Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Saheed Babajide Owonikoko, Researcher, Centre for Peace and Security Studies, Modibbo Adama University of Technology

Mali and Nigeria, two of the countries in the Sahel region of west Africa, are separated by approximately 1,000 kilometres, with the Niger Republic between them. They differ in population size and government, but they face some of the same threats.

Mali has a population of about 22.4 million, while Nigeria has about 223.8 million. While Nigeria has been a democracy since 1999, Mali has had a military government since 2020.

The two are similar in that they are threatened by multiple armed groups operating in their territories.

Three armed groups – Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP/ISGS), Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) – are shaping the conflict in Mali.

This reached a new high in April 2026 when Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and the Azawad Liberation Front carried out coordinated attacks across Mali.

The northern cities of Kidal and Mopti, as well as military bases in Sevare and Gao, were captured. The heart of Bamako, the capital city of Mali, was also struck, leading to the death of the defence minister, Sadio Camara.

Nigeria too has been threatened by jihadist insurgence and banditry in the north as well as secessionists and militancy in the south. Jama’at Ahl al-Sunna li al-Da’wa wa al-Jihad (JAS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) are active in the north.

Nigeria lost two brigadier generals fighting the insurgents in the north-east between November 2025 and April 2026.

The weakness of the state plays a significant role in the vulnerability of both countries to attacks. As a scholar who has followed the unfolding events in the Sahel, I draw lessons for Nigeria from the April attacks in Mali.

Those lessons include the possibility of alignment among armed groups, the danger of the jihadists advancing to other Sahelian countries, the audacity of the groups, and the possibility that gains of JNIM in Mali could incite rival groups in Nigeria.

Key lessons for Nigeria

The first lesson concerns armed groups teaming up to fight the state. The April attackers were a combined force of FLA and JNIM. These groups share a common aim: securing enclaves within Mali. They joined efforts to carry out the attacks, each focusing on the areas they wished to control.

In the same vein, Nigeria has battled many armed groups. Competition, rather than cooperation, has defined the relationship between these groups, especially in northern Nigeria. This has always been to the advantage of the Nigerian state. The erstwhile charismatic leader of terror group Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, survived for more than a decade but died during clashes between his group, JAS and ISWAP members.

This led to a decline in Boko Haram’s activities, although they are now gradually resurging.

However, there is evidence of an unfolding alliance between terrorists in the north-east and bandits in the north-central and north-west areas of Nigeria. Such alliance have often been in terms of tactical cooperation as well as exchange of members and arms.

There is also a possibility of closing ranks and joining forces between Boko Haram and ISWAP, especially if leaders who favour working together with ISWAP take over Boko Haram from Bakura Doro, the current leader of JAS, after the death of Abukakar Shekau. If this happens, it may escalate terrorist activities that may be difficult for Nigeria to manage.

The second lesson is that the audacity of the JNIM/FLA coalition and the results achieved can motivate related groups to act in other parts of the Sahel. The al-Qaeda-linked and ISIS-linked terrorist groups have been involved in a competition for control of the Sahel for a long period.

This comes in the form of direct armed attacks against each other, competition over territory and recruiting, and attempting to demonstrate the ability to cause more violence than the other. This has led to an increase in jihadist attacks.

JNIM’s takeover of some cities in Mali may encourage its ISIS-affiliated rivals in the Greater Sahara and Lake Chad to also increase their violence.

In the Lake Chad Region, ISWAP has intensified attacks against military formations while also building parallel states in many areas of the Lake Chad basin, with Nigeria being the most affected.

Lastly, with the capture of Kidal and attacks near Bamako, JNIM may be close to capturing Mali. If Mali falls, it could be a training ground for terrorists in the Sahel. This fear was the reason Nigeria mobilised its forces for a peacekeeping mission in Mali in 2012. And if Mali falls, Burkina Faso and Niger will be threatened.

The threat to Niger is a significant problem because it is a buffer zone for Nigeria. Meanwhile Nigeria is a major target of the jihadist insurgents in their move to extend towards coastal west Africa.

What should Nigeria do?

Mali’s experience could turn the lens on Nigeria. Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have opted out of the Economic Community of West African States, Ecowas. But Nigeria and other countries in the region should not abandon the breakaway states at this stage. Necessary regional support should be galvanised and Nigeria can still play a leading role in this.

In my view, Nigeria also needs to rejig its counter-terrorism to be more responsive. Rather than its current defensive posture, which gives jihadists the opportunity to plan, Nigeria ought to adopt sophisticated and strategic offensive counter-terrorism that takes the war to the jihadists.

– Mali’s security crisis holds warnings for Nigeria: here’s why
– https://theconversation.com/malis-security-crisis-holds-warnings-for-nigeria-heres-why-282180

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Herkulaas MvE Combrink, Senior lecturer/ Co-Director, University of the Free State

Misleading information online is often treated as a technical glitch, something that better algorithms or stricter moderation can fix. But research points to a more complex reality. That is, the rise of “misfluencers”, individuals who shape how information is interpreted, shared and trusted across digital platforms.

Whether acting deliberately or not, they tap into emotion, identity and community to amplify misleading claims in ways that feel credible and relatable. This human layer makes misinformation harder to detect and regulate. It’s a danger when it comes to everyday decisions about important topics like health, finance and technology. Understanding how misfluencers operate is key to navigating an information environment where trust is increasingly contested.

Herkulaas MvE Combrink is a co-director at the Interdisciplinary Centre for Digital Futures, senior lecturer in Economics and Management Sciences at the UFS, and the head of the Knowledge Mapping Lab, a research group to manage infodemics and human language technology innovation.

Phelokazi Mkungeka is an interdisciplinary researcher with a background in sociology, specialising in artificial intelligence and health misinformation in digital environments.

They’ve explored the interplay between AI, misfluencers and health communication.

What exactly is a ‘misfluencer’, and how do they differ from traditional influencers?

A misfluencer is an individual who shapes how information is interpreted, trusted, and acted upon within a network. Misfluencers fuel the spread of misinformation by being perceived as a trustworthy source of information that people within their social network latch onto.

Traditional influencers typically aim to promote products, lifestyles, or ideas with clear intent. Often, these are within commercial or branding frameworks marketing a specific product, for example.

Sources of misinformation, on the other hand, are usually defined by the content itself. They are people who share false or misleading information.

During the COVID-19 health crisis, for example, some people on social media without any scientific or medical training unintentionally endorsed medications that were not approved.

Their relatability also makes their content feel credible, even when it is not accurate.

Misfluencers often speak from a point of perceived authenticity, shared identity, or community belonging, rather than formal expertise. They may have a strong opinion about something that is either sensational or topical at that point in time – a new discovery, a crisis, a political campaign, even a new technology.

