Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Luisa F. Escobar Alvarado, Post Doctoral researcher, Università di Torino

Few places in Africa have been as isolated and understudied as eastern Angola, particularly the highlands of the Moxico provinces, a region rich in biodiversity, culture and history. The country’s political past helps explain this isolation. Having achieved independence from Portugal in 1975 after 11 years of war, Angola descended into a civil war that lasted 27 years, one of the longest conflicts in Africa.

Since peace was established in 2002, development has concentrated in the capital Luanda, on the west coast. The east of the country has remained deeply marginalised, with limited access to basic services such as healthcare and education. Infrastructure is scarce and portions of the territory still have many landmines.

In these areas the state’s limited presence, likely a legacy of political exclusion and geographic isolation, has allowed communities a good deal of autonomy over land and resources. This has contributed to ecological preservation but hindered social and economic development.

Isolation has also shaped something less visible: the role of fire in human survival and the woodland ecosystem.

As a team of ecologists, social scientists and political scientists from the University of Edinburgh and the University of Turin, supported by the Okavango Wilderness Project, we have been researching ties between forests and local communities in this region. Fire is one of the main tools communities use to manage the landscape – clearing fields, improving visibility, stimulating fruit growth, and aiding hunting.

In a recent paper we set out our findings about how civil war had shaped fire regimes (patterns of fire in an ecosystem) in eastern Angola. We combined analysis of satellite data on burned areas and in-depth interviews with 42 elders who lived through the conflict and still live in the area now.

We found something that surprised us and that runs counter to what researchers have documented elsewhere. During the war, fire activity was lower than before or after it. In most conflict zones, war has tended to be associated with higher fire activity. This is important since how “normal” fire activity is defined determines how fire is managed.

Wartime in Angola’s highlands

Our fieldwork took place in three villages in the Moxico highlands. Dry forests and miombo woodlands grow in the high parts. Lower down there are grasslands and rivers – the headwaters of the Okavango Delta, whose waters sustain ecosystems and communities across southern Africa. This remote area is sparsely populated and the main activities are subsistence farming and honey collection.

Local people have traditionally used fire to clear their fields and the bush for easier hunting. They use controlled burns in savannas and woodlands to reduce the risk of larger fires reaching homes, and to help keep snakes away from villages. The villagers also use smoke in harvesting honey and firewood for cooking.

Customary authorities still govern the use of natural resources.

Elders told us fire was used less during the war: people were constantly displaced, relying heavily on woodland products – honey, fruits, mushrooms and wild animals – for survival. A woman said:

During the war, we had to move constantly; you built a house, stayed a month or a year, then moved again.

Armed forces strictly regulated the use of fire for cooking or hunting, since it could reveal people’s location; therefore, it was often used at night, when aircraft were not around. Forest cover was needed for safety. Careless use could result in harsh punishment and even death. One respondent told us:

If you burned, that was a crime! You would get whipped!

Respondents said that during the war, forested areas expanded and got denser.

Our spatial analyses of burned areas confirmed that fire decreased by an average of 36% during the war compared with the average after the war (2003 to 2018), with sharper declines in some periods. There was a 46% drop between 1991 and 1992, possibly linked to renewed violence after Unita (one of the parties in the civil war) rejected the Bicesse Accords election results. After the war ended in 2002, burned area rose 60% above the wartime average.

Fire and conflict

The case of eastern Angola shows some interesting patterns which can bring a new perspective to the relationship between fire regimes and armed conflict.

One is that most research on war and fire documents an increase in fire. This has been seen in Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Ukraine.

Our study shows the opposite: a marked decrease in fire activity during the conflict, followed by a sharp postwar recovery.

This drastic increase was likely driven by returning populations, restored livelihood practices and expanded market connections, all likely exacerbated by natural fuel accumulated during years of suppressed burning.

We read it not as an anomaly but as a return to a peacetime baseline. We suggest that it was the wartime suppression of burning that was exceptional.

This distinction is important not only for academic debates on human-fire interactions but also for fire governance and policy in the region. Taking the low-burning years of the war period as the baseline fire regime can lead to management strategies that focus on suppression, like banning early controlled burning. These can in turn disrupt fire-dependent livelihoods, overlook longer-term historical patterns, and promote narratives that are not necessarily grounded in local ecological or socioeconomic realities.

The effects of the war extended well beyond its end in 2002. Before the conflict, fire was managed collectively through long-standing community traditions. Wartime restrictions on burning, together with the disruption caused by the conflict, eroded these practices and the intergenerational knowledge that sustained them. As a result, fire use today is largely shaped by individual decisions rather than coordinated community management.

Managing fire in context

This case carries several implications: war can reshape fire regimes in ways current literature has overlooked, and fire itself is still too often framed as a danger or disaster, rather than a crucial tool for rural communities. Managing fire in this landscape calls for approaches that fit local realities, recognising fire as a socio-political process as much as an environmental one, and placing local livelihoods at the centre of governance.

The highlands of Moxico may represent an extreme case, but they are a reminder that war’s consequences for landscapes and livelihoods can be complex, unexpected and long-lasting – especially for marginalised groups.

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Author’s note on photos: before we take pictures with people we always ask for their consent, and we ask if we can share those pictures in different places. We obtain oral consent since most of the people we work with don’t read or write.

– Angola’s long war changed the way farmers used fire – why it matters
– https://theconversation.com/angolas-long-war-changed-the-way-farmers-used-fire-why-it-matters-285616

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Glen Robbins, Research Associate, PRISM, University of Cape Town; Adjunct lecturer, Gordon Institute of Business Science, University of Pretoria, University of the Witwatersrand

Just over a third (38%) of the residents of South Africa’s commercial capital, Johannesburg, reported being satisfied with their electricity services in a survey conducted in 2023/2024. This was down from 77% in 2017/18. The decline reflected years of citizen concerns about the service. In 2026 the auditor general noted that the city had spent only 1% of its operating budget on maintenance in 2024/25, against a national treasury guideline of 8%. As part of a response to these concerns, in May 2026 the City of Johannesburg and the German state-owned development bank Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) announced agreement on a R3.8 billion (over US$230 million) concessional loan to help fix the city’s electricity utility, City Power.

The announcement came weeks after a letter sent by the finance minister to the city raised concerns about years of unfunded budgets and poor financial management. The Conversation asked urban and economic development scholar and specialist Glen Robbins to reflect on issues related to the loan.

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Why do South African cities borrow?

Since the 1994 democratic settlement in South Africa, and as part of the reforms to the country’s local government arrangements, there has been some level of borrowing to support metropolitan budgets. It’s been used alongside national and provincial grants, and own revenue, to:

• extend services for new developments

• tackle the investment backlogs arising from apartheid urban development patterns.

In National Treasury’s 2017 update of the Policy Framework for Municipal Borrowing a commitment was made to increase the share of borrowing to finance municipal capital programmes. It was then around one quarter for the larger metros.

