Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Bradley A. Mortin, PhD Candidate, King’s College London

Every electric vehicle, smartphone and laptop battery begins with one essential ingredient: lithium.

The critical mineral sits at the centre of the global transition to cleaner energy. Lithium powers rechargeable batteries. Securing its supply is, therefore, an economic and geopolitical priority.

The International Energy Agency expects global lithium demand to increase as electric vehicle production and renewable energy storage expands. Africa, particularly the Sahel, is becoming increasingly important in the search for supply. The current top producers are Chile, Australia and China.

The Sahel is a semi-arid zone running from west to east Africa, between the Sahara Desert to the north and the tropical savannas to the south.

Across this vast region, armed groups are finding new ways to profit from the expanding lithium trade. Over 40,000 tonnes of lithium are already mined from African rock each year for international consumers. This figure is set to rise to an estimated 500,000 tonnes by as early as 2030.

I am a researcher specialising in geopolitics and war studies. In a recent study, I examined how expanding lithium extraction intersects with conflict across the Sahel. I studied Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad and Nigeria.

I found that growing lithium industries are becoming entangled in existing conflicts, insurgent activity and cross-border smuggling. These are all enabled by weak governance.

For instance, jihadist and criminal groups – particularly Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) – are exploiting the weak oversight of lithium mining to generate revenue and expand their operations.

I argue that if Sahelian governments don’t strengthen oversight, lithium risks becoming another resource that funds conflict instead of development. Where governance is weak, valuable minerals such as gold and diamonds have previously fuelled conflict.

Lithium in the Sahel

Beneath parts of the Sahel lie some of Africa’s most promising lithium deposits, particularly in Nigeria and Mali. Exploration and geological surveys are expanding elsewhere in the region, including in Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad.

For governments facing persistent economic challenges, lithium reserves are attracting investment and creating jobs. Whether these early gains translate into broader economic development will depend on decisions related to governance, regulation and security.

Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Nigeria are already grappling with violent insurgencies. They also face organised crime, weak institutions and limited government control over remote border regions.

The same natural resource conditions that attract investors also attract armed groups. There are dozens of examples across the continent.

Diamonds helped finance civil wars in Sierra Leone and Angola. Gold mining has funded armed groups across west Africa. Oil wealth has fuelled corruption and political instability in Nigeria, Angola and Libya.

My research suggests lithium could become the latest example.

Following the money

Like any organisation, armed groups need money to sustain their operations.

They tax miners and control access to mining sites. They also charge traders and transporters moving minerals through their territory, and provide “security” where governments cannot.

In doing so, they perform some of the functions normally associated with the state. My research suggests that as lithium extraction expands, these same systems are adapting to the commodity.

I examined evidence from Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad to identify why some emerging lithium industries are more vulnerable to criminal and terrorist exploitation than others.

I compared differences in governance, the presence of artisanal mining, insurgent influence and the accessibility of cross-border smuggling routes. I drew on conflict databases, geological surveys, media reporting and publications from African and international organisations.

I found that the overall vulnerability of each country depends on the strength of local institutions, border controls and governance.

Nigeria: Lithium mining is expanding rapidly but remains largely informal and outside government oversight. Criminal groups exploit the lack of regulation. They demand protection payments and infiltrate both legal and illegal supply chains.

Mali: Armed groups embedded in the country’s gold economy have begun applying similar taxation and extortion models in lithium-producing regions. Weak state institutions and ongoing conflict have increased the risk of exploitation.

Burkina Faso: Jihadist groups have used informal mining networks to generate revenue from lithium and strengthen local influence. Limited government control in remote areas has created opportunities for armed groups to tax and regulate extraction.

Niger: Political instability and weakened border controls following the 2023 coup have increased the risk of mineral smuggling. Trafficking routes used for gold and weapons are being adapted for lithium.

Chad: Weak governance and corruption facilitate illicit cross-border trade. This is creating vulnerabilities that could be exploited.

Where governments regulate mining effectively and retain control over mineral supply chains – as Botswana has done with diamonds – the revenues generated are more likely to support infrastructure, public services and economic growth.

In the countries examined in my study where governance is weaker and state control is more limited, armed groups are able to insert themselves into supply chains.

What next

The global transition to cleaner energy depends on expanding lithium production. But rising demand also creates incentives for faster extraction. This can outpace governments’ ability to put effective regulation and oversight in place.

The batteries helping the world reduce carbon emissions could therefore, indirectly, help finance some of Africa’s deadliest armed groups.

The solution is to govern lithium better.

1. Governments should bring artisanal and small-scale miners into the formal economy. This can be done through licensing, legal protections and transparent markets. State authority should be restored in mining regions.

2. Regional organisations should strengthen systems for tracking minerals across borders and share intelligence on illicit trade.

3. African governments should invest more in processing lithium instead of exporting raw ore.

But there’s no single solution for every context.

Formalising artisanal mining is likely to be most effective where governments control their territory. Sharing intelligence is important where trafficking routes span countries – like Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Domestic lithium processing can deliver long-term benefits in countries with stronger institutions and the capacity to support industrial development.

These recommendations are grounded in approaches already adopted elsewhere in Africa. There are regional mineral traceability initiatives in the Great Lakes region and efforts by countries like Zimbabwe to promote domestic lithium processing.

Africa’s lithium reserves could help power one of the defining technological transformations of this century. They could also become the next chapter in a long history of resource-driven conflict.

Which future emerges will depend on the governments responsible for managing it.

– Lithium in the Sahel: how armed groups are exploiting the global scramble for the critical mineral
– https://theconversation.com/lithium-in-the-sahel-how-armed-groups-are-exploiting-the-global-scramble-for-the-critical-mineral-287526

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Lawrence Nkosikhona Malinga, Programme Manager (Crop Protection) & Senior Entomologist, South African Sugarcane Research Institute; University of KwaZulu-Natal

South Africa has around 25,653 small-scale sugarcane growers, making the industry a lifeline for rural communities in Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal provinces. By generating 65,000 direct and 270,000 indirect jobs, its agricultural and milling operations support more than a million livelihoods in these areas. But the productivity of many small-scale growers remains well below potential. Production constraints are limiting both farm profitability and the sector’s overall contribution to rural economic development.

The growers face complex challenges that go beyond access to technical farming advice. A six-year research project by senior entomologist Lawrence Nkosikhona Malinga and his colleagues at the South African Sugarcane Research Institute in collaboration with the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, South African Farmers Development Association and South African Canegrowers looked to identify and address some of the challenges. They found variations in growers’ education levels, language barriers, lack of funding, lack of technical expertise and poor planning of crop production.

Some of the key findings are that issues such as weed pressure, weak planning systems, contractor dependence, limited access to seedcane and poor technical support undermine productivity and profitability. The project identified lessons for agricultural systems and smallholder farmer support programmes.

What are the 4 biggest challenges for small-scale sugarcane growers?

1. Weed pressure

Many growers struggle with choosing and measuring herbicide, applying it at the right time, and the cost. Due to financial constraints, they sometimes use less herbicide than is needed, or they delay application. They manage weeds after they appear instead of preventing them.

