Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ian Caistor-Parker, PhD student, University of Warwick

During the Mau Mau uprising between 1952 and 1960, the British colonial government confined an estimated 150,000 Kenyans in a sprawling network of “emergency” detention camps.

None of those held in the camps had been found guilty in a court of law. Instead, they were detained on suspicion of supporting the uprising.

British control over Kenya was effectively declared in 1895. A distinctive feature of colonial rule was the decision to encourage white settlement. These settlers were granted vast tracts of Kenya’s most fertile land and pushed policy in an increasingly harsh and unequal direction.

By the early 1950s, many African Kenyans were facing severe land shortages in the countryside and desperate living conditions in urban areas.

In 1952, this situation erupted into the Mau Mau uprising, a broadly anti-colonial rebellion.

The British government responded with overwhelming force. It declared a state of emergency and suppressed the uprising militarily.

Revelations about the extreme violence employed in some emergency detention camps made the continuation of British rule untenable. Particularly key was the Hola massacre of 1959. Guards beat 11 detainees to death and the colonial government attempted to cover up the crime.

Outrage at these events shattered Britain’s grip on the colony, and Kenya achieved independence in 1963 under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta.

A great deal is known about these detention camps. They were sites of neglect and brutal violence. Detainees were forced to go through a so-called rehabilitation system designed to make them renounce their support for Mau Mau.

In practice, they were subjected to brutal compulsory labour, were at risk of assault and lived in unhygienic conditions. Some of those who refused to cooperate ultimately faced systematic, state-sanctioned torture.

I am a historian researching punishment in Kenya, and I have been investigating the deeper history of detention camps. My research shows that this emergency detention system was shaped by an earlier network of “ordinary” detention camps. These were established in 1926 and processed more than 400,000 people before the uprising.

These camps, intended as a milder alternative to prison, evolved into a poorly regulated system characterised by exploitation, overcrowding and weak accountability.

These findings challenge the idea that the detention system of the 1950s was exceptional. Instead, it was rooted in long-standing colonial practices, shaped by economic incentives, administrative gaps and coercive labour systems.

Understanding this deeper history matters because it changes how we view the Mau Mau emergency. It proves that the brutal 1950s detention system didn’t just emerge from nowhere – it was built on a foundation of state violence and disorder that had been normalised for decades.

The roots

Influenced by a draconian-minded European settler minority, the Kenyan colonial government adopted a harsh approach to punishing the local population. Judges frequently imprisoned Africans for “technical” offences lacking criminal intent. These included failing to pay tax and minor violations of coercive labour laws.

By the 1920s, Kenya’s prisons were overcrowded and “technical” offenders inevitably mixed with hardened criminals.

In response, the colonial government introduced detention in 1926 as a supposedly milder alternative for technical offenders who had simply broken administrative rules. In theory, prisons were to be reserved for those who had committed crimes involving moral violation. In practice, however, these distinctions didn’t (or couldn’t) hold.

To visibly separate detention from imprisonment, the colonial government gave day-to-day control of detention camps to district commissioners (the powerful heads of local governments), not the prison department.

However, this separation was incomplete. Detainees were legally classified as prisoners (though they were not informed of this). The prison department retained ultimate authority over the camps.

This overlapping authority produced a gap in accountability, which ultimately proved disastrous.

In 1930, seeking to divert more people from formal prisons, government officials removed almost all sentencing restrictions on detention. Subsequently, the only limitations were that sentences had to be under six months and that those with more than one prior prison conviction were ineligible.

Numbers surged immediately, with more convicted offenders sent to detention than formal prisons almost every year until 1952.

Judges increasingly used detention for serious offences, including manslaughter. A limited criminal records system meant that individuals with prior convictions – sometimes as many as 16 – ended up in detention.

Conversely, the amendment did not stop harsh magistrates from continuing to send significant numbers of minor offenders to prisons.

This blurring of populations, combined with a lack of structural and legal separation, meant detention camps mutated into a parallel prison system, serving a different colonial master, district commissioners, but lacking fundamental distinction.

Detention camp living conditions were atrocious. Most district commissioners delegated almost all duties to Kenyan African “overseers”. Overseers were under-trained. Yet they were expected to be on duty constantly and often had to guard more than 60 detainees, making meaningful supervision impossible.

Camps were generally collections of temporary wattle-and-daub huts. Over time, these decayed but were not replaced, resulting in squalid conditions.

Furthermore, overcrowding was endemic. Food rations were poor and basic facilities were often absent. Sickness rates were significant. Detainees responded by escaping at a rate of more than one a day.

Failed reform

In 1937, a high-level committee condemned the system as dangerous and inefficient. Calls for reform from London also grew.

But nothing changed.

Why?

The primary reason was economic. Detainees were a vital reservoir of free labour for cash-strapped district commissioners. When camps were introduced, local governments’ labour budgets were cut. This made detainee labour crucial for maintaining government stations.

In the late 1930s, penal officials sought to reintroduce stricter eligibility criteria for detention. However, they abandoned this idea as it would add to overcrowding in the prison system.

Trapped by bureaucratic gridlock, underfunding and economic dependency, Kenya’s detention system limped into the 1952 emergency – unreformed.

Ultimately, “ordinary” detention camps persisted until the 1980s, far outliving their emergency counterparts.

The consequences

This history exposes stark continuities between the pre-emergency and Mau Mau penal systems. Furthermore, as they were under the control of district officials and lacked standard prison regulations, existing detention camps could, and did, easily become dumping grounds for Mau Mau suspects in the early months of the emergency. Ordinary detention was both a model and enabling mechanism for emergency detention.

– Brutal Mau Mau camps in Kenya were an extension of Britain’s colonial prison system – historian traces their roots
– https://theconversation.com/brutal-mau-mau-camps-in-kenya-were-an-extension-of-britains-colonial-prison-system-historian-traces-their-roots-277856

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Kristof Titeca, Professor in International Development, University of Antwerp

Bobi Wine’s escape from Uganda is not just a striking episode in itself, it also offers insight into the current state of the opposition – particularly his National Unity Platform party – and into the divergences within the Yoweri Museveni regime.

The Ugandan opposition leader had been in hiding for almost two months after the January 2026 presidential election, which Museveni won by 72%. Wine came second with 25% of the vote. Museveni, 81, has been in power since 1986.

Wine, born Robert Kyagulanyi, entered formal politics in 2017 when he won a parliamentary by-election.

He soon emerged as one of the leaders of the People Power movement, a loose, generationally charged mobilisation built around the slogan “People Power, Our Power”. It took shape in the aftermath of protests against the removal of presidential age limits in 2018. At the time, the opposition appeared largely exhausted and unlikely to unseat the regime. Bobi Wine and People Power therefore brought a new energy to Uganda’s opposition.

People Power later formalised into the National Unity Platform party, which Wine used to vie for the presidency in 2021. He secured about 35% of the presidential vote against Museveni’s 59%. National Unity Platform became the largest opposition force in parliament with 57 seats.

These results also highlighted the constraints of electoral politics in the face of extensive repression.