The same document indicated concern that most metros had become dependent on national grants for over 50% of their capital spending. Metros were supposed to fund the bulk of their capital programmes.

According to a 2022 report the five largest metros (Johannesburg, Cape Town, eThekwini, Ekurhuleni, Tshwane) averaged a little under R6 billion (around US$365 million) of total borrowing a year during the 2010s.

National Treasury has set a guideline ceiling for total borrowing for each of the metros: it should not exceed 45% of total annual revenue. However, the largest South African cities have tended not to push their total borrowing much beyond 30%-35% of total annual revenue.

The KfW loan is one in a long line of medium- to long-term loans that Johannesburg has sought to use for its budgeted programmes.

According to the city’s financial reporting, total loans and borrowings (as part of non-current liabilities) amounted to R19.4 billion (US$1.181 billion) in 2025. This figure refers to the outstanding loans and borrowings beyond the financial year of reporting. Johannesburg has to pay annual interest and also budget for paying down the capital of loans.

What’s this particular loan for?

The city’s leadership says the funds are needed to attend to urgent capital works for the municipal electricity utility, City Power. Municipal electricity utilities are important as generators of revenue for South Africa’s cities. City Power’s electricity sales are projected to generate 30% of Johannesburg’s budgeted revenue for 2026/27.

City Power’s infrastructure has become increasingly prone to failure.

KfW says it is supporting obligations associated with South Africa’s development intentions, including the Just Energy Transition Investment Plan. This was agreed between a number of western donor countries and South Africa during the 2021 COP26 Climate Summit.

South Africa’s largest cities are among the most significant groupings of customers for power from the country’s state-owned utility, Eskom. They are widely considered to be critical to the country’s complex energy transition.

A City of Johannesburg press release reports the loan as having a term of 15 years. This includes a five-year grace period on capital repayments. For the first five years the city would only need to pay interest on the loan. Repayments on the capital would only start in 2031.

This has allowed the city to project a lower cost of repayments than has been the case in recent years.

KfW also announced that the loan would be in local currency, thus reducing currency risk.

The interest rate for the loan has been set at 8.56%. Some previous loans were at rates closer to or above 11%. This lower rate has much to do with the fact that the South African Reserve Bank repo rate – the rate at which it lends money to banks – improved in 2025.

A press report in mid-2026 indicated that the electricity infrastructure backlog for City Power is estimated at around R40 billion (US$2.4 billion).

Are there concerns?

Both City Power and the City of Johannesburg have struggled for some time to deliver on their mandates.

The city failed to budget adequately to support City Power’s operational and infrastructure needs. And it allowed outstanding payments to Eskom for bulk electricity supplies to balloon to over R5 billion (US$304 million).

City Power has not fixed its poor revenue collection system. Losses on sales are reported at R5.7 billion in 2024/25. And it has not kept up with maintenance work.

Both have been linked to probes by the Special Investigating Unit, which was set up to look at corruption, malpractice and maladministration. This has earned it rebukes from the auditor general.

These challenges have been compounded by pressures of a growing population, years of power cuts by the state utility and high increases in its bulk supply costs to municipal utilities.

Culpability for many of these issues can be laid at the feet of the City of Johannesburg’s political and administrative leadership. But concerns have also been raised about the years of weak responses from national policy makers.

These circumstances clearly raise public concern that the funds might not deliver improvements.

What can people living in Johannesburg expect?

This loan will be unlikely to change a lot in terms of the experience of citizens of Johannesburg and their electricity services in the short term. There’s likely to be ongoing pressure to increase revenue through electricity price increases above the inflation rate. There will probably be attempts to correct troubled metering and billing systems. Efforts at reducing the very high level of informal connections are also likely.

The backlog on maintenance and major capital works will take time to attend to. Consistent improvements in services are likely to take some time to materialise.

What else can be done about the problems?

Metropolitan utilities do have capacity. Even City Power has shown that it can turn its hand to more innovative service delivery. This was evident in a recent off-grid project in an area that had no municipal grid infrastructure.

Efforts could be made to integrate business and residential roof-top solar and battery storage systems into City Power’s network. Efforts to increase cheaper bulk energy procurement from renewable energy suppliers could also bring benefits.

Work-flow planning and contract performance tracking could make a difference relatively quickly.

More support for low-income households could also make a difference.

The combination of the loan and support from the National Treasury’s Metro Trading Services Reform Programme may give the city and City Power the best chance they have had for many years to correct their path.

Progress will also require citizen groups, organised business and other stakeholders to push for transparency and accountability.

But nothing can be taken for granted. A media outlet recently reported that the City of Johannesburg was unable to obtain an additional loan from AFD, the French development bank, because of concerns about inadequate oversight of spending.

City finance figures quoted come, in the main, from annual budget reports for the various cities as well as annual reports and annual financial statements. These can be found on municipal websites and also from the National Treasury’s GoMuni portal. Budgets are subject to change within financial years and there can be a delay in the publication of audited figures.

– Johannesburg has taken a big new loan to help fix its electricity problems, but the results will take time
– https://theconversation.com/johannesburg-has-taken-a-big-new-loan-to-help-fix-its-electricity-problems-but-the-results-will-take-time-285658

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By XN Iraki, Professor, Faculty of Business and Management Sciences, University of Nairobi

Kenya’s Gen Z-led protests of 2024 drew global headlines. For weeks, young people mobilised against proposed tax increases, the rising cost of living, unemployment, corruption and what they saw as an unresponsive political class. But what began as opposition to the 2024 Finance Bill quickly evolved into a broader challenge to the way the country was being governed.

The protests were remarkable for their scale, decentralised nature and ability to mobilise through social media. They were eventually subdued through political concessions and state repression. At least 63 people were killed.

The issues that drove the protests haven’t disappeared. Questions about taxation, unemployment, public spending and inequality remain central to Kenya’s political debate. XN Iraki, an economist who has researched and taught in Kenya and beyond for more than two decades, explores the challenges.

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What has changed in the government’s approach to taxation and spending?

Economic policymaking in Kenya has become more politically constrained. The government can no longer assume that tax measures will be accepted.

As a result, the government has become much more cautious when it comes to tax policy.

The government is far more careful about introducing new taxes or increasing existing ones. Several proposed tax measures have been dropped or watered down, reflecting a greater sensitivity to the political risks of being seen to increase the cost of living. These include a 16% rise in the price of electric bikes resulting from new taxation.

Instead, policymakers have pursued two alternative approaches.

The first has been to widen the tax base, particularly by targeting Kenya’s vast informal sector, which accounts for 8 in 10 jobs (over 18 million employees).

Government officials argue that the tax burden is currently carried by registered taxpayers (only 40% out of 22 million taxpayers), and that everyone should contribute.

But taxing the informal economy remains difficult because many businesses in this sector operate without formal records and survive on thin margins. Small traders are already struggling to make ends meet.

The second approach has been a gradual shift from direct taxes towards levies, fees and charges on services. These include digital payment charges. They are often less politically controversial, but they still raise the cost of doing business. In turn, higher costs can make Kenyan goods and services less competitive and place pressure on consumers.

