the country was officially welcomed back as a respected member of the international community. Over a period of three years (1994-1996), South African warships visited at least 29 ports in at least 23 countries during eight flag-showing cruises.

So, after years of isolation, the navy played a major role in establishing ties of friendship. It also established several new ties with African, Asian and South American countries.

Unfortunately, in the years 2018 to 2025, not a single tailor-made South African Navy flag-showing cruise took place, mainly because of budgetary constraints.

However, in February 2026, the warship SAS Amatola sailed to India for an international fleet review and to participate in Exercise Milan, involving the Indian and other visiting navies.

What does the future hold for the navy’s ‘grey diplomats’?

The primary role of the navy must always be to conduct operations in defence of South Africa. But in times of peace, it has an equally important role to play. This includes search and rescue, relief operations, assistance to state authorities, regional assistance operations and flag-showing cruises.

A warship is both a reflection and projection of the state it represents. It is, therefore, important that the ships are not undersized or under-equipped. A South African warship is South African territory afloat, and its presence in foreign waters sends a signal of support to the country’s allies.

Hopefully the navy will in future have at its disposal the necessary funds – and ships – to meet all the demands of its mission statement.

– Warships as diplomats: how the South African Navy is tasked with building ties with other nations
– https://theconversation.com/warships-as-diplomats-how-the-south-african-navy-is-tasked-with-building-ties-with-other-nations-275830

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Anné H. Verhoef, Professor in Philosophy, North-West University

When we seek happiness, what exactly are we searching for? And when we wish happiness on someone else, what is it that we truly desire for them?

Can happiness even be defined or is it an illusion, an impossible desire to fulfil? So then why are there so many happiness self-help books? What do they promise and can they be attained? Is it possible to measure happiness? If so, how do ordinary people and scientists do that?

To answer these questions, I explored different definitions of happiness in my book Happiness, Unhappiness, and Chance. The book is based on my PhD study in philosophy.

Happiness today is narrowly defined by some positive psychologists as a joyous state of mind or well-being.

The happiness sciences see it as something you can calculate and quantify. They developed a Happiness Index and the World Happiness Report. These basically measure happiness as satisfaction, with criteria like gross domestic product per capita (money) and life expectancy (health) as some of the factors considered.

But happiness is also defined by our capitalist, consumer-driven society as certain aspirational products, brands and lifestyles. These consumerist definitions are often exaggerated by influencers on social media, but also through the manipulation of consumers by the online algorithms behind the digital tools we use. Increasingly, this also happens through artificial intelligence.

All these different definitions of happiness create their own problem for happiness. In fact they can lead to more unhappiness than happiness.

Joy and pleasure are often short-lived and unsustainable; well-being can quickly be ruined by illness and fate; owning certain brands, products and lifestyles exposes us to the trap of the “hedonistic treadmill,” which causes one “to rapidly and inevitably adapt to good things by taking them for granted”.

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Read more: How much money do you need to be happy? Here’s what the research says

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Happiness that’s reduced to a single and simple definition does not consider the complexity of being human, of the societies we live in, and the fragile relationship we have with the environment.

My book searches for a more inclusive and encompassing definition of happiness. A happiness that is more than just joy or well-being, more than an ethical or good life. More than just good and meaningful human relationships. More than just luck, the absence of pain or a by-product of consumption. More than just a meaningful, fulfilled and content life.

I wanted to find out if a better understanding of happiness can be formed and actually achieved. One that considers all cultures and also factors like justice and caring for each other and the environment.

Can this kind of understanding of happiness, I wondered, not be a powerful motivation to live and work for a better future for all?

Consumerism

To explore the potential of such a philosophical understanding of happiness, we first need to understand why the current dominant definitions of happiness don’t work anymore.

Today, consumerism and capitalism are the forces behind the digital technologies that manipulate our understanding of happiness. Consumerism, with its “you-must-have-this-or-that-to-be-happy” approach, became so powerfully enforced through today’s digital platforms that it became a question of whether we can still envision, hope, and live for something more than what the algorithmic ecologies we live in present to us.

Happiness sciences

Happiness sciences, as the power behind happiness within our contemporary global happiness culture, proclaim that happiness is something one must work for and must achieve. Happiness itself is becoming so all-consuming that it is like a new religion. US historian Darrin McMahon describes the situation thus:

At the dawn of the modern age, God was happiness; happiness has since become our God.

Consequently, happiness becomes and remains an exhausting and impossible task which paradoxically makes one more unhappy. In this process people give up on happiness and may even become cynical due to this impossible pressure to be happy in a certain way.

Religion

Globally, the strongest power behind certain forms of happiness, especially as “true and eternal” happiness, is religion.

The type of happiness some religions offer is one where the ideal is that unhappiness should be overcome or will be in an afterlife. Some religions teach that true happiness can only be achieved in the afterlife, in heaven or nirvana, for example. They proclaim it is impossible to find true happiness in this world, or in the here and now.

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Read more: Why leisure matters for a good life, according to Aristotle

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It is a happiness where this life is not fully affirmed because happiness can’t be attained. It is still to come. In effect it is not only giving up on the possibility of happiness, but on “true” goodness and beauty in daily life.

Philosophy

As alternative to these problematic understandings of happiness, and the different driving forces behind them, I used well-known French philosopher Paul Ricoeur’s thinking to guide me. He argued that happiness should and could not be defined as the overcoming of unhappiness. Such an attempt will always be futile. It denies unhappiness as part of the fundamental reality and fullness of life, and leaves us with an impossible and unhappy task. Happiness and unhappiness are always in relation to each other, and the one does not mean the annihilation of the other.

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Read more: Lifetime trends in happiness change as misery peaks among the young – new research

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Secondly, the relationship between happiness and unhappiness is situated within our fragile ability to work for happiness. Yet, at the same time, to be aware that receiving happiness is not just hard work but can be a result of chance. Unhappiness can be in the form of unexpected tragedy.

The tension between striving for happiness and receiving happiness unexpectedly should remain. We should continue to work at contributing to our own and others’ happiness. But if we try to always be in control we will become exhausted. So we should also keep on allowing space for chance – as luck and tragedy – in our lives.

Why this matters

The ability to think and dream again about a different kind of happiness, one that is connected to our lives (not the technological world of the present), our desires (not those manipulated by consumerism), and the needs of the world – which includes unhappiness and injustice – has become increasingly important today.

We need better definitions of happiness in a world where the term is constantly corrupted and used by consumerism, politicians, prosperity evangelicals, the self-help industry, and in algorithmic technologies.

