Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Bizuneh Yimenu, Lecturer in Comparative Politics, Queen’s University Belfast

Ethiopia is preparing for a national election on 1 June amid deep political uncertainty and growing insecurity. Officially, the polls are expected to reinforce the country’s democratic transition and political stability. But the conditions suggest that the elections are unlikely to be genuinely competitive.

Elections are competitive when parties campaign openly, voters participate freely, and political actors engage without fear of violence or intimidation.

There are two main reasons why this will not be the case.

First, opposition actors remain fragmented, weakened or excluded from effective political participation. Second, there are armed conflicts and political tensions in several parts of the country. The most tense regions are Amhara, Oromia and Tigray. This has created an unstable environment for electoral competition.

Together, these conditions may make the upcoming elections among the least politically competitive Ethiopia has held since multiparty elections were introduced in the 1990s.

Ethiopia has held six national elections since adopting the federal constitution in 1995. Most took place under conditions of strong ruling-party dominance. The 2005 election was widely considered the country’s most competitive contest. But violence, mass arrests and a severe crackdown on opposition supporters followed, after disputed results and protests.

Elections in 2010 and 2015 took place in a more restrictive political environment dominated by the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front.

The 2021 election happened under Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party during the Tigray war. It was marred by delays, insecurity and opposition boycotts. No voting took place in several constituencies. Unsurprisingly, the incumbent won in a landslide.

The current electoral environment appears even more challenging.

As a scholar of federalism and Ethiopian politics, I see the present conditions as particularly restrictive to meaningful political competition.

Opposition fragmentation and exclusion

Ethiopia’s opposition parties remain fragmented along ideological, ethnic and regional lines. Many lack strong national organisational structures or the capacity to mobilise voters effectively across the country.

Attempts to build durable opposition coalitions have faltered. This is due to political mistrust, leadership rivalries, and competing visions of the Ethiopian state. Some parties want stronger regional autonomy and ethnic self-determination. Others favour a more centralised national political framework.

These divisions prevent a unified electoral challenge. Even those in the same camp, such as parties advocating for ethnic self rule, are unable to a form united front.

Opposition actors continue to face political and institutional constraints too. Several have previously been arrested or detained. Civic actors have come under pressure.

During the 2021 elections, prominent Oromo opposition leaders were detained. This prompted the Oromo Liberation Front and Oromo Federalist Congress, the two main opposition groups in the region, to boycott the polls.

Ethiopia formally operates a multiparty system. But meaningful political competition depends also on parties’ ability to organise, campaign and compete on relatively equal terms. Genuine opposition actors have struggled to do so effectively.

Political tensions and armed conflict

The second major challenge is the country’s deteriorating security environment. Ethiopia is experiencing armed conflict and political instability in several regions. It is difficult to conduct competitive elections in these conditions.

In the Amhara region, fighting between federal forces and Fano militias has intensified over the past two years. Large areas have experienced insecurity, militarisation and disruptions to normal political activity.

Oromia continues to face violence linked to the conflict between the government and the Oromo Liberation Army. The conflict has contributed to displacement, insecurity and political tensions in Ethiopia’s largest, most populous and vital region.

Tigray also remains politically fragile. This is despite the 2022 Pretoria agreement. The pact formally ended the civil war between federal forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.

Important aspects of the agreement remain unresolved. These include:

• the return of internally displaced people

• the return of pre-war Tigray territories

• security arrangements

• relations between regional and federal authorities.

Recent tensions inside Tigray’s political leadership have raised fears of renewed instability.

Such conditions narrow political space and reduce the possibility of open electoral competition.

Elections without competitiveness?

The incumbent is running uncontested in 64 of Ethiopia’s 547 constituencies. Voting will not take place in Tigray. And voting will not happen in notable constituencies in Oromia and Amhara because of security concerns.

But it’s not enough for voting to take place. Political competitiveness depends on whether opposition parties can take full part, whether citizens can engage freely and whether the broader political environment allows genuine contestation for power.

Current conditions raise serious doubts about those requirements. Even compared with previous elections held under authoritarian conditions, today’s environment may prove more restrictive. Insecurity and conflict now intersect with longstanding political constraints.

This does not necessarily mean the elections will lack administrative significance or political consequences. For example, the Oromo Liberation Front is running for the first time since 1992. This is symbolically meaningful.

But elections alone will not resolve Ethiopia’s deeper political crisis. The country continues to face unresolved disputes over political representation, federalism, security and state authority. Without broader political inclusion and a reduction in armed conflict, the elections are unlikely to provide the level of political competition associated with genuinely open democratic contests.

– Ethiopia’s elections will not be politically competitive: two reasons why
– https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-elections-will-not-be-politically-competitive-two-reasons-why-283896

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Alemayehu Fentaw Weldemariam, Ph.D. Fellow, Center for Constitutional Democracy, Indiana University

Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed has revived debate over whether the country should impose term limits on its head of government. Speaking before the National Dialogue Commission in May 2026 – just weeks before national elections – he said executive power should be “limited by law”. He suggested the issue could form part of wider constitutional reform that many Ethiopians have been calling for since 1995.

At first glance, the proposal seems straightforward. But Ethiopia operates under a parliamentary system, not a presidential one. Alemayehu Fentaw Weldemariam, who has studied Ethiopia’s constitutional design and law, explains why the real issue isn’t term limits, but the failure of the parliamentary mechanisms meant to constrain executive power.

Why don’t parliamentary systems usually impose term limits on prime ministers?

In parliamentary systems, prime ministers derive their authority from parliament. They remain in office for as long as a majority in parliament is willing to support them. There are no fixed term limits.

In presidential systems, leaders get their authority directly from voters and serve fixed terms set by the constitution.

Prime ministers may be removed at any time through a vote of no confidence, internal party revolt or electoral defeat. In contrast with presidential systems, the removal of a prime minister doesn’t always trigger a national election.

When a prime minister loses office, a new leader may be selected within the governing party. The underlying parliament still has democratic legitimacy, so there is no need to return to voters – or to cap tenure.

Margaret Thatcher served for 11 years in the UK. Angela Merkel governed Germany for 16 years. Their longevity was evidence that parliamentary accountability and electoral competition were functioning as intended. They remained in office because they continued to command confidence within competitive parliamentary democracies. Thatcher’s premiership ended when Conservative MPs withdrew support through a leadership challenge. Merkel stepped down after choosing not to seek another term.

By contrast, in presidential systems, the executive and legislature derive their mandates independently. Removing a president interrupts a fixed term chosen directly by voters, and a successor cannot be appointed simply through parliament.

In Ethiopia, executive power is vested in the Council of Ministers, headed by the prime minister. The difficulty is that the formal parliamentary logic has often failed to operate in practice.

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Read more: African countries are adopting two houses of parliament to boost democracy – but that’s not always what happens

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First, the House of People’s Representatives has rarely functioned as an independent body capable of holding the prime minister politically accountable. This has made a no-confidence vote against the prime minister politically unrealistic.