The protests have also influenced spending priorities. The last two national budgets have included more programmes targeting young people, including internships, enterprise support and procurement opportunities reserved for youth. Yet youth unemployment remains high, at about 67% (ages 15-34). This suggests the scale of the challenge exceeds the resources being devoted to it.

The biggest fiscal consequence has been on borrowing. There are still budget deficits, so borrowing bridge the gap. Recent budgets have relied increasingly on domestic borrowing to finance spending. Domestic borrowing refers to money the government raises from Kenyan investors through the sale of treasury bills and bonds. Kenya also borrows from international lenders, which is often cheaper but carries exchange-rate risks as repayments are made in foreign currencies.

In the 2026-27 budget, 90% of a Sh1.2 trillion (US$9.3 billion) deficit will be borrowed locally. In the 2023-24 financial year, domestic borrowing was 70%.

Domestic borrowing may be politically easier than raising taxes. But it raises concerns about the “crowding out” effect. This happens when government borrowing absorbs funds from lenders, such as banks, that might otherwise have been available for private sector investments and job creation.

What have been the key implications for the economy?

A major concern is that government spending has remained high. Many Kenyans expected the protests to trigger a serious effort to reduce waste and lower spending. That is work in progress.

Two spending items stand out. The first is the public wage bill, which absorbs a significant share of tax revenues. In theory, technology and digitisation should make the government leaner and more efficient. In practice, reducing public sector employment carries political risks, particularly given Kenya’s high unemployment rate.

The second is debt servicing. Kenya spends a large portion of its revenue repaying loans. This leaves less money available for development projects and public services. It creates a vicious cycle. High spending leads to more borrowing, which in turn requires higher future taxes or further borrowing.

The government is caught between competing pressures.

Citizens want lower taxes and a lower cost of living. The state needs revenue to fund services and repay debt. And politicians are reluctant to cut spending ahead of the 2027 general election.

What are the policy hits and misses?

The biggest policy success has been the government’s recognition that young people need to be more deliberately included in economic policy. Recent budgets have expanded funding for youth empowerment programmes.

The misses, however, are more significant.

One is the attempt to expand taxation into parts of the digital and gig economy, where many young Kenyans have sought opportunities. Taxing these sectors risks discouraging innovation and entrepreneurship.

Another is the gap between expectations and delivery. The government’s promise to create overseas employment opportunities for young people has generated publicity, but the numbers remain small relative to the scale of youth unemployment.

Perhaps the most important policy failure is that young people are still viewed primarily as a political challenge rather than an economic opportunity or asset.

Around the world, countries are grappling with ageing populations and shrinking workforces. Kenya has the opposite advantage: a large, educated and technologically savvy young population. Yet corruption and limited economic opportunities mean many young people feel their talents are undervalued and underutilised. This can create frustration.

What economic issues might mobilise young people again?

The issues that brought young people onto the streets in 2024 have not disappeared.

Youth unemployment remains high. Slower economic growth intensifies these frustrations.

Corruption remains another powerful mobilising issue. Many young Kenyans believe public resources are still being mismanaged while essential services remain inadequate.

As Kenya approaches the 2027 elections, the greatest risk for policymakers is assuming that the protests were solely about the Finance Bill. The bill was merely the trigger. The deeper concerns – jobs, corruption, inequality, accountability and economic opportunity – remain largely unresolved. Those issues are likely to continue shaping political mobilisation, even beyond 2027.

– Did Kenya’s Gen Z protests achieve anything? An economist weighs up what’s changed and what’s stayed the same
– https://theconversation.com/did-kenyas-gen-z-protests-achieve-anything-an-economist-weighs-up-whats-changed-and-whats-stayed-the-same-285722

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Bekalu Wachiso Gichamo, Lecturer in Peace and Security Studies & Senior Researcher, Wolkite University

Ethiopia’s Oromo people have an indigenous philosophy known as Namummaa, or “humanness”, which places relationships and peace at the centre of social life. The Oromo are Ethiopia’s most populous ethnic group, making up about 38% of the country’s population of 105 million people. Most live in Oromia, a region that covers about a third of Ethiopia’s land area. Oromia is a political powerhouse that plays a central role in shaping Ethiopia’s trajectory.

Drawing on his research into Oromo traditions and customs, Bekalu Wachiso Gichamo explains how Namummaa shapes ideas of conflict resolution – and why its lessons may be relevant to a country grappling with political and ethnic divisions.

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What are the main characteristics of Namummaa?

The word is built from two parts: “nama”, meaning human, and “ummaa”, meaning the essence or quality of being something. At its core, Namummaa means “humanness”.

For the Oromo people, the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, a person becomes fully human through their relationships with other people, the natural world and Waaqa, the creator in Oromo belief systems.

This perspective is similar to ubuntu, a southern African philosophy often summed up as “I am because we are”.

The Oromo also use a moral code called Saffu. This encourages people to keep a respectful distance from evil and maintain healthy relationships. If you act selfishly or harm others, you lose your Namummaa. You might still have a human body, but the community will say you lack humanness.

How do indigenous moral values shape the character of the Oromo?

Namummaa shapes both personal conduct and collective identity.

The Oromo place great emphasis on relationships, mutual care and responsibility towards others. A person’s worth is judged by how they treat fellow human beings and contribute to communal wellbeing, not by wealth or status.

This is reflected in Oromo proverbs such as:

Your neighbour’s situation is your situation too

and

Your happiness is my happiness.

These sayings express the belief that individual wellbeing cannot be separated from the wellbeing of others.

The Gadaa system– an indigenous system of governance that largely dictates Oromo life – promotes values such as accountability, participation, dialogue and collective responsibility. This reinforces the idea that human dignity should be respected.

However, Namummaa has not always been perfectly realised in practice. One example is Butta, a customary armed expedition. Under the Gadaa system, men passed through a series of age-based classes, where they were taught their social and political responsibilities. Before assuming leadership, some Gadaa classes were expected to wage war or raid neighbouring groups regarded as enemies.

Such practices appear to contradict the ideals of peace and coexistence associated with Namummaa. They remind us that indigenous traditions, like all social systems, contain tensions and contradictions. They also suggest that some historical practices may have weakened or distorted Oromo ideals concerning peace, democracy and intercommunal relations.

Is there relevance for this in peacebuilding and conflict resolution?

Peace, or nagaa, occupies a central place in Namummaa.

Because relationships are viewed as the foundation of social life, maintaining and restoring peace becomes a collective responsibility.

One example can be seen in how serious crimes are handled. When a hidden crime such as murder occurs, elders often play a leading role in investigating and resolving the conflict. Rather than relying solely on punishment, the emphasis is placed on uncovering the truth, repairing harm and restoring relationships.

The Oromo believe that truth possesses moral and spiritual force. A common saying is:

Truth is the son of God.

When wrongdoing is discovered, family members may be expected to help establish the truth because an unresolved crime is believed to harm not only the individual offender but also the wider family and community.