Misfluencers amplify misinformed ideas or constructs, which become part of the dialogue within digital domains. It is not always on purpose.

Why are misfluencers so influential?

In an age where online influence shapes reality, the question is no longer what is true, but whether truth can still compete. Complex ideas (like a new vaccine) are full of terminology and concepts that the everyday person may not understand.

Misfluencers often take complex ideas and distil them into an understandable narrative for most people. They are effective because they operate on the level of meaning, not just information. They create a sense of coherence, even when the underlying content is misleading. In many cases, the narrative “feels right” before it is evaluated as true or false. People then tend to latch onto these ideas. Another example is the social media conspiracy theories that emerged during the 2020 COVID-19 lockdowns.

Information shared within networks is more likely to be accepted and repeated, reinforcing its perceived validity.

Do misfluencers act intentionally?

While some individuals may deliberately spread misleading information for ideological, financial or social gain, many others do so unintentionally.

You can think of it as a type of intellectual broken telephone. The way the initial message is comprehended changes over time as it is told and reframed, leaving out key details that distort the intellectual meaning just enough to be misinformed. Algorithmic systems further complicate this. Content that generates engagement is more likely to be promoted by online algorithms, regardless of its accuracy.

This can elevate individuals into influential positions without deliberate intent. Understanding misfluencers therefore requires moving beyond the idea of “bad actors” and recognising the systemic and social processes that enable ordinary users to participate in the spread of misleading information.

What can be done about it?

Addressing misfluencers requires a shift from content control to context awareness. Simply removing or flagging harmful information is often insufficient, as it does not address why the information is persuasive. Individuals should be critical rather than passively consuming “information”.

One idea is to place a Social Stress Indicator and a Credibility score on online conversations, specifically in public chatrooms and social media platforms. A Social Stress Indicator is a type of digital thermometer that can flag conversations once the social stress reaches a certain threshold. Social stress is an indicator that can measure potential statements or conversations that may escalate into online arguments, typically centred around sensitive conversations or around topics that may be considered provocative. These conversations may then in turn trigger negative sentiment, which can then be tracked online.

Another important societal call to action is to improve digital literacy. Digital literacy needs to move beyond fact-checking towards interpretive awareness. In other words, people need to become more critical about the information they consider correct because information is being generated faster than it can be verified. When this happens, we have an infodemic – the perfect environment for misinformation to arise and for misfluencing to happen. Interventions should focus on slowing down the spread of potentially harmful narratives rather than censoring them outright. The reason is that there may be legitimate concerns within conversations that contain misinformation, and it is important to address these concerns, otherwise the misinformation will continue.

For policymakers, the challenge is to find a balance between protecting freedom of expression and ensuring accountability when harmful or misleading information spreads online. This does not necessarily mean stricter censorship. Instead, it can involve practical measures such as requiring greater transparency around sponsored content, supporting independent fact checking, improving digital literacy, and creating clear rules for how social media platforms respond to harmful misinformation.

For example, governments can encourage platforms to label manipulated content, provide context on health claims, or make data available to researchers studying how information spreads. During public health crises, partnerships between universities, health departments and technology companies can also help identify harmful narratives early and improve public communication.

Better tools are needed to measure influence and harm. Policymakers need reliable indicators that can show when online conversations begin to shape risky behaviour, distrust, or confusion at scale. Building these measures will require much more research and collaboration between scientists, public health experts, and technology sectors.

The goal is not to silence people or eliminate misfluencers. It is to create healthier information environments where influence is balanced by trustworthy information, context and accountability. In a world where online voices increasingly shape what people believe, the future may depend not only on who speaks the loudest, but on how society helps people make sense of what they hear.

– What are misfluencers and what can be done about false information online?
– https://theconversation.com/what-are-misfluencers-and-what-can-be-done-about-false-information-online-282072

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Catriona Macleod, Professor of Psychology, Rhodes University

A series of conferences held in Entebbe, Uganda, between 2023 and 2025 have resulted in a draft African Charter on Family, Sovereignty and Values. The meetings were organised by the Inter-parliamentary Network on African Sovereignty and Values, which organises continental conferences for African legislators and faith-based advocates. Supported by international conservative groups like Family Watch International and heavily promoted by Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni, the aim of the drafters of the charter is to convince African governments to sign on to it.

The draft charter is situated within the current global movement to the right, which prioritises nationalism, tougher immigration policies and an erosion of social values like gender equity. Framed as an effort to “protect” the family, it urges governments to adopt a series of regressive measures.

These include:

• opposing comprehensive sexuality education

• rejecting the sexual and reproductive health and rights agenda, especially abortion (under any circumstance)

• establishing African “sovereignty” over health, food, education and economic development

• preserving African cultural values, traditions and the role of elders.

Several legal responses have been set out by African rights institutions, such as Afya Na Haki. These show the clash of many of the draft charter’s proposals with continental legal provisions.

We are researchers with extensive experience in sexual and reproductive health and rights. Here, we address the inaccuracies contained in the charter. We are particularly concerned about the implications if it is adopted.

Decades of scientific evidence produced on the African continent and elsewhere suggest that the measures, if adopted, will cause significant harm.

Reproductive health and rights

The draft charter declares, among other things, that African countries shouldn’t ratify any agreements that reference sexual and reproductive health and rights. It also calls for eliminating comprehensive sexuality education and any form of abortion service provision.

At a very basic level, disregarding sexual and reproductive health undermines obstetric and gynaecological care, childbirth and fertility treatments. It also affects the prevention and treatment of HIV and sexually transmitted infections. It harms access to contraceptive services and family planning, as well as reproductive cancer care. No African country would sensibly contemplate this.

Additionally, the draft falsely claims that the sexual and reproductive health rights “agenda” promotes abortion on demand. Yet, the UN’s definition of “reproductive health” encompasses comprehensive abortion care within countries’ legal frameworks.

The draft charter encourages states to define all related terms to clearly exclude any rights to abortion. No exceptions are specified. This would include cases where the pregnant person’s life is at risk, as well as pregnancies resulting from rape or incest.

This stance contradicts understandings of abortion within African countries. A 2025 survey conducted across 38 African countries found that nearly two-thirds (63%) of citizens say abortion is justified if the woman’s health or life is at risk. Nearly half (48%) justified abortion in the case of rape or incest.

The draft also flies in the face of recent changes in African law. Globally, Africa, compared with other regions, has had the largest number of countries liberalising abortion laws since 1994.

Implementing the draft charter would additionally lead to a significant increase in maternal mortality from unsafe abortions. It’s important to note that the proportion of unwanted and unsupportable pregnancies that end in abortion is consistently similar across countries with liberal or restrictive abortion laws. This means that restrictive laws don’t reduce abortion rates. They merely drive abortion underground, rendering it unsafe.

