Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Janet Appiah Osei, Research Fellow, African Research Universities Alliance (ARUA), University of Ghana

Every morning in Accra, Ghana’s capital, thousands of commuters sit in traffic while minibuses and taxis compete for limited road space.

More than 70% of Ghanaians rely on informal public transport, predominantly minibuses (trotros) and taxis, for their daily mobility. About 84% of passenger trips in Accra are made using these modes (a 2017 estimate). Precise counts of vehicles are not available due to the informal nature of the sector, but thousands of taxis and trotros are active on Accra’s roads each day.

Despite the constant movement, the traffic’s progress is slow. Ghana’s cities are moving, but not efficiently.

Taxi and minibus services are essential. They provide flexible, relatively affordable mobility and reach areas that formal systems do not. For millions of people, they are the backbone of daily travel.

Yet surprisingly little is known about their diversity and characteristics.

I research how urban transport systems can be made more efficient and climate-friendly, particularly in rapidly growing cities where there are mobility challenges.

In my recent study of commercial vehicle models in Ghana’s urban transport system, I identified 52 different types of taxis and trotros currently in operation. This diversity reflects a system shaped more by market demand than by coordinated, large-scale planning.

My findings show a highly diverse fleet structure, with differences in vehicle capacity and service patterns across the fleet. There’s a strong reliance on conventional fuels and older vehicles. These patterns suggest a fleet that has developed gradually over time, rather than through deliberate and structured modernisation. The result is traffic congestion, higher fuel consumption and increased emissions.

I argue that a more structured approach to urban transport could allow cities to move more people with fewer vehicles, reduce overlapping low-occupancy trips, and improve fleet regulation and planning.

Why efficiency is a growing problem

Most taxis, which are typically sedan cars, carry only a few passengers per trip and operate over short distances. Trotros seating about 10-20 people carry more passengers and travel longer routes. But they still fall short of the capacity offered by larger buses used for mass transit, which can carry 50 or more passengers per trip.

This means more vehicles are required to move the same number of passengers.

In Accra alone, roughly one million passenger trips are made daily using these modes. As demand increases, the system responds by adding more vehicles, not by increasing capacity per vehicle.

This pattern is evident in the the city’s rapid motorisation: vehicle ownership rose from about 40 per 1,000 people in 1990 to 260 per 1,000 in 2015. This highlights how growing mobility demand has largely been met through more vehicles on the road, rather than through more efficient, higher-capacity transport.

The result is growing congestion, longer travel times and increasing pressure on already limited road infrastructure.

For commuters, this means more time spent in traffic. For cities, it means declining transport efficiency.

Environmental costs of low-capacity transport

The dominance of low-occupancy vehicles also affects the environment.

Vehicles that carry fewer passengers generally consume more fuel and generate higher emissions per passenger-kilometre compared to higher-capacity modes of transport. For example, one study on urban transport found that transit buses can reduce emissions by 82%-94% relative to sedan cars.

The cumulative effect of a large fleet of low-occupancy vehicles in Accra contributes to higher overall fuel consumption and increased urban emissions.

Expanding and strengthening high-capacity public transport systems is not only a transport issue, but also an environmental one.

Economic implications for cities and commuters

Inefficiency in transport systems has direct economic consequences.

Higher fuel consumption increases operating costs for drivers, which can eventually translate into higher fares. Congestion slows down the movement of people and goods, reducing productivity and increasing the cost of doing business in urban areas.

Efficient transport systems support economic growth by improving reliability and reducing delays. As Ghana’s cities expand, these efficiencies become even more critical.

Why the current system persists

Despite these challenges, taxis and trotros continue to dominate for good reason.

They are flexible, adaptable and responsive to demand. Routes can change quickly, and services can reach areas that formal systems often overlook. The relatively low cost of entry also allows many individuals to participate in the sector.

This flexibility has made the system resilient. But it has also limited large-scale coordination.

The case for high-occupancy transport

Improving urban mobility is not just about increasing the number of vehicles, it is about moving more people with fewer vehicles.

High-occupancy transport systems, particularly Bus Rapid Transit (BRT), a system that uses larger buses operating along dedicated corridors, carry more passengers per trip. A single high-capacity bus can replace multiple taxis or minibuses.

This does not mean eliminating existing transport modes. Taxis and trotros can play a complementary role as feeder services, connecting passengers to main transit routes. This integrated approach combines flexibility with efficiency.

Ghana has already made attempts to introduce BRT systems. But partial implementation has limited their impact. For such systems to succeed, they require dedicated lanes, consistent policy support, and long-term investment.