Second, leadership transitions have taken place through ruling-party decisions rather than genuine parliamentary contestation. The replacement of Hailemariam Desalegn by Abiy Ahmed in 2018, for example, occurred through internal party politics. Parliament then formalised it.

How has Ethiopia’s system produced concentrated executive power?

Parliamentary systems don’t operate the same way in every political context. They function differently in:

• a dominant-party state: this is a political system in which several parties may legally exist and elections may be held, but one party monopolises political power over an extended period.

• transitional democracies: these are political systems moving from authoritarian rule toward democratic governance. The transition is often fragile, especially if political instability, economic hardship or legacies of conflict continue to shape public life.

• politically fragmented countries: here, political authority and party competition are divided among rival groups, making stable governance and national consensus difficult.

When ruling parties dominate parliament, opposition parties are weak and lawmakers rely heavily on party leaders. Parliament may stop acting as a real check on executive power. In such situations, a prime minister can begin to resemble an elected monarch. He or she is technically accountable to parliament, but in practice holds highly concentrated power.

This is what makes Ethiopia’s constitutional experience complex.

The constitution adopted in 1994 and entered into force in 1995 follows the formal logic of a parliamentary government. Article 70(4) limits the president – a largely ceremonial head of state – to two six-year terms. Articles 73 and 74 impose no limit on the prime minister.

On paper, this is orthodox parliamentarism.

In practice, Ethiopia has the formal structure of a parliamentary system without the political conditions needed for real parliamentary accountability. These conditions are strong opposition parties, meaningful intra-party competition, independent committees and the real possibility that parliament could withdraw support from the executive.

The result is that political power is concentrated in the executive and the dominant ruling coalition.

What role does Ethiopia’s electoral system play in this?

Electoral systems shape how votes are translated into political power and legislative representation.

Ethiopia uses a first-past-the-post electoral system. This means the candidate with the most votes wins the seat. By contrast, proportional representation systems allocate seats roughly in proportion to each party’s share of the national or regional vote.

First-past-the-post systems mean that modest electoral victories can be transformed into overwhelming legislative dominance.

Article 54 of Ethiopia’s constitution adopts this system. Ethiopia, therefore, combines parliamentary government with an electoral model that magnifies majorities into monopolies.

What does Ethiopia’s political history show?

Ethiopia’s post-1995 political record illustrates this pattern clearly.

Meles Zenawi served three full parliamentary terms as prime minister. He was two years into his fourth term when he died in 2012.

Meles was replaced by Hailemariam Desalegn. His premiership ended in 2018 after three years of mass protests and political upheaval. His resignation was extraordinary in Ethiopia’s political history.

Abiy Ahmed took office in April 2018 to complete Hailemariam’s parliamentary cycle. He dissolved the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front – in power since 1991 – and consolidated authority under his Prosperity Party. Abiy began his first full five-year term after the 2021 elections. His party won 410 out of 436 parliamentary seats, giving him the premiership.

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Read more: What is federalism? Why Ethiopia uses this system of government and why it’s not perfect

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The issue is that a prime minister can be repeatedly reappointed because the electoral and party systems limit meaningful contestation from the outset.

Would term limits solve the problem?

Only partially.

A constitutional term limit could encourage leadership circulation, reduce the personalisation of executive office and create incentives for succession planning.

In fragile democracies, such limits may serve as a safeguard against indefinite incumbency.

But term limits alone would not resolve Ethiopia’s deeper constitutional problem. A dominant party can rotate prime ministers while preserving the same electoral advantages, patronage systems and concentration of power.

The deeper reform question is whether Ethiopia can achieve:

• stronger opposition rights

• more independent parliamentary committees

• greater transparency in legislative voting

• more credible intra-party competition.

Formally, Ethiopia isn’t a one-party state. As of 2026, the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia has accredited 24 national political parties and 45 regional parties. A total of 48 parties are confirmed to participate in the seventh general election scheduled for 1 June 2026.

The absence of prime ministerial term limits in Ethiopia is not the problem. A lack of parliamentary competition and independence is.

– Should Ethiopia limit how long its prime minister can serve? Why this won’t fix a deeper democracy problem
– https://theconversation.com/should-ethiopia-limit-how-long-its-prime-minister-can-serve-why-this-wont-fix-a-deeper-democracy-problem-283405

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Redie Bereketeab, Associate Professor of Sociology and Senior Researcher, The Nordic Africa Institute

Ethiopia’s general election on 1 June 2026 will take place amid armed conflicts and political fragmentation. This has raised questions over voter participation and legitimacy and the future of the country’s multi-ethnic federal system. Ethiopia is Africa’s second most populous country and a key regional actor in the Horn of Africa. Redie Bereketeab, who researches state- and nation-building, identity and nationalism in the Horn of Africa, unpacks the 2026 election.

Who is on the ballot, and what is at stake?

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party remains by far the strongest political force nationally. The party controls most federal and regional state institutions. The incumbent faces more than 45 opposition parties that are contesting the election. These include the Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice, the National Movement of Amhara, Enat Party, the Freedom and Equality Party and the Oromo Federalist Congress.

But the result will not necessarily indicate broad political inclusion. This partly stems from widespread restrictions on opposition parties, such as arbitrary arrests and preventing meetings. This has been documented by rights groups, including the US-based Freedom House.

Most of the parties face organisational, financial and security constraints too. Others have limited regional reach.

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Read more: Ethiopia’s national dialogue was meant to heal the nation, but divisions are deepening

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Some of the country’s most influential political actors are either weakened, fragmented or excluded altogether. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, long the dominant political force in Tigray and previously central to Ethiopian politics for nearly three decades, has been banned from the election by the National Election Board. As it now controls the region, an election there is highly unlikely.

So, there is little uncertainty over who will govern after the votes have been counted. Instead, the key election issue is whether the process itself will be regarded as sufficiently inclusive and legitimate across Ethiopia’s highly diverse regions and political constituencies.

How significant is the shadow of conflict on the election?

The elections will take place against the backdrop of multiple overlapping conflicts. These have displaced millions and weakened state authority in several parts of the country. Insecurity is expected to limit voting in large areas. Among constituencies reportedly considered too unstable for normal polling operations are Humera, Raya Alamata and Tselemti in northern Ethiopia.

The central question will be how much of the population can realistically participate.

In the north-western Amhara region, fighting between federal forces and Fano militias has continued since 2023. Armed conflict persists in parts of Oromia to the south, involving the Oromo Liberation Army. In both regions, insecurity, displacement and communications restrictions have complicated political organising and voter mobilisation. Elections are therefore unlikely to be organised across large areas.

In the northern region of Tigray, large-scale fighting formally ended in 2022. Nevertheless, unresolved disputes over territory, political representation and the return of displaced populations continue to fuel tensions. The fragile post-war environment is further complicated by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front being barred from contesting the election. The party’s legal status was cancelled by the National Election Board of Ethiopia in May 2025 for failure to hold a national assembly within the legally mandated period.