Already, sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 29% of the global unsafe abortions and 62% of abortion-related deaths. Further restrictions on comprehensive abortion care (including post-abortion care) would drive up maternal morbidity and mortality.

Comprehensive sexuality education

The draft charter argues for abstinence-focused sexuality education. It falsely claims that comprehensive education would sexualise African children, undermine their innocence and violate parental rights.

Comprehensive sexuality education is a curriculum-based, scientifically accurate process of teaching and learning about the cognitive, emotional, physical and social aspects of sexuality. It encourages abstinence but also provides teaching, in an age-appropriate manner, on contraception and ways to avoid sexual risks. These risks include infections and unplanned pregnancies.

Research conducted over three decades indicates that comprehensive sexuality education provides more positive outcomes than abstinence-based sexuality education. These outcomes include reducing early and unintended pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases (including HIV). It also helps delay early initiation of sexual activity and reduces intimate partner violence.

In claiming that comprehensive sexuality education undermines children’s innocence, the draft charter conflates “innocence” with ignorance. Children have a natural curiosity regarding sexual issues once they reach puberty. They will seek out information where they can (including social media). One of the ways of protecting them from sex-related harms is to empower them with age-appropriate knowledge about sexual issues. And the skills to avoid sexual risks.

Comprehensive sexuality education also recognises that parents often struggle with talking to their children about sexual matters. It therefore offers an important source of trustworthy information for children and adolescents. Further, while the family is of pre-eminent importance in society, it can also be the site of child abuse, child neglect and intimate partner violence.

Definition of family

Finally, the draft charter defines the family as based on marriage between a man and a woman. This definition of family as nuclear and heterosexual is not an originally African one.

In precolonial Africa, the practice of polygyny/polyandry was prevalent. This presented a clear contrast to the nuclear, monogamous model. In reality, family structures are highly diverse in Africa. They include many multigenerational, single-parent, re-constituted and same-sex parent families.

The draft charter dresses up its provisions in the language of ubuntu. This is a relational, inclusive and dynamic ethical philosophy. In doing so, it distorts the essence of ubuntu by converting this philosophy into a rigid, exclusionary and state-focused ideology.

What next

The draft charter threatens to undermine the rule of law and the shared legal principles that underpin the international treaty system. It claims to defend African sovereignty.

But true sovereignty means honouring the treaties governments have freely adopted. These include the Maputo Protocol, which guarantees women extensive rights, including reproductive health choices and protection from violence. The African Children’s Charter similarly enshrines children’s rights to protection, development and well-being.

The draft charter is not defence of African values. It’s a legal coup against them. It should be dismissed outright by all African governments.

– A draft African charter on ‘family values’ is on the cards: why it’s flawed and dangerous
– https://theconversation.com/a-draft-african-charter-on-family-values-is-on-the-cards-why-its-flawed-and-dangerous-282423

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Abeer Elshater, Professor of Urban Morphology, Ain Shams University

Generative AI (GenAI) is a type of artificial intelligence that creates new content – like text, images, or ideas – by learning patterns from existing data. GenAI, particularly through large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT and DeepSeek, is rapidly becoming part of everyday urban design research and practice.

The models can summarise literature in seconds, generate policy scenarios, and help draft complex narratives.

For urban designers and researchers working under pressure, this feels like a breakthrough. But beneath this efficiency lies a deeper question: are we enhancing urban design knowledge, or quietly reshaping it in ways we do not fully understand?

Urban design is an academic and professional field concerned with shaping the physical form and experience of cities. It looks at the relationships between buildings, spaces, people and activities within broader urban systems.

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Read more: AI could make cities autonomous, but that doesn’t mean we should let it happen

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The field has evolved differently across regions, reflecting diverse historical, political and spatial contexts. For example, in Europe, urban design has often been shaped by post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation of the destroyed urban forms, while in the United States it has been influenced by urban renewal policies and large-scale redevelopment. Urban design is not a fixed set of principles, but a context-dependent theory and practice that responds to specific local challenges and conditions.

GenAI is now widely used in urban design to help with analysis and decision-making. For instance, researchers use machine learning to study pedestrian movement and traffic patterns from video data, which helps planners create safer and more efficient streets.

Some studies use GenAI to create and test different urban design options, such as changing land use, building density, or access to green spaces, so designers can quickly compare choices. In environmental planning, GenAI models can simulate urban heat or air quality, helping with climate-sensitive decisions. These examples show that GenAI provides ways to test ideas and handle complex challenges, rather than replacing designers.

Our work as urban designers and researchers has always depended on interpretation, context and ethical judgment. Cities are not just datasets; they are lived environments shaped by history, culture and power. When LLMs enter this space, they influence how problems are framed and how solutions are imagined. Their use therefore should not be just technical, but should be managed critically. Each theory developed for a particular city or place evolved to address the needs of specific groups of people within a distinct context and for a particular purpose. LLMs need to be developed faster to have this sensitivity about people and place history.

Our recent research was motivated by the rapid and often uncritical integration of LLMs into planning research and practice. The work asks a central question: how do these tools reshape the way urban knowledge is produced, interpreted and validated in a discipline that depends heavily on context, judgment and field-based understanding?

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Read more: Debate: How to stop our cities from being turned into AI jungles

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Our key finding is that LLMs can be very helpful; they can speed up writing, support analysis and help explore ideas. However, they also carry important risks, especially when their outputs are treated as fully correct or used without considering context.

We propose some cornerstones for responsible use. These are not strict rules, but practical guides to keep human judgment central, ensure ideas stay grounded in context, and maintain responsibility in planning research and practice.

10 cornerstones

1. Research sovereignty should remain with the human. The direction of inquiry must always come from the researcher. If planners begin by asking the model what to study or how to frame a problem, they risk producing inconsistency and generic outputs.

2. Engagement with GenAI is critical, not passive. LLMs generate plausible text based on patterns, not verified truth. This means every output should be tested and refined. Accepting it at face value risks embedding hidden biases and weak assumptions.

3. Knowledge should be grounded in context. Cities are deeply specific. A recommendation that works in one place may fail in another due to social, political, or cultural differences. LLMs tend to produce generalised solutions without understanding local realities. Planners must anchor these suggestions in field knowledge and community insight.

4. Everyone should be careful. They should not trust GenAI too quickly. In planning debates such as zoning or rent control, LLMs can sound very confident, even when they are wrong. Sometimes they may even give references that do not exist. This can spread incorrect information and weaken trust in research.

5. While any of the LLMs can assist in identifying and organising sources, they cannot replace the critical judgment required to assess accuracy, context and fit. The responsibility for validating references remains with the researcher.

