Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jonathan Munemo, Professor of Economics, Salisbury University

The prolonged disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has exposed how vulnerable Africa’s economies are to geopolitical shocks. Fuel prices have remained elevated, squeezing economies that depend heavily on petroleum imports from the Middle East. These include Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda.

This vulnerability also puts at risk the continent’s push to escape poverty through what economists call structural transformation: moving workers from low-productivity activities such as subsistence farming into more productive jobs in manufacturing and modern services.

The continent never fully participated in the export-manufacturing wave that transformed East Asia from the 1960s onward. And now Africa’s industrialisation ambitions have become even more difficult to realise as geopolitical rivalry, fragmented supply chains and artificial intelligence reshape the global economy.

As an economist who has written about how weaponisation of global trade affects African economies, I believe structural transformation still matters. But it must be reinvented around four priorities:

• larger markets

• reliable electricity

• Africa’s comparative advantages

• agriculture.

Why the old model worked

Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China and Vietnam all industrialised in broadly the same way. They expanded exports of labour-intensive manufactured goods such as garments, footwear, furniture and electronics. These industries created millions of jobs for workers with limited formal education while gradually building technological capabilities, productive firms and efficient logistics networks.

What made this possible was a relatively stable global trading system. Trade barriers generally fell, demand for manufactured goods expanded, and richer countries steadily moved out of low-wage industries as incomes increased. Governments could focus on becoming more competitive because the rules of international trade were comparatively predictable.

Africa never fully benefited from that opportunity. Manufacturing accounts for only about 10% of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa, compared with around 22% in East Asia and the Pacific. The continent’s share of global manufacturing has fallen from roughly 3% in the 1970s to less than 2% today.

The continent struggled to establish internationally competitive manufacturing even when the global trading environment was relatively open. Among the factors holding it back were:

• unreliable electricity

• high transport and logistics costs

• small and fragmented domestic markets

• weak industrial capabilities

• limited access to finance

• unpredictable policy.

As a result, many economies remained dependent on commodity exports while importing most manufactured goods.

These longstanding constraints have not disappeared. Instead, Africa now faces a double challenge. It must overcome the structural barriers that prevented the traditional manufacturing-led development model from taking off in the past, and also adapt to a global economy that’s changed dramatically. This challenge does not make structural transformation impossible. It simply means the old way of doing it won’t work.

Four changes have rewritten the rules

The first change is that trade itself has become a geopolitical tool. Countries use export controls, financial sanctions and control over strategic technologies to pursue national security goals. The disruption in the Strait of Hormuz illustrates this.

The second is that manufacturing can’t create jobs on the scale it once did. Automation has reduced demand for the low-skill factory jobs that once absorbed millions of workers.

This matters because by 2030 sub-Saharan Africa is expected to account for roughly half of all new entrants to the global labour force. That’s around 15 million young people each year. Creating productive employment will require growth across manufacturing, modern services and higher-value agriculture rather than relying on factories alone.

Third, China has remained competitive in labour-intensive manufacturing. Rising wages led many economists to expect production of clothing, textiles and footwear to relocate to lower-income countries. Instead, China still dominates. This makes it much harder for African producers to enter sectors that earlier industrialisers used as entry points.

The fourth change is artificial intelligence. AI is becoming a general-purpose technology that can help economies move labour and capital into more productive activities. For example:

• AI-powered tools can help farmers make better decisions about weather, pests, input use and market prices

• businesses can use AI to reduce costs, improve quality and participate in regional and global value chains.

How governments should respond

The African continent still needs millions of better-paying jobs and much higher productivity to reduce poverty and raise living standards. What has changed is the route to achieving those goals.

First, pursue economic security collectively rather than nationally. Structural transformation requires firms to invest in new industries. But they are less likely to do so if export markets are uncertain or supply chains are easily disrupted. A larger integrated market can reduce those risks.

Acting together also gives African countries greater bargaining power as the US, China and Gulf states compete to invest in the continent’s digital and physical infrastructure. Full implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area is more urgent than ever.

Second, invest in electricity. It is the foundation of both industrialisation and the digital economy. Manufacturing, digital services and AI-enabled industries cannot grow without reliable power. Yet electricity remains one of the biggest constraints. In sub-Saharan Africa 78% of businesses experience routine power outages. As a result they lose an average 8.4% of annual sales, compared with a global average of 5.2%. In Nigeria 86% of businesses own or share a generator. In Kenya it is 65%; in South Africa 63%.

This dependence on diesel generators increases reliance on imported fuel: a vulnerable spot.

Third, compete where Africa has genuine comparative advantages: industries linked to natural resources and growing domestic markets. Examples include:

Finally, recognise that agriculture is central to structural transformation, not separate from it. Around half of sub-Saharan Africa’s workforce is employed in farming. Higher farm productivity raises rural incomes, releases labour for productive activities and creates demand for manufacturing and services.

AI can accelerate this process by helping farmers.

Countries that successfully connect these new realities to the long-standing goal of shifting workers and resources into higher-productivity activities will be best positioned to achieve sustained and inclusive growth.

– The world has changed. African countries must rethink how they grow their economies
– https://theconversation.com/the-world-has-changed-african-countries-must-rethink-how-they-grow-their-economies-289060

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Mathew Tembo, Lecturer, Arts and Musicology Department, Copperbelt University

Zed Beats is a music movement that evolved in the late 1980s when young producers started using computers to blend western music with local languages and flavour. Today it’s an umbrella term for popular urban music in Zambia.

Musician and academic Mathew Tembo is a Zed Beats specialist. His PhD is on its history, production and musical labour from 1986 to 2024. We asked him to tell us about the music and how it shapes the country.

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What is Zed Beats?

Zed Beats takes its name from the “Z” in “Zambia”. It’s a blend of indigenous musical elements with influences drawn from R&B, reggae, rap, Jamaican dancehall, hip-hop, Afrobeats, amapiano and other urban music genres trending at the time of its production.

The music, sung mostly in Zambian languages Chinyanja and Chibemba, along with some English, is produced on digital audio workstations by self-taught producers in home studios. The use of local languages makes Zed Beats resonate with young people, whose everyday conversations are carried out in these languages.

What forces created the ‘new’ music?

During the late 1980s and 1990s, Zambia’s live music scene was devastated by the HIV/Aids epidemic, which claimed the lives of a generation of top musicians working in genres like Kalindula and Zamrock. The collapse left Zambian radio and TV heavily dominated by foreign American, Congolese and Jamaican music.

Zed Beats stepped into this void, using affordable computer software to resurrect local music and give Zambians back their voice. It was a youthful voice that helped create a new urban identity and became a reset for the nation.