This is a pattern that would again become apparent in the 2026 elections.

As several human rights organisations noted, the 2026 elections took place in an environment marked by widespread repression and intimidation.

After the vote, Wine went into hiding. He posted photos and videos seemingly from Kampala, triggering roadblocks and searches across the capital city. On 18 March 2026, he resurfaced in the United States.

I have researched Ugandan politics for over 20 years, and recently published an article analysing the structural challenges Wine’s political party faces in Uganda’s authoritarian context.

Drawing on this work, my reading is that Wine’s escape reveals controlled tensions within Museveni’s regime, where different factions appear to disagree on how to handle the opposition – without signalling a full split. At the same time, it exposes a deeper dilemma for Wine and his party: how to balance international advocacy with maintaining grassroots legitimacy at home.

This moment matters because it highlights the structural constraints facing opposition politics in Uganda, and raises questions about whether meaningful political change can occur within the current system.

Frictions within the regime

The contrasting approaches within the Museveni regime are illustrated by events that followed the 2026 election. In the weeks following the vote, defence force chief Muhoozi Kainerugaba (Museveni’s son) issued a series of unusually explicit statements about Wine.

In a now-deleted tweet, he claimed that 22 members of the National Unity Platform – whom he labelled “terrorists” – had been killed. He added that he was praying that the next death would be Wine’s.

On 26 January, the defence chief escalated this rhetoric, stating that he wanted Wine “dead or alive”. These statements built on earlier threats, including about beheading Wine.

Taken together, they amount to sustained violent threats directed at the main opposition leader.

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Read more: Uganda’s autocratic political system is failing its people – and threatens the region

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Set against this, however, is the fact that Wine was able to evade capture for nearly two months and ultimately leave the country.

It emerged that he did so with assistance from high-level state and security officials.

The same sources and regime insiders reported that intelligence services had informed Museveni about Wine’s whereabouts. The president chose not to act upon this information.

Taken together, these events suggest differences within the regime between factions in the security services, or more broadly between Muhoozi and other centres of power. Potentially even within the first family itself.

But these differences should not be overstated.

The episode does not indicate an open or consolidated split. Criticism of Muhoozi within the regime remains tightly constrained.

What this suggests is a regime where disagreements are contained within narrow limits. Wine’s escape, therefore, points less to a rupture than to an ongoing negotiation over power and strategy within the ruling elite.

And this is becoming increasingly important in light of the anticipated transition beyond Museveni.

Tensions within Wine’s party

Wine’s political strength has always come from where he came from.

He was rooted in the ghetto, and more broadly among urban youth who had long been mobilised by opposition politics but rarely felt represented by it.

Earlier figures like Kizza Besigye could appeal to this group, but Wine embodied it. He spoke the same language and made politics feel accessible to people often treated as outsiders.

That sense of authenticity was central to the early momentum of People Power. It also mattered that Wine broke with a long-standing pattern in Ugandan politics: he did not come from the western region, the core of the ruling elite.

But this “outsider” appeal has become harder to sustain over time. As People Power turned into a political party, and as Wine himself became more embedded in formal politics and international networks, parts of that original base began to feel that something had shifted.

What once felt like a movement of “one of us” increasingly risks being seen as something closer to the political establishment it set out to challenge.

As my research shows, this is not unusual. It is a core dilemma when protest movements turn into parties, especially under repression.

The social media backlash to Wine’s appearance in the United States needs to be read through that lens.

It not only echoes criticism from Museveni that Wine is an “agent of foreign interests”, but also from within the opposition where some radical voices argue that he should have stayed and faced the regime, even if that meant prison. Besigye, for instance, is facing treason charges after he was abducted and extradited from Kenya in 2024.

This criticism echoes a longstanding divide within opposition politics in Uganda: should opposition leaders embody defiance on the ground, or navigate politics through institutional spaces?

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Read more: The making and breaking of Uganda: an interview with scholar Mahmood Mamdani

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Being in the US reinforces a growing perception that Wine is becoming more distant from the people who carried the risks on the ground.

If the party cannot connect its international advocacy and diaspora support back to the everyday struggles of its supporters in Uganda, this episode will likely deepen the feeling that the party has become more of the same.

What role remains for Wine?

There is an uncomfortable reality here. Wine serves a function for the regime. His presence helps maintain the appearance of political competition, particularly within the international community.

Wine now faces a choice. Engaging in electoral politics risks reinforcing the system he seeks to challenge. Stepping outside it risks isolation, repression or loss of political relevance.

How he navigates this tension will shape not only his political trajectory, but also that of his party.

– Bobi Wine’s decision to flee Uganda points to a shrinking landscape for opposition politics
– https://theconversation.com/bobi-wines-decision-to-flee-uganda-points-to-a-shrinking-landscape-for-opposition-politics-279475

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Odongo Kodongo, Associate professor, Finance, University of the Witwatersrand

Kenya is laying the ground for an infrastructure fund which will raise money for new projects – such as roads, energy and ports – through public-private partnerships, privatisation proceeds, and institutional capital. We asked Odongo Kodongo, a project finance expert, to unpack the potential risks and rewards of this strategy – and where it falls short.

Why now?

Kenya is weighed down by public debt that has built up rapidly over the last few years. The country’s public debt stood at about 12.30 trillion Kenya shillings (US$94.6 billion) as of December 2025, having risen from about 9.15 trillion shillings (US$70.3 billion) in December 2022. That is, public debt grew by over 34% in only three years.

Public debt as a percentage of GDP in 2022 was 67.9%. Thanks to an appreciating local currency, the debt to GDP ratio remained almost unchanged at 67.5% in 2025. For emerging and developing economies, a debt limit of no more than 64% of the country’s production (gross domestic product or GDP) is recommended.

In the financial year 2024/25, 71.2% of all government revenue went towards the servicing of debt. This left very little resources for other government activities including social programmes and capital projects such as infrastructure investments.

Kenya faces a massive infrastructure gap. Estimates show that the country needs to invest over US$12 billion annually in infrastructure until 2040 to meet its development goals. It doesn’t have this, resulting in an infrastructure financing gap of roughly US$2.1 billion annually.

However, due to the country’s excessive public debt, Kenyans must consider avenues other than tax revenues and public debt to pay for infrastructure. In this regard, the new fund is long overdue.

How will the fund work?

The National Infrastructure Fund Act establishes the fund as a corporate entity run by a board of directors. The board includes state officers and independent directors, recruited in accordance with the legislation governing state owned enterprises.

The treasury secretary is expected to formulate the act’s supporting regulations and guidelines. These include the fund’s investment policy, government support mechanisms, and standards and procedures.

However, the fund’s proposed legislation appears to indicate that its major responsibilities will include:

• identifying and setting priorities for public infrastructure investments

• conducting feasibility studies and developing bankable proposals

• identifying an optimal mix of financing options for infrastructure projects

• negotiating and closing financing deals with infrastructure financiers

• overseeing implemented projects to manage risks and minimise time and cost overruns

• audit to ensure past experiences inform project planning.