In addition, tensions within the movement have produced rival factions. In early May, Tigray People’s Liberation Front chairman Debretsion Gebremichael assumed full control of the region, pushing out Addis Ababa-backed Tadesse Werede. These developments raised tensions with the federal government.

The government needs to hold elections to demonstrate its legitimacy. But with Tigray not participating, as well as major parts of Amhara and Oromia, that legitimacy will be in doubt.

What are the other factors shaping the election?

The economy is one main factor.

Ethiopia has high rural poverty, a mounting public debt burden and the economic, social and humanitarian consequences of years of conflict and displacement.

The last general election was held in 2021. This was before the economic impact of the Tigray war hit the country. Since then, the currency has been devalued, contributing to rising inflation and living costs. Higher prices of imported goods and fuel placed additional pressure on households already affected by conflict and economic hardship.

Deteriorating economic conditions could fuel further internal unrest and strengthen the position of armed movements in parts of the country.

Regional tensions could also influence the political atmosphere and security environment surrounding the election. Relations with Eritrea have deteriorated sharply in recent months amid disputes over Red Sea access and growing fears of renewed confrontation between Addis Ababa and Asmara.

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Read more: Ethiopia’s 2026 elections: without reforms, the vote may not be free or fair

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Ethiopia’s involvement in the wider Sudan conflict is another source of tension. An escalation with Eritrea or further spillover from Sudan could intensify nationalist rhetoric and divert political attention away from domestic reform. It could further complicate already fragile security conditions during the electoral period.

Civic and political space has also narrowed in recent years. Journalists, activists and opposition figures have faced arrests, harassment, travel restrictions and pressure from security forces, particularly under emergency measures introduced during the conflicts in Amhara and Oromia.

Several opposition parties have accused the government of using state institutions and security structures to tilt the political playing field in favour of the ruling party. This further undermines faith in the electoral system.

How does the election shape Ethiopia’s federal project?

Ethiopia’s multi-ethnic federal system was introduced in 1991. It was designed to accommodate diversity and grant significant autonomy to regional states. But in practice it has also sharpened struggles over territory, autonomy and access to political power.

Today those unresolved tensions are visible in the insurgency in Amhara, the conflict in Oromia and the fragile post-war order in Tigray. If voting cannot take place across those three major regions and ethnic groups, then the elections lose legitimacy.

Rather than resolving competing claims, the federal system has in many cases institutionalised them by linking territory, political representation and state power to ethnic identity. For some the system has failed as power was never fully devolved to the states. For others it could never succeed as it fuels ethno-nationalism at the expense of national identity.

The result is that identity has been turned into a central axis of political competition.

What conclusions do you draw?

Without broader political dialogue and efforts to address the underlying conflicts, the election risks reinforcing divisions.

A better approach would be to resolve the conflicts and then convene an election where the entire population can participate.

There is scope for the European Union and the US to play a constructive role. They have the capacity to exert pressure on the Ethiopian government given their strong economic, military and diplomatic ties, and their weight in international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

There may be little appetite in Brussels or Washington for such moves.

– Ethiopia votes: dominant ruling party seeks a new mandate in a deeply fragmented nation
– https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-votes-dominant-ruling-party-seeks-a-new-mandate-in-a-deeply-fragmented-nation-283783

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Mattia Bessone, Post Doc, Department for the Ecology of Animal Societies, Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior

Millions of people in central Africa rely on wild meat for their nutrition, especially in rural areas around the Congo rainforest, the second largest tropical rainforest in the world. Here, meat from domestic animals is scarce due to poor national transport infrastructure, livestock diseases and lack of forage. As a result, wild meat and freshwater fish are the main animal foods and provide the proteins and micro-nutrients needed for a healthy diet.

At the same time the growing demand for wild meat coming from a growing urban population provides an economic opportunity for rural hunters. In the past 20 years, the proportion of wild meat sold on average by subsistence hunters in sub-Saharan Africa increased from 34% to 72% of their catches. In essence, hunters used to sell about a third of their catches, but today they sell almost three quarters of their catches.

As a conservation biologist, I am interested in understanding the factors influencing the viability of wildlife populations, finding a balance between wildlife conservation and people’s livelihood. In a recent paper, I examined the extent of wild meat consumption in central Africa together with 45 colleagues from 33 institutions from 12 countries. Using data from over 12,000 households from 252 locations, we found that for rural people, wild meat accounts for 20% of the recommended daily protein intake. This compared with 13% and 6% for those living in towns and cities, though our modelling suggests this is growing.

One major cause of concern about these consumption patterns is the threat of animal transmitted epidemics, as the recent Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda has underscored. The Bundibugyo virus, which is the cause of the disease, can be contracted through the handling and consumption of infected wild animals.

These outbreaks invariably lead to calls to stop the trade and consumption of wild animals. But our study suggests that heeding those calls could result in a humanitarian catastrophe in most of rural central Africa. As our study shows, wild meat remains an important component of people’s diets there.

Instead of banning the consumption of wildlife, we propose the legal and sustainable use of non-protected wild animals in rural areas. Clear national laws co-designed with people who hunt and eat wild meat could enable the sustainable management of these remaining species. It would improve the sustainability of the wild meat sector in rural settings while providing a regulatory framework for early warning of wildlife transmitted diseases.

A search for wild meat

Our research was based on data collected over the past 15 years and stored in WILDMEAT, an open-access evidence base for wild meat researchers and practitioners. It was launched to collate and standardise data from all available site-specific studies.

My colleagues used this data to publish the first regional assessment of hunting trends in sub-Saharan Africa. Using 83 studies carried out around African tropical forests, they confirmed that hunting had increased in the region since 1991. They found this could be linked to an increase in the use of guns and to the proportion of the harvested meat being sold, rather than consumed locally.

What was missing was an overview of where the sold meat was consumed.

We thus set out to compile the largest database of wild meat consumption ever assembled for central Africa. We made use of WILDMEAT and its large web of collaborators to gather data from 30 studies covering 252 locations in six central African countries. Overall, the database represented 12,453 individual households and 163,896 “recall events”, defined as occasions when the households reported the food they consumed in a given period between one and 365 days.

What we found

Our analysis showed that the highest consumption rates were in rural communities living in villages. These were followed by towns located in semi-rural areas not far from forest patches.

In contrast, we found lower rates of consumption in cities, and the lowest in major urban centres, particularly the countries’ capital cities.

We also obtained predictions of wild meat consumption across the region based on detailed information about forest intactness, remoteness, human population density and human development. This allowed us to identify hotspots of wild meat consumption across the entire region. By calculating what the estimated rates meant in nutritional terms we found that, on average, wild meat (the amount that a person here typically eats) contributes around 18% of the daily protein intake recommended by the World Health Organization. This percentage increased to about 20% in rural areas and it was close to 100% in remote regions of the Republic of Congo and Central African Republic.