In my study I discuss how Zed Beats also emerged from a dire economy, using technology that made producing music more affordable. This reformed Zambia’s “musical labour” economy. It marked a move away from the traditional, collective effort of live bands touring night venues to individualised digital production.

Deejays became the new vehicle to spread the music, instead of traditional media. Women participated more than ever before in the production of popular music. As Zed Beats became more visible in southern Africa, it also became a source of national pride. Today, Zed Beats artists are internationally known figures who contribute to the music conversation in Zambia.

Who were the pioneers?

To understand the evolution of Zed Beats, a brief history of home studios is necessary.

In 1989, Mushima, the first known home studio, was established at the Lusaka home of Dr Katele Kalumba, a controversial politician, public health specialist and musician. However, the most influential producer of the 1980s and 1990s was sound engineer Michael Linyama. He and his business partner Francis Mwiinga were the first to use a computer to record music in a home studio in Zambia.

By the late 1990s, neighbourhoods across Zambian cities hosted home studios as spaces where musicians could record. In 1997, Daddy Zemus, considered to be the inspirer of Zed Beats, released his debut album Salaula (Pick from a Pile). Salaula refers to secondhand clothes imported from the US and Europe for resale at open markets in Zambia. With the harsh economic situation, this was a common practice in urban marketplaces.

The success of the song inspired other pop music acts to experiment with lyrics in local languages. Before that, pop musicians inspired by American music mostly sang in English.

In home studios, producers were able to multi-track and manipulate sounds using music software. This became a model for producing urban popular music. In 2001, Jordan Katembula’s debut album JK epitomised the new sound of Zed Beats. After the release of JK, the artist could not drive in the streets of Lusaka and other bigger cities without being mobbed by fans.

His song Balekuzembeleka (They Are Lying to You), sung in Chibemba, was about a love relationship. It resonated with young people and would establish a major theme in Zed Beats lyrics.

Who are today’s stars?

Zambia’s music economy continues to grow. Today, many musicians are able to make a decent career in music. Yo Maps, Slap Dee, Macky 2 and his brother Chef 187 are some of the Zed Beats musicians who’ve dominated the scene in the last decade or so.

Some of the biggest hits of the past few years have been Yo Maps’ Somone (Come and See), Slap Dee’s Asante (Thank You), Macky 2’s Winsula (Do Not Look Down Upon Me) and Chef 187’s Shadow Boxing. Their themes vary.

Somone is about a man who was refused by a woman for having too little money. In the song he asks her to “come and see” how successful he’s become. A reminder that people can change their circumstances.

In Asante, Slap Dee thanks God for guiding him through life and making him succeed. Winsula is a lament from a woman who has been treated unfairly by her man because she does not look as beautiful as she did when they first met. In Shadow Boxing, Chef 187 claims there is no rapper better than him out there. He is simply boxing himself (his shadow). The stories of rejection, resilience, love and faith make Zed Beats songs relatable.

What role do these artists play during elections?

Although Zed Beats musicians are not known for political lyrics, they are routinely used to mobilise voters, particularly during elections.

The tightly contested 2011 elections, for example, saw the opposition Patriotic Front win for the first time. Music played a big role in advancing their campaign, especially the catchy song Donchi Kubeba (Don’t Tell Them). In it, Dandy Crazy encourages people to accept favours from the ruling party but secretly vote for the opposition.

In 2016, JK’s Dununa Rivesi (Kick it Back) featured prominently during elections, played and performed at rallies.

For the 2026 elections, more than half of the most notable Zed Beats artists have been contracted to record theme songs or perform at rallies for the ruling party and the opposition.

Zed Beats is fluid. It plays various roles in Zambian society and can be heard wherever people gather in numbers. Its ability to draw from other musical influences and morph into different forms while maintaining its identity is the reason the music endures and is starting to go global.

– Zed Beats: how home studios reinvented Zambian pop music and gave young people a voice
– https://theconversation.com/zed-beats-how-home-studios-reinvented-zambian-pop-music-and-gave-young-people-a-voice-288438

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Carina Venter, Senior Lecturer in Musicology, Stellenbosch University

When I interviewed a man I will call Charles as part of my research on classical music and abuse in South Africa, he shared a poem with me. He’d written it when he was studying music at university in South Africa.

it is madness / this building / with its windows / cold and closed / so that not even the stale air can escape … with its countless doors / their iron locks and tiny square portholes…

You might think the writer was describing a prison or an asylum built centuries ago for those deemed unfit to live in “normal” society; not a university music department.

Charles told me that he was suicidal for much of this period and that he self-harmed. Queer, brown, gifted, and the first in his family to attend university, he’s the kind of student who might have excelled in post-apartheid South Africa. Yet he dropped out before he could complete his music studies.

When I asked him why, he said he’d been forced to “juggle” multiple traumas. In his university residence, he experienced racial abuse. At the same time, the musical world that had once given him a sense of belonging became a place of isolation, even incarceration. He described feeling trapped between his love of classical music and the reality of studying in an environment where he did not feel he belonged.

Charles spoke at length about the emotional abuse he experienced from his teacher, who repeatedly told him he was a failure despite his exceptional musical abilities. These experiences compounded his profound sense of isolation. It left him with what he described as feelings of “madness”.

Charles’s description of institutionalised music schools is not isolated. “The rooms suggest prison cells,” observed US harpist Judith Kogan of the prestigious Juilliard music school. Hungarian violinist Carl Flesch wrote about how powerful and charismatic music teachers “usually are vampires who suck out their pupils’ personality…”

In classical music education, especially when it comes to a performance career, the teacher is a formative influence on the student. They are in a position of power, not only by virtue of their reputation and expertise, but also their professional networks. They’re able to create opportunities for students, to recommend them to other influential people and institutions.

As a musicologist with interests in violence and trauma, I have researched how classical music responds to difficult histories and how these histories, including apartheid, have shaped our thinking and writing about music and race in South Africa. My most recent project narrows this to consider abusive behaviours within the institutions that produce classical music. This includes universities, professional organisations, orchestras and choirs.

All is not well

There have been suggestions that all is not well in South Africa’s classical music industry. A handful of media reports have focused on individual teachers or famous international performers accused of sexual abuse.

A 2024 report, with a focus on women in the South African music scene, found that just under one third of those surveyed felt pressured to enter a sexual relationship.

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Read more: Sexual abuse and bad pay: women’s struggles in South African live music exposed

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Yet South African classical music institutions and the industry more broadly have been vexingly silent about why abuse cultures might be ingrained in their teaching philosophies and practices.

Not even the #MeToo movement and a call for the South African music industry’s own reckoning with sexual abuse could rupture the sound-proof walls of South African classical music.