Such happiness should be able to affirm our lives, here and now. Such affirmation will become more important as our lives are more manipulated and controlled by technology and consumerism.

I argue in my study that this affirmation of life allows for a happiness that can include and respond to unhappiness and chance. Life itself is one thing we should not give up on; otherwise, happiness will also become irrelevant.

– What is happiness? A philosopher looks for answers
– https://theconversation.com/what-is-happiness-a-philosopher-looks-for-answers-276091

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Andrew Robert Donaldson, Senior Research Associate, Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town

In presenting the 2026 national budget to South Africa’s parliament on 25 February, finance minister Enoch Godongwana characterised this as the turning point in South Africa’s public finances – heralding improved confidence, increased growth and rising infrastructure investment.

For over a decade, the size of the deficit and the rise in public debt have been central themes in the annual budget.

This year, analysts have welcomed the apparent turnaround in the budgetary outlook. Debt has peaked at just under 80% of GDP. And for the first time in a decade, the Treasury projects that interest on debt will increase more slowly than spending on education or health.

This is a transition that goes back to May 2025, when the rand began to strengthen against the US dollar in the turbulence that followed US president Donald Trump’s April tariff announcements. The South African Reserve Bank’s commitment to lower inflation and Parliament’s opposition to value added tax increases reinforced market sentiment that inflation would be kept in check. Around this time, the 10-year government bond yield began an extraordinary decline from its 11% peak to around 8% today.

These are the financial trends that account for the national treasury’s projected decline in debt service costs as a percentage of GDP. It expects these to fall from 5.4% this year to 5.2% in 2028/29.

But for the economic outlook to improve decisively, growth must rise. It is projected to increase, but not by much: 1.4% in 2025 and 1.6% in 2026, and then 2% by 2028. The recovery is still very fragile – gross fixed-capital formation, which should be upwards of 25% of GDP, is just 14%. Unemployment is still above 30% of the labour force. And the budget deficit for the year ahead (the difference between expenditure and revenue) is still uncomfortably high at 4% of GDP.

As an economist, I would argue that, if growth is the metric that counts, this is not yet the turning point that will deliver rising living standards and jobs for all.

Growth depends, in the Treasury’s analysis, on continued implementation of structural reforms, several of which form part of the Presidency’s Operation Vulindlela programme, launched in 2020. These include:

• electricity sector restructuring

• modernisation of state transport utility Transnet and logistics networks

• investment in digital infrastructure and an e-visa system

• boosting export competitiveness.

The Budget Review presents a summary of progress: 62% implementation of electricity reforms, 33% in transport, 11% in the water sector, 67% in telecommunications, 75% in reform of the visa system.

These initiatives will take time to shift the economic growth outlook.

What still needs to be done

Operation Vulindlela recognises that improvements in state capability are priorities of phase 2 of the presidency’s programme. There is a renewed focus on local government. This includes a proposed shift to a “utility model” for water and electricity services in which these functions will be run “like businesses”, to ensure proper infrastructure maintenance and accountability to the public.

Deterioration in local infrastructure is increasingly evident in water supply, roads and local services in many municipalities.

The Treasury also hopes that the implementation of the Public Service Amendment Bill will lead to improvements in professional standards in government, and particularly in municipalities.

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Read more: South African politicians, not bureaucrats, stand in the way of a professional civil service

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Is state capability perhaps the key turnaround needed for an improved growth outlook?

The 2026 Budget Review signals a more robust, interventionist approach of the National Treasury to dysfunctional provincial departments and municipalities.

This will include centralised control of payroll and headcounts, enforcement of financial recovery plans, and stricter conditions attached to financial flows to provinces and municipalities.

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Read more: South Africa’s municipalities aren’t fixing roads, supplying clean water or keeping the lights on: new study explains why

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It also includes technological reforms, such as the “smart meters grant programme”. Its aim is to improve billing accuracy and address leaks and illegal electricity connections.

But substantial improvements in state capability will not be achieved by top-down interventions and technology projects alone. Substantial reallocations of state resources are also needed. Simply put, resources must be redirected from unproductive to productive activities.

This is where the Treasury’s “targeted and responsible savings” initiative comes into play. Expenditure reviews have been under discussion for several years; in the 2025 medium term budget policy statement the savings programme was introduced to give this practical effect. The 2026 budget includes R4 billion (US$250 million) a year in identified savings.

That is not enough. It is less than 0.1% of GDP, and just 1.1% of the gap between government expenditure and revenue.

It’s not just that savings must be found if tax increases are to be avoided while lowering the budget deficit. The targeted and responsible savings initiative is also about shifting resources towards the investment, infrastructure maintenance, housing, police and court services that need to be strengthened. A bolder approach is needed. The goal should be R100 billion (US$6.3 billion) a year.

This means a targeted reconsideration of the “architecture” of the state.

What needs to be fixed

Here are some of the dysfunctionalities that must be addressed:

Two-tier local government: District municipalities serve no discernible democratic purpose. Where they provide cross-boundary services, these can be organised as utilities owned by and accountable to their component local municipalities.

Sector Education and Training Authorities (Setas) and the National Skills Fund: Once again, the Treasury has signalled its intent to “review” the skills funding system. Setas should be liquidated and the levy paid to them by employers abandoned. They are costly and inefficient intermediaries. The levy relief would be a benefit to businesses, allowing them to finance training as needed, not subject to one-size-fits-all rules and bureaucratic processes.

The Road Accident Fund: It is more than 20 years since reform proposals were set out for the Road Accident Fund. It has an unfunded liability of around R400 billion (US$25 billion) arising from road accident compensation claims that have yet to be settled. It should be restructured as a capped benefit scheme, with the balance of cover left to insurance providers.

Unemployment Insurance Fund expansion of mandate: The fund is planning to expand its administrative staff from 3,424 in 2024/25 to 11,424 next year. It also intends to expand its activities from payment of unemployment benefits to provision of skills audits, employment subsidies, and enterprise support. Its reported expenditure increased from R26.0 billion in 2024/25 to R48.8 billion in 2025/26. The Treasury should simply say No. It is absurd that public health and education programmes are subject to strict spending controls while a fund administered by the Department of Employment and Labour is allowed free rein.

Southern African Customs Union transfers: Review of the customs union agreement is long overdue. Its formula-based distribution of over R78 billion (US$4.9 billion) to neighbouring countries next year no longer rests on a defensible rationale from either a trade or regional development perspective.