Poor weed control has major consequences. Weeds compete directly with sugarcane for water, nutrients and sunlight. The cane doesn’t grow well but the labour and production costs are high. The incorrect dosage and inefficient application of products can also lead to herbicide resistance. Many of these growers are not familiar with these issues and good practices.

It’s usually cheaper to manage weeds before they can affect cane yields.

2. Weak planning

Many farming decisions, including seedcane ordering, planting dates, weed control, harvesting schedules and fertiliser applications, happen later than is optimal. These delays are often linked to financial constraints, knowledge gaps, or dependence on others like service providers, input suppliers, technical advisors, and labour availability. One delayed decision triggers several others.

With sugarcane, which isn’t planted every year, these delays can reduce productivity for multiple seasons and reduce overall profitability. Improved planning would allow growers to use inputs more efficiently and reduce avoidable losses.

3. Contractor dependence

Many small-scale growers rely heavily on contractors for planting, agrochemical applications, harvesting and land preparation. They don’t have the expensive machinery and labour to do these jobs themselves. But too much dependence can reduce grower control over critical operations. Delays, poor communication, or inconsistent service quality affect production outcomes.

Some growers also reported limited confidence in supervising contractor activities or challenging decisions when work quality was poor. This is partly due to gaps in knowledge about what has to be done on the farm.

4. Limited access to quality seedcane and technical support

Growers sometimes get seedcane from neighbours, informal networks, or their own fields because certified or approved seedcane is expensive, unavailable locally, or ordered too late. As a result, they may end up with the variety that’s available rather than the one best suited to the soil type or regional pest and disease pressures.

Growers said technical support was inconsistent from extension officers but they needed help with pest and disease diagnosis, variety selection and chemical use.

How should these challenges be tackled?

The findings suggest that farmers need stronger support systems, not just technical recommendations. A combination of practical learning, institutional coordination and improved access to resources would help.

Weed pressure

Weed management support needs to become more practical and continuous. Growers need extension officers to help them choose the correct products and time the application.

Demonstration plots, a small piece of land used to test and showcase new agricultural techniques, crop varieties, or technologies, would be useful. And growers should be able to learn by doing.

Low-cost practices like hand weeding and covering the soil with dried cane leaves to suppress weed growth would reduce the need for chemicals.

Weak planning systems

Seasonal calendars, simple budgeting tools and practical farm-planning templates could help growers improve the timing of planting, fertiliser applications, seedcane ordering and harvesting. Regular engagement is better than occasional workshops. Cost-benefit tools (methods to compare the costs of an action or decision with the benefits it produces) would help growers choose how to use limited resources more efficiently.

Contractor dependence

Small-scale sugarcane contractors are growers that provide mechanical (land preparation, crop maintenance and cane transportation) and labour (cane cutting) services to fellow growers. The productivity of these contractors is generally low and their services aren’t always reliable. Delays can be costly. Improving contractor efficiency and productivity would benefit both contractors and growers. Growers would get quality services at competitive prices, and millers would receive a steady flow of quality cane.

Because contractors are deeply embedded within small-scale production systems, solutions should focus on improving relationships rather than replacing them. Growers need support to supervise contractor activities more confidently. Stronger communication between growers, contractors and advisory services would improve accountability and timing.

Limited seedcane access and technical support

Seed production and distribution should be done by a wider network, not a central scheme. This would promote varietal diversity and create rural employment.

Extension services need to move from just delivering information to more practical visits where farmers can learn by doing.

These challenges are interconnected. Isolated interventions are unlikely to succeed. Integrated support systems would combine practical learning, stronger extension services, improved coordination among industry stakeholders, better access to inputs and continuous collaborative engagement. The evidence suggests that growers are more likely to adopt recommended practices when support is practical and they can see that it works for them.

Why does solving these challenges matter?

Improving weed control, planning systems, contractor coordination and access to seedcane could do far more than increase yields. These changes could improve profitability, strengthen household incomes, reduce production risks, and increase the resilience of rural farming communities.

Experiences from countries such as Brazil, Kenya, Mauritius, and India show that small-scale sugarcane productivity improves when growers receive integrated support rather than isolated interventions. Practical extension services, timely access to certified seedcane, coordinated contractor and mechanisation services, and better farm planning have increased yields, profitability and resilience, demonstrating that strengthening the entire production support system can deliver lasting benefits for rural farming communities.

Perhaps the biggest lesson from this work is that productivity challenges are rarely caused solely by not accepting recommendations. Small-scale growers often know what should be done, but operate within systems that make it difficult to follow the advice.

The South African Sugarcane Research Institute team leaders including Lindani Mchunu (project manager), Khanyisile Buthelezi, Tholoana Mofurutsi, Surashna Jithoo, Siphumelelo Mbhele and other research and extension colleagues played a crucial role in the research and the article.

– South Africa’s small sugar farms are producing less than they could: study finds ways to boost them
– https://theconversation.com/south-africas-small-sugar-farms-are-producing-less-than-they-could-study-finds-ways-to-boost-them-285098

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Bomikazi Zeka, Associate Professor in Finance, University of Canberra

Ever used or thought of using artificial intelligence (AI) for financial advice? Is it a good idea?

Anyone with the internet, even on their phone, can access AI. Tools like ChatGPT, Claude and Perplexity are free, instant, and easy to use. They can break down complex financial concepts and provide financial solutions in seconds. But can they safely guide a user through a nuanced, high-stakes financial crisis?

Our recent research explored this question, drawing on our financial planning and consumer behaviour expertise. We evaluated how three open-access AI models handled the financial queries of users whose personal situations put them at risk of harm.

To do this we created hypothetical scenarios representing different life stages, economic challenges and socioeconomic vulnerabilities. We then ran these scenarios through OpenAI’s ChatGPT, Anthropic’s Claude and Perplexity AI:

• a 22-year-old university graduate wanting to save for a home deposit during a cost-of-living crisis

• a pregnant woman seeking financial advice on planning for maternity leave, with a partner who doesn’t share money

• a single parent of two children, with a modest income, who was told by their cousin to invest in cryptocurrency.

In our analysis we found that AI offers highly structured and practical advice. But it has blind spots. We provided the models with explicit information about how the three cases were vulnerable, but the models didn’t respond appropriately to that. They even offered advice that could make financial harm worse.

We concluded from our research that AI is a powerful tool for financial fact-finding and brainstorming. If you are already financially literate, and know how to cross-check data, AI can be a useful financial aid. But, for now, AI cannot replace the human element.

Running scenarios

We chose Claude for its versatility and conservative approach, ChatGPT for being an all-round assistant, and Perplexity for its contextual understanding.

We developed five hypothetical scenarios and simultaneously ran each scenario five times to test for consistency in the output. Each scenario was run in a different web browser, in incognito mode, with cleared cache and cookies to eliminate any retained information. This was also to ensure that the output generated was not influenced by retained data.

To reduce the risk of AI-generated bias, we removed identifying attributes that could influence model outputs, such as names, locations, race and income. We then assessed how the AI models considered the user’s vulnerability, area of financial need, and goal or desired outcome.

The models distinctly addressed the financial query, yet revealed gaps in how they balanced advice with considerations of vulnerability.

At first glance, the AI models looked like they were giving sound financial advice. But our analysis showed that they handled vulnerability in vastly different ways.