Tackling abuse is imperative to create safer environments for teaching and professional music-making. And also to reckon with the harms that colonial and apartheid cultural production have carried into the present.

Why the silence?

The silence is not entirely surprising. For centuries, classical music in South Africa has remained ensconced in an ethos of non-political neutrality. It was about universal beauty and musical genius. Not things like race, colonialism or apartheid.

It has often represented the most admirable of human qualities, telling stories about “great” composers or performers (often men) overcoming adversity through music.

But apartheid favoured white South Africans. It structured education, social life and economic possibilities according to racial privilege. Classical music performance and listening, part of the European tradition of high art, were largely reserved for white South Africans. It connected them to what was regarded as a western tradition of superior culture and civilisation.

Black students were able to study classical music at white universities only under exceptional circumstances. There, they were generally trained as classroom teachers rather than prepared for careers in concert performance or elite music education.

This history has lived on in many different ways, shaping music institutions after democracy.

Abuse in South Africa

In my own ongoing research, I have heard of powerful music professors or teachers who abused their students. Of male orchestral players and conductors forcing themselves onto women players. Of teachers trading in manipulation and humiliation.

Charles’s account is taken from the first work published on abusive behaviours in South African classical music. It exposes blurred boundaries: between the possibilities of teaching to create intimacy, knowledge and self-discovery – and teaching that harms students, reducing them to instruments serving the teacher’s gratification.

Charles saw studying music as a key to community, critical thinking and self-discovery. At first his music lessons felt like a safe space. But the warmth could at any moment give way to shouting and a lesson ending abruptly.

A teacher’s physical touch is often to demonstrate something about the mechanics of playing or singing. For Charles it began to feel it was also “to show that he (the teacher) was in control”.

What Charles experienced, I argue in my paper, is more than just a case of emotional harm committed against a student of colour in a teaching context. It carries with it the weight of a difficult past.

At its best, teaching and learning invites curiosity, creativity, critique and self-discovery. But emotional harm, sexual talk and a touch that feels controlling amounts to what I call the “pornographic in pedagogy”. Teaching where the transformative possibilities of education are replaced by a harmful play of feelings.

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Read more: Sexism permeates every layer of the music industry – new report echoes what research has been saying for years

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Charles’s story is not just the story of an elite teacher and a student. Particular aspects of classical music education and its cultural underpinnings lend themselves to abusive behaviours. This raises questions about the enduring silence in South African classical music about them.

If the history and present of South African classical music is going to be written in all its complexity, it will require for us to grapple not only with the influence of apartheid, but also with the sustained silence about abusive and harmful behaviours that have threaded through them.

– Abuse and silence in South Africa’s classical music culture: what a student’s story reveals
– https://theconversation.com/abuse-and-silence-in-south-africas-classical-music-culture-what-a-students-story-reveals-286773

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Matthew Shupler, Postdoctoral Research Associate in Environmental Public Health, Harvard University

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 had an almost immediate impact on global energy markets and the movement of food around the world. During the first year of the conflict, international crude oil and natural gas prices rose sharply. Disruptions to exports of wheat, maize, sunflower oil and fertilisers from Russia and Ukraine contributed to record global food prices.

Kenya was badly affected as the country imports about 92% of the wheat it consumes.

I am a global health researcher and was interested in tracking how the war in Ukraine affected Kenyans’ ability to afford food and cooking fuel. In 2022, I worked with a team in Mukuru, an informal settlement in Nairobi, to understand how the war had affected the way families used liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) for clean cooking.

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Read more: How Russia-Ukraine conflict could influence Africa’s food supplies

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Most Kenyan households still rely on biomass fuels like wood for cooking, but LPG is used by about one-third of Kenyans. LPG is much more commonly used in Kenyan cities (about 60% use) compared with rural areas (about 10% use). Since Kenya does not produce any LPG domestically, changes in global energy prices and supply disruptions can greatly increase cooking costs.

During 2022, after Russia invaded Ukraine, food inflation in Kenya nearly doubled from 8.9% to 15.4%. This sharp price rise was driven by rising global food and transport costs and also a multi-year drought, which reduced harvests across the region.

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Read more: Kenya’s cost of living crisis: expert unpacks what’s driving it and what should be done

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We analysed data from families’ smart meters, which showed how often they cooked with gas and how much they spent on fuel. We also surveyed the households to understand how rising food and fuel prices changed what they ate during 2022.

We found these drastic changes in dietary and cooking behaviours:

• three-quarters of families in our study changed the foods they cooked. More than half ate less meat and fish in 2022. They consumed more ugali (maize porridge, a staple food in Kenya), vegetables and fast food.

• half of families skipped more meals

• one-third reduced the amount of gas they consumed for cooking.

Following families through the food price crisis

Mukuru is a large informal settlement, with a population of 500,000-800,000 people. The families we surveyed were customers of a company called PayGo Energy. The company allows customers to pay for gas in smaller increments rather than having to purchase a full cylinder of gas at once.

As purchasing a full gas tank can be very costly for families living below the poverty line, a pay-as-you-go option can make cooking with gas more accessible for families. These families might otherwise cook with cheaper biomass fuels, like wood, that often generate more air pollution when burned.

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Read more: Kenya’s maize price has doubled in a year: 6 ways to avoid a staple food shortage

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Because PayGo Energy monitored their customers’ gas use using smart meters, we measured their use before and after the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war to estimate the change in their consumption. We also surveyed the families and held focus group discussions.

We used a United Nations World Food Programme tool which measures the steps households take over the previous week to cope with food shortages. We also asked participants whether they were skipping more meals or eating different foods than usual.

Families used less gas

We found that households greatly lowered the amount they cooked with gas in 2022 compared with 2021. Families only used their gas stove for an average of eight days a month in 2022 compared with 19 days a month in 2021. Their total cooking time per month decreased from 12.8 hours to 8.3 hours.

These results matched our survey findings, in which 63% of participants reported changing the type of food they consumed, 50% shared that they skipped more meals and 30% stated that they cooked with gas less frequently in 2022 compared with 2021. One participant said:

I have shifted to rice and spaghetti because it takes less time to cook hence saves gas.

People ate less food

Another person said:

There has been a high rise in food and fuel (prices). We have had to create a balance by lowering the food and maintaining the gas usage.

Reducing their cooking time led households to spend an average of 86 Kenyan shillings (US$0.66) less per month in 2022 compared with 2021. One person told us they were decreasing their spending on cooking and skipping meals:

Our children have a feeding programme at school which is advantageous so we adults can just skip meals and wait for supper to save.

Finding policy solutions

Although our research studied the effects of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022, geopolitical conflicts will likely continue to threaten global food and energy security, as demonstrated by the war between the US and Iran.