What are the potential risks and rewards?

The potential benefits of an infrastructure fund include greater infrastructure endowment, its potential cascading effects on development, and reduced reliance on the public purse.

But the success of such a fund hinges on many things. First, the fund’s design as a state owned enterprise creates the expectation that it will have autonomy to make its decisions without political interference and executive meddling.

However, some provisions of the act cast doubt that this will be possible. For example, the power to appoint independent directors is vested in the treasury cabinet secretary. This is a red flag. Given that the same cabinet secretary is a member of that board, independent board members may feel under pressure to agree with their appointing authority, making them effectively nonindependent.

Second, the fund must incentivise superior performance. Part III of the act recognises this need. The treasury cabinet secretary can set the board’s performance targets and evaluate its performance. But the cabinet secretary is a member of the same board and cannot be a fair referee.

Third, the act identifies the fund’s audited financial statements as a basis for performance evaluation. While this conventional approach appears sound, the structure of a more appropriate incentive system should focus on the objectives for which the fund is being set up. That is, performance should be based on:

• the quantity of financial resources mobilised, especially from private sources

• the amount of mobilised resources actually invested in infrastructure projects

• efficiency in the management of projects

• existence of feedback loops at various points between project origination and termination to support monitoring and corrective actions when necessary

• capacity development and skills transfer.

The last point is important, given that human capital constraints have limited the region’s capacity to generate a pipeline of bankable projects, rendering its infrastructure sectors unattractive to private sector capital.

The fourth major weakness is the significance attached to financing derived from the disposal of government assets. Given that these assets are in short supply, monies from such sales must not be regarded as a primary source of financing.

Indeed, while the motivation for setting up the fund is to diversify funding sources and increase fiscal headroom, the act does not say much about private sector involvement.

In contrast, a similar fund created in South Africa in 2020 is specifically mandated to employ blended finance instruments. This involves using concessional finance (such as borrowing from development banks) to make an investment less risky to encourage private sector participation.

Finally, there is an ominous clause in the act that empowers the treasury secretary to issue government support in the form of letters of credit, guarantees and firm commitments to support projects. Because some of these mechanisms constitute public debt, this clause contradicts another clause that motivates the fund’s establishment on the grounds of “reduction in the reliance on public debt”.

What’s missing from the strategy, what needs fixing?

First, the implementation guidelines to be developed by the cabinet secretary should clearly spell out the fund’s goals. These include:

• specific capital mobilisation targets: what is the volume of financial resources expected to be mobilised?

• infrastructure investment targets: what are the immediate, medium and longer term infrastructure investment goals? These would be consistent with the country’s development plans, which often have specific timelines, such as year 2030.

Second, the underpinning law links performance measurement to the fund’s ability to “make a return commensurate with its level of investment”. This “economic/financial” view of performance ignores the social return potential of infrastructure investments.

For example, investing in hospitals and schools creates a healthier and higher quality manpower with greater longevity (social returns) and receptiveness to new knowledge. This increases labour productivity (economic returns).

Third, one of the more important beneficial spillovers of the fund’s operations is likely to be the development of the country’s capital markets. The fund could access capital from financial institutions such as pension and wealth funds, and diaspora resources, through innovative design of financial instruments.

The increased diversity of financial instruments and larger pool of capital could deepen the country’s capital markets. Thus, the act ought to have included capital markets development as one of the fund’s objectives.

At the operational level, several things need fixing. For example, the government must provide “seed” capital to support the fund’s initial activities. The amount of the seed capital, the justification for it, and its source(s) must be anchored in law.

Further, given the highlighted flaws of the cabinet secretary’s dual roles as a member of the board and its oversight agent, the cabinet secretary should be made an ex-officio member by law.

Finally, all proceeds, if any, from the sale of public assets in future should be ring-fenced to the fund. This, too, should be anchored in law.

– Kenya’s new infrastructure fund is long overdue – but design flaws could limit its impact
– https://theconversation.com/kenyas-new-infrastructure-fund-is-long-overdue-but-design-flaws-could-limit-its-impact-279254

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Konstantinos Kolokythas, Postdoctoral research fellow, Rhodes University

Astronomers are uncovering previously hidden structures within some of the universe’s largest objects, known as galaxy clusters. Using the powerful MeerKAT radio telescope in South Africa, researchers have mapped faint, diffuse radio emissions, an imprint that reveals energy processes taking place in the vast spaces between galaxies when galaxy clusters collide or merge.

Konstantinos Kolokythas, a radio astronomer and postdoctoral research fellow at Rhodes University and the South African Radio Astronomy Observatory (SARAO), has led research into what these radio emissions reveal about our cosmic history. His findings provide a glimpse of what powerful instruments like MeerKAT and the upcoming Square Kilometre Array (SKA) will discover as they explore the “invisible” radio universe.

What has MeerKAT found, thanks to its sensitivity?

Think of a galaxy cluster not as a collection of thousands of galaxies, but as a bustling city. While telescopes usually see the “bright lights” of individual galaxies, MeerKAT has enabled us to detect the faint “smog” or “mist” filling the streets between them. Our search has been for this extremely faint “diffuse radio emission”. It is spread over millions of light-years, like a thin, glowing fog.

In the vast spaces between galaxies lies the Intracluster Medium – an incredibly hot, thin gas that fills the cluster. While the gas itself is usually seen by X-ray telescopes, it also contains magnetic fields and electrons travelling at nearly the speed of light.

When galaxy clusters merge, it is like a cosmic dance: the electrons encountering a magnetic field are compelled to spiral along the magnetic field lines, emitting energy as radio waves. This is the radio emission we see at 1.28 GHz with MeerKAT. It reveals the places of shock accelerations (the aftermath of cosmic collisions).

Our research within the MeerKAT Galaxy Cluster Legacy Survey (MGCLS), a programme led by the South African Radio Astronomy Observatory, used this capability to map 115 of these “cosmic cities”. We identified 103 diffuse sources, including 60 structures that were completely invisible to previous generations of telescopes. The legacy survey also produced its own overview.

We have essentially moved from having a blurry map of the neighbourhood to a high-definition atlas, revealing that the “empty” space between galaxies is actually teeming with energy. By combining this radio data with X-ray and optical observations, we can calculate the “energy budget” – essentially a full accounting of all the power, heat and magnetic energy moving through these massive structures.

How does this clarify or add to what was known before?

Before this work, we mainly observed only the brightest, most violent merger events. With our new catalogue, we can see the broader picture of cosmic evolution, detecting the faintest structures arising from galaxy cluster collisions. By identifying these features in over half (54%) of the surveyed clusters, we can study how energy is processed on a cosmic scale.

These radio signatures are the “scars” left by cluster mergers – colossal, slow-motion collisions where gravity draws two massive collections of galaxies together. This process generates turbulence and shockwaves that “kick” particles to extreme speeds.

Our findings demonstrate that these high-energy events are a fundamental part of a cluster’s life cycle and the universe’s evolution. Clusters that appear “quiet” or “relaxed” in X-ray light often conceal a history of radio activity. We are mapping the secret structures of magnetic fields over billions of years. In radio astronomy, the universe is never truly silent.