ChatGPT was highly detailed and practical, but did not recognise the vulnerability embedded within the prompts. Instead, it relied on the information that was explicitly stated. It didn’t consider whether the user’s situation suggested a need for additional support or tailored guidance.

Perplexity emerged as the most conservative and risk averse as it most frequently urged users to seek professional financial advice. But it produced the least detailed responses.

Claude offered comprehensive recommendations. But it leaned heavily towards self-guided financial planning.

The vulnerability blind spot

AI is trained on massive datasets designed by humans who are biased. For instance, when models are trained on historical records that reflect systemic discrimination, the tools can fall back on social stereotypes and make biased assumptions in their output.

Research shows, too, that when AI models explain their recommendations, humans are far more likely to trust the advice blindly, ignoring whether it is actually correct.

The most alarming finding from our research was the technology’s failure to consistently recognise and address the needs or concerns of vulnerable users.

For instance, in the case of the graduate, the recommendations focused on saving for a deposit but ignored how the high cost of living would make that harder. This was even when explicit details about the graduate’s financial circumstances had been provided in the prompt.

The response didn’t consider how achieving the long term goal would affect the current lifestyle.

In the case of the pregnant mother, Perplexity and ChatGPT’s output assumed the partner would assist with household expenses after the birth, even though the prompt explicitly stated that the partners did not share their finances. The models did not consistently use the detail provided in the prompt and instead generated a response based on a more common assumption about household financial arrangements.

We saw the output reflecting social stereotypes where mothers are strongly associated with parenting while fathers are strongly associated as material providers.

This shows that even as AI evolves, it still replicates biases.

Take the single parent asking for cryptocurrency recommendations. Even though the AI models advised caution, ChatGPT described in detail how to get into cryptocurrency investments and recommended cryptocurrencies for beginners.

A human financial advisor would immediately flag these areas for consideration: a modest income, children, a high-risk investment, and anecdotal advice from the cousin. A human advisor would first gauge the user’s overall financial position, time horizon, risk appetite and investment objectives.

Our research shows that AI models are limited in providing tailored financial advice, unless the user provides additional explicit input.

Where do we go from here?

Financial planning isn’t just about numbers; it’s about advice based on human values, emotional anxieties, family dynamics, personal experiences and risk tolerance. AI has opened the door to instant financial information for the masses. But until these models can truly comprehend the complex, vulnerable and emotional realities of humans, the most valuable financial skill remains critical thinking and asking yourself: “does this make sense for me?”.

If AI tools are to become an avenue for financial guidance, there must be safeguards. Policymakers and financial regulators must build clear frameworks around AI generated advice. What also needs to be considered is what AI models do with the financial information provided. Strict transparency standards are needed to regulate how these models handle consumer data.

Financial information is deeply sensitive and consumers must have absolute clarity on how their inputs are stored, whether the AI retains a “memory” of their finances, and who has access to that data.

– We asked ChatGPT, Claude and Perplexity for financial advice: what we got was practical, but with big blind spots
– https://theconversation.com/we-asked-chatgpt-claude-and-perplexity-for-financial-advice-what-we-got-was-practical-but-with-big-blind-spots-288948

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Michael Oluwatosin Bodunrin, Associate professor, University of the Witwatersrand

For centuries, useful metals have been developed by starting with one core element and adding small amounts of other elements. Steel, for example, is composed primarily of iron; carbon is added in varied amounts to produce different grades of steel. Bronze is made up of copper and tin. These mixtures are known as alloys.

Africa already supplies several of the metals used in alloys. Yet the continent captures far less value from designing and manufacturing advanced materials than from mining the ores that make them possible. For example, the continent supplies about three-quarters of the world’s manganese, 70% of cobalt, and nearly one-fifth of global copper production, but earns less than 1% of the value created through manufacturing clean energy technologies that use these minerals.

In effect, Africa exports wealth in its rawest form and imports value in its most advanced form. Correcting this imbalance requires a shift from raw mineral exports to domestic processing, refining, advanced materials production and manufacturing. It would enable African countries to retain a greater share of economic value while accelerating industrialisation, fostering innovation, and promoting sustainable development.

A big advance in metallic materials research provides an opportunity to change the story. It focuses on high-entropy alloys, an emerging class of metallic materials that have the potential to transform Africa from a “dig-and-ship” economy to a leader in material design for hydrogen storage applications. Hydrogen storage is a clean energy issue.

Instead of one prime metal, high-entropy alloys mix many elements (typically more than three) in equal or unequal portions. These materials, when optimised, are often stronger, more resistant to heat and corrosion, and last longer than most regular alloys. For example, what’s known as Cantor alloy and its variants are very tough and resist corrosion. Their mechanical properties improve at cryogenic (very cold) temperatures, making them promising candidates for certain applications.

The scientific challenge is to predict which combinations produce useful properties. Our interdisciplinary research team brings together expertise in materials science and engineering, chemical engineering and computational materials modelling, with experience in energy materials research. We have been looking at high-entropy alloys as a solution for an urgent modern problem: how to store and transport hydrogen safely in clean energy supply chains.

We’ve reviewed computational studies to better understand how alloy composition affects hydrogen storage. Our findings show how computational techniques can speed up the identification of good hydrogen storage materials by discovering interesting metal combinations before testing them in experiments.

The goal is to store hydrogen and release it in ways that can be applied in vehicles.

Hydrogen storage in clean energy

Hydrogen is considered a clean energy carrier since it produces low emissions when used. Global hydrogen demand was about 100 million tonnes in 2024. It has potential to grow further in the coming decades. But storing hydrogen has many challenges. It needs space and there are safety constraints. One of the methods to store hydrogen is as a solid, where hydrogen atoms are absorbed into a metal or alloy and later released when needed.

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Read more: Green hydrogen is a clean fuel, but South Africa’s not ready to produce it: energy experts explain why

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The major advantage in this metal hydride storage is that you can store more energy in less volume, more safely, than other methods. Literature shows that high-entropy alloys can be designed to absorb more hydrogen with high stability through multiple cycles of absorbing and releasing hydrogen. They can operate at near-ambient temperatures and pressure.

Relying only on experiments to develop high-entropy alloys for hydrogen storage is impractical, however. With so many possible combinations of elements, testing each resulting alloy in the laboratory would consume lots of time and resources.

Herein lies the importance of computational materials science. Researchers can model the behaviour of atoms within a material before it is created by using techniques like density functional theory. This uses the laws of quantum physics and high-performance computing to predict the behaviour of materials at the atomic scale.

These models can forecast an alloy’s stability, structure formation and hydrogen binding strength. They allow scientists to design materials before putting them in the furnace. This method lowers costs, speeds up discovery and opens up opportunities for new avenues for research and technological innovation without large-scale experimental equipment.

By gathering current knowledge and identifying research gaps, our work provides a roadmap for the future use of high-entropy alloys for hydrogen storage.

Africa’s natural advantage and challenges

Africa is particularly well-positioned to benefit. Titanium, vanadium, chromium and manganese are just a few of the elements that are now mined throughout the continent and are used in high-entropy alloys.