In 2026, the Strait of Hormuz closure disrupted energy markets and raised concerns about fertiliser supplies and food prices. The impacts in east Africa are likely similar to what they were in 2022.

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Read more: 80% of Africa’s fertiliser is imported: how food systems can adapt to the Iran shock

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As economic crises will continue to occur and as climate change intensifies, national and global policies can help protect against food insecurity risk. This will require direct safety nets for families, including cash transfers or payments from the government.

The government could also subsidise nutritious foods that are cheaper and faster to cook, such as canned beans, frozen vegetables and fortified foods.

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Read more: Russia-Ukraine conflict is driving up wheat prices: this could fuel instability in Sudan

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Supporting small-scale farmers with better seeds, access to credit and water-saving farming methods can also help communities produce more food and become more resilient to drought and climate change. Taken together, making these investments can help build a more adaptable food system.

– Drought and the war in Ukraine changed what families in Kenya could afford to eat – research tracked food and cooking gas use
– https://theconversation.com/drought-and-the-war-in-ukraine-changed-what-families-in-kenya-could-afford-to-eat-research-tracked-food-and-cooking-gas-use-287424

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tackson Makandwa, Postdoctoral Researcher in the Department of Anthropology, University of KwaZulu-Natal

Over 250,000 people were registered as asylum seekers and refugees – people displaced by force – in South Africa in 2024. About 4% of them were from Burundi, some 3,000km away.

When people think about refugees, they often imagine families fleeing war and finding safety in another country. As social scientists, we’re also interested in what happens after they arrive. Does finding safety also mean finding a place to belong?

We believe that everyone has a story to tell, and we listened to the stories of Burundian refugees living in Chatsworth, Durban. This is a suburban area that was set aside for people of Indian descent under South Africa’s racial apartheid laws (repealed in 1991).

Our study brings to light the complex reasons these men and women left Burundi: conflict, political violence, persecution and fear for their lives. Burundi has endured decades of political turmoil, marked by recurrent episodes of ethnic violence, authoritarianism and civil wars.

We wanted to understand what everyday life looked like once Burundians were in the destination country.

South Africa allows refugees and asylum to settle and integrate without confining them to a camp system. However, displaced people must carve out lives within fragile economies, contested political spaces and precarious social landscapes.

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Read more: Burundi at 60 is the poorest country on the planet: a look at what went wrong

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Rather than focusing on the challenges of access to employment, shelter, or legal documents, we explored something less visible but equally important: how people hold on to hope while carrying the weight of loss, living with scars of war, grief and uncertainty.

We interviewed 15 Burundian refugees and asylum seekers, including their community leaders, in Chatsworth in 2025. From what emerged, the adopted “home” space of Chatsworth represents both safety and struggle.

The study reminds us to see refugees not simply as people in need of assistance, but as individuals with dreams, talents, families, and hopes for the future.

From Burundi to Chatsworth

Originally designed under apartheid’s Group Areas Act as a relocation site for Indian South Africans, Chatsworth has evolved into a multicultural township marked by socio-economic challenges and increasing migrant settlement.

For Burundian refugees, Chatsworth is both a space of possibility, where religious networks, informal economies and community solidarities provide forms of stability, and a space of precarity.

We collected data through walking in and around the area; we visited homes, restaurants and community spaces such as Catholic church venues. We met men from Burundi who were mostly contracted under a large South African grocery store delivery business.

Community leaders and other participants were accessed through organisations working with migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in the city of Durban, primarily through Refugee Pastoral Care, a programme run under the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Durban.

Every few years, anti-foreigner sentiments and organised activities flare up in South Africa. In June 2026 another wave of violence swept across the country, including the central areas of Durban, not far from Chatsworth.

Nevertheless, some Burundians in our study viewed South Africa and Durban (and suburbs like Chatsworth) in particular, as a place where they could find shelter and protection from physical harm. They were grateful to have escaped the violence of their home country and to be able to work and support their families.

Yet some also said they never truly felt accepted by the surrounding communities. One participant summed it up powerfully by saying that Chatsworth was

safe for my body, but not for my heart.

Another important finding was that hope is not simply wishful thinking. For the people we spoke to, hope was something they practised every day. Hope meant working long hours so children could attend school. It meant saving small amounts of money whenever possible. It meant attending church or mosque, where faith offered strength during difficult times.

For some, education represented the greatest hope for the future. Parents believed that although they had lost opportunities because of conflict, their children might enjoy a better life. Hope became a reason to keep moving forward despite heavy uncertainty.

For Burundians, as a refugee or asylum seeker, sorrow remained a constant companion. In this study, almost everyone carried painful memories of Burundi. Some had lost family members during the conflict there.

These memories remained vivid even after many years. Some still dreamed of returning home one day to rebuild their lives in peace.

The research also revealed that women and men sometimes experienced displacement in different ways. Women carried the responsibility of caring for children while also earning an income through informal work. They described drawing strength from women’s savings groups and prayer meetings, where members encouraged one another and pooled small amounts of money to cope with daily challenges.

Some men, on the other hand, spoke about losing the social status they once enjoyed in Burundi. Former teachers, business owners and professionals now found themselves doing physically demanding work simply to survive. Although some felt they had lost part of their dignity and identity, providing for their families gave their lives purpose.

As one pointed out:

I was a big man back in Burundi, all the politicians and the people in the army, Hutu or Tutsi, they know me, I was a very successful businessman … but when the war started, I was hunted like an animal. They took everything …

Hope and heartbreak

In this study, hope and sorrow reveal themselves as existing side by side. It is easy to think of refugees either as victims or as inspiring examples of resilience. The reality is far more layered and complex.

The Burundian refugees we met were both hopeful and heartbroken. They mourned the lives they had lost, while working hard to build new ones. They appreciated the safety South Africa offered while still longing for home and acceptance.

Their stories show remarkable courage, but they also remind us that recovery from displacement is about much more than crossing a border. It is about rebuilding a life, finding a sense of belonging, and holding on to hope even when sorrow never fully disappears.

– Burundi refugees talk about life in South Africa after their long journey: hope and heartbreak side by side
– https://theconversation.com/burundi-refugees-talk-about-life-in-south-africa-after-their-long-journey-hope-and-heartbreak-side-by-side-288774

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Michael Wahman, Professor, Public Affairs, The University of Texas at Austin

Malawi’s constitutional court annulled the 2019 presidential election. The 2020 re-run brought an extraordinary transfer of power from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party to the opposition Malawi Congress Party, raising hopes for economic and political renewal.

However, the new government came to preside over a period of deep economic crisis and growing public discontent driven by a series of overlapping shocks.