A critical moment for Ghana’s cities

Urbanisation in Ghana is accelerating. As more people move into cities, demand for transport will continue to rise.

If current trends continue, the number of low-capacity vehicles will increase further, worsening congestion and environmental pressures. Over time, this could reduce the overall effectiveness of urban transport systems.

Ghana now faces a choice: continue expanding a vehicle-intensive system, or move towards higher-capacity models that prioritise efficiency and sustainability.

What needs to change

Addressing these challenges requires coordinated policy action.

Transport planning must move beyond reactive, market-driven growth, towards long-term system design. This includes integrating informal transport operators into structured frameworks while investing in infrastructure that supports high-capacity movement.

In my view, priorities should include:

• full implementation of Bus Rapid Transit systems with dedicated lanes

• investment in high-capacity buses and supporting infrastructure

• integration of informal operators into formal planning systems

• gradual reduction of low-occupancy vehicles along major corridors

• stronger institutional coordination and long-term planning.

These steps can help create a more flexible and efficient, balanced system.

The future of Ghana’s cities will depend on a simple shift where more people, not more vehicles, are moved.

– Ghana’s transport system is chaotic: how it can move more people with fewer vehicles – research
– https://theconversation.com/ghanas-transport-system-is-chaotic-how-it-can-move-more-people-with-fewer-vehicles-research-278810

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Josef Hanekom, Clinical Veterinarian and Lecturer, University of Pretoria

Dogs can be very aggressive towards one another, as many people will have witnessed in public places. But in South Africa aggression between dogs occurs more often in people’s homes.

We, a group of South African veterinary scientists including epidemiologists and a behaviourist at the Faculty of Veterinary Science, University of Pretoria, set out to understand the drivers of dog-on-dog aggression in dog bite patients. One of the reasons for doing this is that international studies rarely represent African settings, yet dog-keeping practices profoundly influence behaviour.

In South Africa, for example, dog ownership is driven by safety concerns and a guard against crime. Typically owners keep multiple dogs, select more aggressive dog breeds and combine large breeds for protection with smaller “alert” dogs meant to raise the alarm.

In a recent paper we examined detailed owner surveys from dogs presented to the veterinary hospital with bite wounds. We have also been drilling down into data based on more than 3,000 dogs that had been treated for dog bite wounds between 2013 and 2024 at the Onderstepoort Veterinary Academic Hospital. We analysed dog fight descriptions and household demographics, looking at the sex, age, breed and sterilisation status of dogs.

Our aim was to provide solid evidence-based and locally relevant prevention strategies to reduce inter-dog aggression, and to identify some risk amelioration strategies for South Africa.

We found that the biggest drivers of dog-on-dog aggression were overcrowded homes, and mismatched dog groups in terms of sex, sterilisation status and size. And that, by and large, dogs had minimal training and early socialisation and were given limited exercise outside the household.

Together, these factors create a household “pressure cooker” for inter-dog conflict.

Unfortunately, once fighting between household dogs occurs, this behaviour usually escalates. It’s often necessary to permanently supervise or separate fighting dogs.

This makes identifying prevention strategies all the more important, as once fighting occurs between two household dogs it is very difficult to curb.

Our findings highlight the importance of selecting compatible dogs, managing home environments and supporting owners with practical, evidence-based advice. Based on our findings we make seven recommendations that could help reduce dog-on-dog violence. These include limiting the number of dogs in a home to two or three, castrating male dogs, making sure there’s a mix of males and females, and not mixing small and large breeds.

What we found

Our research found extensive damage to the dogs that had been bitten:

• 4% had chest or abdominal cavity penetration

• 12% suffered fractures

• 6% resulted in death or euthanasia.

Beyond the welfare concerns for the dogs, this conflict also affected humans in considerable ways. Owners were injured while breaking up the fight in 3.2% of fights. Wounds to the face and hands were reported.

We found that households where fighting occurred owned more dogs (4.1 dogs compared to 3.4 dogs) and had more than one intact male dog.

When we examined patterns in fighting pairs, we identified clear trends: 71% of fights were between dogs of the same sex; 53% occurred between dogs with the same sterilisation status. Conversely, fighting was less common between male and female dogs (29%). The most common pairs were two intact males (25%) or two spayed females (15%).

Intact males were significantly over-represented in fights (38% of fighters vs 12.7% for castrated males). We did not establish causality, but the association is strong.

Female spayed dogs were slightly over-represented: 28% of fighting dogs vs 22% for female intact dogs. Fighting was frequent (12% of reports) when one household dog was in oestrus (on heat).

Fights were more common in dogs older than three years when hierarchy challenges arose. Most injured dogs were small breeds attacked by larger dogs.