What direction does this point to for future research?

This catalogue serves as a high-resolution “baseline” for the coming decade. With MeerKAT, we have pushed the limits further, allowing us to observe more “ultra-steep spectrum” sources – faint emissions from the oldest, most “tired” particles in the universe. These are vital for understanding the long-term lifecycle of cosmic energy.

Looking forward, this research paves the way for the Square Kilometre Array (SKA) observatory, the world’s largest and most sensitive radio telescope, which is expected to be fully operational by 2030. If MeerKAT can detect 60 new structures in a small patch of the sky, the SKA will likely find thousands.

Why does this matter?

Because these structures forming in clusters are the largest “natural laboratories” in the universe. By studying them, we aren’t just looking at pretty pictures; we are learning how gravity, magnetism and matter behave on a scale that is otherwise impossible to recreate and the human mind can barely conceive.

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Read more: Astronomers used machine learning to mine data from South Africa’s MeerKAT telescope: what they found

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This research proves that South Africa is at the forefront of this discovery, using homegrown technology to answer the deepest questions about the fabric of our universe, where our universe came from and how it evolves.

– South Africa’s MeerKAT telescope is mapping previously invisible spaces between galaxies – and it’s found 60 new cosmic structures
– https://theconversation.com/south-africas-meerkat-telescope-is-mapping-previously-invisible-spaces-between-galaxies-and-its-found-60-new-cosmic-structures-279002

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By MJ (Thinus) Booysen, Professor in Engineering, Stellenbosch University

Across much of Africa, motorcycles are not leisure vehicles. They are workhorses. They carry commuters, schoolchildren, goods, medicines and deliveries. For millions of people, they provide the most affordable and accessible form of transport, while also creating livelihoods for riders and small businesses.

In many places, they fill the gap left by limited public transport. Kenya alone has about 1.5 million riders.

Of the 27 million motorbikes in sub-Saharan Africa, only about 0.1% are electric, running on clean and low-cost energy.

As part of a team of electrical and industrial engineers at Stellenbosch University, I work (and go on adventures!) to see if that share can be increased.

When our team rode a locally manufactured electric motorbike from Kenya to South Africa in 2024, charging it with only solar power and battery storage along the way, we were not only testing a vehicle. We were testing whether Africa could build and power its own electric mobility future.

The journey covered roughly 6,000km via cities, rural roads and border posts, showing that electric two-wheelers are not a distant dream for sub-Saharan Africa. They are already practical, and they point to a much bigger opportunity.

Feasible transition

Electric motorcycles with battery swapping fit the realities of mobility demand in African countries: relatively short daily trips, constant use, tight operating margins and the need for low-cost transport. It’s already been estimated that electrifying this segment will reduce total cost of ownership for riders by 35%-40%, improve urban air quality, cut greenhouse gas emissions and lower dependence on imported fuel.

Our own research suggests this transition is both technically and economically feasible.

Together, these findings suggest that electric micromobility in Africa is not only technically viable, but can be paired with local solar systems in ways that improve affordability, resilience and access.

An industrial opportunity

Africa should not simply become a market for electric vehicles designed and manufactured elsewhere. It should become a place where they are built, adapted and improved for African conditions. The continent’s mobility needs are specific. Vehicles must cope with rough roads, heavier loads, long operating hours and uneven access to charging. A motorcycle designed for Europe or Asia is not always right for a boda-boda rider in Kenya or a delivery rider in South Africa.

In one study, we developed and validated a physics-based model twin of an electric motorcycle under African operating conditions, showing that energy use can be predicted with good accuracy from real trips, terrain and payload. This digital twin can be used in virtual assessments of electric fleet deployments.

Local production would also create local jobs. It can create opportunities in assembly, fabrication, battery integration, electronics, software, data analytics, servicing and charging infrastructure. It would give young engineers, technicians and entrepreneurs a foothold in an industry that is already growing quickly.

But that growth will not happen on its own. It needs policy support. Ethiopia banned imports of internal combustion engine vehicles in 2024. This rapidly accelerated EV adoption and altered the economics of vehicle imports. South Africa’s belated 150% tax incentive for local electric vehicle production is a step in the right direction.

Tapping into local resources

Sub-Saharan Africa has some of the best solar resources in the world. At the same time, many communities still face unreliable grid electricity or no access at all. That may sound like a barrier to electrified transport, but it is also an opportunity.

Compared with large cars or buses, small vehicle batteries are far easier to charge from decentralised solar systems. Solar-powered charging points, battery swap stations, mini-grids and storage systems can all support electric motorcycles where conventional infrastructure is weak.

Charging has already been demonstrated on solar-hybrid mini-grids, particularly for rural electric two-wheelers, with documented cases in Nigeria and operator-led deployments in Sierra Leone.

Our research has found that decentralised solar can help power this transition: a school-centred solar trading model serving households and electric motorbikes achieved payback periods of under five years in favourable cases and improved supply reliability for external users by about 60%.

This matters especially in rural and peri-urban areas, where mobility poverty is often most severe. A locally manufactured electric motorcycle charged with solar power is more than a cleaner vehicle. It is a tool for inclusion. It can improve access to jobs, education, healthcare and markets while reducing exposure to fuel price shocks.

That is why this transition should not be framed only as a climate issue. It is a development issue.

Policy needs

African governments must make it easier to produce and sell electric vehicles locally. At present, many local manufacturers face the strange situation where importing a finished vehicle is cheaper and simpler than building one domestically. High duties on components, inconsistent regulations, costly certification, weak access to finance and uncertain policy signals all work against local industry.

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Read more: Ghana’s new vehicle tax aims to tackle pollution – expert unpacks how it’ll work and suggests reforms

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If governments are serious about industrial development, electric micromobility is a practical place to start. Support could include lower tariffs on components for local assembly, tax incentives for domestic manufacturing, development finance, clear technical standards and public procurement policies that create dependable demand. The aim should not be permanent protection, but smart support that helps African firms scale and compete.

Governments must support cross-border collaboration. Africa’s challenges are shared, but our responses are often fragmented. Countries create separate standards, separate pilot projects and separate industrial plans, even when their transport needs and energy constraints are remarkably similar. This duplication makes progress slower and more expensive.

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Read more: What’s stopping sunny South Africa’s solar industry? Court case sheds light on the wider problem

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Many African borders were imposed in colonial times. They do not reflect the deeper connections between economies, people or problems. Fuel insecurity, unemployment, poor public transport, congestion and unreliable electricity are not isolated national problems. They are regional realities. The response should therefore also be regional.

That means harmonised standards, easier trade in locally made vehicles and components, shared research platforms and coordinated industrial policy. A larger, more integrated African market would help manufacturers scale up, reduce costs and justify investment in skills and supply chains. It would also allow innovations developed in one country to spread more quickly across the continent.

Electric mobility policy must be linked to energy policy, especially solar energy.