However, mineral wealth alone does not ensure advanced manufacturing. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) notes that sub-Saharan Africa still carries out little higher-value mineral processing. It faces constraints including finance, know-how, infrastructure, energy systems, transport networks and processing capacity.

The opportunity here is clear: African nations should focus on how to turn these resources into high-value alloys rather than exporting them in their raw form. This could boost industrial development and economic benefits. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to invest in research infrastructure, provide access to high-performance computing, and foster more cooperation between the private sector, government and academic institutions.

– A new class of metals could transform Africa’s clean energy economy – scientists explain
– https://theconversation.com/a-new-class-of-metals-could-transform-africas-clean-energy-economy-scientists-explain-282572

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Opeoluwa Adeosun, Researcher, Department of Economics, Obafemi Awolowo University

Conflicts in Africa vary in scope and intensity. They range from large-scale civil wars to territorial disputes, localised insurgencies, inter-communal violence, political instability, armed conflict and terrorism. The continent has earned the reputation of being the world’s bloodiest.

These conflicts can be felt across country borders. I am an economist whose research has focused on inclusive growth, debt sustainability, geopolitical risk, economic policy and climate-related uncertainties. In a recent paper I looked at whether conflict had an effect on government debt among countries sharing geographical borders in regions of Africa.

The research sampled 38 countries from western, central, eastern and southern Africa using data from 2000 to 2022. I applied the Spatial Durbin model, which looks at how local and nearby factors affect an outcome in one place.

The study examined how conflict is linked to government debt across neighbouring African countries. Instead of looking at each country on its own, it considered how events in one country can affect its neighbours. This made it possible to identify both the effects within a country and the effects across borders.

The findings show that debt is shaped not only by domestic conditions but by developments in nearby countries. Conflict generates cross-border spillovers, raising the debt level in geographically proximate countries. Military spending by neighbouring countries amplifies the spillovers.

These findings are important because they show that no country’s economy is isolated. Even if a country is peaceful and stable, its financial position can be weakened by conflict in a neighbouring country through refugee flows, disrupted trade and humanitarian costs.

The results also suggest that regional instability can have a greater impact on government debt than domestic conditions alone. Countries may need to borrow more even when they are not directly involved in conflict.

Mapping the ripple effects of conflict

To see how conflict is associated with debt across borders, I used a specialised mapping technique that links countries based on their shared borders. The research analysed historical data from the World Bank and a conflict database for the selected countries and period.

This made it possible to measure three things:

• the direct impact of conflict on a country’s debt within its own borders

• the indirect effect of conflict in one country on a neighbour’s debt

• the total effect, summing up the direct and indirect effects.

Examining 38 countries in different regions ensured that different kinds of conflicts were accounted for. For instance, conflicts in central Africa are often linked to weak governments, political instability and tensions between ethnic groups. In west Africa, conflict related to competition for natural resources and land is more typical.

The composition and structure of debt are not the same either. In francophone West African Economic and Monetary Union countries, the level of debt is high due to their reliance on foreign borrowing and their historical dependence on France for external financing.

In east Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda have borrowed large amounts to finance roads, railways and other infrastructure projects. As a result, east Africa recorded the highest average debt level among the regions studied.

Southern Africa has experienced fewer large-scale wars. But some countries, including Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe, have faced local conflicts and political violence. South Africa relies more on borrowing from its own financial markets, making it less dependent on foreign lenders.

Because neighbouring countries are closely connected through shared borders, trade and regional institutions such as the Economic Community of West African States and the Southern African Development Community, the effects of conflict often spread from one country to another. The results varied across regions.

The impact

In western Africa, the direct and indirect effects of conflict on debt are significant. Indirect spillover effects are substantial in triggering higher debt levels in a neighbour. For example, instability in the western Sahel and Lake Chad Basin made governments borrow more to manage the fallout.

Domestic conflict, such as the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, drives debt accumulation through local destruction, fiscal pressure and the cost of militarisation. The region is also susceptible to indirect effects. For example, instability in Mali has created a fiscal burden for neighbours such as Niger and Burkina Faso.

Refugee movements, humanitarian emergencies and disrupted trade routes create fiscal pressure, leading to debt accumulation, even when countries are not directly involved in the conflict.

For example, there’s spillover from South Sudan to Uganda, where the cost of hosting refugees and providing public services has placed a heavy strain on the host country’s budget.

Conflict also erodes revenue. Insecurity weakens tax compliance and state capacity to provide public goods. This narrows the domestic resource base, culminating in debt. Illicit value chains generate money for armed groups, prolonging violence and intensifying government debt.

Trade disruptions, border closures, damaged infrastructure and conflict-related uncertainty deplete trade flows, lower customs revenues, and disrupt supply chains.

Military spending amplifies the indirect spillover effects of conflict on debt in western Africa. Neighbouring countries may have to prevent insurgent incursions and maintain internal security. Security costs can add to debt levels.

I further found that risk perceptions regarding regional risk may increase sovereign debt premiums for countries in a region – not just the country where the conflict or debt is. Creditors will demand higher risk premiums from the neighbouring countries. Even relatively stable countries within the region pay high interest rates by association.

What needs to be done

The findings highlight the need for interventions:

• regional financial safety nets, reducing the need for excessive and costly borrowing

• regional peace programmes and cross-border security cooperation on conflict prevention

• coordinated fiscal stabilisation strategies

• regional defence cooperation to reduce militarisation.

– Refugees, lost trade and security costs: how conflict in one African country drives up debt for its neighbours
– https://theconversation.com/refugees-lost-trade-and-security-costs-how-conflict-in-one-african-country-drives-up-debt-for-its-neighbours-288952

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Karin Barber, Emeritus Professor of African Cultural Anthropology, University of Birmingham

In Lagos in the 1910s and 1920s a new market of readers was emerging who wanted to express themselves in their own languages. Despite the dominance of colonial English print culture, entrepreneurs increasingly started using printing presses for mainstream Yoruba-language newspapers, books and pamphlets.

A new book by cultural anthropologist Karin Barber explores what was printed, and also how and why. We asked her about her study.

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What’s the history of the printing press in Lagos?

Lagos was a thriving commercial port on the coast of west Africa well before the imposition of British colonial rule in 1861. The printing press was brought to the region by Christian missionaries in the mid-1800s. At the inland mission station at Abeokuta, the Church Missionary Society published translations of Christian texts, and pioneered the first Yoruba newspaper, Iwe Irohin, from 1859 to 1867.

But in Lagos, the press was in the hands of independent entrepreneurs, not missionary organisations, from the beginning. The first Lagos printing press was established in 1862 and others quickly followed. Most of what they printed up to the early 1900s was in English, read only by a small, highly educated elite.

This was because after colonisation, English had become the language of government, administration, secondary education and international commerce as well as Christian worship. And the core of the early elite were “returnees” who had been liberated from the slave trade, converted to Christianity, and educated in English before making their way back to their Yoruba homeland. For some, English came more easily than Yoruba.

Some of the elite did have an interest in Yoruba literature, and in the late 19th century the Lagos presses published several books in Yoruba: proverbs, riddles, divination poetry and popular oral poetry, which members of the educated elite collected and wrote down. But this was a very small part of the Lagos print output of the time.

In the 1910s, however, a new potential readership had emerged – people who had attended elementary school and were literate in Yoruba, the language of everyday life for the majority of Lagos citizens.