More broadly, the budget reform that is needed is to extend Treasury’s expenditure planning and control systems to cover the 196 public entities that perform statutory functions and rely on fiscal revenue but fall outside the expenditure control limits of the budget process. Public entity boards and executive staff are often paid more than senior departmental officials, their programmes are not subject to Treasury review, and in many cases they hold funds that should properly be controlled by the Treasury.

Tighter expenditure control can in part be done through existing provisions of the Public Finance Management Act. More complete implementation might require fiscal responsibility legislation.

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Read more: South Africa’s debt has skyrocketed – new rules are needed to manage it

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The Treasury’s plan for fiscal sustainability is to introduce a principles-based “fiscal anchor” that will require each new administration to table a medium-term plan to ensure that debt service costs do not erode service delivery capability. If the expenditure planning system is not extended to include public entities, this will be a toothless tiger.

A version of this article first appeared on the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (Saldru) website.

– South Africa’s economy is picking up, but hasn’t reached a turning point yet – economist
– https://theconversation.com/south-africas-economy-is-picking-up-but-hasnt-reached-a-turning-point-yet-economist-277263

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jan Pospisil, Researcher at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs

South Sudan has not held an election since it gained independence 15 years ago, and progress towards a new constitution has stalled. Election dates have been set and postponed at least three times. A new date has been set for December 2026 but it’s unclear the poll will take place. If it does, it will be the first electoral test for President Salva Kiir, who has been in power since 2011. It raises the question of what legal guardrails exist for a smooth transition to new leadership outside an election. Jan Pospisil, who has studied the country’s politics and power-sharing agreements, explains what’s in place.

What legal frameworks govern presidential succession in South Sudan?

Two legal frameworks operate side by side to regulate the succession question in South Sudan: the 2011 transitional constitution and the 2018 peace agreement, which has a quasi-constitutional quality.

Read together, the logic in the 2011 and 2018 frameworks is straightforward. Upon vacancy, the first vice-president acts as president, but only until the party in power nominates a successor. The president’s party then has 48 hours to nominate a replacement. If a nomination is made within that period, however, the nominee is sworn in and replaces the acting first vice-president.

The peace agreement overlays the constitutional acting mechanism with a time-limited party entitlement. But it does not replace the constitutional fallback.

A more granular breakdown looks like this.

The 2018 agreement is based on a power-sharing deal between five major political parties and blocs. It is the primary framework governing the country’s transitional period from conflict to democracy.

The peace agreement created a collective presidency composed of a president, one first vice-president and four vice-presidents. The four vice-presidents are considered equal in rank.

The key provision on succession is clause 1.6.5. It states that if the post of the president falls vacant during the transitional period, the replacement shall be nominated by the respective party as constituted at the signing of the agreement. The process of choosing a successor must also be done within 48 hours of the post falling vacant.

The clause establishes two principles.

First, the presidency remains allocated to the party that originally held the position under the power-sharing arrangement. In this case, it’s the mainstream SPLM, now called SPLM-IG, for “in government”. This is to differentiate it from the main opposition that formed in December 2013 in the course of civil war, SPLM-IO, for “in opposition”.

Second, the party’s right to nominate a successor is time-bound. The 48-hour window is designed to preserve the elite settlement and guarantee executive continuity with minimal friction.

What the agreement doesn’t do is spell out in detail what happens during those 48 hours. It does not foresee the creation of a separate interim authority for this short period.

Instead, continuity is ensured through the 2011 transitional constitution.

In the constitution, article 102 defines five ways the president’s office can become vacant. These are expiration of the term of office, resignation, impeachment, mental infirmity or physical incapacity and death. It lays out the respective succession rules.

If the presidency falls vacant, the vice-president assumes office temporarily,

pending the filling of this position, within fourteen days from the date of the occurrence of the vacancy, by a nominee of the political party on whose ticket he or she was elected.

Under the post-2018 structure, this provision applies to the first vice-president.

There has been precedent for such structured succession. In 2005, Salva Kiir assumed regional leadership following the death of John Garang under the constitutional framework that was then in force. At the time, South Sudan was a semi-autonomous region led by Garang, with Kiir as his deputy.

What happens if the 48-hour deadline is missed?

This raises difficulties. The 2018 agreement sets a time limit but does not contain a separate sanction clause.

If nomination occurs on hour 72 or 96 rather than hour 48, the text does not specify whether the party’s entitlement automatically lapses.

Different interpretations are possible. One reading treats the deadline as mandatory: once expired, the first vice-president’s acting role becomes substantive, and he or she becomes the president.

Another reading is that a delayed nomination could still be recognised if political actors agreed. This would be in line with the transitional constitution, which allows a 14-day window for nominations that need to be accepted by the vice-president acting as president.

In practice, such a scenario would likely be resolved through political bargaining rather than judicial enforcement.

What about the issue of someone being detained or being on trial?

This is a further complexity as the current first vice-president, Riek Machar, is in detention and on trial.

Detention or trial, however, do not automatically create a vacancy under either the 2011 constitution or the 2018 peace agreement. Unless the office holder resigns or is formally removed, the position remains legally intact.

If the presidency were to fall vacant while the first vice-president was detained but not removed, the legal text would still designate the latter as the acting authority.

The 2018 agreement does not rank the other vice-presidents for automatic succession. All are explicitly of equal rank.

Any attempt to bypass the first vice-president without formal removal would therefore be politically and legally contested.

Where are the biggest risks in the current system?

Behind these legal provisions lie political realities.

The 48-hour clause requires rapid consensus within the president’s party, the mainstream SPLM. The 2018 agreement does not specify which internal organ of the party must nominate the successor. Instead, this process is guided by internal party leadership structures, rules and regulations. In practice, this is likely to be handled by the SPLM Political Bureau.

However, the decision-making would be shaped by more than formal party ranks. Other factors, especially the support of the security sector, ethnopolitical balances and existing patronage networks, would come into play.

The presidency has historically been embedded in military and security structures, which gives succession an importance that extends beyond procedural law.

The 48-hour provision is clear on paper, but its operation depends entirely on political cohesion. If consensus fails, the text alone cannot prevent contestation.

How would elections help?

The picture could change once elections become a realistic possibility and a nomination process is held. South Sudan has postponed elections previously due to delayed preparations, political resistance and lack of funding. Polls are now slated for December 2026.

A post-transition order would revert to a presidency-vice presidency model as per the transition reflected in the country’s National Election Act, with a vice-president elected on a ticket as running mate, and thus positioned as the undisputed successor. Elections would force parties to clarify leadership hierarchies in advance.