These results underscored the major nutritional importance of wild meat for millions of Africans, many living in some of the most food-insecure regions of the continent.

Expanding demand

Another key issue shown by our analysis is the growing demand for wild meat coming from expanding provincial urban areas. In most of central Africa, these provincial cities and towns are not easy to access, so it’s difficult to get other protein sources such as chicken and fish there.

Because wild areas are nearby, though, wild meat is generally available at low prices. And law enforcement may be weaker than in larger cities. Our study identified these provincial towns as potential hotspots of wild meat consumption.

We also found that people living in major cities in central Africa still consume wild meat. This is for two main reasons.

First, it is perceived as healthier than imported domesticated frozen meats, characterised by the extensive use of antibiotics and unreliable maintenance of the cold chain during transport.

Second, consuming wild meat is seen as a way to maintain cultural traditions and sometimes acts as a status symbol. In a time of growing urbanisation we expect the demand for wild meat from urban areas to further increase, with potentially catastrophic consequences for the wildlife in the surrounding areas.

Solutions

We conclude from our findings that the role of wild meat in the current urban food systems should be reduced. But this is not an easy task under current socio-economic circumstances. We make the following recommendations.

• Increase the regional production, importation and distribution of healthy, safe and culturally appropriate alternatives (like poultry and fish).

• In peri-urban areas, encourage sustainable alternatives to wild meat avoiding environmental degradation.

• In cities, develop tailored campaigns to reduce demand, for example via social networks and other mainstream media, like Yoka Pimbo, a behavioural change campaign launched in Kinshasa, DRC, in 2022.

• Target areas currently lacking consumption data. Focusing on these areas would allow our model to be validated, improving our understanding of wild meat consumption to assess where interventions may be most needed.

Lastly, our study calls on central African governments, international and national institutions and non-governmental organisations to operate towards the sustainable management of wildlife hunting and trade for the conservation of natural heritage and for the livelihoods of rural communities.

– Central Africa’s wild meat dilemma: why outright bans threaten food security for millions
– https://theconversation.com/central-africas-wild-meat-dilemma-why-outright-bans-threaten-food-security-for-millions-283389

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Mélissa Morel, Chercheure en métallurgie et en archéologie, University of Cambridge

How was iron produced 2,000 years ago in Senegal? A recent study at the Didé West 1 archaeological site, in the Falémé Valley in eastern Senegal, sheds light on an ancient iron production technique.

Passed down from generation to generation for nearly eight centuries, this technology appears to have been developed to meet local needs. African archaeology specialists Anne Mayor, Mélissa Morel and Ladji Dianifaba explain the significance of this discovery and what it reveals about the transmission of technical knowledge over the long term.

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What did you find?

For over 2,000 years, metalworkers produced iron in what is now Senegal. By studying the remains they left behind, we have been able to reconstruct their technical choices, the natural resources they used, and, to some extent, aspects of their way of life. Beyond their scientific value, these studies also highlight the expertise of ancient blacksmiths, since iron production represented a major technical and social transformation, particularly for agriculture.

In eastern Senegal, in the Falémé Valley, within the Boundou Community Nature Reserve, many ancient iron production sites have been identified in recent years. Archaeological surveys and excavations carried out by an international research team involving scholars from the universities of Geneva and Fribourg in Switzerland, as well as the Institut Fondamental d’Afrique Noire at Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar, revealed at least five distinct technical iron traditions.

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Read more: Why did Tutankhamun have a dagger made from a meteorite?

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The new study focused on one of these iron production techniques (named FAL02) identified in the region, which is represented at around 100 sites.

The site of Didé West 1 (DDW1), the largest and best-preserved of these sites, stands out for two major reasons. First, it provides one of the earliest known dates for iron-smelting furnaces in Senegal. Second, it documents a long sequence of metallurgical activity spanning nearly 800 years, from 400 BCE to 400 CE. These radiocarbon dates were obtained from charcoal directly associated with the furnaces.

The exceptional preservation of this site allowed us to document this technique in detail, trace its transformations over time, and better understand the choices made by the metallurgists.

How were you able to prove it?

The main evidence of ancient iron metallurgy comes from slag, which is the waste produced when ore is transformed into metal. During the smelting process, this slag flows like molten lava within the furnace before solidifying into rocky masses. Once the operation was completed, the slag was discarded and gradually piled up into large heaps.

Our study of the Didé West 1 slag heap revealed 35 furnace bases, attesting to repeated activity over several dozen generations. Certain technical features define this tradition, including multi-perforated tuyères (clay pipes pierced with holes to allow air to circulate within the furnace), as well as the use of African palm nuts as packing material at the bottom of the furnace. This system appears to have facilitated the separation of metal from slag.

By combining these observations, we were able to reconstruct how this technique worked. The metalworkers used small circular furnaces equipped with a removable chimneys rather than permanent shafts. The iron ore likely consisted of laterites (a type of soil) collected from the immediate surroundings. Taken together, these elements reflect a high level of technical expertise.

Who were the people behind this technology?

Research on African societies during the first millennium BCE and the first millennium CE comes with several challenges. Written sources are scarce, and organic materials that could provide information about housing or diet are poorly preserved. Even iron artefacts are usually too degraded to survive.

On many sites, only pottery fragments remain. It is therefore still difficult to identify precisely the populations behind the FAL02 technique. This specific technical tradition was recognised through the shapes of the furnaces, tuyères, and slag found at the sites. Iron production techniques are not merely technical processes. They reflect traditions, choices and know-how specific to each cultural group.

Analysis of the slag volumes also helps estimate how much iron was produced. At Didé West 1, the data point to modest and irregular production, likely seasonal. These elements suggest that the activity was intended to meet local needs, rather than large-scale production for export.

Why this matters

The origins of iron metallurgy in west Africa are still debated. Two major hypotheses continue to be discussed. One argues that ironworking spread from the Hittite world in Anatolia (in present-day Turkey) via the Maghreb or the Nile Valley. The other suggests an independent invention in sub-Saharan Africa. To date, the available evidence does not allow a definitive conclusion.

However, several ancient iron production sites dating from the first millennium BCE have been identified in sub-Saharan Africa, including in Nigeria, Niger, Togo, and Burkina Faso, and now in Senegal. These discoveries tend to strenghten the case of local development.

Within this context, the dates obtained at Didé West 1, reaching at least the 4th century BCE, make it one of the earliest known ironworking techniques in Senegal. The site therefore contributes important new data to a still limited body of evidence and helps document the early development of metallurgy in the region.

What happens next?

This study marks an important milestone, but several questions remain unanswered. The next challenge is to better understand the other iron production techniques identified in the Falémé Valley. At least four other traditions have been recognised.

Some of these techniques were in use at the same time, revealing a complex metallurgical landscape where very different traditions coexisted. This diversity raises several questions: which groups of metallurgists were behind them? How can we explain their transformations? Why do certain techniques disappear? Were some techniques more efficient than others?