6. Planners must recognise that LLMs do not “remember” in the way humans do. They lack continuity across conversations and can lose track of earlier assumptions. AI forgets things. Maintaining coherence in long-term research, therefore, depends on the researcher, not the tool.

7. A subtler issue is rigidity. LLMs often repeat dominant ideas or default solutions, even when the context differs. For example, when asked how to improve a congested street, an LLM may suggest widening roads or adding car lanes, even where such interventions could harm walkability and heritage value. Breaking out of these patterns requires active intervention.

8. We can understand GenAI as a partner in thinking, but not an equal one. The planner must decide what matters, whose voices are included, and what ethical priorities guide the work.

9. Effective use of GenAI requires strategic manoeuvring. This means combining AI-generated insights with collected data, community engagement and professional judgment. The value of LLMs lies not in replacing urban design processes, but in enriching them, if used carefully.

10. Academic integrity is non-negotiable. Urban design research is not just about producing text; it is about engaging intellectually with people, places and consequences.

Why this matters

GenAI in urban design is like fire – powerful, but dangerous without human control.

Used well, GenAI can help urban designers think more broadly and act more effectively. Used poorly, it risks reducing urban design to automated generalisation, detached from the lived experience of cities.

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Read more: AI-powered assistive technologies are changing how we experience and imagine public space

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The future of urban design is not about choosing between humans and machines, but about designing thoughtful collaboration between them. The challenge is not whether machines can think, but how we think with them.

– AI can design cities, but can it understand what matters to people? 10 ways to keep humans in control
– https://theconversation.com/ai-can-design-cities-but-can-it-understand-what-matters-to-people-10-ways-to-keep-humans-in-control-281471

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Kyra Pazan, Assistant Professor of Anthropology, California State University, Stanislaus

When imagining our early human ancestors in prehistoric Africa hundreds of thousands of years ago, one might envision trekkers plodding across a savanna, baking under an equatorial sun.

Research, however, suggests that our species’ unique strengths – creativity, cooperation and adaptability – may have been honed in a very different environment. Our team of archaeologists has uncovered a story in which mountainous landscapes played a central role in making us human.

Today, those of us who like to explore mountains have technical gear and conveniences like GPS safety beacons, water filters and raincoats that pack down small. Without this, we’d be lucky to last one night in some places. How did early humans not only survive, but thrive in these landscapes?

This question inspires my archaeological research in Lesotho’s Maloti-Drakensberg Mountains. Since 2023, I have led an international team of excavators at Likonong, a collapsed rock shelter in a remote area of eastern Lesotho.

Our findings reveal that Likonong is the oldest known archaeological site in these mountains and an incredible case study in human adaptation.

Likonong was first discovered in 1995. I visited the site as a graduate student in 2015 and returned in 2023 with my PhD to begin excavations. I hoped that Likonong would be older than Melikane, which, at 83,000 years old, was Lesotho’s earliest known site at the time. When my team started finding stone tools that looked 100,000 years older, I realised this site was more important than I’d imagined.

Our excavations have found evidence of people visiting Likonong beginning at 242,000 years ago, and making regular, longer visits by 144,000 years ago. Previously, archaeologists suspected that sustained occupation in highland Lesotho was unlikely before the climate warmed during the Last Interglacial, 130,000 years ago. Instead, our research shows that early humans thrived here during an ice age, possibly by relying on one another.

The setting

We’re no longer in an ice age, but living in Lesotho still requires teamwork. At Likonong, we’re hours away from the nearest paved road or medical clinic, excavating on a precarious, erosive slope above a ravine. We sleep in tents, filter water, and cook for ourselves. The sun sets at 5pm, giving way to unbearably cold and windy nights. Tinder is scarce on the barren, treeless landscape. At an elevation of 1,800 metres, an oncoming storm inevitably means snow.

Making the excavation work requires cooperation from each member of the team. While some of us dig, others sieve excavated sediment in search of artefacts. Someone heats up the tea kettle when the late afternoon chill sets in, and someone else knocks down the metre-long icicles that collect on the shelter roof.

It simply isn’t possible to survive in this environment without help, which might be why earlier hominins – members of the human lineage – didn’t stand a chance. While a few isolated hand axes suggest that a few brave individuals attempted to survive here, we haven’t discovered their bones or their campsites.

In contrast, 50km north-west of Johannesburg (about 600km from our site), an underground labyrinth of limestone caves known as the “Cradle of Humankind” traces human evolution back nearly 4 million years, to a time before the first stone tools or manmade fire. Hominins thrived in these lowlands and the equatorial highlands of east Africa, but the earliest occupations at Likonong didn’t occur until after the emergence of our species.

When were people there, and what were they doing?

In our excavations at Likonong we used several methods to get a clearer idea of how humans learned to adapt and survive at the site. One, called magnetic susceptibility, measures how easily sediment can be magnetised. We use it as an indirect measure of fire use, which we expect to have been frequent for anyone using Likonong as a home base. Fire is critical not only for warmth, but also for cooking, making tools, and advanced technologies like adhesives. The earliest occupations dating to around 242,000 and 214,000 years ago have relatively low magnetic susceptibility values, implying limited burning and that humans were not staying at the site for very long.

Evidence for human occupation between 214,000 and 144,000 years ago is minimal. But then something changed. Signs of human activity increased so much that we named this layer “Lower Crazy Town” because of the stone tools and charred bone gushing from its layers. We believe that this is the point at which humans started using Likonong as a more permanent home base. Families built hearths on top of hearths, cooked food, made tools, and slept in the shelter. Not long after, burning was so frequent that the earth itself turned red. Instead of building the occasional fire, humans structured their lives around this technology.

Crucially, surviving in the highlands at this time (144,000 years ago) would have been even more challenging than at 242,000 years ago. Between 190,000 and 130,000 years ago, a period of time known as the Penultimate Glacial Period, the world was plunged into an ice age. Temperatures dropped more than 6ºC, lush forests disintegrated into windswept grasslands, and glaciers capped the mountains’ highest peaks.

So why couldn’t Likonong’s first visitors figure out how to survive at the site for longer periods of time? We don’t believe they were any less intelligent than the later occupants.

We think they left because they didn’t share information, collaborate, or cooperate with one another. Innovations don’t happen in a vacuum. Cultural knowledge relies on mechanisms for both preserving and spreading information, such as far-ranging social networks and oral tradition. One small change – for example, more frequent fire use – could have led to profound technological advances by creating an environment for information sharing and group cohesion.

The humans who ventured into the highlands 144,000 years ago would have been under extreme environmental pressures. If they chose to rely on one another, sharing their skills and experiences around a fire, they may have jump-started a cascade of changes that shaped us into the adaptable species we are today.