The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted supply chains. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 pushed up the cost of key imports like fuel, fertiliser and maize. Malawi has also endured successive floods, droughts and cyclones. Severe shortages of foreign currency, fuel and electricity compounded the effects of poor harvests.

By 2025, the World Food Programme estimated that nearly one-third of Malawians faced acute food insecurity. This meant that Malawi’s 2025 parliamentary election took place against the backdrop of profound political and economic turmoil.

We are researchers of Malawian politics, and in collaboration with the Westminster Foundation for Democracy’s Cost of Politics programme, we sought to understand how an economic crisis can shape an election campaign. Collecting new data from 2025, we were able to make interesting comparisons with the 2019 poll.

We found that the cost of running for parliament in Malawi has risen dramatically from an average of US$20,000 per candidate in 2019 to US$51,000 in the 2025 poll.

The economic crisis intensified candidates’ reliance on electoral clientelism. This is the exchange of benefits like cash or goods for political support, usually votes.

Malawi has one of the four highest poverty rates in the world, and for many people living in acute poverty, elections provided an opportunity to secure much-needed relief.

Clientelism, therefore, continues to play an important role in electoral competition, with weak political parties relying on well-resourced parliamentary candidates to finance campaigns.

Further, the oversight of campaign finance remains limited and weakly enforced. And the rising cost of campaigns has made it even harder for less well-resourced groups, particularly women and young people, to access political office.

The result is that politics excludes more people, and well-funded independent candidates can compete successfully against party nominees.

A heavy reliance on personal wealth distorts political competition. It also creates incentives for corruption, as MPs seek to get their money back once elected.

The cost of a seat in parliament

Malawi introduced new regulations in 2019 to curb this kind of politics. Before the 2025 election, there was further reform. Most notably, the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties was established a year earlier to enforce political finance rules, including a ban on material handouts during campaigns.

However, the office is under-resourced and understaffed. Though handouts are not legal, the office could not investigate every allegation.

We sounded the alarm about the cost of Malawi’s parliamentary campaigns in 2019.

Our earlier survey found that the average parliamentary candidate spent around US$20,000 (in 2019’s exchange rate) on their campaign. This is an astonishing sum in one of the world’s poorest countries. Most of the money came from candidates’ personal savings, according to our survey of self-reported campaign spending.

Candidates invested in sinking boreholes, building bridges or even buying ambulances. They also provided personal goods, including cloth, money or food, to voters. A lot of this spending happened during election rallies.

Yet campaign spending in 2019 pales in comparison with the costs incurred during the 2025 election.

In nominal terms (without taking into account staggering inflation of 238% between elections in 2019 and 2025), we found that average spending rose by 500%. Even after adjusting for inflation, campaign spending increased by 78% in real terms.

On average, candidates spent about US$51,000 on their campaigns in 2025 (in 2025’s exchange rate). Among candidates who received more than 20% of the vote, average spending reached US$95,500.

We attribute the increase in spending to two factors:

• a very competitive election environment – in 2019, candidates from the government party far outspent the competition; in 2025, candidates from both the ruling party and the opposition were able to spend large sums of money

• the economic crisis, which increased the demand for handouts.

The drivers

Money-fuelled politics is one of the thorniest and stickiest issues in Malawian democracy.

Our research revealed confusion about the law around election handouts among both candidates and voters.

Politicians have raised questions about whether banning campaign handouts was ever realistic in a political environment where they are expected.

Further, candidates said Malawi’s economic crisis created pressures to provide handouts.

Like many African countries, Malawi is a place of stark economic inequality. Those seeking elected office usually belong to the country’s economic elite. For ordinary people facing severe hardship, elections became an opportunity to seek short-term economic assistance.

Candidates reported being asked to fund community development projects, pay school fees, and cover funeral expenses and medical bills. They were also expected to provide voters with cash, food and other basic necessities.

The Malawi Electoral Commission was praised for substantial improvements in its management of the election, but there has been little progress in addressing the role of money in politics.

This undermines electoral competition and weakens political representation.

What next

In fragile economic environments, democracies become more vulnerable to politics where money buys votes.

Policymakers need to make reforms that reduce candidates’ reliance on this exchange. Our research suggests that it may be necessary to:

• change to a more party centred system where individual candidates are less pressured to provide private resources

• create protected pathways for women to contest elections

• invest in the enforcement of campaign finance regulation

• enhance the role of civil society to oversee intra-party candidate selections

• introduce spending caps for parliamentary campaigns.

Such reforms will be essential if African democracies are to become more resilient during periods of economic crisis.

David Kayuni, Lingalierini Mihowa and Nandini Patel contributed to this article.

– Running for parliament in Malawi costs a fortune: economic crisis undermines democracy
– https://theconversation.com/running-for-parliament-in-malawi-costs-a-fortune-economic-crisis-undermines-democracy-288240

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tanya Doherty, Professor and Chief specialist scientist, South African Medical Research Council

Every woman has the right to be treated with dignity, compassion and respect when giving birth. Yet for many South African women childbirth in public health facilities can be marked by poor communication, neglect, lack of privacy and, in some cases, verbal or physical mistreatment from health workers.

In a few cases, exposure to severe, disrespectful and abusive behaviour can lead to long-term psychological distress, affecting women and their families.

Efforts to improve respectful maternity care in South Africa have focused mainly on training individual healthcare workers through short courses. Training is important. But it often overlooks a crucial factor: the organisational culture in which health professionals work.

Health workers don’t operate in isolation. Their behaviour is influenced by heavy workloads, staff shortages, workplace hierarchies, team relationships and leadership practices. Providing more respectful care means addressing these underlying organisational factors.

We have spent more than two decades designing and implementing health systems research to improve care for women, newborns and children. Our recent study, conducted in nine rural district hospitals in South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal province, explored whether improving teamwork, learning and workplace culture could improve women’s experiences of maternity care.

This is the first study to assess the feasibility and effects of an intervention addressing both organisational culture and women’s experience of care.

After the intervention, we found improvements in key aspects of care: particularly in communication, autonomy and supportive care experienced during childbirth. Importantly, the largest gains were observed among women from poorer households and those who had attended fewer antenatal visits, who may be more vulnerable. It also improved organisational learning culture and health worker teams.

A different approach

We developed and carried out an intervention called Strengthening Teamwork and Respect (STAR) over a one-year period. The intervention did not focus solely on how staff treated women. It also encouraged teams to examine their own working environments, communication patterns and professional relationships.

The approach involved:

• participaton: multidisciplinary teams of nurses, midwives, doctors, managers and non-clinical staff met approximately monthly. They reflected on challenges in their maternity units and developed locally relevant “change projects”.

• leadership by local staff champions selected from within each maternity unit. The champions received a two-day training.