Several breeds were over-represented in fighting households. These included boerboels, German shepherd dogs and pitbull terriers. Jack Russell terriers and miniature pinschers were over-represented in dog bite wound patients.

Breeds such as dachshunds, labrador retrievers, miniature schnauzers and toy poodles were less represented in fighting households.

The differences between South Africa and Europe

In Europe, fights occur mostly in public spaces between non-household dogs. Research has been done this on this in the UK, Germany and Czech Republic.

But in South Africa, household dynamics themselves are the central risk factor. In our study 85% of the dog bite wound cases happened at the owner’s home, and 68% involved dogs living in the same household.

Fighting often happened when a dog escaped from the yard or entered another dog’s property.

In several countries like the UK and Germany, leash laws were introducted to reduce dog attacks and fighting. But in our study population this would have a minimal effect on fighting between dogs at this occurs mostly at home.

Other clear differences to previous western studies were that most households in our survey kept 3.4 dogs. In many European studies there were usually fewer than two.

This shows that South African households face unique pressures that shape dog behaviour. Local evidence is essential to prevent fights and improve welfare.

What can owners do?

Keep no more than three dogs in a household. More dogs, more competition = more fighting.

Secondly, castrate all male dogs.

Third, avoid keeping dogs of only one sex. Fighting between same sex pairs was more common.

Fourth, avoid keeping large breed dogs with small breed dogs. Injuries were more common when small breed dogs were bitten by larger breed dogs.

Fifth, avoid keeping boerboels, German shepherds and pitbull terriers in multi-dog households. These breeds were more common in fighting households.

Sixth, Jack Russell terriers and miniature pinschers should be limited to low risk households without large breed dogs. These two breeds were over-represented in dog bite wound patients.

Seventh, maintain dog proof-fencing and control dogs during gate opening and closing. Fighting was often reported when dogs escaped their yard or entered another property.

– South African study reveals most dog fights happen at home – and how best to prevent it
– https://theconversation.com/south-african-study-reveals-most-dog-fights-happen-at-home-and-how-best-to-prevent-it-281447

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Elena Moore, Professor of Sociology, University of Cape Town

Botswana’s economy is projected to contract by 0.4% in 2026, driven largely by a slowdown in the diamond sector. Diamonds account for a third of fiscal revenues and a quarter of GDP. This means the government has less money to spend, even before making any policy choices.

At the same time, the government has set about reducing debt as a share of GDP by cutting expenditure to stabilise the economy. This combination is forcing difficult decisions about public spending.

A key one is investment in social protection for older people. Over the past two decades, the number of older persons aged 60+ has doubled to about 279,111 people (roughly 8% of the population). In coming decades, that number is set to rise even more sharply. While this reflects important gains in life expectancy, it also presents a policy challenge: how to support an ageing population in a context of tightening public finances.

We have between us expertise in long term care systems, public financing and budget analysis. Our recent study sought to tackle this question by examining how the Botswana government has funded elder care over the last 20 years.

We also obtained government data to examine how state spending on older people has evolved over time under various social protection measures. These included the old age pension, destitute programme, disability allowance and war veteran’s allowance, as well as care provision through the home-based care programme.

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Read more: Botswana’s hike of old age pensions hasn’t fixed the problem of who cares for the elderly – new study

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Our final report looks at how spending in 2005 compares to spending in 2024-2025, adjusted for inflation to reflect real changes in today’s value, and how these trends correspond with the growth of the older person population.

The key insight of the new report is that while Botswana has significantly expanded its old age pension system, investment in care services for older people has not kept pace.

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Read more: Botswana’s hike of old age pensions hasn’t fixed the problem of who cares for the elderly – new study

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The result is a system that provides income support but leaves many without the care they need and an underinvestment in the care economy in Botswana.

A pension success story: at a cost?

Botswana’s old age pension has long been one of the country’s most important social protection programmes. It is universal, meaning all citizens above a certain age qualify, and it has achieved broad reach across both urban and rural areas.

In 2025, the government made two major changes: it lowered the eligibility age from 65 to 60 and increased the monthly benefit.

These reforms have been widely welcomed. For many older people, the pension provides a crucial lifeline, helping to cover food, transport and other basic needs. In a country without unemployment benefits, it often supports entire households, not just individuals.

But this success comes with trade-offs.

The rapid expansion of the pension has absorbed a growing share of the broader social protection budget. This has left less room for other forms of public support, particularly those related to care.

A hidden crisis of care

Ageing is not just about income, it is also about health, disability and the need for care. As people live longer, they are more likely to experience chronic illnesses and multiple health conditions at once. This often leads to increased levels of disability and dependence.