From talk to action

Our journey from Nairobi to Stellenbosch, now told in our seven-episode documentary series, Recharging Hope, was not a publicity stunt. It was a practical demonstration that locally made electric motorbikes, powered by solar energy, can work across African roads and real African conditions. The question is no longer whether this future is possible. It is whether policy and investment will help Africa build it for itself.

With the right policies, partnerships and investment, electric micromobility can help the region move people more affordably, build local industry more confidently and use the power of the African sun more fully.

Africa’s mobility future should be built in Africa and powered by its own abundant renewable energy.

– Africa’s electric motorbike future can be built locally and powered by solar – our 6,000km ride shows what’s possible
– https://theconversation.com/africas-electric-motorbike-future-can-be-built-locally-and-powered-by-solar-our-6-000km-ride-shows-whats-possible-279008

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ding Fei, Assistant Professor, Cornell University

As African cities experience some of the fastest urban growth rates in the world, China has become a major bilateral financier for urban infrastructure.

From Nairobi’s elevated expressways to Lagos’s airport upgrades and Addis Ababa’s new riverside developments, Chinese-backed projects are transforming skylines and daily life across the continent.

I study China’s economic engagements in Africa, focusing on how development is enacted, negotiated, and contested across sites of production, governance, and everyday life.

My recent analysis of 267 Chinese‑financed projects in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of Congo), Lagos (Nigeria), Luanda (Angola), Lusaka (Zambia) and Nairobi (Kenya) shows that while China delivers an impressive volume of infrastructure, it risks reinforcing Africa’s national government dominance in decision-making on urban infrastructure development.

The completion rate, and the speed at which most projects are finished, is impressive. But that’s only part of the equation. Cities – their governments and residents – are excluded from the project planning and negotiation process.

Across my project dataset, none of the infrastructure deals were financed directly through municipal governments. Instead, the agreements were mostly negotiated and funded through national ministries or state agencies. This happens partly because many cities are legally restricted from taking on external debt, and partly because lenders prefer working with sovereign governments.

This national-level dominance has far-reaching consequences for how African cities develop. When cities are not involved in financing negotiations, they lose the opportunity to align major infrastructure projects with long-term urban development plans.

China’s expanding footprint

African cities face massive infrastructure shortfalls. The African Union estimates that urban areas require about US$142 billion every year to build and maintain essential systems. In this context of urgent need, China has become one of the most important bilateral financiers helping to fill the gap.

The six cities examined in my study are the biggest urban centres in their respective countries. Together they house only about 13% of national populations. Yet they receive nearly 30% of all Chinese infrastructure financing flows into those countries.

Between 2000 and 2021, Chinese lenders committed about US$37 billion to urban infrastructure in these six cities. Transport projects account for the largest share, over US$17 billion. This is followed by social projects such as housing, schools and hospitals, which drew more than US$8 billion. Digital networks, electricity systems, water infrastructure and government buildings made up the remainder.

These investment patterns mirror the continent’s biggest infrastructure gaps, especially in transport and education, as identified in a 2022 UN-Habitat report.

Most of this financing is in the form of loans rather than grants. Loans represent nearly 68% of all projects and almost 89% of the total money committed to the six cities. The terms vary widely. Some loans are offered at very low interest rates. Others are closer to commercial rates, sometimes approaching 7%, with repayment periods stretching up to two decades.

Digital infrastructure projects often come with more favourable terms, though they are often tied to Chinese technology suppliers. Two large Chinese development banks, the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank, provide nearly 94% of project lending.

One notable feature of Chinese finance is the speed at which many projects are completed. Of the projects with available information, about 74% were completed. Many were completed within two to three years.

This is a relatively high rate compared with typical attrition levels in infrastructure projects across the continent.

The overall completion rate shows a capacity to deliver infrastructure projects at speed.

Still, speed and scale tell only part of the story. Equally significant is who negotiates the terms of lending.

Bypassing city authorities

Local governments are often mandated to implement projects and operate new infrastructure. Yet they lack the power or resources to do so.

In 2020, subnational governments across Africa received only 24% of total public spending, well below the global average of 39.5%. Weak property tax systems, heavy reliance on transfers from central government, and restrictions on borrowing leave most cities with limited fiscal autonomy.

Chinese financing, while substantial, has not altered this structural imbalance.

It’s not that cities don’t get funding at all. As urban hubs in their respective countries, the six cities under study often attract high-profile, foreign-funded projects. The projects elevate a city’s skyline. But they often don’t address neighbourhood-level gaps in water supply, transit access, or environmental services.

My other research indicates that large, showcase projects funded by China often take precedence over localised, community-level improvements. Thus infrastructure is unevenly provided in urban areas.

Cities need fiscal power

If African cities are to manage the rapid urbanisation and meet the needs of the roughly 1.5 billion people expected to live in urban areas by mid-century, they need more than new bridges and roads.

They need the fiscal power and planning capacity to plan, finance and govern infrastructure on their own terms.

Based on my research findings, these steps would be useful:

• rethink how urban infrastructure is discussed

• strengthen municipal revenue and financial capacity

• improve planning coordination across governments.

Firstly, it is crucial to rethink how urban infrastructure is discussed in policy and the media. For years, the conversation has revolved around the idea that African cities simply lack enough roads, pipes, grids and public facilities.

While the shortfalls are real, this framing can reinforce the belief that only large, externally financed megaprojects can solve urban problems. It also risks sidelining the diverse and often creative ways communities already provide services when formal systems fall short.

Instead of viewing cities solely through the lens of what they lack, policymakers should also recognise the hybrid networks that public, private or community actors establish to keep daily services running. Examples of these include housing collectives in Harare and smart water meters in Nairobi.

Strengthening these systems requires a broader, more inclusive vision of what urban infrastructure can be.

Secondly, municipal revenue and financial capacity needs to be strengthened.

For cities to gain real decision-making power, they need stronger and more reliable sources of revenue. That means improving property tax systems, developing transparent land-based financing tools, and ensuring residents have equitable access to productive sector employment.

Some cities, such as Lagos, have already built robust tax bases and even issued municipal bonds to finance major projects.

But reforms cannot just happen at the city level. National governments must give municipalities clearer legal authority to raise revenues and borrow responsibly.

And when countries do rely on external finance, they need strong safeguards in terms of transparent bidding processes, rigorous project evaluations, and clear rules for how risks and costs are shared. Without oversight, long-term contracts can saddle cities with high user fees or hidden financial liabilities that become burdens on future budgets and residents.

Thirdly, planning coordination across governments and sectors must be improved.

Urban infrastructure does not function in silos. Transport depends on land use, water systems depend on energy, and digital networks depend on both. Yet planning is often fragmented across ministries, sectors and international partners.

A more coordinated approach is essential. National and local governments should work together through joint planning committees, shared databases and consultation processes that ensure new projects fit into long-term city strategies. Giving city governments and community groups a seat at the table, especially in the early stages of feasibility studies and project design, will help prevent mismatches between high-profile investments and everyday needs.