• the use of structured activities to encourage reflection, dialogue, teamwork and problem-solving.

What we found

We surveyed more than 1,800 women who had recently given birth, as well as over 200 maternity healthcare workers, before and after the intervention.

Our main findings included an improvement in overall person-centred maternity care. Scores increased from 61.5 out of 100 before the intervention to 65.7 afterwards.

The greatest improvements were in areas related to communication and autonomy. More women reported that healthcare providers explained procedures, sought consent before examinations, involved them in decisions about their care, and allowed them greater choice during labour.

Supportive care also improved. Women reported shorter waiting times, greater trust in healthcare providers and a more positive overall experience.

One particularly striking finding concerned birth companions. Before STAR, almost nine out of 10 women said they were not allowed a companion of their choice to stay with them during labour. After the intervention, access to companionship increased substantially.

Many of the participating hospitals had chosen to make birth companionship one of their change projects. STAR teams developed ways to make it possible to have birth companions – things like name badges for companions, written confidentiality agreements, and informing security staff.

Perhaps the most encouraging finding was that the largest improvements occurred among women who often face the greatest barriers to good care. Women from the poorest households experienced greater gains than women from wealthier households. Similarly, women who had attended fewer antenatal visits showed larger improvements than those with more frequent antenatal care.

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Read more: Burnout and bias can lead to poor care during childbirth – we created a project in Kenya that helps health workers

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Our research also measured changes in organisational learning culture. We measured the extent to which workplaces encouraged learning, dialogue, innovation and shared problem-solving.

Healthcare workers reported stronger continuous learning cultures, greater openness to feedback, better systems for sharing lessons, and stronger leadership support. One of the greatest improvements was staff feeling more empowerment to initiate positive changes.

In highly hierarchical healthcare environments this can be transformative. When staff feel empowered, they are more likely to identify problems and work collaboratively to solve them.

Challenges remain

The improvements we observed were modest rather than dramatic.

Many longstanding challenges remain. Staffing shortages, workload pressures and service delivery demands often limited participation in the intervention. Attendance varied across professional groups. Maintaining momentum required ongoing support.

Our study was also conducted without a comparison group. This means we cannot definitively attribute all observed changes to the STAR intervention alone.

Nevertheless, the findings provide important evidence that respectful maternity care is not only about changing individual behaviour. It is also about creating work environments that support learning, teamwork, reflection and accountability.

Lessons for the future

Healthcare systems around the world are under pressure. The instinctive response is often to introduce more training, guidelines or policies. But respectful care cannot simply be instructed from above.

Women’s experiences are shaped by the culture of the facilities where they give birth. Improving those experiences requires creating workplaces that support the people who provide care.

The success of STAR suggests that healthcare workers themselves can be powerful agents of change when given the tools, support and space to lead.

For policymakers, the message is clear: dignity and respect during childbirth needs investment in the culture of the workplaces where care happens.

– Respectful maternity care starts with improving hospital culture: lessons from rural South Africa
– https://theconversation.com/respectful-maternity-care-starts-with-improving-hospital-culture-lessons-from-rural-south-africa-288230

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Bismark Aha, Senior Lecturer in Real Estate, Nottingham Trent University

For years, Ghana’s housing debate has revolved around one headline figure: a national shortage commonly estimated at about 1.8 million homes. The number is useful. It signals that housing supply has failed to keep pace with population growth, urbanisation and household formation.

But it tells only part of the story. A household may have a roof over its head and still live without adequate sanitation, safe waste-disposal arrangements, clean cooking fuel, durable construction or enough space. Counting the homes that are missing does not tell us whether the homes that already exist are healthy, safe and adequately serviced.

In our recently published research, we examined this less visible side of the housing challenge. We used Ghana’s 2021 Population and Housing Census to analyse 836,515 households across all 261 districts. We asked a straightforward question: how adequate are the homes in which Ghanaians already live?

To answer it, we developed a Multidimensional Housing Quality Index that combined nine housing conditions recorded in the census. These covered structural durability, room crowding, drinking water, electricity, toilet and bathing facilities, cooking fuel and space, and waste disposal.

The findings indicate that Ghana’s housing policy must ask not only how many homes are missing, but also where existing homes fail to provide safe and adequate living conditions, which deficits occur together, and what combination of interventions is needed.

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Read more: Why Accra’s property boom hasn’t produced affordable housing

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A home can exist and still be inadequate

Each condition was assessed against a minimum adequacy threshold. The nine indicators were then combined and rescaled to a 0–100 index using a statistical method suited to indicators that record whether a standard is met. Higher scores indicate better material and service-related housing conditions.

The national average is 62.2. This figure should not be read as a pass mark. Its main value is comparative: it reveals how sharply housing conditions differ across places and population groups. Urban households score 73.1 on average, compared with 45.3 for rural households. That difference of almost 28 points is too large to be treated as an urban advantage. It reveals a sharp geographical divide in access to housing-related infrastructure and services.

We also used a multidimensional poverty method to identify households facing overlapping housing deficits. A household is classified as housing poor when its deficits account for at least one-third of the total indicator weight. Severe housing poverty is when they account for at least one-half. On this basis, 56.5% of Ghanaian households are housing poor and 37.2% are severely housing poor. These are housing-specific measures, not estimates of income poverty. They show how many households experience a sufficiently broad or intense combination of inadequate housing conditions.

Progress in one service can hide deficits in another

Some of the most revealing results concern the uneven distribution of access across basic services. Electricity meets the study’s adequacy threshold for 86.2% of households, while 82.4% meet the threshold for safe drinking water. These services are comparatively widespread.

But only 37.3% of households use clean cooking fuel, 42.9% have an improved toilet facility and 33.4% use an adequate waste disposal method. In other words, the relatively high access to electricity and safe drinking water has not been matched by comparable access to sanitation, clean household energy and waste disposal.

Housing quality is produced by a bundle of conditions working together. Electricity cannot compensate for unsafe sanitation. A durable structure does not compensate for reliance on polluting cooking fuels. Improving one service while neglecting the others can leave households exposed to overlapping risks.

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Read more: Ghana’s new rental scheme won’t fix the real problem: a housing shortage

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The national average hides local issues

The housing divide is often described as a contrast between the better-served south and the poorer northern regions. Our results confirm a strong north-south pattern, but they also show why regional averages are not enough.

Greater Accra, where the capital is located, has the highest regional score at 78.5, while Savannah Region, in northern Ghana, has the lowest at 36.1. Yet substantial differences also appear within regions. In Ashanti, home to the second city of Kumasi, district scores range from 24.3 to 84.1. Greater Accra’s districts range from 51.0 to 86.7.