During my first season as a principal investigator at Likonong, I was constantly texting my colleagues for help and advice. Which sieve should we use? What kind of stone was that? How do I resolve personal conflicts with team members? I’m lucky they picked up the phone. Without their help, I probably would have quickly left the site, too – just like the first humans to venture into the highlands, 242,000 years ago.

– Lesotho’s mountain life was harsh for early humans: fire made all the difference
– https://theconversation.com/lesothos-mountain-life-was-harsh-for-early-humans-fire-made-all-the-difference-281168

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Misheck Mutize, Post Doctoral Researcher, Graduate School of Business (GSB), University of Cape Town

Africa is providing cheap liquidity to wealthy nations. In return it is paying huge interest rates to external institutional investors at the cost of its own development.

For instance, African central banks export their reserve funds for safekeeping. Sovereign wealth funds and pension fund managers invest only in investment-grade European and United States institutions. The most popular one is risk-free US treasuries, where they earn 3.5% annually on average. These are perceived as the safest instruments, easily convertible to cash without losing value.

The same European and US institutions then reinvest the same capital back to Africa at a high return for themselves. They purchase high-yielding bonds issued by African governments. Cumulatively, Africa has raised more than US$200 billion through sovereign Eurobonds since 2003. African countries are paying between 9% and 15% through Eurobond issuances.

Based on my expertise researching African financial markets, I argue that African countries can close their financing gap if they change regulations and investment policies.

Channelling a portion of Africa’s domestic funds to the continent’s development finance institutions would create a huge pool of domestic resources. This will make a significant impact on development. It would not jeopardise the central banks and asset managers’ need for safety of their funds. This would be a practical step towards a self-sustaining African financial ecosystem.

Africa’s capital strength

African central banks hold an estimated US$530 billion in reserves offshore. This is an international financial practice promoted by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and credit rating agencies. Central banks are required to maintain enough US dollar reserves to pay for four to six months of imports.

The sovereign wealth funds of 20 African countries now have approximately US$109.8 billion in total assets under management. Adding other assets of African origin, the amount climbs up to an estimated US$1.2 trillion.

The latest report by Africa Finance Corporation estimates Africa’s domestic capital base at US$4 trillion. These are funds owned by African institutions and individual citizens in the form of reserves, collected deposits, premiums and savings.

Other countries such as China, South Korea and Japan used domestic resources and state-directed finance to aggressively drive their own industrial transformation.

This hasn’t been the case for African countries. The continent’s financing gap is estimated at US$280 billion annually for infrastructure and trade. That’s the amount African countries need every year to build roads, electricity capacity, ports, railways, manufacturing industries and trade connections necessary for African economies to grow and compete globally.

In addition, despite a huge domestic capital stock, African countries pay high interest rates when they borrow abroad.

A system designed for capital flight

The reason for Africa’s capital flight is systemic. Africa’s financial institutions, including central banks, are required by national regulations and investment policies to invest in investment-grade rated instruments. The only investment-grade ratings recognised by the IMF and World Bank are those issued by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. This means the majority of African assets are excluded from the safe asset category.

The result is that African capital exits the continent. This has left African financial markets with fewer participants and investment instruments. Shallow financial markets make it difficult to finance industrialisation, infrastructure and job creation.

The absence of deep and liquid domestic financial markets becomes the justification for continuing to invest abroad. This is why African countries have remained heavily dependent on foreign capital and external debt despite growing domestic savings.

African central banks reserves

Three African leaders – the presidents of Ghana, Kenya and Zambia – have called for the continent’s foreign reserves invested overseas to be reinvested in African institutions.

At the 2025 Africa Financial Summit, central bankers agreed that it was time for African governments to place a portion of their foreign exchange reserves with domestic institutions.

Channelling a portion of these funds to African development institutions would be a practical step towards a self-sustaining African financial ecosystem. It would not compromise the effectiveness of central banks and other financial institutions. Instead, it would:

• deepen domestic financial markets

• bolster sovereignty

• reduce dependence on foreign financial centres

• strengthen local capital markets.

The Central Bank Deposit Programme by Afreximbank is a good example. Launched in September 2014, it invests in trade and development finance. The programme has mobilised over US$44 billion – about 9% of central bank reserves. Participating central banks have earned 6% to 6.5% – much higher than what investments in Europe and the US offer.

The programme’s performance demonstrates that African reserves can be safely and productively invested within the continent.

AU investment policy shift

It is for this reason that in February 2024 the African Union called on member states to redirect all their reserves back into the continent.

This was a landmark but long-overdue correction in the stewardship of Africa’s financial resources. It was more than an investment policy shift. It was a bold declaration of confidence in Africa’s own institutions and financial markets.

Since then, the AU’s own portfolio of resources has been fully reinvested in African-owned financial institutions. This declaration did not require ratification by AU member states.

What more needs to change

Building an African financing architecture demands a fundamental shift in how African assets are valued, regulated and invested. It means redefining risk for African markets. It also means developing regional investment-grade benchmarks and modernising prudential rules so that African capital can work and grow on the continent.

African capital markets remain shallow not because capital is scarce, but because risk perceptions are distorted. The rising discontent from African policymakers on the cost of capital makes the case even more compelling.

This is why a transformative project such as the Africa Credit Rating Agency has gained support in its pre-establishment phase.

African regulators and reserve managers must act decisively in the following ways:

• change reserve management frameworks to allow more investment in African assets and regional financial institutions

• formally recognise domestic credit ratings that offer contextually sensitive and empirically grounded assessments

• reform IMF-driven constraints that exclude reserves placed in African institutions from being accounted as official reserves

• allow rapid liquidity across borders when needed. This can be done while maintaining global standards to prevent illicit flows and regulatory breaches.

Africa cannot build credible domestic markets if its own capital is absent from the story. Investment is ultimately an act of confidence in the institutions behind the assets. The continent needs to invest in itself.

– Africa’s capital must stay home to plug its financing gap: how it could be done
– https://theconversation.com/africas-capital-must-stay-home-to-plug-its-financing-gap-how-it-could-be-done-281060

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Harith Omar Morgadinho Farooq, Lecturer, Lúrio University

Africa is one of the most biodiverse regions on Earth. But much of its biodiversity remains poorly studied. Research from the continent contributes to less than 1% to global scientific output.

This pattern is often explained by limited investment in research. Governments in sub-Saharan Africa allocate, on average, only about 0.4% of their gross domestic product (GDP) to research and development. By comparison, European countries invest on average more than 2% of GDP, while the global average is around 2.6%. India invests close to 0.7% of GDP, and the US nearly 3.5%. Additional constraints include the lack of infrastructure, and political instability.

But there is a more direct and often overlooked constraint: the salaries of the scientists.