In this sense, an electoral framework does not merely choose a president – it simplifies succession.

– South Sudan has never had an election to hand over presidential power: so what are the rules of succession?
– https://theconversation.com/south-sudan-has-never-had-an-election-to-hand-over-presidential-power-so-what-are-the-rules-of-succession-276640

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tony Roberts, Digital Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies

Across Africa, governments are introducing digital systems that use individuals’ unique physical measurements to identify them. These systems collect citizens’ biometric and personal data and use it to give people access to essential public services like voting, healthcare, education and social protection. Biometric digital identification systems are often promoted as tools to improve efficiency, inclusion and service delivery.

But a new report by the African Digital Rights Network, published by the Institute of Development Studies, highlights serious concerns about exclusion, rights violations, data protection and accountability. Drawing on evidence from ten African countries, the report shows how millions of people are struggling to enrol in or safely use these systems, or are choosing not to participate due to fear and mistrust.

The report draws on the expertise of researchers based in each of the ten countries studied. Tony Roberts, co-editor of the report, takes us through what they found.

What are biometric digital IDs and why are they both useful and problematic?

Digital-ID is a form of identification that can hold large amounts of sensitive personal data. This includes biographic data like name, date of birth and address, as well as biometric data such as fingerprints and facial recognition. What makes digital-ID distinct from paper-based IDs is that it is machine readable. And, when it’s connected to the internet, millions of people can be identified and verified, instantly and remotely.

Biometric digital-ID includes facial recognition, fingerprints, iris scans and voice patterns that are unique to individuals. It can verify that an individual is who they claim to be.

Increasingly, biometric digital-ID systems are being imposed across Africa and used to determine who gets services or entitlements. For example, fingerprint or iris scans are used during elections to confirm that a person is entitled to vote. In Botswana and in Malawi there are examples of ID chaos threatening voter registration.

But these systems are leaving millions of citizens in Africa unable to obtain essential services. Some people struggle to register for biometric digital-ID due to disability or illiteracy. There are costs to use online systems, including phone access, mobile data, or electric power for phone charging. This is deepening existing inequalities.

How is uptake happening in Africa?

Our report includes ten country studies. The research was coordinated by the African Digital Rights Network, bringing together 75 digital rights researchers from 30 African countries, in collaboration with Paradigm Initiative, a non-profit organisation.

We found that pressure to adopt biometric systems often comes from foreign funders and creates dependencies on foreign technology providers.

The World Bank claims that the motivation for spending billions of dollars on digital-ID is to meet the Sustainable Development Goal of “identity for all”. But the role of private vendors, international funders and even state actors may also reflect interests in profit generation, data control, or surveillance of populations.

The introduction of biometric digital IDs varies between countries. Between 2017 and 2025, Ghana registered 19 million people (around 95% of the adult population) to a system called GhanaCard. In Ethiopia, 28 million people (around 35%) have enrolled in the Fayda-ID scheme. In the Democratic Republic of Congo there is still no digital-ID system despite repeated announcements and legislation introduced to enable it since 2011.

In Senegal, biometric digital-ID, with fingerprint data, was introduced in law in 2016. Citizens need it to obtain a phone number, bank account and public services, such as electricity and water. Based on 2025 data, it’s estimated that around 10 million citizens hold a biometric national ID card, just over 90% of the population aged 15 and over.

But this suggests that around 10% of the population over 15 – over 1 million people – lack ID and therefore lack access to essential services and entitlements.

What are the challenges of rolling them out?

One of the challenges is that universal human rights which should be unconditional become conditional on enrolment in a biometric digital-ID scheme. These include access to education, healthcare, social security and voting. Withholding access is a violation of fundamental human rights.

The report includes the case of Ethiopia, where registration in the Fayda digital-ID system is a condition of access to government services, banking and mobile telecoms.

Millions of citizens cannot enrol, particularly those with disabilities. For example, some people don’t have fingerprints due to amputation, diseases including leprosy, years of hard manual labour or old age. Some people cannot provide iris scans due to vision problems.

Millions of Africans are also denied legal ID because government officials dispute their citizenship. The project of digital-ID is sold as a solution. But research shows that it reproduces this form of discrimination and injustice.

For example, in Kenya, members of the Somali, Nubian and Pemba communities who have lived in the country for five or six generations and inter-married are discriminated against and rendered stateless. They are denied digital-ID and so cannot access education, healthcare, voting and social protection.

Some do not want to enrol for a biometric digital-ID because they have good reason not to trust their governments with their personal information. In countries like Sudan and Ethiopia the state is targeting people based on their ethnic group or on other identifiers such as surname, address or religion which are used as proxies for ethnicity.

Are there any dangers?

The use of biometric digital-ID introduces new challenges and risks. These include risks to privacy caused by data leakage or sharing and risks of exclusion due to poor data quality or mismatches.

There are also privacy risks involved because biometrics are permanent. People need to be aware and give informed consent. Data protection principles should be followed.

There is a lack of adequate legal frameworks and robust digital security to prevent unauthorised access to sensitive data. Countries also lack accountability mechanisms for when data entry errors, breaches or system failures occur.

The Universal Digital Public Infrastructure Safeguards Initiative has a framework of 18 core principles to ensure that digital-ID is secure, inclusive and rights-based.

Eight out of ten countries studied in the report have no law specifically governing digital-ID, and none include special protection. In some cases, where legal provisions exist, enforcement is weak or symbolic.

Independent oversight bodies are rare, as are judicial mechanisms to contain function creep – where ID systems expand beyond their original scope. Governments could secure consent by saying that digital-ID will only be used for a single purpose, such as voting. But then they could make it mandatory for accessing education, healthcare, employment and banking.

Without stronger legislation, clearer accountability and harmonised regional standards, digital-ID projects risk entrenching inequality and mistrust rather than delivering inclusion or security.

– Biometric IDs are being rolled out in Africa. Study reveals the risks and pitfalls
– https://theconversation.com/biometric-ids-are-being-rolled-out-in-africa-study-reveals-the-risks-and-pitfalls-273510

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Siyabulela Christopher Fobosi, Senior Researcher, UNESCO ‘Oliver Tambo’ Chair of Human Rights, University of Fort Hare, University of Fort Hare

South Africa’s minibus taxi industry is the backbone of the country’s public transport system. Every day, millions of commuters rely on it. In many low-income and peri-urban communities, there is no real alternative. They account for roughly 70% of daily public transport trips in the country.

Yet despite its scale and significance, the industry remains largely informal. It is governed less by formal contracts and clear regulatory systems than by relationships, trust and unwritten rules.