They provided a new market and a new audience for a local, Yoruba-language print culture. Growing opposition to colonial policies made ordinary people eager to engage in political commentary and debate, while the flourishing oral street culture of Lagos primed them to enjoy new Yoruba-language genres in print.

What kind of material was being printed in Yoruba and why?

In the 1910s there was a major expansion of the Yoruba print sphere with the publication of a number of remarkable books on the history of Yoruba cities including Lagos, Abeokuta and Ibadan.

Then in the 1920s there was an explosion of newspaper production, in both English and Yoruba. Five Yoruba weekly papers were launched one after the other, starting with Adeoye Deniga’s Eko Akete in 1922. This was a small format, 8-page paper (soon expanding to 16 pages). It featured editorials, news snippets, political and social commentary, a serialised history of Lagos, small and full-page adverts, topical poems and songs, letters to the editor and much else.

Most of the news in the Yoruba-language papers was local, though the editors did reprint or summarise articles from the British press. They were read mainly by people who had been to elementary school and were literate in Yoruba but less so in English. All the Yoruba papers also carried English segments to attract readers not fluent in Yoruba. And they even reached non-literate people who would ask friends and neighbours to read parts of the paper aloud to them.

The print explosion was not confined to newspapers. Yoruba-language books and pamphlets on local history, religion, social issues and poetry poured out.

You call it an experimental era?

Yes, this was an experimental era for Yoruba print. There was the potential new readership, more familiar with oral forms of expression than written ones. There was the heated politics in which radical members of the elite such as Herbert Macaulay, now known as “the father of Nigerian nationalism”, allied with the Lagos traditional ruler and the market women and others to launch campaigns against the colonial government’s policies.

There was religious and social change, as immigrants from the hinterland flooded in. New forms of Islam and Christianity sought to gain a foothold, and traditional deference to elders and male heads of households seemed to be fading.

All this combined to make the Yoruba-language print entrepreneurs try out ways of addressing and capturing a new, varied and sometimes volatile readership. Most of the newspaper items talked directly to the reader and used witty and innovative allusions to popular sayings, songs and narratives.

They combined written genres familiar in the English-language press with genres drawn from Lagos street life, such as topical and satirical songs, anecdotes and oral history.

This mixture inspired new genres, such as the famous narrative The Life-story of Me, Segilola, told in the voice of an ageing “good-time girl” looking back on her scandalous past with a mixture of repentance and glee. It appeared in the form of weekly letters from Segilola to the editor of the weekly newspaper Akede Eko, I.B. Thomas (who actually wrote it himself) over nine months in 1929-30.

A newspaper was also an ideal space to try out new styles of writing, because much of the material appeared in series, such as advice columns to young women, or satirical dialogues between characters representing (in disguise) well-known figures in Lagos society. If one series didn’t catch on it could be quietly dropped.

But it wasn’t only the newspapers that were experimental: the books and pamphlets of this period were also doing something new. An important stimulus to experimentation was bilingualism. Yoruba and English texts coexisted in print, and copied and quoted each other all the time.

What do you hope readers will take away?

I hope readers will get a sense of the vitality of the print culture pioneered by Yoruba entrepreneurs. This was not a scene of great authors and international recognition – that came later, thanks, in part, to these efforts.

In the late 1930s, D.O. Fagunwa would introduce a new style of Yoruba-language fiction set in rural villages and magical forests. His rich, rolling, “deep” Yoruba became an inspiration for subsequent writers. There would be an upsurge of Yoruba-language writing after Nigerian Independence in 1960, resulting in one of the richest and most extensive African-language literary traditions in the continent.

The Lagos writers of the 1910s and 20s were less celebrated, and much of what they wrote has been forgotten. But they were part and parcel of everyday life in a rapidly transforming city and the way they wrote captured its vitality and its impulses and idioms.

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Read more: Why West Africa’s pidgins deserve full recognition as official languages

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They made creative use of popular street culture to establish a new print world. This was an early moment in an ongoing history of invention. The experiments with genre and language continue: today, you can hear English, Yoruba and Nigerian Pidgin being creatively mixed in popular music genres such as Afrobeat, fuji and rap, as well as in Nollywood films and fiction blogs.

This history suggests that while British colonialism imposed English as Nigeria’s official language, it had no way of controlling what people did with it, even at the height of colonial rule. And it also shows that Yoruba-language creativity, far from being part of some unchanging “traditional culture”, was actually the main driver of textual innovation and experimentation in the print sphere and beyond.

– How Lagos pioneers built a vibrant Yoruba print culture in the 1920s – at the height of colonialism
– https://theconversation.com/how-lagos-pioneers-built-a-vibrant-yoruba-print-culture-in-the-1920s-at-the-height-of-colonialism-289082

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Amanda Bisong, Policy Leader Fellow, School of Transnational Governance, European University Institute

In 2024, 25.1 million Africans were living in other countries on the continent. Labour migration has long been a defining feature of Africa’s economic landscape.

Migrant workers on the continent are concentrated in certain sectors: agricultural and manufacturing together absorb roughly a fifth of migrant labour. Most migrants hold medium-skilled jobs alongside high and low skilled occupations.

This sectoral concentration matters for the global skill partnership debate.

Global skill partnerships are agreements that link skills creation and skills mobility in a mutually beneficial way. Workers in countries of origin are trained in the skills that origin and destination countries need and are helped to go and work there legally. Destination countries fill labour shortages, origin countries gain skills and investment, and migrants get access to safer, more predictable pathways.

Yet, in practice, most of the partnerships involving destination countries outside the continent and African countries remain limited in scope and poorly attuned to the realities of mobility on the continent.

In Africa, the industries most reliant on migrant labour are regional and not highly formalised. They are not the high-income international corridors that most existing global skills partnerships are designed around. For example, while skills partnerships exist for skilled IT workers between Nigeria and Lithuania, most African migrant workers to other destinations on the continent work in manufacturing and agriculture.

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Read more: Jobs abroad or jobs in Africa? Why a focus on work in other countries shouldn’t replace opportunities at home

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As a researcher working on migration governance and labour mobility, I have followed how African governments and their partners have approached skills partnerships in practice. Drawing on my expertise, research fellowship, work on labour migration and mobility, and contributions to a recent mid-term assessment of the African Union’s Migration Policy Framework for Africa, I am of the view that mobility in Africa is already deeply regional, informal and often precarious.

I argue that what is missing is a skills and labour system that provides structure, recognition and protection. For skill partnerships to meet the needs of African countries, there should be a regional mobility track alongside the traditional domestic and international pathways.

Bilateral partnerships

Existing global skills partnerships involving African countries tend to follow a pattern: a bilateral agreement between one African country and a high-income destination, often in Europe.

These arrangements typically focus on training workers in specific sectors – healthcare, construction, information technology – with the expectation that some trainees will migrate while others remain and contribute locally.

While bilateral initiatives do achieve some of their stated objectives, they have weaknesses.

First, they ignore intra-African mobility patterns – 80% of African migration occurs within the continent.

For example, movement between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire or between Uganda and Kenya is common and economically significant. Bilateral arrangements with distant partners do not support or formalise these flows.