Salary disparities are measurable, policy relevant and a direct economic constraint on researchers’ ability to conduct fieldwork. They play a role in shaping who is able to conduct scientific research, a disparity that becomes especially visible during fieldwork.

We are researchers who have been working on biodiversity conservation in Africa for more than a decade. Through collaboration with and experience in European research institutions, we have observed firsthand how financial limitations affect fieldwork, research continuity and scientific careers. We investigated whether differences in researchers’ incomes are associated with biodiversity research output across African countries.

Our study showed a clear pattern: countries where researchers earn less produce less scientific output and rely more heavily on studies led by foreign institutions. This has implications beyond output alone, because scientific leadership influences which questions are asked, which ecosystems are studied, and how conservation priorities are defined.

Strengthening local research capacity will require greater investment in science and higher education.

Salary disparaties

In our study, we compared salary differences between locally based and foreign-affiliated researchers using publicly available salary data. We linked these to biodiversity research output across 54 African countries using data from the Scopus database.

We found that researchers based at African institutions often earn only a fraction of what their collaborators from higher-income countries receive. This disparity was particularly prominent in Malawi, the Republic of the Congo, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Here, foreign-affiliated salaries were approximately 34, 32, and 25 times higher than local salaries, respectively.

Because of these low salaries, it can take years to save for basic research tools such as field clothing, cameras or computers. For researchers from higher-income countries, these costs can often be covered by a single monthly salary.

This financial constraint may help explain why much of the continent’s biodiversity research is conducted in collaboration with institutions based outside Africa, rather than being led by local organisations, which are few and often underfunded.

Although local researchers often possess critical knowledge of biodiversity, languages, logistics and environmental challenges, they may have limited opportunities to lead projects or secure senior authorship positions in international collaborations.

The hidden cost of doing fieldwork

Biodiversity research is inherently expensive. It requires travel, equipment, permits, and the support of local guides or assistants. Even short expeditions can cost hundreds or thousands of dollars. In many parts of the world, these costs are covered by research grants or institutional funding.

But in Africa, especially for exploratory research, funding is generally limited or unavailable. Consequently, scientists often have to rely on their own income to conduct fieldwork, a pattern also reported by researchers in other lower-income countries.

We found that across countries, foreign-affiliated researchers typically earned between four and 30 times more than locally based scientists conducting research in the same country. Researchers based outside the continent also retain substantially higher disposable income, even after accounting for travel costs, allowing them to contribute to or fully fund fieldwork. By contrast, in half of the African countries analysed, locally based researchers could not cover even a conservative fieldwork budget of US$1,000 using their entire monthly salary.

These differences create an uneven playing field. Success depends not only on the merit of ideas or quality of training, but also on who can afford to be in the field.

As a result, scientists with greater financial security may be better positioned to sustain fieldwork, revisit sites and maintain long-term research programmes.

For students, these realities become clear early on. Even those with a strong interest in biodiversity may decide not to pursue careers in biology, or reduce their involvement over time, once they understand the financial constraints. Consequently, fewer local specialists are trained.

The shortage of local specialists is part of a broader research capacity gap. Africa has approximately 236 researchers per million people. This is far below the global average of around 1,516, and substantially lower than Europe’s 4,240 researchers per million people or the more than 4,800 per million in the US.

Many African countries have few locally based scientists available to conduct biodiversity surveys, supervise students, lead long-term monitoring programmes, or build specialised expertise, particularly in poorly studied taxonomic groups.

When research becomes difficult to prioritise

Low salaries have broader consequences.

Scientists may rely on consultancies or teaching across multiple institutions. This leaves limited time for research. Over time it reduces both their development as researchers and the relevance of the knowledge they bring into the classroom.

Research capacity in African institutions remains limited. Most biodiversity studies are led by researchers from foreign institutions. Though international collaborations are essential, they can lead to local scientists being limited in their ability to lead projects or even participate.

In such cases, local knowledge and priorities can be overlooked. Large parts of these countries, and many taxonomic groups, may remain poorly studied.

In Mozambique, for example, some of the country’s most important areas for threatened and endemic plants and animals lie outside the current protected area network.

Conservation funding and research have historically concentrated in large protected areas known for charismatic megafauna such as elephants and lions.

Solutions are hard to come by

Increasing researchers’ salaries is not straightforward. In many countries, salaries at public universities are tied to national government salary scales and broader public sector budgets. This means there is no single institution that can solve the problem alone. Still, universities and funding agencies can create mechanisms to better support research activity.

These may include productivity-based incentives, research stipends, fieldwork allowances, reduced teaching loads for active researchers, and grant schemes that directly fund local scientists. Governments can also invest in research as part of long-term national development strategies.

– Poor pay is holding back Africa’s biodiversity research and reducing its contribution to global science
– https://theconversation.com/poor-pay-is-holding-back-africas-biodiversity-research-and-reducing-its-contribution-to-global-science-282447

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Bomikazi Zeka, Associate Professor in Finance, University of Canberra

When interest rates rise, most people feel the financial pinch as repayments for home loans, car purchases or personal loans increase. This leads to less money for everyday spending and tightens the household budget.

Middle- and upper-income households tend to hold secured debt such as property, which builds wealth. Lower-income households are pushed into debt as they try to maintain their consumption levels. The result is that the impact of rising interest rates is even more significant for lower-income households. They may have to reduce spending on necessities to service interest payments. Even renters wanting to become home owners are indirectly influenced by rising interest rates, as home loans become less affordable.

Banks make money by charging consumers who borrow money while paying out little interest to those holding savings accounts. And most household debt is owed to the banking sector.

According to the World Bank, most African countries fall into the low- to middle-income bracket. In many of these economies, consumers tend to leave their cash sitting in transaction accounts because they are convenient, familiar and easy to access. While moving money out of transaction accounts and into savings products can offer a better return, most people tend to stick to what they know. And banks actually count on this “inertia”.

Whether it’s staying with the same bank out of habit or ignoring new investment products, that lack of movement is a huge win for the bank’s bottom line.

But there is an opportunity to gain from rising rates by moving excess funds into interest-earning financial products. Examples include:

• term deposits (a type of savings account that allows you to deposit a lump sum of money for a fixed period, with a guaranteed fixed interest rate)

• tax-free savings accounts

• bonds (a loan you make to the government or a company, giving you regular interest payments for a set period and your original investment in full at the end of the loan period).

Collectively these kinds of investments are known as fixed interest securities. They earn interest income in proportion to the amount you deposit. And the capital you deposit in them remains protected from fluctuations in the market.

If you access the funds, the amount of interest you earn will reduce proportionately.

As with any financial decision, it’s important to speak to a professional financial adviser to see which product best aligns with your needs and financial situation.