This means a region that performs relatively well overall can still contain districts facing severe housing inadequacy. Conversely, a national programme aimed only at the lowest-performing regions may overlook deprived localities elsewhere.

Neighbouring districts also tend to have similar housing outcomes. This clustering is consistent with the influence of shared infrastructure networks, environmental conditions, settlement patterns and the uneven reach of public services, alongside differences in household resources.

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Read more: Ghana’s informal settlements are not all the same – social networks make a difference in community development

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What housing policy should do differently

The Multidimensional Housing Quality Index is not a replacement for the housing deficit. The two measures answer different questions. The deficit asks how many additional homes are needed. The index asks where the existing stock falls short, which deficits overlap and which services should be prioritised.

Using both would produce a more realistic housing policy. A district where the main problem is weak structural quality requires different intervention from one where homes are structurally adequate but sanitation and waste services are poor. Another district may need clean cooking support, electricity extension or improved water access.

A single national housing remedy will not address these differences. District housing profiles should inform the location and design of investment. Housing policy must also be coordinated with sanitation, waste management, energy, water, local government and spatial planning. These sectors jointly determine whether a dwelling is genuinely habitable.

The district estimates could support a housing quality atlas or public dashboard, allowing national agencies, assemblies and development partners to compare local conditions and track which deficits are changing. Future censuses and nationally representative surveys could then show whether housing deprivation is falling, persisting or changing in composition.

What the index cannot tell us

No single index measures every aspect of adequate housing. The census does not provide direct measures of housing affordability, tenure security, service reliability, neighbourhood safety or residents’ own assessments of their homes. The Multidimensional Housing Quality Index therefore measures observable material and service conditions, not the full meaning of housing adequacy.

That limitation is important, but it is not an argument for continuing to rely on the housing deficit alone. Ghana already collects detailed housing information through its census. The opportunity now is to use those data in an integrated way that can guide local decisions.

– Ghana’s housing problem goes beyond numbers – it’s also about quality
– https://theconversation.com/ghanas-housing-problem-goes-beyond-numbers-its-also-about-quality-288139

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Sabine Cudney-Valenzuela, Postdoctoral Scholar, University of California, Berkeley

In south-eastern Madagascar, patches of forest that were once cut down to make way for farms are slowly naturally regenerating after being left to lie fallow. But recovering a native forest needs more than just gaining tree cover. The animals that once lived in these forests also need to make their way back so that the forest can function the way it used to.

When these native animals try to return, however, they often find that the forest has been taken over by invasive species they’ve never encountered before.

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Read more: Invasive rats are changing fish behaviour on coral reefs – new study

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I am part of a group of interdisciplinary biologists from Canadian, American and British universities who are working with students from the University of Antananarivo in Madagascar to study how forests there regenerate. For the past two years, we’ve studied the forest in and around Ranomafana National Park, in south-eastern Madagascar. This park is home to 12 species of the country’s famous lemurs.

Our aim was to find out how birds, mammals and plants recover (or not) when forests are left to regenerate naturally, but we also found some unexpected results.

We found that native small mammals, such as brown mouse lemurs (Microcebus rufus), tanala tufted-tail rats (Eliurus tanala) and greater long-tailed shrew tenrecs (Microgale principula), were rare in recovering forests. Instead, we found that black rats (Rattus rattus) were the most common small mammal even in forests that had been recovering for more than 50 years. Black rats are the most widespread invasive alien mammal worldwide, and have ecologically wreaked havoc in many island and tropical ecosystems. They evolved in south-east Asia, but have made their way across the world, as unintentional cargo in land and maritime trade.

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Read more: The endangered species list: counting lemurs in Madagascar

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We also found that forest areas with many black rats had fewer native species, while sites with fewer black rats had more native species, regardless of how long the forest had been regenerating.

This pattern was inverted in mature forests within Ranomafana National Park.

For example, about 90% of the small mammals in protected forests were native species. But in regenerating forests, almost 80% of the small mammals were invasive. This may suggest that invasive rats struggle to establish themselves in intact old-growth forests but can dominate forests that are still recovering, preventing native species from returning.

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Read more: Tourist visits to Madagascar help conserve some forests, but others suffer: study suggests what to do

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Our findings question the belief that regenerating the vegetation of a native forest will automatically ensure that the whole ecosystem recovers. Instead, our research suggests that forest regeneration alone is not enough to help small mammal communities recover if and when invasive rat populations are left to flourish.

Mouse lemurs vs. invasive rats

We could not know which species had been there before the forest was cut down since these sites were not sampled many years ago. But we looked at 25 plots in the forest, comparing five (the control sites) in the protected part of the forest with 20 outside the protected area.

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Read more: Climate change is threatening Madagascar’s famous forests – our study shows how serious it is

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We set up folding traps at each site for six consecutive nights every three months for one year. These traps close when an animal enters, capturing it without hurting it. We identified every individual animal captured, and measured and released them back to the same area.

To understand how invasive rats affect individual native species, we needed enough observations of each species to make reliable statistical tests. However, most native species were caught too rarely to provide statistically reliable results. Only brown mouse lemurs were found often enough for us to confidently analyse how their numbers changed as invasive rat numbers increased.

Mouse lemurs play a key role in rainforest regeneration, as they eat fruits and defecate their seeds in degraded sites, helping the seeds to sprout. Unfortunately, they are also an endangered species, mostly because of human destruction of their habitat.

While we did not find a direct effect of black rat abundance on brown mouse lemur abundance, we did find a negative effect on their weight. The greater the number of invasive rats we found at a site, the skinnier mouse lemurs would get. This could indicate that mouse lemurs are competing with invasive rats for food resources, and losing, which could negatively affect their health and long-term survival.

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Read more: Coral reefs are at risk from rats that have invaded nearby islands

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Another interesting finding was that mouse lemurs may be able to coexist with rats, provided rat numbers remained low. We estimated that finding no more than 3.3 black rats per 100 trap nights indicates a rat population low enough not to affect mouse lemurs.

This calculation is useful because it gives conservation managers a practical target. Our results suggest that if rat numbers can be kept below this level, brown mouse lemurs may be able to coexist alongside them. However, we still don’t know whether the same is true for other native species.

What needs to happen next

While invasive black rats are a clear threat to native species, eradicating them without endangering native species would be hard to achieve. Poisoned pellets have successfully been used to eradicate black rats in other island ecosystems where they had no native small mammals. But many native birds also consumed the poison and died.

Trapping is a safer way of removing black rats. Our identified threshold can be used as an early benchmark for when intervention is warranted, at least for brown mouse lemurs. But it would be impossible to set up enough traps across huge forests to control their population. However, traps can be placed in human settlements. This could both help curtail the spread of black rats in forests and reduce their negative effects on human populations.