This makes the sector an important subject for industrial and economic sociology scholars like myself, who are concerned with how regulation, labour and economic life unfold in practice rather than merely on paper. Particularly in contexts marked by informality, inequality and contested regulatory environments.

In a recent study, my co-author and I explore how “social capital” – the networks, shared norms and trust that connect people – shapes the governance, labour relations and everyday functioning of the minibus taxi sector.

We conducted a structured search of academic databases and South African institutional repositories, and analysed 62 peer-reviewed articles, theses and policy reports to identify themes.

Our central finding is that social capital within South Africa’s minibus taxi industry operates as a double-edged sword. The same dense networks of trust, shared norms and reciprocal obligations that enable the industry to function also entrench inequality, exclusion and, at times, violence. Social capital is a source of both resilience and instability.

This matters because policy debates have too often treated the industry’s informality either as a problem to be eradicated or as a reality to be tolerated. Our research suggests that sustainable reform requires a hybrid approach: one that works with social capital rather than against it. Efforts to formalise or regulate the sector are unlikely to succeed if they ignore the networks and authority structures that already govern it.

It is therefore essential to engage with taxi associations, drivers and commuters, recognising their lived realities and institutional knowledge. It is possible to make the industry safer, fairer and more efficient without undermining the social foundations on which it depends.

An industry born of exclusion

The modern minibus taxi industry took shape during apartheid (1948-1990), when black South Africans were systematically excluded from formal urban planning and public transport provision. Commuters faced long journeys between racially segregated townships and economic centres, so entrepreneurs began operating minibuses to meet demand. The sector grew rapidly because it was responsive, decentralised and embedded in communities.

In the new democratic era after 1994, the industry continued to expand – but without being fully integrated into formal transport planning. Today, it comprises hundreds of thousands of vehicles organised into roughly 1,500 taxi associations nationwide. These associations regulate routes, manage disputes and coordinate operations. Alongside them are individual taxi owners, who own vehicles and lease them out, and drivers.

Part of the reason for this limited integration is that the state has lacked the institutional capacity and the political leverage to impose coherent oversight on the sector.

In the absence of consistent and effective state oversight, informal systems of governance have developed. These systems are rooted in social relationships.

Understanding social capital

The concept of social capital is often associated with political scientist Robert Putnam, who defined it as the networks and norms that enable collective action. According to this view, trust and civic engagement help communities solve shared problems.

But sociologist Pierre Bourdieu offered a more critical perspective. For him, social capital was not simply about cooperation. It was also a resource that groups could use to consolidate power and exclude others.

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Read more: Ghana’s informal settlements are not all the same – social networks make a difference in community development

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Drawing on these traditions, we distinguish between three forms of social capital in the taxi industry:

• bonding: tight-knit networks within taxi associations and owner groups

• bridging: connections across different associations or stakeholder groups

• linking: vertical ties between the industry and formal institutions such as government departments, banks and law enforcement agencies.

All three forms are present in the minibus taxi sector. But they operate unevenly, and their effects are not always positive.

The strengths of dense networks

Bonding social capital is particularly strong within taxi associations. These organisations function as powerful, if informal, regulatory bodies. They control routes, set fare guidelines and enforce industry norms. Membership provides access to shared resources and a measure of protection in a competitive market.

These dense networks allow for rapid coordination. If disputes arise, they can often be resolved internally without recourse to the courts. If demand shifts or new residential areas develop, associations can adjust routes quickly. In communities where formal institutions are perceived as distant or ineffective, such embedded systems can appear more responsive and legitimate.

Trust is also central to financial arrangements. Many taxi owners rely on rotating credit schemes and informal savings groups to finance vehicle purchases and maintenance. Formal financial institutions frequently regard the sector as high risk, making credit expensive or out of reach. Social networks therefore take the place of formal banking relationships.

The driver-owner relationship also depends heavily on trust. In many cases, drivers lease vehicles for a fixed daily fee, with no written contracts. Instead, expectations are governed by personal relationships and informal understandings.

In short, social capital fills gaps left by weak or uneven formal regulation enabling coordination, resilience and continuity.

When networks entrench power

However, the same bonding social capital that enables coordination can also reinforce hierarchy and exclusion.

Taxi associations control access to routes, which are the primary source of income. Because associations regulate who may operate on which routes, they wield considerable power. Dense networks of members can create barriers to entry for outsiders.

Disputes over routes are a feature of the industry. In some cases, they escalate into violence. Such conflicts arise in a system where economic survival depends on territorial control and where formal mediation mechanisms are weak.

Social capital here functions as a resource of dominance. Associations mobilise networks to maintain authority and legitimacy. Their links to communities can confer symbolic power, even in the absence of formal legal recognition.

Most drivers, by contrast, occupy a precarious position. Many are not members of associations in their own right. They lease vehicles from owners and have to meet fixed daily payment targets. To do so, they frequently work shifts exceeding 12 hours. If they fall short, they may absorb the loss themselves.

Without formal employment contracts, drivers typically lack access to medical benefits, unemployment insurance or retirement savings. Trust-based arrangements limit recourse in cases of exploitation or unfair treatment.

In this context, social capital benefits some actors more than others.

The missing links to formal institutions

While bonding social capital within associations is strong, linking social capital between the industry and formal institutions remains comparatively weak.

Government has attempted to formalise and regulate the sector, most notably through the Taxi Recapitalisation Programme. The aim was to replace older vehicles, improve safety and integrate the industry more fully into national transport policy. Yet implementation has been uneven, and many reforms have met resistance.

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Read more: Operational subsidies are key to reforming South Africa’s minibus taxi sector

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One reason is that policy interventions don’t “talk to” existing informal governance structures. Top-down regulation can be perceived as a threat to association autonomy. Where there is limited trust between the state and industry actors, compliance is likely to be partial.

Towards hybrid governance

The research suggests that industry reforms would have to recognise and work with social capital.

Formalisation should not simply impose external control. It should build on existing structures while introducing safeguards.

Legal recognition of taxi associations as cooperatives is one potential pathway. This could enhance access to subsidies, training and financial services. It could also clarify governance and accountability.

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Read more: Why the South African state should not subsidise minibus taxi owners

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Standardised employment contracts for drivers are another step. They could provide greater security, define working hours and clarify dispute resolution processes.

Digital technologies may also help. Mobile payment systems could reduce reliance on cash, improve transparency and minimise disputes over fares. Digital platforms for route management could support fairer allocation processes and clearer record-keeping.