Second, bilateral arrangements tend to create a “two-track” system. One track is for domestic skill development and another is for migration to a specific country. This model overlooks workers who might prefer, or benefit from, opportunities closer to home.

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Read more: Seeking jobs abroad isn’t an option for young Nigerians: they don’t have the right skills

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According to an Afrobarometer survey, almost 22% of respondents wanted to move to another country within their region or on the African continent.

Third, these agreements lack scalability and flexibility. It takes resources to reach them and put them in place, and each agreement must be tailored to the needs of the partner countries. This makes it difficult to respond to shifting labour market demands. Development partners often say it’s hard to scale up the initiatives.

Finally, without coordination at the regional level, multiple bilateral agreements can create fragmented standards and qualifications, and administrative inefficiencies.

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Read more: African migration: focusing on Europe misses the point – most people move within the continent

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Why a third track makes sense

To address some of these gaps, global skill partnerships should evolve from a two-track to a three-track model:

1. Domestic track – training for local labour markets

2. International track – pathways to high-income destination countries

3. Regional track – structured mobility within Africa.

The addition of a regional track recognises that development does not only flow one way.

The benefits of a regional mobility track

A regional track offers several distinct advantages.

Formalising existing mobility

People are already migrating within Africa, often through informal channels. A regional track would formalise this mobility, standardise training and qualifications, and cement legal protections for workers. Policymakers should make existing corridors safer and more productive.

Enhancing worker protection

Informal migration exposes workers to exploitation, poor working conditions and lack of legal recourse. A structured regional pathway would ensure labour standards, social protection and common rights.

Addressing regional skills shortages

Many African economies face skills gaps in healthcare, construction and technical trades. A regional track would allow countries to share human capital more efficiently, matching supply and demand within the continent.

For example, shortages in the healthcare sector in African countries could be partially addressed, provided that training and certification systems were aligned.

Addressing brain drain

One of the criticisms of traditional skills partnerships is the potential for “brain drain”. A regional track keeps talent within the continent.

This does not eliminate outward migration but creates a more balanced ecosystem of mobility.

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Read more: Kenyans are encouraged to work abroad, but protection rights remain weak – new research

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Continental frameworks

Africa is not starting from scratch. Several continental and regional frameworks already provide a foundation for a regional skills partnership track.

The African Union has developed the Free Movement Protocol, facilitating visa-free travel and residence across member states.

The African Continental Free Trade Area and regional economic communities, such as the Economic Community of West African States and the East African Community, create a more integrated economic space and potentially increase the demand for cross-border labour mobility.

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Read more: African migrants can drive growth in their home countries – but three barriers stand in the way

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A more realistic model of mobility

Effective migration policy is not about imposing new patterns of movement, but about working with existing ones, making them safer, fairer and more beneficial for all. A three-track model does that.

Rather than treating international migration as the only destination for trained workers, the model recognises that development can also come from movement between African countries.

It expands opportunity without forcing choices, strengthens regional integration, and offers a grounded, context-sensitive approach to mobility.

Getting this right begins with acknowledging the sectors absorbing most African migrant labour on the continent: agriculture, manufacturing and medium-skilled level jobs, and designing policies that match this reality.

– Africans migrate for jobs mostly within the continent: why regional skills partnerships are needed
– https://theconversation.com/africans-migrate-for-jobs-mostly-within-the-continent-why-regional-skills-partnerships-are-needed-288149

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Vidya Diwakar, Deputy Director, CPAN; Research Fellow, IDS, Institute of Development Studies

Multiple and often overlapping crises such as floods or drought due to climate change, violent conflict and economic instability are creating new forms of vulnerability. Collectively they’re known as a polycrisis. These have severe effects on countries in sub-Saharan Africa with high poverty levels where weak institutions and limited public resources make it harder to respond effectively.

Vidya Diwakar is a senior research fellow at the Institute of Development Studies and the deputy director of the Chronic Poverty Advisory Network. Her research focuses on poverty dynamics, violent conflict and intersecting crises, gender and education. She answers questions about her book Poverty in Polycrisis: Dynamic Pathways for Lasting Change.

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What gap does your book seek to fill about understanding poverty?

The world now experiences increasingly interconnected crises with climate-related disasters, economic instability and violent conflict. These crises often overlap, and their effects build up to create new forms of vulnerability, making it harder for people to get out of poverty.

Consider the story of Aisha (anonymised), a woman our team interviewed in Borno, Nigeria. Aisha was once a successful farmer. But she now finds herself trapped in poverty after a series of crises. In 2013, Boko Haram killed her husband and three of her children, left her injured, and forced her and her remaining family to flee their village to a nearby settlement for internally displaced people.

Following this, Nigeria’s “cashless policy”, which restricted cash withdrawals to curb corruption, led to cash shortages. Aisha was forced to rely on credit-based sales for the charcoal selling business she had set up, leaving her without an income. The poor rains in Borno during the same year further reduced the ability of her remaining five children to support her financially.

Today, Aisha remains in the settlement camp, trapped in poverty.

In the world we live in, Aisha’s story is far from the exception as more people find themselves trapped in poverty due to compounding crises.

While there is extensive work on poverty and its drivers, the book focuses on how crises interact. The research draws on evidence from 15 high-poverty countries in regions of Africa and Asia. It examines how polycrisis is pushing people already in poverty into deeper deprivation. It also, surprisingly, shows how some people are able to escape poverty in these challenging contexts.

What about the intersection of climate-related disasters, economic instability and conflict?

When climate-related disasters, economic instability and violent conflict overlap, their effects mount up, making recovery much more difficult.

For example, a one-off drought might force a smallholder to sell some of their livestock or other assets. But they may be able to rebuild their business once the rains have come. However, if the drought is followed by high price inflation or broader economic volatility and more regular periods of drought, that might worsen the family’s food insecurity, push them into debt and make it harder to rebuild their income and assets.

These compounding forms of vulnerability have severe impacts in countries in sub-Saharan Africa with high poverty levels, weak institutions and limited public resources. Those already in poverty are being pushed deeper. And more people are falling into poverty for the first time and for longer periods of time.

The book also identifies strategies through which some people are escaping poverty. These pathways include relying on environmentally sustainable agricultural practices, diversification into off-farm livelihoods, and continuous economic and social adaptation to changing circumstances.

What about the role of governments and donors?

Our findings point to the fact that efforts and initiatives by governments and donors often reinforce harm, in three ways.

First, in response to crises, governments have adopted austerity measures. Nigeria’s fuel subsidy removal, for example, was accompanied by very little social assistance. This pushed many poor and vulnerable households deep into poverty.

Second, the standard response of fighting one crisis at a time can also make things worse for the world’s poorest. For example, evacuating populations to shelters during floods can increase disease transmission.

Third, there has been a decline in international aid. This will have severe consequences for poverty across future generations.

What are your recommendations?

The book recommends recognising how crises interact rather than addressing them in isolation.

Policies must must understand the challenges faced by poor and vulnerable people, and avoid causing harm.

This may sound obvious. But crisis responses often fail to account for these impacts.

Integrated policy responses could include cash transfers and social protection systems, early warning systems and other forms of disaster preparedness extended to rural and remote communities.