The only thing we can be certain of is that protecting old-growth forests is vital for native species to thrive in the long term.

– Invasive rats are stopping small mammals from returning to Madagascar’s regenerating forests – study
– https://theconversation.com/invasive-rats-are-stopping-small-mammals-from-returning-to-madagascars-regenerating-forests-study-288735

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Daniel Cash, Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research (UNU-CPR), United Nations University; Aston University

The sovereign credit ratings of the leading credit rating agencies are most visible through their outputs: an upgrade, a downgrade or a change in “outlook”. The evaluative work that produces those outcomes receives far less attention. Yet it is precisely that work that explains why credit rating agencies occupy such an influential position in international finance.

The recent case of Gabon provides an unusually clear opportunity to observe this process in action.

Gabon had recently:

• revised its budget

• widened its deficit – meaning that it expected government spending to exceed revenues by an even larger margin

• planned a Eurobond (borrowing from international investors in a foreign currency).

It was also in negotiations with the International Monetary Fund to launch a new programme that would combine financial support with commitments on fiscal and transparency reforms. In addition, an audit that was examining a decade of public borrowing was still ongoing.

Fitch had previously warned that Gabon’s widening fiscal deficit would complicate negotiations over a new IMF programme. Moody’s had cautioned that the country’s ongoing public debt audit could uncover additional undisclosed liabilities. Investors drew similar conclusions, with Gabon’s government bond prices falling after the revised budget was announced. Different institutions had independently reached related judgements about the country’s fiscal outlook.

Gabon is a small central African economy of around 2.5 million people and a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community. Oil, manganese and timber account for almost all of its exports, leaving government revenues highly exposed to commodity prices and external financing conditions.

Moody’s affirmed Gabon’s rating at Caa2 in June and moved the outlook to negative. Fitch had already affirmed Gabon at CCC- a month earlier. A CCC- rating sits near the bottom of Fitch’s long-term sovereign scale and indicates that default risk is considered very high, although default is not regarded as inevitable.

The published rating is only the most visible output. Credit rating agencies also assemble political, institutional and financial evidence into judgements that governments, investors and international organisations can use. Their assessments sit alongside those of the IMF and auditors and investors. Each examines different aspect of the same sovereign.

The Gabon case therefore reveals a broader process. Sovereign creditworthiness is interpreted and reassessed through several overlapping evaluations. Credit rating agencies evaluate institutions, financing strategies and possible future developments alongside current fiscal conditions.

Understanding these functions provides a clearer picture of what a sovereign rating represents and why it carries influence. None of these evaluative processes is unusual on its own. What makes Gabon’s case unusual is seeing so many of them converge at once.

Gabon’s revised budget, IMF negotiations, sovereign rating reviews, public debt audit and market reaction unfolded almost simultaneously. This allowed reporting by the Reuters news agency to capture how sovereign creditworthiness is constructed through overlapping assessments rather than a single institutional judgement.

More than a number-crunching exercise

The first thing to understand is that agencies do more than read the numbers. They perform several other evaluative functions that receive far less attention than the headline rating.

Moody’s noted that Gabon’s spending plans would make it harder for the government to bring spending back into line with its revenues, and also warned that if Gabon asked investors to accept less favourable repayment terms in order to ease pressure on its finances, Gabon’s debt could be classified as distressed and therefore count as a default. This is a routine part of sovereign credit analysis. Credit rating agencies assess not only a government’s current finances, but also the policy choices and future developments that are likely to shape its ability to repay.

Moody’s rates Gabon’s governance issuer profile at G-5, the weakest category on its governance scale, citing weak control of corruption and a record of extra-budgetary spending. Fitch assigns Gabon a score of 5 for rule of law and institutional quality, drawn from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators.

Neither agency measures institutional quality directly. Instead, as research suggests, this is common practice across the industry; agencies incorporate governance assessments produced by organisations such as the World Bank into their broader judgement of creditworthiness.

Credit rating agencies also evaluate how governments choose to finance themselves. A government seeking new borrowing has several options. It can negotiate support from multilateral lenders such as the IMF, issue bonds directly to private investors, or rely more heavily on domestic borrowing. Those choices send signals about a government’s priorities, confidence and financial position.

Gabon’s decision to authorise a Eurobond while its IMF talks remain unresolved is not neutral information sitting alongside the deficit figures. Kevin Daly, an investment director specialising in emerging market debt at Aberdeen Investments, interpreted the decision as evidence that agreement with the IMF was becoming less likely in the short term. In turn this suggested any new programme would probably be delayed until 2027.

Credit rating agencies also evaluate possible future developments. Gabon’s audit of borrowing between 2016 and 2024 has not yet reported, but Moody’s has already stated that it could uncover previously unreported liabilities.

Nicholas Sauer, a portfolio manager specialising in emerging market debt at Robeco, reached a similar conclusion from the investor side, warning that if the audit uncovered more previously undisclosed debt than expected, Gabon’s debt burden could prove significantly worse than investors currently believed. Credit rating agencies are not unique in looking ahead. Investors do the same. The significance lies in the convergence of their evaluations, because similar conclusions reached independently reinforce one another.

Why this carries weight

Political economist Timothy Sinclair’s influential study of the American credit rating agencies that pioneered modern sovereign rating practice helps explain why these evaluative roles carry such weight.

Credit rating agencies, he argued, are not simply technical providers of opinion. They help construct the conditions under which governments make policy choices, which gives their judgements a political character. A rating does not just describe Gabon’s position; it becomes part of the environment Gabon’s government has to navigate next.

None of this happens in isolation. Gabon publishes a budget. Fitch responds. Moody’s responds. The audit proceeds in the background. The IMF continues its own assessment of programme viability. Investors price bonds against all these signals at once, and the market moves accordingly: Gabon’s 2031 and 2029 bonds both fell after the revised budget was published.

Each institution enters this process with a different mandate. The IMF evaluates programme viability. Credit rating agencies evaluate credit risk. Auditors evaluate the completeness of the state’s accounts. Investors evaluate expected returns. No institution is formally responsible for producing sovereign creditworthiness itself. That judgement emerges through the interaction of separate evaluations.

Each assessment is therefore partial. Sovereign creditworthiness emerges from the accumulation of those partial evaluations rather than from any single institution’s judgement.

What appears to be a single judgement about creditworthiness is, in practice, the accumulation of several distinct judgements produced by different institutions.

– What Gabon’s rating downgrade tells us about how sovereign credit worthiness is judged
– https://theconversation.com/what-gabons-rating-downgrade-tells-us-about-how-sovereign-credit-worthiness-is-judged-288226