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Read more: Cashless card payments for public transport: Lagos commuters don’t trust the technology

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Drivers and commuters would have to take part in creating these solutions.

A delicate balance

The future of South Africa’s minibus taxi industry depends on striking a careful balance. Reform must recognise that the sector’s social capital is both its foundation and its fault line.

Strengthening bridging and linking social capital – across associations and between the industry and the state – can reduce conflict and foster shared accountability.

The challenge is not to dismantle the social fabric of the minibus taxi industry, but to reshape it, so that trust, cooperation and collective action serve all who depend on it.

Although our study focuses on South Africa, its implications extend more broadly. Across the global south, informal transport systems play a central role in urban mobility. They are often more adaptable than formal systems but also more vulnerable to conflict and labour exploitation.

– South Africa’s minibus taxi industry runs on social bonds – reform must accept this
– https://theconversation.com/south-africas-minibus-taxi-industry-runs-on-social-bonds-reform-must-accept-this-276771

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jessika Bohlmann, Research Specialist, Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences, University of Pretoria

South Africa’s green transition is creating jobs. But not for everyone.

The country’s economy has historically been heavily reliant on coal. Around 70% of its energy is generated from coal. This makes it one of the world’s most carbon-intensive economies.

To reduce greenhouse gas emissions and modernise the energy system, the government is advancing a transition towards renewable energy, improved energy efficiency, and the development of low-carbon industries. This shift forms part of South Africa’s commitment to a just energy transition, supported by international partners through the Just Energy Transition Partnership.

The transition is unfolding in a context of persistently high unemployment. The official rate is 30%. Youth unemployment is particularly severe. In response, policymakers and international organisations have promoted green industrial development and investment in renewable energy as potential drivers of job creation and inclusive growth.

But the extent to which these opportunities will be equitably distributed remains an open question.

South Africa’s move towards a greener economy is often presented by policymakers, international development institutions and energy transition strategies as achieving two objectives: lower carbon emissions and more jobs.

But does the data support this claim?

We are economists working on labour markets, structural change and the just energy transition. In a recent research paper we set about answering the question. In the study we combined South Africa’s labour force survey data with occupational information that identifies environmentally related work activities – green occupations. This allowed us to track green employment trends over time and examine which sectors and workers benefit most from the transition.

Our research findings show that green employment is indeed growing. However, the benefits are uneven. Some sectors and groups of workers are gaining ground. Others risk being left behind.

South Africa’s commitment to a just energy transition implies that workers and communities affected by structural change should not bear disproportionate costs.

But justice is not only about protecting workers in declining sectors. It is also about ensuring that new opportunities are broadly accessible.

Where jobs are being created, and where they’re not

What counts as a “green job”?

One of the first challenges is defining what a green job is. According to the International Labour Organisation, green jobs are decent jobs that contribute to preserve or restore the environment. They can be in traditional sectors such as manufacturing and construction. Or they can be in new emerging green sectors such as renewable energy and energy efficiency.

In our research, we developed a method to classify green employment in South Africa. We combined South Africa’s occupational classification system, which groups jobs according to tasks and skills, with international data linking specific work activities to environmental sustainability.

These jobs include work directly connected to renewable energy, energy efficiency, environmental management, waste reduction and sustainable finance.

This approach allowed us to move beyond broad assumptions and measure where green employment is actually happening in the labour market.

Our findings showed that the share of green jobs has increased gradually over time from 12.4% in 2022 to 14.8% in 2024. That suggests the transition to a greener economy is underway. But it’s not happening evenly across the economy.

Green jobs are concentrated in a handful of sectors:

• utilities, particularly electricity and water

• mining, including environmental rehabilitation and renewable energy components

• construction, especially green buildings and energy-efficient infrastructure

• finance. Here jobs are being created through sustainability reporting and environmental, social and governance investment activities.

These patterns reflect where regulation, investment and policy signals have been strongest. Government-led initiatives act as major catalysts. Examples include:

• renewable energy procurement

• environmental compliance requirements – including stricter environmental governance – force firms to invest in greener technologies and compliance measures. This creates a direct demand for environmental, technical, and engineering roles.

• sustainable finance initiatives. These are shaping labour demand.

Other sectors show far less green penetration.

The demographic profile of green employment also reveals important patterns. Green jobs are more likely to be:

• held by younger workers

• located in the formal sector; informal workers are underrepresented

• associated with moderate levels of education (including post-secondary or technical qualifications rather than highly specialised professional degrees)

• dominated by men. Gender disparities are noticeable.

This suggests that green growth does not automatically translate into inclusive growth.

Without deliberate policy intervention, existing inequalities may simply be reproduced within new sectors.

What needs to be done

Our findings highlight four policy implications.

Firstly, skills policy is central.

Many green jobs require specific technical or regulatory competencies. These range from renewable energy engineering and environmental auditing to sustainable finance and compliance expertise.

If the education and training system does not respond quickly enough, skill shortages could limit job creation. At the same time, workers without access to training may be excluded.

Active labour market policies, vocational training reforms and targeted upskilling programmes are therefore critical.

Secondly, the transition needs sectoral depth.

Green employment is concentrated in a few industries. Expanding the transition into manufacturing, services and small-scale enterprises could broaden employment effects.

This requires coordinated industrial, energy and trade policy. Localisation strategies in renewable energy value chains, for example, could deepen job creation beyond installation and maintenance.

Thirdly, informal workers must not be ignored. South Africa’s informal economy employs millions of people. Yet green employment, as currently structured, is largely formal.

Waste pickers, small-scale recyclers and informal repair services already contribute to environmental sustainability. Integrating and supporting these workers through policy and municipal systems could strengthen both environmental and social outcomes.

Fourthly, measurement matters.

Green transitions are often discussed in aspirational terms. But policy making requires evidence.

Developing robust methods to identify and track green employment allows government and stakeholders to monitor progress, assess distributional impacts and adjust policy accordingly. Without data, the idea of a just transition remains rhetorical.

A green economy can support employment – with the right choices.

South Africa’s statistical system could also improve measurement of green employment. Statistics South Africa could incorporate questions in the labour force survey that capture environmentally related work tasks, skills and training. It could also develop a national classification of green occupations and industries aligned with international standards. Better data would allow policymakers to monitor the employment effects of the transition more accurately.

Our findings do not undermine the case for green growth. On the contrary, they show that the transition is already reshaping South Africa’s labour market. But the process is uneven and path-dependent. It reflects where incentives exist, where investment flows and where regulatory frameworks create demand.