These kinds of financial instruments can earn you interest income. They won’t, however, outperform the returns you can get from more risky securities like shares. What they will do is allow your money to work for you in ways that money in a transaction account won’t.

And a guaranteed interest income from a fixed-interest investment is more attractive than zero return earned on a transactional account.

Making the most of rates rises in three steps

Firstly, get rid of the surplus in your transactional account.

There’s a common expression in the world of finance:

Idle cash doesn’t generate returns.

This implies that money that is dormant doesn’t grow. If you have excess money in your transactional account, consider how much you can comfortably afford to transfer into a term deposit, tax-free savings account or bonds.

By moving these funds into an interest-earning account, you turn your stagnant balance into a defensive asset that grows with time, shielding your portfolio from negative shifts in the economy.

Secondly, accept that you’re playing the long game.

To make the most out of interest-bearing investments, you need to commit your funds for a year or longer. Longer investment terms typically offer higher interest rates, rewarding you for keeping your money invested. The power of compounding is also on your side as the money you earn from an investment is added back into your balance, and then that new, larger amount earns even more interest. Therefore, with a longer investment period, you aren’t just earning interest on the initial capital. You will begin to earn interest on the interest too. Longer durations can protect you from future interest rate drops by locking in today’s peak interest returns.

Thirdly, look beyond the big banks.

While it’s easy to keep track of your finances when all your funds are with the same bank, consider the investment products offered by alternative or smaller banks. Alternative banks can offer better interest rates to attract more customers. As more consumers explore different investment options, this challenges the “Big Banks” to be more competitive with their rates and product offerings.

By taking action and moving your money, you aren’t just helping your wallet, you are also forcing the banking sector to be more competitive.

When central banks raise interest rates, debt holders feel the impact instantly. But higher rates also create an opportunity that’s easily overlooked. If you can put your money to work in interest-earning investments, those same rate rises can start working for you instead of against you. What feels like bad news on one side can quietly become a source of passive income on the other. It just depends on where your money is sitting.

– Higher interest rates: can I make them work for me?
– https://theconversation.com/higher-interest-rates-can-i-make-them-work-for-me-282632

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Thulani P. Makhalanyane, Professor of Microbiology, Stellenbosch University

South Africa has a paradox when it comes to food availability. Its supermarkets are overflowing. But it continues to record high levels of stunted growth.

This seems to be a global problem. Data suggest that the world has produced more food in the last two decades and more wealth. Yet, roughly 150 million children under five remain stunted (too short for their age).

Stunted growth and poor cognitive development often stem from the same early-life problems, like poor nutrition, illness and unhealthy environments. These impediments to a child’s learning ability and physical growth have been shown to have serious long-term consequences for health and future economic prospects.

More concerning is that it appears that putting calories into mouths is not enough to prevent stunting. The science points to the role played by our intestinal microbiome – the trillions of microscopic organisms, including bacteria, viruses and fungi, that live in and on us – and the inability to digest nutrients.

We – a microbiologist and a health economist – recently published a paper in which we outline emerging evidence demonstrating that poverty affects children’s physiology – the way their bodies work – not merely their access to resources. Addressing childhood stunting therefore requires moving beyond single interventions such as providing food. What’s needed are integrated approaches that simultaneously tackle sanitation, infection control, nutrition quality and early childhood stimulation.

Our findings support the growing scientific evidence that both physiological and environmental factors must be addressed together to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty and developmental impairment. Nutrition is not the full story. The gut microbiome plays a complementary role by breaking down complex carbohydrates that our bodies cannot digest on their own, converting them into forms that may be absorbed and used for growth and development.

Diet provides the essential raw materials, while the microbiome helps unlock their nutritional value, thereby contributing to growth and development. There is also strong evidence that the environment shapes the microbiome’s ability to carry out these functions.

Gut microbes, poverty and stunting

Children’s growth is affected not only by what they eat, but also by how well their bodies can process and absorb nutrients.

Children living in informal settlements, where sanitation is generally poor, are exposed to microorganisms through dirt, toxic dust and sewage. This exposure may lead to a condition called environmental enteric dysfunction. This is when an inflamed intestine impairs the absorption of nutrients, including fats, proteins and vitamins.

The result is stunting. This may remain undiagnosed but can affect health negatively across a lifetime.

The prevalence of environmental enteric dysfunction in South Africa remains unclear. One reason is that there are no easily administered diagnostic tests. The other is the lack of large scale coordinated national studies.

Evidence from studies in Asia supports the potential role of the microbiome as a central contributor to stunting. These studies suggest that gut microbial communities of healthy children tend to follow predictable developmental milestones during the first two years of life. Failure to achieve these milestones may compromise the microbiome’s capacity to process food efficiently, with important implications for child growth and development.

In contrast, children with severe acute malnutrition often carry an immature gut community that does not mature in response to food or interventions focused on water, sanitation and hygiene services alone.

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Read more: South African policy isn’t connecting child nutrition and sanitation

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In a study done in Malawi, scientists transplanted gut bacteria from malnourished children into young animals and showed that the animals developed growth deficits. Conversely, microbes from healthy children could restore growth.

These studies show that an unhealthy gut community may be a cause – not just a consequence – of poor growth. Although the concept of a “healthy” microbiome has been the subject of extensive debate, there is increasing consensus that healthy microbiomes are typically characterised by high microbial diversity, the absence of dominance by a single organism, the capacity to remain stable, resilience and the ability to maintain essential functions even when community composition changes or is subject to environmental disturbance.

Studies that look directly at the small intestine have found that many stunted children have bacteria from the mouth growing in the wrong part of the gut. These bacteria may interfere with how the body absorbs fat, creating a direct link between the makeup of gut microbes and poor growth.

Other studies show that what really matters is what the microbes do – their ability to make vitamins and other building blocks – not just which species are present.

Put simply, the microbiome can help determine whether the food a child eats is used to grow body tissue or is wasted.

Knowledge gaps

Progress in tackling stunting has been slow for a number of reasons.

Firstly, traditional interventions focused on food provision and sanitation without understanding the underlying biological damage that impairs how nutrients are absorbed.

Secondly, the evidence base relies on studies from high-income contexts where nutrition alone may be the primary constraint. In lower and middle income countries the biological mechanisms driving stunting involve multiple interacting pathways.

Part of the answer is geography of research. Many of the early groundbreaking studies come from Asia and south Asia and from a few sites in east Africa and Malawi. Large multicountry cohorts such as the MAL-ED project and several studies in Bangladesh have provided strong evidence about enteric pathogens and their links to growth.

But sub-Saharan Africa remains under represented in longitudinal microbiome studies despite carrying a large burden of stunting. That gap has real world consequences. We know that the gut microbiome varies considerably and is influenced by several factors including diet and geography.