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Read more: Traditional wrestling in Senegal – much more than a sport, it keeps culture alive

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The study of the FAL02 technique over nearly 800 years demonstrates that these practices evolved, with phases of continuity and transformation. By cross-referencing this data with findings from the study of ceramics and settlements, it becomes possible to better understand the societies that produced this iron and how they changed over time.

These remains allow us to move beyond the purely technical question: they offer insight into settlement dynamics, the circulation of knowledge and expertise, and long-term societal transformations, even before the emergence of medieval kingdoms and the expansion of trans-Saharan trade.

We hope that future research will help to answer some of these questions.

– In Senegal, a 2,000-year-old iron workshop sheds new light on the past
– https://theconversation.com/in-senegal-a-2-000-year-old-iron-workshop-sheds-new-light-on-the-past-283236

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Toumani Traoré, Doctorant en Science Politique, Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar

Power struggles often play out in Senegal’s political arena, both within a party and between rival parties. To summarise British foreign minister Lord Palmerston’s argument in 1848:

In politics, there are no permanent enemies, no permanent friends, only permanent interests.

The situation at the top of Senegal’s executive branch is no exception.

The Sonko-Diomaye duo, formed by president Bassirou Diomaye Faye and his prime minister Ousmane Sonko, used to speak with one voice. Today, the alliance that oversaw the fall of former president Macky Sall is plagued by deep internal divisions. These disagreements culminated on 22 May 2026 with the president’s announcement that he’d dismissed the prime minister and dissolved the government.

A political rally held by Sonko in November 2025 already showed signs of a fracture. In an interview six months later Faye removed all doubt. The president confirmed there were disagreements with his prime minister. He denounced the “excessive personalisation” of power around Sonko.

I am a political scientist whose doctoral research focuses on the recent transformations of Senegal’s political system. It examines the rise of the ruling party, Pastef, and the sociopolitical realignments observed between 2021 and 2024, in a period of political instability. I analyse how this anti-establishment party succeeded in upending the traditional sociopolitical order.

In my view, their split is a worrying sign of potential political turmoil ahead for the country, which is also battling an economic crisis.

The myth of unity

This unprecedented duo was forged when opposition leader Sonko’s candidacy to run for president against Sall was invalidated in January 2024. Sonko, the founder of Pastef, backed the party’s less well-known secretary-general, Faye, in securing the elections. In turn Faye backed Sonko to become prime minister.

Initially their relationship was built on political alignment. One handled the management of the state apparatus, the other ensured strong political legitimacy during the first months of their rule.

However, Pastef’s 2025 rally revealed the limits of the two-headed illusion championed by Sonko. As he predicted at the time, the event marked the beginning of a “post-November 8 era”, a turning point for the future of the partnership.

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Read more: Bassirou Diomaye Faye: from prison runner-up to president of Senegal

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But the relationship between the two men soon led to deadlock. First, they disagreed over who should head the ruling coalition. Then came clashes over differing visions of power. Finally, disputes emerged over political alliances.

The once unifying Wolof slogan “Sonko mooy Diomaye” (Sonko is Diomaye) was Pastef’s survival strategy under Sall. That slogan has faded and is giving way to the likes of “Sonko is Sonko” and “Ousmane is Sonko”. The work of Senegalese journalist Sidy Diop supports this view. Diop shows that:

The proclaimed unity is over. It is giving way to a duality that is now visible, almost accepted, where roles are being redefined and ambitions are becoming clearer.

However, from the perspective of the theory of domination and symbolic reproduction, Sonko built what could be called a “proxy capital” (borrowed influence). Their symbolic fusion created a unique shared identity – “partisan habitus” – in which Pastef supporters no longer perceived two distinct figures, but a single political force.

Rivalry between the two leaders was inevitable, despite the “complementarity” that initially defined their entry into executive power. Senegal’s political system demands a clear hierarchy. The president’s authority is not shared.

The powers of the president of the republic and the prime minister are defined by Senegal’s constitution, in articles 42 through 52. This already created a kind of “soft rivalry”.

Faye tends to adopt a restrained posture, acting as a guarantor of proper functioning of institutions. Sonko, on the other hand, maintains a style of mobilisation and disruption. As French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu argues, institutional structures dictate individual actions, language, and posture. Not the other way round.

The office of the presidency imposes a “sovereign habitus” that naturally differs from the habitus or mindset of the prime minister and party leader. In line with the principle of separation between the functions of head of state and party politics, Faye resigned from all leadership positions in Pastef, including secretary-general. By law, however, Sonko was allowed to retain his leadership positions in the party. This further fuelled their stand-off.

The boundary between the two men is mostly invisible but very real. It lies in the transition from the street-level slogan “Diomaye is Sonko” to institutional communication where the image of the president comes first, as protocol demands.

Sonko brought Faye to power. But Faye now holds discretionary authority, including the power to appoint officials. This has created a political polarisation between factions of the party that support Faye or Sonko.

The limits of dual leadership

In physics, when two bodies of unequal weight occupy the same space, the heavier one compresses the lighter. Power is not static, just as human nature is not.

Through upward influence, Sonko draws his strength from his charisma, and strong grip on the party. He has given Faye popular legitimacy. In return, the president’s executive orders and state decisions have translated the party’s “vision” into Senegalese law.

It soon became a tricky situation: if Sonko took up too much space, his influence would spill over into Faye’s institutional territory. The president may appear to be under his tutelage. If Faye isolated himself too much, he would lose his source of legitimacy, which is Sonko. They became locked in a system of mutual dependence and self-destruction as power shifted between the president’s office and the prime minister’s.

By mimicking each other’s desires, they become mirror image antagonists. The more they resembled each other, the deeper their divergence grew. Each saw in the other a mirror of his own ambition. Ultimately both actors want the same things: power, the presidency, leadership. After being sacked by Diomaye, Sonko quickly became speaker of parliament, rejoining the opposition battle.

The myth of a gentleman’s agreement

What has unfolded at the top of Senegal’s leadership is a stark reminder that in politics, a “gentlemen’s agreement” is a myth that best serves idealists. It is the return of the “number two” syndrome. The presumptive heir apparent, initially loyal and competent, climbs the ranks and turns against his leader when the latter takes all the limelight.

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Read more: Senegal’s crisis: why debt restructuring may be the least bad option

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The dominant player, meanwhile, in his quest to secure future elections, turns a loyal ally into an enemy. This creates a further cycle of mutual paranoia that looks set to signal a renewed period of social and political turmoil.

– Senegal’s ruling alliance has split: will political turmoil follow?
– https://theconversation.com/senegals-ruling-alliance-has-split-will-political-turmoil-follow-283710

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Moeniera Moosa, Teacher Education, University of the Witwatersrand

Bullying is a widespread global problem, with extensive research across countries showing that no school is immune. In South Africa, the scale is particularly concerning, with studies indicating that between a fifth and over half of learners have experienced or witnessed school violence.

This means many pre-service teachers will enter training having experienced bullying at school themselves.