Reliable information is central to this effort. Many African countries still lack systems to track external financial flows, project progress, evaluation and management. Building comprehensive data systems is a cornerstone of transparent and responsible governance.

China’s involvement across multiple sectors offers an opportunity to pursue more integrated planning. The recent summits of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation have pledged efforts to institutionalise subnational cooperation. But these will only be effective if African governments actively and strategically shape the agenda.

The challenge for African cities is not simply attracting more finance but gaining the authority and capacity to guide urban development. China will likely remain an important financier. But no external partner can substitute for strong city institutions, transparent financial systems, and coordinated planning.

– China is helping build Africa’s cities, but its approach sidelines local urban planners and residents
– https://theconversation.com/china-is-helping-build-africas-cities-but-its-approach-sidelines-local-urban-planners-and-residents-278209

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Abeeb Babatunde Omotoso, Senior Lecturer at Oyo State College of Agriculture and Technology, Igboora, Nigeria and Senior Research Associate at North West University, North-West University

Agriculture is the backbone of Africa’s economy. It provides livelihoods for over 70% of the rural population and contributes to national food security and economic development.

For most rural households, farming is not just a source of income and sustenance. It also provides cultural identity and social stability. Over the past two decades, however, rural Africa has witnessed increasing levels of violent conflicts that undermine agricultural productivity, investment and long-term development.

Farmers facing insecurity often abandon productive crops, reduce land use and invest less in their farms. There are serious consequences for food security.

Conflict destroys lives and property. It also changes the decisions farmers make about investing in their land.

We are agricultural and applied economists with expertise in rural development,sustainable food system and climate-smart agriculture. We’ve studied the impact of conflict on food systems in the global south.

One of our studies examined how violent conflict influenced agricultural investment decisions among rural households in Nigeria. We combined nationally representative household data with detailed conflict records, to track how exposure to violence affects farming.

The findings showed that violent conflict altered agricultural investment decisions. It made farmers less likely to cultivate major crops.

The cultivation of yam, sweet potato, groundnut, cowpea, maize and cassava declined as conflict incidents increased. Sweet potato was the most affected, perhaps because it needs a lot of labour and a longer time to grow.

When conflict disrupts farming through abandoned fields, lost livestock, or altered investment decisions, it undermines food availability and long-term agricultural development.

Understanding these impacts is useful when designing ways to help farmers and sustain food systems in conflict-affected areas.

The reality

Our study used panel data from Nigeria’s Living Standards Measurement Study covering the periods 2012/2013, 2015/2016 and 2018/2019.

The national study provides detailed household-level information. This covers demographic characteristics, agricultural production, crop choice, land allocation, input use, production costs and market participation.

We combined the household coordinates with geocoded conflict data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) to measure exposure to violent conflict. The ACLED database provides detailed information on battles, violence against civilians, remote violence, protests and riots.

Our study focused on three indicators of violent conflict exposure:

• total number of conflict incidents

• number of violent incidents affecting civilians (including Boko Haram-related violence)

• number of battles, including protests, riots and farmer–herder clashes.

To capture local exposure to violence, we measured conflict incidents within a radius of 10km of each surveyed household in a given year.

By linking spatial conflict data with household-level agricultural information across multiple survey waves, the study analysed how exposure to violent conflict influenced farmers’ production decisions, land allocation and agricultural outcomes over time.

The findings

The results indicate that insecurity discourages farmers from engaging in production activities that involve greater risk or long-term investment. Conflict exposure also affects land allocation decisions.

The analysis showed a reduction in the total cultivated land area and a decline in the share of land allocated to key staple crops.

This pattern suggests that farmers respond to insecurity by scaling down farming activities, avoiding distant plots, and concentrating on smaller or safer areas of land. Reducing the land cultivated may result in less food produced.

We found that conflict led to less spending on agricultural production. Farmers invested less in inputs such as fertilizer, pesticides and hired labour.

The effects varied across management types. Plots managed by men showed relatively stable investment levels. Production costs increased on plots managed by men and women. This could be due to reliance on external labour during periods of insecurity.

The findings demonstrate that violent conflict affects crop choices, reduces land use and discourages agricultural investment.

Disruptions also increase the cost of agricultural production and marketing, making farming less profitable. Government efforts to support agriculture, such as input subsidies and rural development programmes, don’t work so well in conflict zones.

The adverse effects are more severe for households in highly conflict-prone areas. Disputes have long-term economic impacts.

Recommendation and policy implications

The findings highlight the need for conflict-sensitive agricultural policies and targeted rural development interventions.

First, strong rural security and community conflict resolution mechanisms are essential. Government and local authorities should monitor security in major agricultural zones and help communities to build peace.

Policies should encourage farmers to plant climate-smart and low-risk crops that need fewer inputs and have shorter production cycles. This would make agricultural systems more resilient to conflict.

Extension services should advise farmers on which crops to plant, improved seed varieties, and farming strategies suitable for insecure environments.

Policymakers should invest in rural infrastructure and early-warning systems, including market access, transport networks and conflict monitoring systems.

– Violent conflicts are reshaping what Nigerian farmers grow: what this means for food security
– https://theconversation.com/violent-conflicts-are-reshaping-what-nigerian-farmers-grow-what-this-means-for-food-security-278719

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By David Campbell Francis, Senior Researcher, Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the Witwatersrand

The informal economy is responsible for a large share of economic output across the continent. Yet economic policy is almost always designed for the formal economy and overlooks the informal economy.

We are labour-market economists interested in the informal economy and informal work. We have spent the last two years investigating the concept of an economic policy for informal workers. We spent several months interviewing informal traders, traders’ associations and key stakeholders. Our aim was to better understand their challenges, and to inform the development of an economic policy for informal trading.

Drawing on our research partnership with Women in Informal Employment Globalising and Organising, we argue that rethinking economic policy from the perspective of the informal economy is essential.

We begin from the premise that economic policy must actively support the everyday economy. Recognising informal traders as economic agents, and investing in systems that support them, allows local economies to become more resilient, inclusive and sustainable. Traders need a supportive ecosystem so they can move beyond survival, and contribute to local growth and development.

Our findings highlight five areas that should support a policy ecosystem: macroeconomic stability; efficient administration; regulation of competition; participation in policy and governance; and inclusive infrastructure.

On the ground

Our research focused on informal traders in Gauteng, South Africa’s economic hub. The sector provides vital income for marginalised communities and brings essential goods and services closer to where people live. Yet traders remain on the periphery of policy attention. Urban management often treats them as a problem to control rather than as economic actors to engage.

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Read more: Johannesburg has failed its informal traders: policies are in place, but action is needed

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Most informal traders are own-account workers, operating on survivalist incomes that often fall below the poverty line. They face unpredictable markets, limited access to infrastructure, and constant regulatory uncertainty. This makes it difficult to grow their businesses or improve earnings.

These difficulties reflect the fact that informal traders operate in environments that have multiple layers. These include:

• local factors: municipal regulations, permits, policing, infrastructure, competition, community networks

• broader national forces: macroeconomic trends, regulatory frameworks, structural inequalities, formal-sector dominance.