Children in different places have different diets, different exposures and different baseline microbes. Interventions that work in one region may fail in another.

The answers

What’s needed is African led research that samples African children across geography to understand what will work on the continent.

This requires a change in approaches to policy and research.

First, policy makers must stop treating food availability as synonymous with nutritional success. Food security matters but it is not sufficient.

Secondly, routine growth must be monitored better at primary healthcare level so stunting is not missed in communities where short stature looks normal to the eye.

Third, studies must measure gut function – not only weight and height. This will show who is failing to extract the benefit of food.

Fourth, water, sanitation and hygiene must be integrated.

Finally, build African capacity for this work, and fund African research.

Where the science could lead

Research into the microbiome can shift strategies from treating hunger to restoring lifelong health.

For example, it may be possible to identify new microbes that block fat absorption or those that degrade essential vitamins. We may begin to map how early disruptions in gut function influence metabolism and increase the risk of non-communicable diseases later in life.

We may also learn to use simple stool or blood markers to identify children who, despite having enough food, will not grow without gut-directed therapy.

– Gut health: why food alone won’t fix childhood stunting
– https://theconversation.com/gut-health-why-food-alone-wont-fix-childhood-stunting-273395

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Salah Ben Hammou, Postdoctoral Research Associate, Rice University

Malian officials announced on 4 May 2026 that junta leader General Assimi Goïta would take on the post of defence minister after the killing of General Sadio Camara a week earlier.

Camara’s death occurred amid an offensive by the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, which launched attacks across Mali. Insecurity persists in Mali despite years of military rule, which was justified on promises of restoring order and defeating insurgent violence.

On the surface, Goïta’s decision to absorb the defence portfolio appears to be a pragmatic wartime measure, aimed at ensuring continuity within the armed forces during a period of instability.

But the move also follows a broader political path that has become visible in Mali since the junta seized power in 2020. Rather than institutionalising military rule, Goïta has concentrated authority around the presidency, tightened control over the state’s coercive apparatus, and relied on a small circle of military elites.

As political scientists who have extensively published and written on military coups and regime trajectories in west Africa, we observe this behaviour is not unique to Mali. It is the third country in the region to see military leaders consolidate their authority around individual leaders rather than the armed forces.

Across the post-coup Sahel, military regimes have shifted from presenting themselves as temporary “corrective” interventions to becoming personalised systems of rule. The other two examples are Captain Ibrahim Traoré, who took power in Burkina Faso in September 2022, and Niger’s General Abdourahamane Tiani, who seized power in July 2023.

The distinction matters because military regimes governed collectively by officer coalitions retain some internal balance and institutional constraint. As power becomes concentrated around a single ruler, however, decision-making revolves around personal loyalty rather than broader military or state interests.

Military rule and personalisation in Mali

Goïta (then a colonel) and his companions in Mali toppled President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in August 2020. The coup architects initially presented themselves as reluctant interveners. At the time, observers expected a short transition. Within months the regional body Ecowas had lifted its financial embargo.

Goïta pledged elections within 18 months, then 24.

A constitutional revision passed in 2025 removed the provision that had previously barred him from standing in any future presidential election. Political parties were banned. The transitional legislative body was filled by presidential decree. And civilian oversight institutions, including the electoral observation body, were dissolved.

The armed forces were restructured along lines scholars recognise as counterbalancing. This is best described as a coup-proofing mechanism. Regimes create parallel armed structures with distinct reporting lines to make it more difficult for any group to move against them.

In Mali, three specialised military units were created with overlapping counter-terrorism mandates that report to the executive. The police were also placed under military discipline.

Goïta assumed the defence portfolio, appointed the former chief of staff of the armed forces, Major General Oumar Diarra, as delegate minister, and named a new chief of staff to replace him.

The defence portfolio controls the largest share of the state budget, grown from 11.5% to 14.5% of GDP since 2020. It is where Mali’s relationship with Africa Corps, which since 2023 has replaced French forces in counter-terrorism operations, is managed daily.

As defence minister since the coup, Camara had been the primary link with Africa Corps.

The appointment of Diarra is consistent with what scholars describe as the rotation of commanders to limit the accumulation of loyalty around any single figure. Diarra had served as chief of staff since 2020.

Burkina Faso and Niger

In Burkina Faso and Niger, too, there have been signs that military regimes are concentrating power around individual military leaders rather than a collective of officers.

Traoré is perhaps the clearest example of this trend. Since seizing power in 2022, he has cultivated an image of himself as a revolutionary anti-colonial figure, drawing comparisons to the iconic Burkinabè leader Thomas Sankara.

Coordinated social media campaigns glorified Traoré while attacking critics. This was combined with nationalist rhetoric and highly publicised economic reforms. All helped elevate his image as the symbolic saviour of Burkinabè society.

Allegations of assassination attempts and coup conspiracies helped rally public support around Traoré as a besieged national leader. They also served as valuable pretexts for targeting political opponents and rivals in the military.

Traoré has appointed family members and trusted allies to strategic positions. Individuals like his brother, Inoussa Traoré, hold senior positions and help curate the regime’s digital message while maintaining links with sympathetic civil society.

Elections are repeatedly delayed and Burkinabes are urged to “forget about democracy”. Traoré is slated to remain in power until 2029.

In Niger, Tiani, the former commander of Mohamed Bazoum’s Presidential Guard, has extended his rule until at least 2030.

Much like Goïta, he has made the timeline conditional on the state of the country’s security.

Tiani dissolved political parties, promoted himself to army general, a first in Niger, and was cast as a national hero. He has reportedly retreated almost entirely from public life and conducts government from within the presidential guard compound.

From there, Tiani has militarised the civilian administration and placed trusted figures around him. General Salifou Mody at defence serves as his principal relay with Russian partners and with the chief of staff of the armed forces, General Moussa Salaou Barmou.

The regime also moved to repress political opponents through civilian-facing institutions, such as the Commission de lutte contre la délinquance économique, financière et fiscale.

The perils of personalism

For decades, political scientists have highlighted the dangers and weaknesses of personalist political systems. Concentrating power around a single ruler often weakens the institutions needed for effective governance and long-term stability.

In military-ruled countries like those in the Sahel, the consequences can be especially severe. Armed forces may be reorganised less around operational effectiveness than around protecting the ruler from rivals and internal threats.

Promotions and command positions become tied to loyalty, parallel security structures proliferate, and mistrust within the officer corps deepens. On the battlefield, these dynamics can undermine coordination and reduce the military’s ability to respond effectively to insurgent violence.

– Mali’s military leader is consolidating power. Why this is dangerous
– https://theconversation.com/malis-military-leader-is-consolidating-power-why-this-is-dangerous-282923