Once responsibility is established, the offender may provide compensation to the victim’s family. The goal is reconciliation. Community members work to repair the damaged relationship so that both sides can continue living together peacefully.

This differs from many modern legal systems, which often focus primarily on punishment. Whereas formal courts ask what law was broken and how the offender should be sanctioned, Namummaa asks who has been harmed and how the social fabric can be repaired.

How might Namummaa be useful in Ethiopia today?

Ethiopia continues to experience political, ethnic and armed conflicts. As state-led military actions and formal political negotiations struggle to secure lasting stability, Namummaa offers a possible resource. While it originates in Oromo traditions rather than national institutions, I argue that Namummaa offers a credible framework for building a safer Ethiopia and world. We cannot rely on police and prisons alone – we have to rediscover our shared humanness.

Namummaa’s emphasis on dialogue, truth-telling, mutual responsibility and reconciliation provides a framework for addressing conflict that goes beyond political bargaining.

It encourages people to see opponents not as permanent enemies but as fellow human beings whose wellbeing is connected to their own.

The philosophy also promotes intercultural understanding. By recognising shared vulnerability and interdependence, it challenges the divisions that often fuel conflict.

The lessons of Namummaa extend beyond Ethiopia. Around the world, societies are struggling with political polarisation and declining social trust. Namummaa reminds us that peace is the ongoing work of nurturing relationships.

– Can an ancient Oromo philosophy help Ethiopia build peace? Why Namummaa matters
– https://theconversation.com/can-an-ancient-oromo-philosophy-help-ethiopia-build-peace-why-namummaa-matters-281052

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Derek Yu, Professor, Economics, University of the Western Cape

Postgraduate education is good for a country. Thriving economies need people with advanced academic degrees to enhance research productivity. Research and innovation capability have a positive impact on the competitiveness of a country.

The South African government has developed an extensive financial support programme for undergraduate (first degree) education in the form of the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS). However, this doesn’t extend to postgraduate programmes. Postgraduate education therefore remains a luxury for many students, even though the National Development Plan aims to have over 25% of university enrolments at postgraduate level by 2030.

As academics in the Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences at the University of the Western Cape, we examined the impact of students receiving financial aid for postgraduate study. The students in our research were new postgraduate students who registered at the faculty in 2019 (the last normal academic year before COVID-19).

Fewer than half the students received financial aid. We found that aid appeared to have an impact on completion of the study programme, especially for the postgraduate diploma. We think there’s a case for greater investment in support for postgraduate education.

Statistics South Africa’s Quarterly Labour Force Survey data shows that job seekers with only matric (grade 12 school leaving qualification) have a 35% probability of being jobless. The unemployment rate is much lower at 12% among jobseekers with first degrees. And it is only 5% among those with postgraduate qualifications. What’s more, our calculations from quarterly labour force data show that postgraduates on average earn about 38% more than those with only first degrees.

Who got financial aid

We analysed the students’ demographic characteristics, financial aid receipt status and academic results. A total of 623 new postgraduate students enrolled at the faculty: 186 for the postgraduate diploma, 275 for honours, 133 for master’s and 29 for doctorate programmes.

Some important findings emerged from the study.

Firstly, only 45.8% of these new postgraduate students received some form of financial aid. In contrast, almost all undergraduate students in this faculty receive NSFAS support. Out of all four postgraduate levels, the proportion of students receiving financial aid was the highest at postgraduate diploma level (50.5%). It was lowest at doctorate level (37.9%).

Secondly, for those who received financial aid, the university’s internal financial aid was the dominant funding source (35.8% of students received this aid). This was followed by National Research Foundation (16.8%) aid and Finance and Accounting Services Sector Education and Training Authority bursaries (15.1%, mainly for Accounting students).

Thirdly, the mean amount of financial aid received for 2019 (in 2025 December prices) was about R55,000 (about US$3,400) for postgraduate diploma and honours students. It was higher at R110,000 (US$6,800) at master’s level and R225,000 (almost US$14,000) at doctorate level.

Fourthly, the majority of financial aid recipients were Africans at all four postgraduate levels. This is in line with the social justice theory that previously disadvantaged population groups should get support.

Various factors can have an impact on academic performance, such as previous academic experience, residence on campus, and whether parents and students themselves are employed.

But the fifth and most striking finding was about the impact of receiving financial aid.

• It made the greatest positive impact on postgraduate diploma students: 81% of the financial aid recipients eventually completed their studies, as against 71% of non-recipients.

• Similarly, for the honours students, 91% of financial aid recipients completed their studies; 89% of non-recipients did so.

• At postgraduate diploma level, on average it took 1.51 years for financial aid recipients to complete their studies, but it took an additional semester for non-recipients to do so (1.94 years).

• Among the honours students, financial aid recipients took 1.33 years on average to complete their studies. Non-recipients took slightly longer (1.45 years) to do so.

These findings suggest financial aid had a positive impact on study completion and on the time taken to complete studies. The impact was mainly at postgraduate diploma level.

Recommendations

We have three recommendations.

First, policymakers and higher education institutions must consider expanding financial aid beyond undergraduate programmes. This would be a strategic investment in educational equity and academic excellence.

It could be tough ask, given South Africa’s fiscal deficit situation. Even private sector institutions may have dwindling funds available from firms’ profits, given the current economic climate.

Greater investment into postgraduate funding, at a level similar to that of the National Student Financial Aid Scheme, is a strategy worth pursuing to alleviate the country’s poverty, inequality and unemployment and to uplift human capital, productivity and even international competitiveness.

Secondly, it is important to determine whether postgraduate diploma and honours students have been overlooked in provision of financial support. They form the foundation for further studies.

Lastly, a wide range of indicators should be considered to determine if a university has produced enough postgraduates to meet the skills needs in the country’s labour market. These indicators may include:

• the mean years taken to complete studies

• completion rate (what share of students complete studies)

• throughput rate (how long it takes to complete)

• percentage of academic staff with doctorate degrees (which indicates staff capacity to supervise postgraduate students)

• percentage of postgraduate programmes that are also offered on a part-time basis. If students are also working they are more likely to struggle with their studies and take more time to complete.

– Funding boosts postgraduate student success – South African study measures how
– https://theconversation.com/funding-boosts-postgraduate-student-success-south-african-study-measures-how-283780

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Camila C. Matos, Family and Community Physician, Professor, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)

Vaccine uptake has been declining in Brazil and South Africa over the last decade. This decline has reversed important gains in protecting children against vaccine-preventable diseases such as measles, polio, diphtheria and whooping cough.

Both countries have well-established, universal and free childhood immunisation programmes. In Brazil, coverage has dropped 10-20 percentage points since 2016 and remains below the 95% target for several routine vaccines. In South Africa, vaccination coverage has steadily declined since 2015. For example, coverage for the first dose of measles-containing vaccine (MCV1), a key indicator of immunisation programme performance, decreased from 86% in 2015 to 76% in 2024.