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Read more: Johannesburg’s produce market has supplied the informal sector for decades: a refresh is due

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Understanding these interlocking layers is essential when creating policies that support sustainable livelihoods and growth.

Five policy pillars

(1) Macroeconomic stability

This needs to be the first pillar of the economic policy. The informal sector is highly sensitive to macroeconomic conditions for a number of reasons.

Firstly, informal traders earn low and unstable incomes. This means that rising living costs quickly erode their ability to sustain livelihoods. This is particularly true when it comes to food, transport and energy prices.

Secondly, the sector is vulnerable to poor growth and unemployment. The informal economy functions as a safety net during economic downturns by absorbing workers displaced from the formal sector. This was well illustrated during the COVID pandemic. But there’s a downside. A flood of new entrants into a constrained sector leads to overcrowding. In turn this:

• leads to intensified competition for limited trading spaces

• disrupts existing organisational systems

• weakens trader networks

• reduces earnings.

Macroeconomic instability, therefore, expands informality. It also threatens informal livelihoods.

Revisiting macroeconomic policy should also include a tax policy that doesn’t prejudice informal workers.

(2) Efficient administration

Administrative inefficiencies and exclusionary practices create barriers for informal traders. For example, delays in issuing permits and other documentation leave traders vulnerable to harassment, bribery and eviction.

Inconsistent enforcement of bylaws creates an uneven playing field. Compliant traders are disadvantaged while irregular practices persist.

These burdens are not solely the result of local government shortcomings. They also reflect national-level failures such as delays in processing asylum-seeker applications. This disadvantages traders who rely on formal documentation to operate legally.

Together, these administrative challenges have a number of knock-on effects. They:

• intensify competition over limited spaces

• erode trust in authorities

• constrain the stability and growth of the informal sector.

(3) Regulation of competition

The South African informal sector faces competition on multiple fronts.

Traders compete among themselves for a limited number of customers and trading spaces. They also face intense competition from the formal sector. Examples include supermarkets, retail chains and shopping malls. Informal traders are pushed into less profitable or precarious locations.

It’s often assumed that there’s perfect competition in the sector – that market players can trade freely.

But they do face structural disadvantages such as regulatory barriers, formal-sector dominance and uneven access to prime trading spaces.

Formal-sector expansion is framed as economic “development”. But it frequently displaces long-standing informal systems.

Intense and unfair competition in the informal sector has another consequence: it forces traders to compete primarily on price rather than quality or service. This is because they can’t match the economies of scale, marketing power, or infrastructure advantages of formal retailers and better-resourced informal traders.

(4) Participation in policy and governance

An economic policy for informal traders needs to emerge from their involvement in policy and governance discussions.

Informal traders are often excluded from the planning and decision-making processes around things that affect them. This includes bylaw enforcement, market design and permit systems.

The result is policies that fail to reflect the realities of informal trade. In turn this:

• creates unnecessary obstacles

• increases uncertainty

• limits traders’ ability to plan, invest and grow.

(5) Inclusive infrastructure

Many traders operate in spaces without electricity, water, sanitation or safe storage facilities. Poor infrastructure limits the types of goods traders can sell and increases operational. It also exposes both traders and customers to health and safety risks.

Too often, cities treat infrastructure provision for informal traders as optional. Or it’s not designed with the needs of informal traders in mind.

This neglect produces unsafe and precarious work environments, undermining both livelihoods and local economic activity.

Infrastructure that is designed to meet traders’ needs will translate investment into higher productivity, improved earnings, safer working conditions and more vibrant local markets. This will benefit both traders and the communities they serve.

– Economic policy in South Africa neglects informal traders: 5 focus areas to support the sector 
– https://theconversation.com/economic-policy-in-south-africa-neglects-informal-traders-5-focus-areas-to-support-the-sector-278323

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Philippa Osim Inyang, Senior Researcher, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs

West Africa as a region has long had one of the most mobile populations in the world. Since 1979, the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) has allowed citizens of its member states to travel freely across borders without visas.

This freedom of movement has helped support regional trade, labour mobility and social ties. But a technological shift is changing how borders operate, with important implications for human rights.

Across west Africa, governments are introducing biometric identification systems, facial recognition cameras and artificial intelligence tools at airports and land borders.

As a researcher in international law, human rights and technology governance, I recently published a study on these developments. In it I argue that the growing use of AI-driven border surveillance risks undermining migrants’ rights. It is weakening data protection and placing pressure on the region’s commitment to free movement.

These systems promise to help governments combat terrorism, human trafficking and irregular migration. However, they also raise serious questions about privacy, discrimination and the future of free movement in the region.

The rise of ‘digital borders’

In the past, borders in west Africa were often lightly controlled. Many crossing points lacked sophisticated equipment. Regional mobility relied largely on trust and travel documents. This is rapidly changing.

In the past ten years, governments have turned to technology to strengthen border security and identification. They use surveillance tools like cameras and digital systems that monitor, track and record people’s movements.

Border posts are being upgraded with biometric scanners, centralised databases and automated border management systems. Nigeria, for example, now issues biometric passports. Residents have to register for national identification numbers that store fingerprints and facial data. Immigration authorities have also introduced biometric screening at major airports and land borders.

Artificial intelligence systems can analyse travel data and flag suspicious patterns. This helps authorities detect fraudulent documents or potential security threats. But these technologies also create “digital borders”: systems where access to a country depends not only on physical checkpoints but also on data stored in digital databases.

Europe’s influence on African border technology

The expansion of digital border systems in west Africa is not happening in isolation. European migration policy has played an important role. Over the past decade, the European Union has tried to control migration before migrants reach European territory. This strategy is often called “migration externalisation”. It involves funding border control initiatives in the countries that the migrants come from or travel through.

Through programmes such as the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, European institutions have funded control systems across west Africa. These projects are often presented as development assistance to improve governance.

But they also serve another purpose. They help European governments identify and deport migrants who reach Europe by verifying their nationality using biometric data collected in their home countries. Critics argue that this shifts Europe’s border enforcement into Africa.

Nigeria and Niger show two different paths

The impact of these technologies can be seen clearly in two countries: Nigeria and Niger. In this study, I found that Nigeria has gradually introduced biometric and digital technologies into its immigration system. These tools help modernise border management, but they also raise concerns about how data is collected, stored and shared. Nigeria has adopted data protection laws to regulate personal information, but enforcement remains uneven. Migrants may have limited ability to challenge how their biometric data is used.

Niger presents a different story. For years, the country was a key transit point for migrants travelling through the Sahara towards north Africa and Europe. Under pressure from the European Union, Niger adopted strict anti-smuggling laws in 2015 and expanded surveillance of migration routes. But in 2023, after a military coup, the new government repealed those laws and distanced itself from European migration policies. The decision reopened migration routes.

Risks for privacy and migrants’ rights

AI tools can improve efficiency and strengthen border management, but they also introduce new risks. One major concern is privacy.