Peacebuilding activities can also help address root causes of both poverty and violent conflict.

Creating inclusive economic opportunities is important. Most people escape extreme poverty through “growth from below”: household-level strategies rather than top-down interventions alone. Yet government strategies seem to be going back to trickle-down economics.

Support from the international community remains important. This requires recommitting to predictable aid flows, especially to the poorest countries. Governments also have to expand their ability to raise and manage their public revenues, for example through taxes.

Complementary approaches, including debt restructuring, are important in the context of tightened aid budgets. They can ease fiscal pressures and help governments maintain pro-poor domestic investments.

What role can NGOs and the private sector play?

Non-state actors can contribute by supporting integrated responses that complement government action. These can include:

• strengthening community-level resilience

• supporting disaster preparedness at national and local levels

• enabling livelihood adaptation

• helping address vulnerabilities that emerge from overlapping crises.

Beyond service delivery, civil society organisations help ensure that responses are informed by people’s actual experiences. They can amplify the voices of marginalised groups in decision-making.

NGOs and community-based organisations can also act as intermediaries between communities and governments.

The polycrisis reveals how interconnected vulnerabilities have become today. Policy responses need to equally strive to be more interconnected. Collaboration across government agencies, international organisations and civil society is essential to create pathways out of poverty.

– How can governments tackle poverty when climate change, conflict and economic shocks hit all at once?
– https://theconversation.com/how-can-governments-tackle-poverty-when-climate-change-conflict-and-economic-shocks-hit-all-at-once-288292

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tim Forssman, Senior Lecturer, University of Mpumalanga

What is the past? It may seem a simple question to answer, but it is more complex than we might think at first. As science, politics, technologies and ways of thinking change, so does our understanding of what went before.

Tim Forssman is an archaeologist who has conducted research in South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Mozambique. He recently completed a book about how the history of archaeology in Africa has shaped the way we understand the past. Here he shares some thoughts about why the discipline matters.

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What are the key phases of archaeological work in Africa?

In my book, I divided the practice of archaeology in Africa into four phases: the early years, the emergence of archaeology, a coming of age, and archaeology’s diaspora across Africa. These are not definitive, and they have fuzzy boundaries, but they made the most sense to me. Each chapter begins with a story that I felt captured that period in time.

The early years came at a time (the late 1800s) when European nations were scrambling to parcel up Africa into colonies. Much of the archaeological work at this time was based on collections, with little analysis of the finds. Most of the research was carried out by museums employees, missionaries, administrators and travellers but little by trained specialists.

In the early 20th century, archaeological approaches changed, leading to a clash of amateurs and professionals. By the 1920s, robust analytical approaches were being developed and used to interpret the past. However, archaeology was still chasing the ghosts of colonial misperceptions of Africa’s history. Bogus notions of an Atlantis, a legendary sunken utopia, in west Africa, or Hamitic people from Egypt bringing advanced technology to large parts of the continent, continued.

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Read more: Colonialism in Africa: archaeology offers a deeper view

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The second world war brought about a technological leap. Methods such as radiocarbon dating emerged along with other advanced methods that would fundamentally shift archaeological approaches. Early examples of radiocarbon dating in Africa were from Bernard Fagg’s work in Nigeria on the Jos Plateau. While stationed there as a colonial chief inspector of mines he was alerted to finely crafted terracotta heads. He and his wife, Catherine, searched for more and retrieved a large sample. He dated them, producing an age over 2,000 years old, much older than any known kingdom in west Africa at that time. It challenged colonial views that complex civilisations emerged far later in this part of the world than elsewhere.

Growing from the 1960s, the diaspora of archaeology, was the role communities played in research, either as workers or by offering information and knowledge. This, I argue, represents a complete shift in archaeological frameworks and in giving agency to Africans.

The Swahili coastline is a perfect example. Previous work focused on the role that incoming Arabic groups played in transforming the socio-political landscape. Then a new approach emerged which turned the lens and examined how local communities carved out change along the coastline as part of a much longer history. Interest shifted from monumental settlements like the Great Mosque at Kilwa-Kiswani, in Tanzania, to everyday life.

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Read more: Ancient DNA is restoring the origin story of the Swahili people of the East African coast

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These chapters show how the lens archaeologists and historians use focuses on different pasts. As our contexts change, as our approaches shift, or as our science takes on new forms, our view of the past comes into a new focus. We see the past through the present – it is dependent on our social, technological, economic and political contexts.

What role does archaeology play in modern Africa?

The past has created the world we inhabit. For example, the entire eastern seaboard, from Mogadishu in Somalia to Vilanculos in Mozambique, is shaped by the long history of trade, interaction, colonisation, slavery and conflict. During the colonial era, and in South Africa until the end of apartheid, much of this was not fully recognised or widely promoted. Refocusing on the past, in places with colonial pasts, can play a reparative role in acknowledging African histories that were poorly recorded, helping us to better understand how our society was shaped.

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Read more: Looting of African heritage: a powerful new book explores the damage done by colonial theft

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Archaeology matters beyond how we view ourselves and those around us. It has the potential to promote social harmony, improve spiritual and mental health by connecting people with their past and their ancestors, and create sustainable jobs. It also promotes local and indigenous ways of doing and knowing. In Egypt, the Golden Parade of the Pharaohs through the streets of Cairo, when 22 mummies were moved to their new museum in 2021, became an important symbol of nationhood and identity. However, so much of Africa’s heritage is currently at risk.

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Read more: Côte d’Ivoire’s sacred talking drum is coming home: lessons from Kenya on how it could transform lives

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Preserving the past is an important task for all archaeologists and historians. Rampant looting for museums and collections has led to the loss of important historical items, such as terracotta statues in Nigeria and Mali. Crime is another concern. Conflict during the late 1990s in Eritrea and Ethiopia resulted in the toppling of stelae (stone columns) and golden finds from Thulamela (a site in South Africa’s Kruger National Park) were stolen from the museum in Skukuza, never to be retrieved.

Climate change is having an irreparable impact on history and heritage. In east Africa, potentially more than a quarter of the Unesco World Heritage sites are at risk of flooding or erosion. Mozambique is already witnessing massive damage from cyclones. It is only through archaeology that we learn more of these important pasts and identify methods to protect and preserve them.

Where do you see the field going next?

It is a very diverse discipline with a lot of sub-fields. Each has their own ambitions, aims and goals. But I believe there are some overarching agendas.

Reviewing scientific papers of African research shows that the vast majority are authored by people from Europe and North America. This brings collaborations, funds and training opportunities, but it also causes problems locally. This power dynamic needs to be revised. There should be more of an emphasis on growing local capacity, facilities and training.

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Read more: South Africa’s history uncovered: the 1,000-year gap they don’t teach in school

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Archaeological science is advancing our knowledge of the past at a rapid rate. Genetic research is helping us understand human and animal movements across the continent, and chemical analysis of artefacts such as glass beads is helping us map trade networks. We need more laboratories in Africa. This will create jobs and skills development, and reduce the risks associated with moving sensitive heritage items far from their places of origin.