Studies elsewhere have shown that experiences of bullying can foster empathy and intervention, but may also result in avoidance, helplessness or even aggression. That’s why it’s important to understand teachers’ beliefs and coping styles in addressing bullying.

One theory about learning, Social Learning Theory, posits that behaviour is learned through observation and imitation. This would suggest that bullying and aggression are shaped by experiences at home, school and society.

Pre-service teachers therefore start their training with pre-formed beliefs about how bullying is managed, based on what they have witnessed. However, behaviour is not determined by observation alone. The Theory of Planned Behaviour argues that individuals act when they feel motivated and confident. This implies that a person can do something to reduce bullying if they are supported by others.

Researchers have noted that bullying involves three key actors, namely the perpetrator, victim and bystander. It’s been suggested that teachers can be “key agents of change”. But studies have found that although teachers recognise the need to act, they frequently underestimate the prevalence of the problem. And learners may avoid reporting incidents because they think that no action will be taken.

As a teacher educator I’m interested in what they bring from their past to their profession, and how to prepare them for their role. A few years ago I carried out a study which investigated how the past experiences of first year pre-service teachers in a South African School of Education shaped their perceptions about bullying and their responses to it, and how these experiences might influence their roles as future teachers.

More than half the teachers in the study had witnessed bullying at school at some point, but had done nothing about it. I found that they seemed ill prepared to deal with bullying. I am not aware of this being a routine part of teacher training in South Africa. Their training ought to prepare them better so as to break the cycle of learning to be bystanders (or worse).

The pre-service teachers in the study have not been followed up in subsequent years.

Experiences of bullying at school

My study used a mixed-methods, longitudinal design to examine pre-service teachers’ experiences and understandings of bullying. Data from 305 multiple-choice questionnaires established the frequency of their exposure to bullying at school when they were learners themselves. A group of 56 respondents completed open-ended questionnaires about how they thought their experiences might affect them as teachers.

The results revealed that most had experienced bullying as bystanders (66%). They said they had been “afraid of being bullied”, choosing to “just sit and watch”. Some (18%) identified as victims and noted that they had been “bullied most of the time” and “constantly physically attacked by fellow learners”. Twelve percent (12%) of participants said they had assumed a combination of roles (bystander, victim, bully).

One participant stated that he “was a victim at some stage of (his) schooling, but when (he) got smarter (he) started being a bully”. A minority (3%) admitted to bullying, which was often linked to power. One said he had been able to act freely as the “teacher’s favourite”. Another participant noted that he “would use (his) power as class representative and tease others knowing that they won’t say anything back”.

These patterns suggest that the participants had learned through observation, and that they might not act against bullying when they became teachers.

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Read more: Student teachers in South Africa choose comfort over challenge in practical placements: but there’s a hidden cost

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Still, 79% said they believed their experiences would make them “better teachers”, even though they were “never sure what exactly to do”. These participants expressed strong intentions to act by “reporting every bullying incident”, yet also highlighted systemic gaps, noting when they were learners at school their teachers at school “did not take the matter any further”.

A dominant (64%) perception was that “there is no avoiding bullying … (it’s) a growing pandemic”. Participants emphasised emotional impact: one comment was that bullying “makes you feel absolutely terrible and destroyed”. These experiences fostered empathy but also vulnerability, as some felt it could “test (their) anger levels” or make teaching “a burden”.

Future teachers

These findings matter because they show that teachers are not neutral actors; their past experiences of bullying shape how they might interpret, ignore or respond to learner behaviour. When a majority enter the profession as former bystanders or victims, there is a real risk of inaction, misjudgement or overcorrection in classrooms.

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Read more: What student teachers learn when putting theory into classroom practice

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This has direct implications for school climate, learner safety and the reproduction of harmful power dynamics. Without intervention, cycles of silence and normalisation may persist despite good intentions.

The study participants did not receive training after the study to help them manage bullying.

Teacher education programmes must integrate structured, critical reflection on personal schooling histories, particularly around bullying and authority. This should be coupled with explicit training in evidence-based anti-bullying strategies, not just awareness. Mentorship during teaching practice must intentionally surface and guide these reflections. Finally, schools must not put all the responsibility on novice teachers.

– How will teachers handle bullying? South African study finds they’re ill-prepared
– https://theconversation.com/how-will-teachers-handle-bullying-south-african-study-finds-theyre-ill-prepared-282498

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Nina Wilén, Associate Professor, Lund University

Several of Mali’s major cities experienced coordinated attacks in April by a new coalition of jihadists and separatist groups.

As the coalition took over the town of Kidal in the north of Mali, images of Russian troops being escorted out of the town after negotiations were cabled out across global media.

Russia, now in the shape of Africa Corps and previously the Wagner Group, has been the Malian military’s external security partner since the beginning of 2022. It replaced French and European troops from the counter-terrorism operation Barkhane and Taskforce Takuba. France had deployed a force of 5,000 troops from 2014 to 2022. European special forces numbered 1,000 between 2020 and 2022. Both missions were forced to leave as relations between France and the Malian junta grew tense.

The strategic realignment, from western and multilateral forces to Russian troops, expanded in the region. In Burkina Faso, which experienced two coups in 2022, the French troops were expelled at the start of 2023, as 200 Russian troops moved in.

In the summer of 2023, the Malian authorities also kicked out the decade-old 13,000-strong UN peacekeeping mission. Niger’s junta, which took power the same year, followed suit and expelled the EU’s operations in the country six months later, before accepting a few hundred Russian troops.

During the past decade I have researched external security interventions in the Sahel and analysed their justifications, development on the ground, and consequences for political and security environments.

I conclude from my research that the external interventions have not stabilised the region. More than a decade after the first major interventions, the Sahel is more fragmented, militarised and violent than before.

Yet the persistence of insecurity also serves political purposes.

For military juntas, the jihadist threat justifies continued rule and repression. For Russia, the region has become a showcase for anti-western influence and security partnerships in Africa. For western actors, jihadist expansion, migration concerns and fears of regional instability are used as reasons for security engagement despite repeated failures.

The complex interactions between these actors have resulted in a continuous, strategic circle of violence, where civilians are the first victims.

On the ground

On the ground, interventions have often evolved in unpredictable ways through ad hoc decisions and informal interactions between local and external actors.

For example, they have shared logistical and medical assistance and intelligence.

More broadly, the external interventions strengthened militaries as political actors, reinforcing an already biased civil-military balance across the region.

“Security in the Sahel” became the moniker that framed the western and multilateral interventions in the region from 2013 onwards. Improving the capacities, capabilities and professionalism of the national security forces became the official objectives of these interventions, closely linked to the broader aim of defeating the jihadist insurgencies.

Framing the intersecting crises in the Sahel as a security issue also meant that security actors had the task of resolving it. The importance, status and budgets of the national militaries thus increased as the security situation deteriorated. A heavily tilted civil-military imbalance was the result.