Biometric data, including fingerprints and facial scans, is highly sensitive. Once collected, it can be stored indefinitely and shared across multiple databases. Migrants have little information about how their data will be used or whether it might be shared with foreign governments.

Another concern is algorithmic discrimination. AI systems used in border control rely on historical data to identify patterns. If past enforcement targeted certain nationalities or ethnic groups, those biases can become embedded in automated decision-making systems. This may lead to some travellers being flagged for additional screening or denied entry.

Finally, digital border systems can weaken the Ecowas free movement regime if they are used to restrict mobility rather than facilitate it.

Why are regional rules needed?

West Africa already has legal frameworks that could help regulate these technologies.

The 1979 Ecowas Protocol on Free Movement guarantees the right of movement to citizens of member states. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights also protects freedom of movement and prohibits discrimination. But existing laws were written before the rise of artificial intelligence and biometric surveillance. Without updated regulations, governments may adopt powerful surveillance tools without adequate safeguards.

Ecowas has an opportunity to develop regional guidelines on AI and border governance. This could build on frameworks such as the African Union’s Continental Artificial Intelligence Strategy and the G20 AI Principles. These could include rules on data protection, transparency in algorithmic decision-making and independent oversight of surveillance systems. Similar safeguards are already being put in place elsewhere, like the European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act.

Artificial intelligence is likely to play an increasing role in border management worldwide. The question is not whether west Africa will adopt these technologies, but how they will be governed. The region is well placed to develop a model centred on human rights.

– AI-driven border surveillance is spreading across west Africa. What this means for migrants’ rights
– https://theconversation.com/ai-driven-border-surveillance-is-spreading-across-west-africa-what-this-means-for-migrants-rights-278552

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Florian Léon, Chargé de recherche, Fondation pour les Etudes et Recherches sur le Développement International (FERDI); Chercheur associé au CERDI (UMR UCA-CNRS-IRD), Université Clermont Auvergne (UCA)

Africa holds abundant private savings, but much of it remains informal. As a result, its contribution to development financing is limited.

Researcher Florian Léon is one of the authors of a recent report on the potential of the “Caisse de dépôt” model – a financial management framework designed for long-term investment that bridges the gap between public funds and economic development. We asked him how this kind of public savings and investment fund could capture and channel these resources into productive investment, alongside development banks.

He outlines the institutional barriers, the reforms needed, and the paths forward for mobilising both local and diaspora savings.

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What’s the main obstacle to mobilising private savings for development finance in Africa?

First, we need to separate two distinct issues: mobilising private savings; and directing those savings to development financing. African economies have untapped potential on both fronts.

Africa does not lack savings. World Bank data show that household saving rates in the continent are broadly similar to other regions. However, only a small share of these savings is formalised in Africa. Households often prefer informal saving methods, such as hoarding cash.

There are a variety of reasons for this. They range from the cost of using banking services (such as opening an account), to a lack of trust in banks. As a result, much of these savings remains outside the financial system and can’t be put to work for African economies.

That said, even private savings that flow through the banking system rarely fund development in Africa. African commercial banks are often reluctant to grant loans to new clients. Among many factors, financial intermediaries see lending as unprofitable or too risky.

Africa therefore faces a twofold challenge. The continent needs to mobilise more savings and also make better use of the resources already in the financial system.

Our report highlights that if Africa as a region were to catch up with the average developing country in these two areas, it could unlock an additional 10% of the continent’s gross domestic product (GDP) per year.

How do funds like this differ from development banks when it comes to long-term investment?

National development banks and Caisses de dépôt share a common mission. Both aim to finance development and support long-term strategic projects.

The differences between them lie in how they operate. Development banks borrow at low rates. They borrow either on the markets or through loans from other development banks (World Bank, African Development Bank). They then lend at better terms than those available on the market (in terms of rate, duration, or amount).

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Read more: Africa’s development banks are being undermined: the continent will pay the price

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Caisses de dépôt collect private third party funds. These include consignments (funds deposited for temporary safekeeping before restitution, such as prisoners’ savings or unclaimed funds), mandatory deposits, or a portion of regulated savings. They use part of these resources to invest in domestic companies through equity investments. Some of the largest institutions also provide loans.

In short, a fund like this channels domestic private savings into development projects. As for development banks, they rely mainly on borrowed funds – often from external sources.

These two institutions complement each other, as they mobilise different resources and financing tools.

It should be noted that in some countries, including France, Italy and Mauritania, public savings and investment institutions also act as national development banks.

What reforms could make them more effective?

Caisses de dépôt in Africa face a basic problem. They struggle to access the funds they are supposed to manage, such as legal professional deposits or pension reserves. Without them, these can’t play a meaningful role in financing the economy. This situation reflects a lack of political support, depositor mistrust and the reluctance of financial intermediaries (banks) to transfer their resources. Our report identifies three priorities to fix this.

• First, these institutions must build trust with stakeholders, including governments, depositors and financial institutions. This requires strong legal frameworks, sound governance and transparency. They must demonstrate that funds are secure and properly managed.

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Read more: Africa’s public finances are in a mess: a new book explains why and what to do

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• Second, they must broaden their funding base. This involves having a frank discussion with the depositors and custodians of these resources and with the state, which must provide backing. They can then diversify their resources, for instance by developing regulated savings tools.

• Finally, when they have sufficient resources, they can step up as development finance actors. However, they should focus on filling market gaps rather than competing with existing financial intermediaries.

In addition, they can support the development of local financial systems by helping grow segments such as private equity.

How can informal savings and diaspora savings be better harnessed to finance development?

There is no silver bullet, but some lessons can be learned from past experiences. As early as the 1800s, European countries created innovative solutions to offer savings products to the “working population”. By offering liquid, safe savings options backed by the state and providing returns, financial inclusion expanded significantly.

That same formula explains the success of products such as livrets A in France or postal bonds in Italy.

African countries can draw on these models. The practical details must be adapted to the local context, especially to target people living far from urban centres. Digital solutions and mobile money networks could help. If such products existed and were accessible, they could increase the formalisation of public savings.

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Read more: Development finance: how it works, where it goes, why it’s needed

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Mobilising funds from the diaspora raises different challenges. The amounts involved are significant (African diaspora savings are estimated at nearly US$35 billion) and some of these Africans living elsewhere in the world are willing to invest back home. However, mobilising these savings is more complex for various reasons. The diaspora may be spread across many countries. Each group may require tailored solutions that comply with regulations and offerings in host countries.

Currency risk adds another layer of complexity. Diaspora members earn and save in foreign currencies (dollars, euros), but their savings end up in their home country’s currency, which can be weaker and lose value over time. On top of that, diaspora members have different expectations. The offer must be carefully designed to match their preferences.

Efforts are already underway. DiasDev by Expertise France, for example, is working with several African Caisses de dépôt to overcome these challenges. But turning diaspora savings into a real engine for development finance will take time.

– Development finance in Africa: economist explains how private savings could be unlocked
– https://theconversation.com/development-finance-in-africa-economist-explains-how-private-savings-could-be-unlocked-277204