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Read more: Nigeria’s city of Ilé-Ifẹ̀ has survived and thrived for 1,000 years: here’s how

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I also feel that including local communities in archaeological research at various levels is a grand shift in the discipline. In the earlier years, community knowledge was undervalued, whereas today many studies place it at the centre of understanding. Studies of rock art, for example, struggled to understand the art’s meaning until scholars turned to the belief systems of people who produced it to unlock its symbolism.

While there are many challenges, archaeology is in a strong position to contribute to the future. However, archaeologists must ensure that they show how the past is relevant in the present, or it risks being left behind.

– Archaeology has evolved: Four eras of understanding Africa’s past
– https://theconversation.com/archaeology-has-evolved-four-eras-of-understanding-africas-past-287886

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Nicole Beardsworth, Lecturer, University of the Witwatersrand

Zambia’s election, scheduled for 13 August, has shaped up into a battle between two alliances. The ruling United Party for National Development alliance is backed by 15 smaller parties. The Tonse-Pamodzi Alliance is headed by presidential newcomer Brian Mundubile and his running mate, Makebi Zulu.

The Tonse-Pamodzi alliance includes a group of smaller political parties without parliamentary representation, and many of the remaining structures of the Patriotic Front. Mundubile was formerly in the Patriotic Front, which was voted out in 2021. Alliances cannot register, so they have to run as a party but are backed by an informal alliance.

Almost every election in Zambian history includes negotiations on an opposition electoral coalition, but few survive to fight the elections. In 2026, the opposition cohered late in the face of what they say is significant state interference. They hope to take the election despite facing these challenges.

Having worked extensively across multiple Zambian elections and based on the research I have done as part of the Zambia Elections Research Network, my view is that the election will do two things:

• test the strength of the Tonse-Pamodzi’s local campaign and remaining Patriotic Front loyalties

• be a referendum on the United Party for National Development’s policies.

The election has turned into a more competitive race than most analysts had expected. With 14 candidates standing for the presidency, there are few recognisable party names. And for the first time in 30 years there isn’t a single former ruling party represented on the ballot.

Mundubile – and the National Reconciliation Party for Unity and Prosperity he’s heading – face a challenge of trying to sell themselves to Zambians in an extremely short period without the party labels or name recognition of previous contenders. His candidature on this new party was only announced in May.

The best performance of a newcomer candidate in Zambia’s history was in 2001, when the founder of the newly established United Party for National Development, Anderson Mazoka, faced down the Movement for Multiparty Democracy’s Levy Mwanawasa, who won the election with just 29% of the vote to Mazoka’s 27%.

The biggest factor playing on voters’ minds is the economy. While our survey conducted in late 2025 suggests that many Zambians are quite happy with many of the government’s flagship policies, the high cost of living and people’s expectations of the economy will be a key election issue.

It’s the economy …

When Hakainde Hichilema and the United Party for National Development won in 2021, he found the cupboard bare.

In November 2020 Zambia became the first African COVID-era debt default following years of unsustainable borrowing by the Patriotic Front government, which had run the country since 2011.

When Hichilema took over there was no clarity even on the extent of the debt. This was partly as a result of the contracting of debt at ministerial level and the broader weakening of institutions and oversight mechanisms.

He set about returning technocrats to the Ministry of Finance and the Treasury. A debt restructuring process was completed in June 2024. This cut over US$900 million from the total debt burden and spread future payments over a much longer period.

Zambia’s default status was officially lifted in November 2025, when ratings agency S&P Global raised its long- and short-term foreign-currency credit ratings with a stable outlook. Other economic wins included:

The restructuring deal is not without its critics. Nevertheless, five years after hitting rock bottom, Zambia is once again seen as a destination for global investment.

The Zambia Elections Research Network ran a survey in Zambia in late 2025 in which respondents ranked government’s performance on many of its key policies positively. The policies included cash for work programmes, the expansion of the constituency development fund and the introduction of free education. The survey was a nationally representative telephonic survey of 1,497 respondents.

But the primary complaint of many in Zambia is that the cost of living is still too high. And the changes at the macroeconomic level are yet to trickle down to household level.

The cost of a basic needs basket in Zambia increased by 43% between July 2021 and July 2026. But salaries have not kept up, according to the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection, which publishes a monthly cost of living bulletin.

Governance and legislation

The government’s achievements on deepening Zambia’s democracy and cleaning up corruption have been mixed.

The United Party for National Development government pursued an anti-corruption campaign. Many senior government officials were charged for corruption. Some were imprisoned. But none of the companies that took part in corrupt activities were charged. And few of the corruption scandals under the United Party for National Development administration have been pursued.

Hopes of progressive legal changes were raised in 2021 when the administration repealed the law on defamation of the president and finally brought in the Access to Information Act. But the overall record is much more mixed.

In 2025, the government introduced the contentious Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act, No. 7 (commonly known as “Bill 7”). But the change failed to meaningfully reform Zambia’s long-debated centralised constitution. Instead it nearly doubled the number of seats in parliament. It added 40 proportional representation seats without adequately specifying the mechanisms by which the elections would work.

In the final days before Parliament closed – and just three months ahead of the elections – the government pushed a massive 74 bills through parliament. These included crucial bills that would govern how the election was run. This “legislative overloading” reduced the already diminished oversight role of Parliament.

Opposition parties claim that state institutions were used to prevent them registering for the 2026 elections. It has been alleged that the Registrar of Societies – the body that governs political parties – changed the names of their office bearers, or changed their status from a political party to a church, or in some cases changed party names entirely. They argue that this state interference was the primary reason why for the first time in 30 years there isn’t a single former ruling party on the ballot.

The ruling party has also proven increasingly intolerant of dissent. Since 2021, several journalists and opposition leaders have been arrested, and no opposition rallies were approved to be held for five years. A key opposition leader was sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour for the defamation of the president. This has had a chilling effect on the opposition and civil society.

The battle of the alliances

Having been the leader of the opposition in Parliament since 2021 and the government chief whip from 2019 to 2021, Mundubile has a profile among those who watch politics in Lusaka. Relying on remaining Patriotic Front structures and sympathies in the party’s former heartlands, his alliance has run an impressive campaign with huge rallies across much of the country.

His campaign has done extremely well, despite having few resources, and it appears that he is gaining significant ground. While he has a considered manifesto, much of his campaign has tried to draw on remaining sympathies for the late former president Edgar Lungu, and he has pledged to “rule just like Lungu did”. Many of his promises on the campaign trail seem to pledge a return to the kind of decentralised patronage politics of the Lungu era.

For its part, the ruling United Party for National Development has put up a gruelling, if last-minute, campaign, and the president has been holding mass rallies across the country while also using his position to announce the opening of new development projects. Hichilema has also spent much of that time speaking off the cuff and attacking former party insiders and MPs for not supporting his constitutional reforms.

In a context where it appears that there was a deliberate attempt by state institutions to keep recognisable parties off the ballot, this election will be a test of the capacity of the Tonse-Pamodzi campaign, the remaining strength of Patriotic Front loyalties and a referendum on the United Party for National Development’s policies. Either way, the country is likely to have a much stronger opposition to contend with after the 2026 polls.

– Zambia votes: who’s who and what issues are shaping the elections?
– https://theconversation.com/zambia-votes-whos-who-and-what-issues-are-shaping-the-elections-289074