Reasons include social conditions, personal experiences, cultural beliefs, and access to health services. These vary across groups and contexts.

As researchers in public health, we have studied how these different social contexts shape routine childhood immunisation in Brazil and South Africa.

The study formed part of the PhD research of physician and lecturer Camila Matos, conducted under the supervision of professors Marcia Couto in Brazil and Charles Shey Wiysonge in South Africa.

Participants were recruited from diverse racial, gender and socioeconomic backgrounds. The analysis considered how these social determinants influenced the decisions they made about health. It found that vaccine hesitancy in the two countries is not a single, uniform phenomenon.

The research found that practical barriers to vaccination mattered most for lower-income families in both countries. Among the barriers were long waiting times, limited clinic hours, transport difficulties, and occasional vaccine shortages. In contrast, among some higher-income and more educated families in both countries, vaccination decisions were more likely to reflect values. Decisions were more about vaccine safety and side effects, distrust of pharmaceutical industries, and parental autonomy.

Country-specific concerns also emerged, including fears about autism or personality changes in South Africa and concerns in Brazil about the large number of vaccines and doses in the childhood immunisation schedule.

The findings show that decisions about vaccination are shaped by different social realities. These include inequality, access to health services, trust in institutions, and exposure to misinformation. Recognising differences is important for developing vaccination policies and communication strategies that respond to local contexts.

Declining vaccine coverage

Brazil and South Africa are upper middle-income countries, both with long histories of social inequality and segregation.

Brazil has the National Immunisation Programme and South Africa has the Expanded Programme on Immunisation. Both have historically achieved high vaccination coverage. Brazil maintained coverage above 95% for several childhood vaccines during much of the 2000s and early 2010s. South Africa has frequently reported national coverage levels around or above 90% for key childhood vaccines before recent declines.

But both countries are now facing sustained declines in vaccination coverage. Brazil’s decline is due to a combination of factors including social inequalities, disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, barriers in access to health services, and growing vaccine hesitancy.

In South Africa, too, the decline is due to a combination of factors. Persistent inequalities in healthcare access and increasing vaccine hesitancy leave a substantial proportion of children not fully immunised. In 2016, an estimated 40.8% of children were not fully immunised for their age. The COVID-19 pandemic also disrupted routine vaccination services. Coverage of key vaccines remained below pre-pandemic levels.

Beyond misinformation: social roots of vaccine hesitancy

Evidence from both Brazil and South Africa points to vaccine hesitancy as an important reason for declining vaccination coverage. Vaccine hesitancy is defined as “a motivational state of being conflicted about, or opposed to, getting vaccinated”. It includes intentions and willingness to vaccinate, but it is context-specific.

We conducted in-depth interviews to explore how caregivers of children up to six years old perceived, delayed, selectively accepted or refused vaccines. Participants were intentionally recruited from diverse racial, gender and socioeconomic backgrounds.

The broader study included families with different vaccination statuses and practices. These included children fully vaccinated according to the national schedule, children vaccinated with delayed or alternative schedules, and children who had received few or no vaccines. This article focuses on narratives in which vaccine hesitancy emerged as a central theme.

We found that childhood vaccine hesitancy was influenced by different, but often interconnected, social and everyday life factors.

Among many medium-low and low-income non-white families in both countries, vaccination uptake was affected by hesitancy-related concerns and practical difficulties in accessing vaccination services. These included long waiting times, limited clinic hours and, in some cases, temporary shortages or unavailability of vaccines at health facilities.

These challenges rarely reflected outright refusal but led to delays and incomplete vaccination.

In contrast, deliberate decisions not to vaccinate were more common among medium-high and high-income white families. These families emphasised parental autonomy, individual choice and natural lifestyles. They often positioned themselves as critical of the medical or pharmaceutical systems rather than explicitly anti-vaccine.

Why vaccine hesitancy cannot be addressed with a single strategy

Across groups, concerns about safety and side effects were central. Many caregivers reported “doing their own research” online. This exposed them to misinformation while reinforcing a sense of autonomy. Yet mistrust was not confined to privileged families. Among lower-income participants, it often stemmed from negative experiences with health services.

The findings also reveal country-specific nuances. In South Africa, some linked vaccines to conditions such as autism or personality changes. In Brazil, concerns were more related to the extensive immunisation schedule, the high number of doses, and the administration of several vaccines at the same visit.

Together, the results show that one-size-fits-all strategies are unlikely to succeed. Effective responses must address both structural barriers and the cultural perceptions and social beliefs surrounding vaccination.

We argue that the next steps should place the social sciences at the centre of immunisation policy. Public health planning must take account of community perspectives and the social determinants of vaccine hesitancy. Communication must be culturally responsive. Reducing vaccine hesitancy to “lack of information” or parental negligence is too simple. People’s decisions are shaped instead by complex realities.

The study shows that choices about whether or how to vaccinate children are deeply rooted in the social positions families occupy. They intersect with race, class, inequality, trust, and lived experiences with health systems.

Rebuilding confidence will depend on better information and socially responsive, context-aware public health strategies.

– Vaccine hesitancy can’t be boiled down to a single factor: what we learnt in South Africa and Brazil
– https://theconversation.com/vaccine-hesitancy-cant-be-boiled-down-to-a-single-factor-what-we-learnt-in-south-africa-and-brazil-278807

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Hafte Gebreselassie Gebrihet, Research fellow, University of Oslo; University of Cape Town

Africa faces declining aid, rising debt, climate pressure and a weakening global order. Official development assistance, the technical term for foreign aid, fell by 23.1% in 2025, the largest annual contraction on record. It’s projected to decline by a further 5.8% in 2026, before accounting for strain from the current crisis in the Middle East.

UN Trade and Development has also warned that debt servicing is diverting scarce resources from education, health, infrastructure and other development priorities.

We believe that this moment is not only a crisis to survive. It is an opportunity to ask whether development can be renegotiated on more equal terms.

Our views are based on our earlier research on trust, corruption and tax compliance; ongoing work under the Africa-Europe Clusters of Research Excellence on African agency, development financing and sustainability, a collaborative hub connecting researchers, policymakers and practitioners; and recent roundtable discussions with policymakers, scholars, activists and civil society representatives in Ethiopia, Malawi, South Africa and Mauritius.

The question is whether Africa will approach this moment with priorities shaped by donors, creditors and external policy agendas, or with its own policy compass. Agenda 2063, the African Union’s long-term development blueprint, was designed to provide that compass. It speaks of inclusive growth, sustainable development, regional integration, good governance, peace, prosperity and citizen wellbeing.

That matters because Africa does not need another grand vision. It needs to treat the vision it already has as a discipline.

That discipline begins with money. AU policy direction is clear that Africa must finance its own development, including Agenda 2063. In practice, this means African governments must rely less on external goodwill through fairer domestic revenue, more productive use of debt and firmer negotiations with donors, creditors and investors.