As military officers took over power through coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, a strategic realignment towards Russia began, to maintain military rule.

The Russian Wagner group allowed the newly installed juntas to entrench their power, while “deprofessionalising” the forces through harassment, attacks and massacres of civilians.

Research shows for example that civilian targeting accounted for 71% of the Wagner Group’s involvement in political violence in Mali between December 2021 and July 2022. This strategy of attacking civilians has made recruitment easier for jihadist groups. They could increase their ranks by exploiting grievances.

The latest attacks in Mali in April 2026 demonstrate the military junta’s failure, together with its Russian security partners, to contain the jihadist groups’ expansion.

They also reveal that Russia is in the country mainly to keep the military junta in power. Assimi Goïta, Mali’s military leader, reconfirmed the partnership with Russia after the attacks in spite of their failure on the battlefield.

The military leader needs regime maintenance more than ever, and the Russians need to be in the country for continued geopolitical influence on the African continent.

Conclusion

The result is that while all external actors claim to fight instability, the current regional order depends on continuing insecurity.

Stabilisation risks becoming less about resolving conflict than about managing insecurity in ways that sustain regimes, partnerships and geopolitical influence.

Foreign interventions, in combination with national actors’ ambitions, have helped to transform the region into a space of militarised regime survival, jihadist expansion and geopolitical competition between Russia and western democracies.

As military approaches have repeatedly proven insufficient to solve the intersecting crises in the Sahel, pressured military juntas may now be forced to negotiate with jihadist groups. That is likely to result in new, hybrid spaces of power and governance.

– The Sahel region is less secure than ever: foreign forces just add to the cycle of violence
– https://theconversation.com/the-sahel-region-is-less-secure-than-ever-foreign-forces-just-add-to-the-cycle-of-violence-282917

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Lisette IJssel de Schepper, Chief Economist Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch University

It is forgivable to think that an oil shock mainly hurts at the petrol pump. After all, that is where households feel it first. But when my colleagues and I at the Bureau for Economic Research started digging through South Africa’s fuel data, a different story emerged – one that says as much about the country’s infrastructure failures as it does about global geopolitics.

As we began modelling the likely impact on the South African economy, it quickly became clear that diesel would inflict even more pain on the economy than petrol. (Our insights are based on ongoing analysis that has not yet been published.)

There are two reasons for this.

Firstly, diesel underpins the South African economy’s cost structure. It powers the systems that keep the economy functioning: freight transport, food distribution, mining operations, agricultural machinery, generators and large parts of the country’s logistics network. Higher diesel prices therefore raise the cost of transporting goods, distributing food, operating mines and running backup generators during electricity disruptions.

This means the dominant economic impact of the Gulf war on South Africa is not simply that households are paying more at the pump. The impact is also being felt through higher logistics, freight and operating costs as they feed through supply chains into broader inflation.

Secondly, the price of diesel has spiked markedly more than the price for petrol. Relative to the first quarter of 2026, diesel prices in the second quarter increased by almost 60%, compared with about 25% for petrol.

Our calculations suggest that higher fuel prices could add roughly R45 billion (US$2.7billion) – just over 2% of quarterly GDP spend – in additional fuel costs to the South African economy in the second quarter of 2026 alone. Nearly 70% of that additional cost burden would come from diesel rather than petrol.

The main conclusion we draw from our insights is that South Africa needs to fix its fundamentals and shore up buffers so that it is better placed to withstand external shocks when they strike.

South Africa’s shift in fuel consumption

To understand why diesel matters so much today, it is important to recognise how fuel consumption has changed.

Over the past two decades, diesel consumption has steadily overtaken petrol consumption in the South African economy.

In 2005, petrol accounted for close to half of total fuel consumption, while diesel accounted for roughly a third (see figure below). Today, diesel accounts for almost half of all fuel consumed nationally, while petrol’s share has declined steadily.

Part of the explanation is relatively benign. Petrol vehicles have become significantly more fuel-efficient over time, allowing households to travel further on less fuel. Weak household income growth, higher fuel prices and expensive vehicle financing have also constrained discretionary driving and slowed petrol demand growth.

Diesel, however, is different. Diesel is primarily an operational input into the economy rather than a form of discretionary consumption. As such, its increased use reflects deeper structural changes in the South African economy:

• More freight has shifted to roads and trucks as the state-owned transport monopoly Transnet’s rail capacity has deteriorated. These freight trucks run on diesel.

• Use of diesel accelerated sharply during the severe power-cut years between 2022 and 2024. This was particularly evident in businesses in the mining, manufacturing and agricultural sectors as well as hospitals, shopping centres and data centres. All have increasingly come to rely on diesel generators to keep operating.

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Read more: Does South Africa have a future without power cuts? Ramaphosa intervenes, but the drama isn’t over

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During the worst periods of load-shedding in 2023, Eskom relied heavily on diesel-fired open-cycle gas turbines to help keep the lights on when the coal fleet failed. At times, Eskom’s diesel usage was estimated to account for 20%-30% of national diesel demand. Fortunately, that dependence has eased considerably as electricity supply stabilised and diesel-fired open-cycle gas turbines usage declined.

Still, diesel has quietly become South Africa’s shadow infrastructure system – the fuel that has compensated for failures elsewhere in the economy, from electricity generation to freight transport.

This means South Africa’s vulnerability to oil shocks cannot be easily remedied just by getting consumers to ditch their fossil fuel-guzzling SUVs in favour of electric vehicles. Vulnerability is embedded in the diesel-intensive systems that move goods, power operations, and keep the economy running.

The impact

South Africa has always been vulnerable to oil shocks because it imports virtually all of its crude oil. But the nature of that vulnerability has changed. As domestic refining capacity has declined as several domestic refineries closed between 2020 and 2023, fuel (rather than crude) imports have increased. This means South Africa has become exposed not only to higher oil prices, but also to disruptions in global fuel supply chains themselves.

This creates the risk that external and domestic shocks will begin to reinforce one another. A global fuel disruption on its own is painful but manageable. But fuel stress becomes considerably more destabilising.

The impact is likely to be felt in a number of ways.

Firstly, in the country’s agricultural sector. South Africa is unlikely to face an immediate food supply crisis as domestic agricultural production conditions remain relatively favourable. Nor is there an immediate risk of food inflation as consumer food inflation began moderating earlier this year, supported by ample supplies of grains, fruits and vegetables.

Nevertheless, the sector will be affected. Fuel accounts for a substantial share of food distribution costs in South Africa’s highly road-dependent transport system. Wandile Sihlobo, chief economist of the Agriculture Business Chamber of South Africa, notes that roughly 80% of South African grain is transported by road. Higher diesel prices, therefore, feed directly into the cost of moving food across the country.

Farming is also highly diesel intensive. In addition, fertiliser prices have spiked as a result of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. These price hikes will squeeze margins across farming and food distribution long before they fully appear in supermarket prices.

Farmers may also lose important export markets. The Gulf states, together with Iraq and Iran, are important destinations for South African fruit and meat exports, much of which moves through shipping routes linked to the Strait of Hormuz.