If policymakers want the green transition to reduce unemployment and inequality, design matters. A greener economy will not automatically be a fairer one. Ensuring that it is requires deliberate, coordinated action.

Darlington Mushongera, manager for research and development at the South African Qualifications Authority, contributed to this article.

– South Africa’s move to greener energy is creating new jobs, but benefits aren’t evenly spread
– https://theconversation.com/south-africas-move-to-greener-energy-is-creating-new-jobs-but-benefits-arent-evenly-spread-276495

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Kristof Titeca, Professor in International Development, University of Antwerp

Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), remains at large two decades after the International Criminal Court issued its first arrest warrants against him and four of his commanders.

The LRA emerged nearly 40 years ago. Between 1987 and 2006, northern Uganda’s civilians were caught between LRA brutality – massacres and mass abductions – and a government counterinsurgency. This forced nearly two million people into camps for internally displaced people.

The LRA framed its struggle as resistance to President Yoweri Museveni and the sidelining of the Acholi, the dominant ethnic group in northern Uganda. However, over time violence ceased to be merely a strategy. It became the organising logic of the movement itself.

The YouTube video Kony 2012, produced by the American advocacy organisation Invisible Children, went viral in 2012. It turned a long war into a global cause célèbre. In 2013, Washington followed with a US$5 million bounty, which remains in place.

The International Criminal Court arrest warrants were for war crimes and crimes against humanity between 1 July 2002 (when the court’s jurisdiction took effect) and July 2005 (when the arrest warrants were issued).

Today, the LRA is no more than a small, mobile group (possibly 12 to 20 fighters) living off trade, agriculture and protection in one of Africa’s least governed border zones. It operates within the remote borderlands of the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

The LRA may now be small, but its survival matters.

Kony’s continued evasion of arrest – despite two decades of warrants, bounties and military operations – exposes the limits of both regional security cooperation and international justice. Recent intelligence and defector accounts suggest he is still alive, operating in the Sudan-CAR borderlands.

As long as he remains at large, the International Criminal Court’s first arrest warrants risk becoming a symbol – not of global justice, but of its limits.

I have been researching the LRA for more than 20 years and in a recently published article, I answer the question: how has the group survived, even in extreme decline?

Drawing on interviews with former combatants, local actors and policymakers, my analysis looks as the LRA’s evolving strategies of endurance since 2011.

Two things have been crucial: borderlands and the lack of political priority.

Borderlands – particularly between Sudan and the CAR, and to a lesser extent with the DRC – have offered Kony and his LRA members a way to disappear, to trade and to buy protection.

At the same time, the shifting political priorities of the states tracking Kony have repeatedly undermined their own goals.

Why borderlands matter

Given their weak state presence, borderlands are often described as peripheral, marginal or forgotten. But in much of Africa, they are not empty spaces. They are active political and economic zones, shaped by cross-border networks of trade, migration, armed mobilisation and patronage.

For rebel groups, borderlands offer a particular set of advantages: access to sanctuaries across borders; rough terrain and low population density; cross-border trade routes; and opportunities to link into alternative centres of power.

This is precisely the kind of environment in which the LRA has been operating.

For roughly two decades, between 1987 and 2006, the LRA was primarily fighting a Ugandan war. The conflict produced vast civilian suffering, including the displacement of nearly two million people into camps – what has been described as “social torture”.

From 1994 onwards, southern Sudan became crucial to the war, as Khartoum offered the LRA sanctuary and weapons. Further, before peace talks began in 2006 between Uganda and an LRA delegation, the rebel group crossed into the DRC and established itself in the dense and (at the time) mostly ungoverned Garamba National Park.

Following the collapse of negotiations, Uganda launched Operation Lightning Thunder in late 2008. The operation failed, and the LRA retaliated with massacres in north-eastern DRC in 2008-10.

These attacks were the LRA’s last moment of large-scale violence. Military pressure did not destroy the group, but fragmented it and pushed it out of the DRC.

Anticipating further offensives, the LRA began moving into the remote borderlands between the CAR, Sudan and South Sudan.

By 2010, it was operating around the contested Kafia Kingi enclave – a strip of territory that is, in principle, part of South Sudan but has long been controlled by Sudan.

From this point onward, Kony’s strategy shifted: the group reduced attacks, limited abductions and tried to become less visible.

It was no longer trying to win a war, but trying to avoid being found.

The borderland economy

As looting declined, the LRA needed income streams that attracted little attention. Trade and agriculture became central. In the Sudan-CAR borderlands, established routes for licit goods like bamboo intersect with trade in cannabis, gold, ivory and diamonds.

The LRA did not only participate in this economy, but also taxed it. It set up checkpoints along trading routes. It also cultivated a variety of crops on a large scale and was active in the trade of honey.

All of this allowed the group to survive quietly from around 2010 onwards, and become part of the border landscape. Its relationships included nomadic cattle herders, armed groups in the CAR and elements of the Sudanese military.

Kony also bought protection with the proceeds of illicit trade. Armed groups provided warnings about military threats and information about who was moving where. When necessary, Kony could move across borders quickly.

But borderlands are not only spaces of opportunity: they are also volatile.

Under military pressure, Kony divided his troops into smaller units to avoid detection. That made control harder. His violent internal rule – including the killing of commanders – pushed more people towards defection, leading to two splinter groups in 2014 and 2018.

They still operated under the LRA banner (in the CAR-DRC borderlands), but were no longer under Kony’s command. In 2023, through the work of the Dutch NGO PAX and Congolese NGO APRU, and amid growing insecurity, these groups demobilised in the largest LRA defection ever.

The outbreak of war in Sudan in 2023 disrupted the borderland economy. Trade slowed dramatically, increasing hardship and fuelling more defections.

The politics of the chase

The LRA has not been a security priority for Uganda, the CAR, the DRC, Sudan or South Sudan for decades.

The group operates far from capitals, poses little direct threat to state power and is expensive to pursue.

It has largely disappeared from the American political horizon. Advocacy networks that once kept the issue alive have faded.

Even when Kony’s location has been known by various intelligence services and analysts, it has not reliably triggered action. As my recent article shows, this was the case as recently as 2022-2023. In April 2024, reports surfaced that the Wagner group had attacked Kony’s trading camp in eastern CAR – but failed to capture him.

The end game that never arrives

The LRA’s survival reflects the sanctuary offered by borderlands, and uneven and inconsistent political will, shaped by shifting interests that often have little to do with justice for victims.