From aid dependence to ownership

Aid has supported health systems, education, infrastructure and food security. But aid was never a secure foundation for sovereignty. Dambisa Moyo, the Zambian-born economist and author of Dead Aid, warned that the aid-dependency model keeps Africa in a “perpetual childlike state”. When donor budgets shrink, geopolitical priorities change, or wars elsewhere redirect resources, African countries are left exposed.

Malawi shows how sharp that exposure can be. Development partners have historically funded close to 40% of its national budget. One roundtable participant in Blantyre put the stakes bluntly: if Africans do not do away with aid, aid will do away with them. If African countries do not shape what comes after the old aid model, its collapse will simply consume them.

Agenda 2063 cannot be implemented through permanent dependence on external goodwill. If African governments are serious about owning their development priorities, domestic resource mobilisation must move from technical language into the centre of politics.

In our view, that means raising and spending taxes fairly, using borrowed money more productively, and standing together as a continent to increase bargaining power.

Tax justice, not just more taxes

Citizens already carry heavy burdens through consumption taxes, fees, informal payments and the daily costs of poor services. Asking them to pay more while public money is wasted, elites avoid tax, and services remain weak is not domestic resource mobilisation. It is extraction without accountability.

The real issue is tax justice. People are more likely to accept taxes when they can see that public money is used fairly, services improve, and leaders are held accountable. But citizens are unlikely to accept this bargain when corruption is widespread and institutions lack credibility. Evidence from fragile African states shows that corruption weakens public trust and can undermine citizens’ willingness to comply with tax obligations.

Revenue systems need to widen the tax base fairly, improve administration without harassing small traders, reduce illicit financial flows, and tax rents, wealth, property and extractive sectors more effectively. They also need to close exemptions that serve political connections more than development.

Citizens do not pay taxes so that governments can search for aid on their behalf. They expect services, security and accountability. Agenda 2063 will remain abstract unless it is felt in clinics, schools, roads, electricity, water systems and public institutions that treat people with dignity.

Debt as a development test

Debt raises a similar issue: whether borrowed money strengthens development or deepens dependency. Africa’s debt problem is often discussed as if borrowing itself is the disease. That is too simple. Roads, power systems, universities, irrigation, industrial corridors and climate adaptation require large investment. The issue is not only whether governments borrow. It is what debt does.

Borrowing that expands productive capacity can strengthen a country. Borrowing that finances recurrent spending, vanity projects or corruption leaves the next generation paying for yesterday’s failure. It weakens bargaining power and turns national policy choices into negotiations with creditors.

Agenda 2063 should become a test of debt quality. Does a loan increase a country’s capacity to produce, trade, employ and innovate? Does it support regional integration, food systems, skills, infrastructure or future revenue? If the answer is no, the debt may be legal, but it is not developmental.

Bargaining power

A country that cannot finance basic services, manage debt or mobilise fair revenue will struggle to negotiate with donors, creditors and investors. It may speak the language of sovereignty while operating from dependency.

African agency depends on bargaining power. That power does not come from slogans. It comes from fiscal capacity, credible institutions, regional cooperation and the ability to say no. Rwanda offers a glimpse of what that looks like, directing its development partners towards national priorities rather than accepting whatever is offered. Saying “no, thank you” requires somewhere else to stand: stronger continental and regional institutions, alliances within Africa, diaspora networks and South-South cooperation.

This is why regional integration cannot remain ceremonial. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), one of the African Union’s flagship projects under Agenda 2063, aims to accelerate intra-African trade and strengthen Africa’s common voice in global trade negotiations. That ambition should not remain on paper.

The trade agreement should help African countries negotiate from stronger positions over debt restructuring, climate finance, investment, infrastructure, energy access, local processing and fairer value chains. Fragmented negotiations leave countries exposed to external terms negotiated one by one.

No more excuses

The real danger is policy laziness: producing visions without financing them, announcing reforms without implementing them, and promising transformation while preserving the systems that block it. The danger also lives in language. Buzzwords such as resilience, capacity building and localisation travel well across institutions precisely because they have stopped meaning anything in particular. Retiring them, or filling them with substance, is part of what reclaiming agency means.

African citizens are not asking for abstract development language. They want decent work, reliable electricity, functioning clinics, good schools, roads, water, security and accountable institutions. They want governments that do not use crisis as an excuse for permanent failure.

African countries are at a potential turning point, but only if today’s uncertainty produces more serious policy choices. Africa already has a vision. The task now is to use it.

– Can Africa survive the global aid squeeze? Yes, but it will take financial discipline
– https://theconversation.com/can-africa-survive-the-global-aid-squeeze-yes-but-it-will-take-financial-discipline-285423

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Kevin Naidoo, Professor of Scientific Computing and Physical Chemistry, University of Cape Town

In the intricate biology of the human body, organs such as the breast, the colon and the lungs are lined with a defensive barrier known as the epithelium. At the heart of this barrier sits a remarkable protein called Mucin-1 (MUC1). In a healthy body, MUC1 is like a sentinel.

It stands on the cell wall, draped in a complex “armour” of long chains of sugar molecules (carbohydrates), where it serves as a physical shield against bacteria, viruses and toxins. Crucially, it communicates with the immune system, telling our natural defences when the body is under threat.

But in the case of cancer, this guardian exchanges its sugar coat armour for shorter sugar chains and so turns into a traitor. It stops sending danger signals to the immune system and instead binds to the immune cells, creating an anti-inflammatory microenvironment that promotes tumours.

The team I lead at the Scientific Computing Research Unit at the University of Cape Town is home to computer modelling experts and experimental chemical biology research scientists. The molecular details of this MUC1 alteration, which contributes to the transformation of normal cells into tumour cells, were recently published in Nature Communications, and provide a new look at exactly how this process happens.

By developing a novel “test-tube” synthetic biology approach, we modelled and decoded the molecular assembly line reorganisation that allows cancer to “redecorate” MUC1, turning it from a protective shield into a cloak of invisibility. We used our own computational chemistry algorithms to map the exact sugar coating positions that create a tumour-promoting environment.

Understanding the location and nature of the MUC1 sugars that prevent the immune system from detecting tumours provides the foundation for our laboratory and others in the field to develop cancer vaccines, biomarkers and therapeutics.

This South African-led discovery represents a major leap forward in our ability to decode one of cancer’s most effective survival strategies.

The problem: a malignant makeover

In a normal cell, the sugar molecules attached to MUC1 are long and complex. The process of attaching sugars is called glycosylation. In cancer cells, however, this process goes haywire. The sugar molecules are often cut short or altered, creating “aberrant” structures like the Tn and sialyl-Tn (sTn) antigens. These are specific types of sugar-protein combinations that are tags for tumour cells.

These altered sugars do two dangerous things: they allow the tumour to evade detection by the immune system, and they actively trigger the process of turning a normal cell into a cancerous one.

Because MUC1 is found in so many different types of cancer, the US National Cancer Institute has ranked it as the most accesible target.

To stop the cascading effect of the MUC1 changes from normal to tumour cells, scientists first had to understand exactly how the “assembly line” breaks down.