The second major impact will be on the government’s finances.

In April 2026, the government introduced temporary fuel levy relief of R3 per litre (or $0.18/litre), before extending and expanding the support specifically to diesel. By May, diesel levy relief had effectively increased to R3.93 per litre ($0.24/litre), temporarily reducing the general fuel levy on diesel to zero.

The total relief provided between April and June is expected to cost the fiscus roughly R17.2 billion in forgone tax revenue. Since this exceeds the roughly R10 billion contingency reserve available in the current budget, the fiscal cost will need to be absorbed either through stronger-than-expected revenue or expenditure adjustments elsewhere.

The third area of impact is inflation. The cost of fuel shapes inflation expectations because it is highly visible and purchased frequently. Even temporary fuel spikes therefore risk de-anchoring inflation expectations. This is particularly important in the South African economy, where the Reserve Bank has spent several years cementing its credibility to aid the move to a lower inflation target. This depends on inflation expectations continuing to fall towards 3%.

This helps explain why policymakers are concerned not only about fuel prices themselves, but also about the possibility that higher fuel costs may become embedded in broader pricing behaviour and wage expectations.

The bigger lesson: resilience matters

South Africa did not consciously choose to become more diesel dependent. It happened gradually, one workaround at a time. It spent years building diesel into its coping mechanisms. When rail failed, the country used trucks. When electricity failed, it used generators and open cycle gas turbines.

Those adaptations kept the economy moving, but they also quietly increased South Africa’s exposure to global fuel shocks.

The lesson from the current crisis is, therefore, not simply that oil prices are volatile. It is that resilience matters – just not the kind of home-grown resilience which depends on costly workarounds just to keep the lights on and the goods moving.

– Iran war is exposing South Africa’s dependency on diesel: what went wrong
– https://theconversation.com/iran-war-is-exposing-south-africas-dependency-on-diesel-what-went-wrong-283516

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Marew Abebe Salemot, Researcher in Political Sciences and International Studies, Debark University

When conflicts break out, most people around the world rely on international media to understand what is happening. These reports do more than inform. They shape how crises are interpreted, which actors are seen as responsible and where global attention is directed.

In complex situations, what is left out can matter as much as what is included.

Ethiopia is a clear example of this problem. Since 2020, the country has experienced multiple, overlapping conflicts.

The war in Tigray (2020-2022) has been one of the most widely reported, drawing sustained global attention because of its scale and humanitarian impact. But at the same time, violence has broken out and continues in Ethiopia’s Amhara and Oromia regions, causing severe consequences for civilians and deepening regional instability.

Our research set out to understand how these conflicts, which targeted ethnic groups, have been reported by the international media, and how the media understand the country’s current complex crises. As a team of media scholars, we analysed news coverage from four major global outlets – BBC from Britain, CNN from the US, Al-Jazeera from Qatar, and CGTN from China – over a five-year period from January 2020 to March 2025. We collected 1,412 stories from the four outlets on Ethiopia’s complex conflict.

To further assess how they frame the conflict and the nature of their reporting, 60 stories were systematically selected from each media outlet, yielding a total sample of 240 conflict-related articles. This allowed us to track patterns in attention, framing and sourcing.

We found that the coverage tended to present Ethiopia’s crisis through a narrow lens, centred largely on one conflict: the Tigray war.

More than three-quarters (77.2%) of all the stories we analysed focused on the conflict between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. Conflicts in Amhara (at 2.7%) and Oromia (at 0.4%) appeared only marginally in coverage.

This risks producing a partial understanding of a much more complex reality.

Ethiopia’s conflicts are not easily reduced to a single narrative. They involve multiple actors, regions and historical trajectories. Capturing this complexity is challenging, but it is essential. When global media coverage is too narrow, it risks shaping responses that address only part of the problem.

Based on our findings, we recommend that there needs to be a more balanced approach to reporting. Secondly, a greater emphasis must be placed on context, which would include explanations of the historical and political background of conflicts.

A more comprehensive approach would not only improve understanding. It would also contribute to more informed and balanced international engagement with one of the most important and complex regions in Africa today. This matters because Ethiopia is a key player in the Horn of Africa. Instability here has implications for regional security and international diplomacy.

Our findings

Our analysis revealed three major trends in the media coverage of conflict in Ethiopia.

The first was that the Tigray conflict received significantly more media attention than other conflicts in the country. The war, which began in November 2020 between Ethiopian federal forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, drew widespread international attention because of its scale. The conflict was marked by mass atrocities, civilian displacement and famine conditions. An estimated 800,000 civilians were killed.

Although violence persists across several regions – particularly Amhara and Oromia – the war in Tigray dominated reporting, accounting for 77.2% of total news coverage. This means conflicts were not subjected to the same level of scrutiny or narrative. Humanitarian suffering in Amhara and Oromia was far less visible in our dataset. This does not mean it was absent on the ground. Rather, it suggests that some forms of suffering were more likely to be reported than others.

Second was a lack of context. We identified what we term “episodic reporting”. Around two-thirds of the stories we analysed focused on immediate events – including military clashes, political statements or humanitarian emergencies – without providing much background or context. This meant that complex political dynamics were often reduced to simplified narratives. Long-standing tensions related to governance, federalism, identity and power were rarely explored in detail. Instead, the focus remained on visible crises and urgent developments.

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Read more: Ethiopia’s national dialogue was meant to heal the nation, but divisions are deepening

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Third, that coverage was predominantly negative towards the Ethiopian government. Sources critical of the government were used far more frequently than those offering alternative perspectives. While critical reporting is an essential part of journalism, the imbalance in sourcing suggests that some voices were amplified more than others.

The implications

This imbalance in the reporting has broader implications. Media coverage plays a significant role in shaping international agendas.

Media reports could assist policymakers, humanitarian organisations and international institutions to assess crises and determine priorities. In this regard, the Tigray war alone was discussed over 10 times at the UN Security Council.

In this sense, visibility can translate into political and humanitarian action. Conversely, conflicts that receive limited coverage may not attract the same level of concern.

What needs to be done

Improving this situation requires a number of steps.

Firstly, a more balanced approach to reporting is needed. International media need to widen their scope and pay closer attention to underreported conflicts. This does not mean reducing coverage of major crises, but rather ensuring that other significant developments are not overlooked.

Secondly, context needs to be given. Explaining the historical and political background of conflicts can help audiences understand not just what is happening, but why. Without this context, reporting risks reinforcing simplified narratives that do not capture the full picture.

Thirdly, audiences themselves play a role. Recognising that media coverage is selective can encourage more critical engagement with news. Seeking out multiple sources and perspectives can help build a more nuanced understanding of complex situations.

– Global media networks simplify Ethiopia’s conflicts: insights from 5 years of data
– https://theconversation.com/global-media-networks-simplify-ethiopias-conflicts-insights-from-5-years-of-data-282776