The ICC hearings in November 2025 that confirmed war crimes charges against Kony underline this paradox. While the court has built a legal case against him, the conditions that have kept him alive remain largely intact.

– Joseph Kony: how a Ugandan war criminal and his soldiers have evaded capture and endured for decades
– https://theconversation.com/joseph-kony-how-a-ugandan-war-criminal-and-his-soldiers-have-evaded-capture-and-endured-for-decades-276680

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tim Vogel, Researcher, German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa) was introduced in 2000 as the cornerstone of US development-oriented trade policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. It was designed to grant eligible countries duty-free access to the US market.

In February 2026, President Donald Trump signed a one-year extension after the programme lapsed in September 2025.

Yet the programme’s core benefit has already been effectively eliminated.

Since April 2025, the US has imposed additional bilateral “reciprocal” tariffs ranging lately from 10% to 30% on countries eligible for the Agoa terms. Critically, Agoa only waives the standard tariff rate the US applies to all World Trade Organisation members (called the Most Favoured Nation tariff). This averaged just 3.3% in 2017.

The US Supreme Court struck down the much larger reciprocal surcharges on 20 February 2026. But the White House responded immediately, imposing a 15% surcharge on most imports, effective 24 February 2026 for 150 days.

Agoa technically lives on after a one-year extension. But its main advantage has largely disappeared since the US added tariffs on top of it.

As economists and trade modellers at the German Institute of Development and Sustainablity, we are interested in quantifying the effects of the changing US tariff regime. We ran a model that captures economy-wide adjustments across sectors and countries after a tariff shock via prices, production, consumption and trade diversion.

Our simulations show that new Trump-era tariffs drive large declines in US-bound exports from Africa. The steepest damage is in a few Agoa-dependent countries and sectors such as apparel. Our results remain valid after the latest shift to the 15% tariff surcharge.

African exporters face substantial duties. Agoa offers only a modest advantage over other developing countries still subject to Most Favoured Nation status tariffs.

Thus, the promise of duty-free access has been hollowed out.

When preferences vanish but ‘America First’ stays

Our simulations of the “Liberation Day” tariff package – the April 2025 “America First” tariffs applied on top of Agoa expiry – show that Agoa-eligible countries do lose out, but the aggregate effect on all countries at large is relatively small.

Agoa countries’ exports to the US fall sharply by 34.7%. But in context of their global exports the decline equates only to 1.1%. Real GDP of Agoa-eligible countries remains largely unchanged.

Behind this average, however, some countries and sectors are hit hard. Lesotho’s total exports could drop by about 5.9%, Madagascar’s by 3.3%, and those of both Chad and Botswana by 1.9%.

Wearing apparel is the most affected sector: bilateral Agoa exports to the US fall by nearly half. For Madagascar and Mauritius they are almost wiped out, with losses of roughly US$128.5 million and US$147 million respectively.

According to our latest simulation updates accounting for the lower November 2025 tariff rates, negotiating tariff cuts with Washington or accepting US concessions seem to change little. Agoa-eligible countries still face a 9.2 percentage point rise in their trade-weighted average US tariff (vs 14.8 percentage points in April), leading to a fall of Agoa exports to the US by 9.6%.

Total exports in our simulation decline only by 0.7% as trade diversion to other markets offsets over 40% of US losses.

The limits of preferences

Even before the “Liberation Day” tariffs, Agoa’s effectiveness was limited. Our simulations of a simple shift from Agoa preferences to standard Most Favoured Nation tariffs show only modest impacts on beneficiary countries. Bilateral exports to the US fall by 3.7%, but total exports for Agoa-eligible countries decline by just 0.1%.

This underscores how little Agoa mattered for African trade growth on a larger scale.

This limited effectiveness stems from three main factors.

First, for most sub-Saharan Africa economies, the US is no longer the primary export destination. EU and Chinese markets have become more important.

Second, meeting Agoa’s rules of origin – if a product qualifies for the preferences based on location of value creation – is often costly. In contrast, the tariff advantage has been narrow due to already low US Most Favoured Nation rates.

Third, uncertainty over programme renewals and eligibility reviews has long discouraged firms from investing in Agoa compliance.

To make Agoa work for development again would require substantial reforms. These would need to include:

• longer timelines and automatic continuation provisions

• more predictable eligibility through transparent biennial reviews

• updated rules of origin

• broader coverage of increasingly important trade issues, such as digital trade, services, as well as non-tariff related trade barriers.

The bipartisan Agoa Renewal and Improvement Act of 2024 proposed some of these improvements, including a 16-year extension to 2041. But it stalled under the “America First” priorities.

Alternatives

In practice, deep reform looks unlikely amid volatile tariffs and short extensions, leaving Agoa increasingly irrelevant.

African policymakers must look elsewhere for new trade opportunities.

China’s new zero-tariff policy for 53 African countries beginning 1 May 2026 offers some relief from US protectionism.

Covering all tariff lines, it extends previous preferences for the continent’s 33 least developed countries to a much wider group of African partners. Middle-income exporters such as Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and Morocco stand to benefit. These countries previously faced Chinese tariffs of up to 25% on processed goods. They will now gain duty-free access on the same terms as the poorest African economies.

Such policies have boosted export diversification modestly for least developed countries in the past. But the benefits will depend on product fit and value-chain dynamics. Until now African exports to China have largely been dominated by low-value, primary products. African countries would need substantial investments to make use of preferential market access to China.

Beyond Chinese offers, the EU offers a stable partnership with substantial market scale. Its own unilateral tariff preferences through Generalised System of Preferences, Everything But Arms and reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements provide more predictable access than the US tariff rollercoaster.

On top of this, the EU actively tries to pursue strategic alignment around critical raw materials, green energy and sustainable investment. It does this via Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships and Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreements.

Developing countries, however, often criticise the EU sustainability measures or costly compliance to EU standards which worsen their trade opportunities. Hence, the EU has to find a better balance of its sustainable trade and development playbook to build trust with the global south.

What needs to be done

African policymakers should seize this moment to build a foundation for a trade system that doesn’t depend on uncertain preferences and external policy shocks. Accelerating the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) serves as the most credible route to trade resilience, diversification and industrial upgrading.

The free trade area agreement can’t immediately replace US demand (different products, limited value-chain overlap). But it can reduce structural vulnerability to external shocks like US tariff volatility.

– Trump’s tariffs have gutted Agoa’s duty‑free promise: our model shows how
– https://theconversation.com/trumps-tariffs-have-gutted-agoas-duty-free-promise-our-model-shows-how-276641