The discovery: relocating the factory

Our research team set out to do something ambitious: recreate the transition from a healthy sugar coating to a cancerous one in a laboratory setting.

In normal cells, the enzymes that build these sugar chains (long molecules) live in a part of the cell called the Golgi apparatus, the cell’s “packaging and delivery centre”. We built an in vitro (test-tube) model to simulate what happens when these conditions change. We discovered that in tumour cells, the enzymes responsible for starting the sugar chains are relocated to another part of the cell, the endoplasmic reticulum, essentially the cell’s “factory floor”.

This relocation changes everything. Here, the enzymes are no longer inhibited by the usual cellular checks and balances. They take over the sugar sites on the MUC1 protein, creating the foundation for the cancerous Tn antigen.

To take the study even further, we used quantum chemistry. We simulated the behaviour of atoms and molecules at the most fundamental level to find out where these changes are most likely to happen. We identified a specific location on the MUC1 protein, known as the T13 site, which cancer enzymes prefer. This specific interaction is what drives the massive increase in the sTn antigen seen in malignant tumours.

Why this matters: from lab to patient

Understanding the “how” and the “where” of these sugar changes is the first step towards stopping them. The research didn’t stop at the test tube; the team is already looking at what this means for patients.

The next phase of the research, as detailed in a recent paper in Glycobiology, involves building a sophisticated “systems biology” computational model. A model can connect the changes in the MUC1 sugar coating to the behaviour of immune cells. For example, scientists found that when these cancerous sugars interact with macrophages (a type of white blood cell), they trigger the release of specific signals that tell the tumour to grow and spread.

We are refining these details for various types of cancer. We are comparing common forms of breast cancer with more aggressive, currently untreatable types to see if the “sugar code” differs between them.

By using this accurate, atomic-level data to build computer models of the entire biological system, we hope to identify new drugs that can block these signals. The goal is to move towards precision medicine: treatments that can strip away cancer’s sugar shield, allowing the patient’s own immune system to finally see and destroy the tumour.

– South African scientists make breakthrough in decoding cancer’s most effective survival strategy
– https://theconversation.com/south-african-scientists-make-breakthrough-in-decoding-cancers-most-effective-survival-strategy-283545

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Anné H. Verhoef, Professor in Philosophy, North-West University

Can technology really replace human relationships? As philosophy scholars who focus on human happiness and on artificial intelligence (AI), we tackle this question in a recent paper.

In our study, we address the rise of AI companions, chatbots, and social robots for friendship, advice, emotional support, and even romance.

We argue that AI can reduce loneliness and provide assistance, but it lacks the genuine understanding, emotions, and moral responsibility needed for human flourishing.

Genuine happiness relies on authentic interpersonal connections, but AI is disrupting traditional ideas of friendship and relationships. Replacing these with AI-driven interactions risks eroding well-being and community.

Human happiness

The study of happiness is a broad field. In our paper, we turn to the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur to address an aspect of happiness that links to authentic human connections, friendships, and community building.

Ricoeur was particularly influential in the field of human capability and how people understand themselves, others and their world. He advanced our understanding of happiness by connecting it to unhappiness and chance, but also by emphasising the human relational nature of happiness. He makes three interrelated claims on what happiness means.

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Read more: What is happiness? A philosopher looks for answers

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First, happiness reflects the individual’s desire for a fulfilled life and personal agency. Yet, Ricoeur warns that human beings exist within complex social systems that shape and constrain their pursuit of happiness. So, we can’t easily secure happiness through individual effort alone. This leads to the second thread.

Second, happiness is no longer a private aspiration but emerges through giving and receiving. Its fragility lies in its shared character, which builds friendships to dispel loneliness and deepen fulfilment. But this is not just about the bonds we share with those who are close to us.

Ricoeur adds a third thread to include those distant from us. He argues that happiness is linked to an individual’s private pursuits and the role others play in enabling or frustrating them. “Others” includes those with faces – friends and loved ones – and faceless, distant strangers.

Happiness, then, may be located within the self, in intimate relationships, or in relations with the wider community.

Ricoeur’s account of the concept of happiness reflects a well known study that found that strong community ties help people live longer and happier lives.

The study draws on nearly 80 years of data from the lived experiences of 268 students who moved from Harvard University dorms to residential houses in 1938. The research shows that close relationships best predict longevity, health, and life satisfaction. Such ties protect against discontent, and delay physical and cognitive decline. They’re more reliable predictors of well-being and happiness than wealth or status.

However, the rise of digitalisation and AI now complicates who and what may count as “others” in the promotion of our individual happiness.

Robot technology

According to a study on how AI companionship develops, 68% of AI chatbot users perceive these tools as “somewhat” or “fully” humanlike, 90% believe chatbots are intelligent, 78% believe chatbots are empathetic, and 75% believe they’re conscious.

AI is being used to answer questions and probe human interests, shaping a new kind of dialogue in many spheres of life. With it, ideas of friendships are shifting to involve human-technology relations.

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Read more: Lifetime trends in happiness change as misery peaks among the young – new research

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Traditionally, the “others” in a person’s life have been human subjects. Emerging scholarship on human-technology relations challenges this assumption. Ranging from sport companions to sexual intimacy, these studies compel us to reconsider what counts as the other.

Technologies like Replika now occupy the role of the “other” in some people’s lives. This human-companion chatbot with the motto “the AI friend to do life with” has over 42 million global users at the time of writing. Replika is designed to foster companionship and friendship among those who feel lonely. Users create an avatar that becomes their digital companion.

Socially disruptive technologies like AI-driven social robots are designs that distort our traditional social norms, relations, and the way we see the world. One reason they’re considered disruptive is that they are unpredictable and continually challenge our worldviews. Historically, technologies were not moral agents. Today, however, they play the roles of moral subjects and objects in our lives.

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Read more: In a lonely world, widespread AI chatbots and ‘companions’ pose unique psychological risks

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For example, in Japan the hikikomori phenomenon, a state of human social reclusiveness, is gaining momentum, with over 1.5 million individuals becoming attached to virtual companions instead of other people.

An estimated 3,700 individuals have reportedly applied for marriage certificates through Gatebox with a holograph called Hatsune Miku. One marriage has already been registered. In some religious settings, social robots serve as religious leaders to a community of believers.

These technologies have disrupted traditional concepts such as friendships and relationships, and what it means to contribute towards human well-being and flourishing.

So can robots bring real happiness?

In our study we acknowledge that these technologies can foster human flourishing and happiness, but not from the standpoint of Ricoeur’s “others”.

They fail to satisfy the criteria for human otherness. The technologies:

• only mimic the experiences we share with them

• do not act out of their own “will”, and we cannot hold them responsible for any moral or legal action

• do not have stories and experiences of their own.

Social robots, though lacking sentience (the ability to feel pain or pleasure), can elicit meaningful emotional and psychological responses, enhancing human well-being and happiness in ways that resemble traditional human interactions. AI-driven social bots are always available, energetic, patient, adaptive, and responsive to our needs. In this regard, they seem to offer much more to our potential happiness than our best friends and families do.

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Read more: Evidence shows AI systems are already too much like humans. Will that be a problem?

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However, they are social bots and must remain as such. We must not confuse them with what the human others meant to Ricoeur or with what they meant in the Harvard study.

This because the experiences they elicit are not real, and they are not objects of moral considerations (receiving real care, justice, and sympathy). In our view, being an object of moral considerations is a necessary condition in promoting genuine human happiness and well-being.

– People are marrying holograms and making friends with chatbots. But can AI bring true happiness?
– https://theconversation.com/people-are-marrying-holograms-and-making-friends-with-chatbots-but-can-ai-bring-true-happiness-284872

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Heike Becker, Professor of Anthropology, University of the Western Cape

Celebrated Namibian liberation leader Andimba Toivo ya Toivo played an important role in his country’s development. Beyond Namibia, however, he remains unknown to many.

Anthropologist Heike Becker has written a biography of ya Toivo, finally telling his story in full. We asked her four questions about the man and the book.

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Why is he little known outside Namibia?

It’s true, few know about ya Toivo, even though his legacy includes one of the most powerful speeches from the dock ever made during the struggles against settler colonialism in southern Africa.

His contribution remains overshadowed because he never became the official leader of the liberation movement that he’d founded in 1957, Swapo (South West Africa People’s Organisation). Nor did he become Namibia’s president. These positions were occupied by Sam Nujoma, who is regarded as the official “founding father” of the nation.

During the decades of the Namibian liberation struggle, Nujoma, who had lived in exile from 1960, had become internationally well-known. Ya Toivo was jailed on Robben Island until 1984.

Unusually for his generation, he did not clamber for power. He influenced people through his “stubborn” example, as his lifelong friend and fellow political prisoner Helao Shiyuwete remembered. Although I met ya Toivo informally in the 1990s, the book is based on speaking with his peers and young Namibians, along with extensive archive and film material.

Many who knew him recall his defiance, his self-discipline, his determination to reach his goals, and his friendliness. (Though he could be very strict, as one of his daughters recalled during his memorial service in 2017.)

My book begins to highlight his central role in shaping the Namibian liberation struggle. It also shows that he continued to advocate for social justice, fighting corruption and tribalism, after Namibia’s independence in 1990.

Who was Andimba Toivo ya Toivo?

Ya Toivo was born in 1924 in Omangudu in northern Namibia, where his father was a lay preacher and teacher under the Finnish Lutheran mission. His mother was from the royal family of Ondonga, one of the historical Owambo kingdoms.

As a boy he herded cattle and received primary education from the mission. During the second world war, he was a soldier with the South African Native Military Corps, a unit of the racially segregated South African army.

Although Namibia was officially administered under a League of Nations mandate, South Africa governed it as a de facto fifth province, so about 5,000 black Namibians were recruited into the neighbouring country’s army. After his discharge in 1943, ya Toivo went back to school in northern Namibia.

In the early 1950s, ya Toivo moved to South Africa. In 1957, he and other Namibians formed the Ovamboland People’s Congress, the forerunner of Swapo. Their inaugural meeting was held at a Cape Town barber shop owned by Namibians. The founders adopted a petition, demanding that the administration of Namibia be transferred from South Africa to the United Nations.

They also called for the end of Namibia’s detested contract labour system, established under German colonial rule. The petition included demands for the rights of women in the workplace.

At the time, the South African government had extended its apartheid policies of racial and ethnic separation to its colony, Namibia, then known as South West Africa. Because of his activism, the South African regime deported ya Toivo. In northern Namibia he continued to play a vital role in organising anticolonial resistance, despite the regime’s severe measures to contain him.

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Read more: A man called Hope: the legacy of Namibia’s Andimba Toivo ya Toivo

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In 1967, the South African regime clamped down. Ya Toivo and 36 others were charged with “terrorism”. On trial in Pretoria he drew international attention to the Namibian liberation struggle with a formidable speech in the court room. He told the judge, the apartheid regime and the world about the determination of the Namibian people:

I know that the struggle will be long and bitter, but I also know that my people will wage that struggle whatever the cost.

Sentenced to 20 years in prison, ya Toivo spent 16 years on Robben Island, where he continued his defiant resistance alongside his fellow Namibian prisoners. He also made friends with South African resistance leaders like Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu.

In 1984 he was released and joined Swapo in exile. Between the 1960s and the much delayed implementation of the Namibian independence plan in 1989, Swapo’s political-diplomatic and armed struggle was led mainly from southern Africa’s frontline states, particularly Zambia and Angola.

What did you learn writing this book?

Researching the biography, I realised that it could bring attention to lesser-known dimensions of the Namibian liberation struggle. I became particularly interested in the experience of, and the role played by, about 200 Namibian workers who, like ya Toivo, found themselves in Cape Town in the 1950s.

Their experiences of displacement and migration were significant for early nationalist politics, as were their political contacts in Cape Town. This transnational aspect deserves more attention.

Ya Toivo’s first sojourn in South Africa, as a soldier, had raised his political awareness. One Namibian activist, Leonard Lidker, was 11 when he met ya Toivo in Odibo in 1944. He recalls him spending evenings telling young students about the importance of standing up for equality and justice.

Later, in Cape Town, ya Toivo became involved with South African anti-apartheid organisations, left-wing intellectuals and activists. This influenced the ways in which he organised his fellow Namibians, workers, and also a handful of students studying at the Cape.

When Namibians like ya Toivo joined the migration to South Africa, they managed to break through what had previously been a sealed door to the outside world. In Cape Town, the mid-1950s were a period of blossoming life and activism. Despite the apartheid restrictions, social intermingling remained possible.

Easter weekend camps, for instance, brought people together in seaside suburbs. Ya Toivo recalled that these were an eye-opener because it was the first time that he saw people of different racial categories mingling freely.

The events were organised by the Modern Youth Society, a multiracial left-wing group of activists. Ya Toivo would become the group’s vice-chair.

What is his legacy and why is he still so relevant?

Throughout his long life, ya Toivo remained committed to the fight for justice, against inequality, poverty, tribalism and corruption. As an internationalist and opposed to ethnic politics, he forged connections and solidarities across national, cultural and social divides.

His farewell speech in the Namibian National Assembly in 2005 reminded Namibians to continue the struggle for social justice. He issued a stern warning against greed and self-enrichment to those who had come to power after liberation.

Ya Toivo’s life and vision remain relevant a decade after his death at 92. His legacy continues to inspire those devoted to social justice and unity. This includes a new generation of Namibian activists, who never met him in person and who have been given voice in the book. They have taken up ya Toivo’s call to complete the “unfinished struggle”.

– Who was Andimba Toivo ya Toivo? The Namibian leader who chose justice over power
– https://theconversation.com/who-was-andimba-toivo-ya-toivo-the-namibian-leader-who-chose-justice-over-power-283978