Yet Botswana’s spending patterns suggest that these realities are not being fully addressed.

Pension coverage has expanded. But access to other support programmes has stagnated or even declined. The proportion of older persons receiving the destitute allowance has fallen significantly over the past decade, and disability support reaches only a small fraction of those who need it. While there has been an increase in total spending, there has not been an increase in total spending in real terms per person.

At the same time, spending on community home-based care, a key service that supports older persons in their homes, has decreased in real terms. This is happening despite clear evidence that demand for such services is rising.

Families under pressure

Care for older people in Botswana has traditionally been provided by families. This model is under increasing strain. A previous report on caregiving indicated how the long-term impact of HIV/Aids, combined with migration and rising female employment, has reduced the availability of family caregivers.

Moreover, between 2012 and 2023, female labour force participation increased from 54.9% to 63.4%, meaning fewer women are available to provide full-time care at home.

At the same time, many households face significant economic and infrastructural challenges. Older-people households are often large and multigenerational, yet resources are limited. Nearly half report experiencing food insecurity, and many lack access to basic services such as piped water and sanitation.

In a few isolated cases there are “voluntary” carers supporting older persons. But serious questions remain about their long-term sustainability.

In rural areas, where most older persons live, these challenges are even more pronounced.

Poverty persists despite pensions

Poverty among older people remains a serious concern. Around 11.9% live in extreme poverty, and they are more likely to be poor than any other age group. One reason is that the pension is often stretched across entire households.

At the same time, access to additional assistance is limited. Programmes such as the destitute allowance and disability grant often rely on discretionary assessments by social workers. Many older persons report that these programmes are difficult to access or simply unavailable.

This points to a broader issue: Botswana’s social protection system for older people is becoming increasingly narrow, centred on a single programme while other forms of support fall away.

These challenges are unfolding in a context of fiscal austerity. As the government seeks to reduce deficits and stabilise the economy, public spending is under pressure. But cuts to social services come with risks. Botswana is already one of the most unequal countries in the world. Reductions in social protection and care services are likely to exacerbate these inequalities.

Public services are also under strain. The country faces shortages of healthcare workers and infrastructure. In this context, reducing investment in care could have long-term consequences for both social and economic development.

Rethinking social protection

The current moment calls for a shift in how social protection is understood. Rather than focusing narrowly on pensions, policymakers need to take a broader view, one that includes care as a central component. Investing in care services is not just about meeting immediate needs. It can also create jobs, support households, and contribute to economic growth. Community-based care programmes, disability support, and partnerships with local organisations all offer pathways to strengthen the system.

Across Botswana, community initiatives are already stepping in to fill the gaps. But without stronger public support, these efforts cannot meet the scale of need.

What’s needed is a more balanced approach to spending priorities, one that protects income security while also investing in the public services that enable people to age with dignity.

– Pensions for Botswana’s elderly are growing, but care services are lacking – study tracks 20 years
– https://theconversation.com/pensions-for-botswanas-elderly-are-growing-but-care-services-are-lacking-study-tracks-20-years-281644

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Frank Gerits, Research Fellow at the University of the Free State, South Africa and Assistant Professor in the History of International Relations, Utrecht University

The 2026 Africa-France summit in Nairobi on May 11-12 is the first to be held in an African country that is not a former French colony. It is also the first to be held since the dramatic collapse of relations between France and a number of west African countries – notably Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

The 2026 summit can be understood as the latest example of President Emmanuel Macron’s new Africa doctrine, which he laid out in Burkina Faso in 2017. The doctrine’s three notable messages were:

• an apology for colonial wrongs

• a neoliberal small-business approach to assistance programmes

• the French resolve to develop new alliances outside French Africa.

In keeping with the new doctrine, the French president hesitantly apologised in 2021 for some aspects of French colonial policy in Algeria. These include the torture and assassination of the Algerian nationalist hero Ali Boumendjel.

But mostly, Macron has looked to strengthen the position of Paris as old alliances were becoming weaker.

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Read more: France in Africa: why Macron’s policies increased distrust and anger

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He has consciously invested time and effort beyond French west Africa. The official visit to Guinea-Bissau, a former Portuguese colony, is a case in point.

Right after his election in 2017, France’s development aid agency (AFD) and the Tony Elumelu Foundation signed an agreement in Nigeria to empower a new generation of business leaders. Tony Elumelu Foundation is a Lagos-based non-profit that promotes youth entrepreneurship across Africa.

Macron then promoted entrepreneurship during the New France-Africa Summit in 2021. He sought to inspire the youth of Africa to innovate and set up businesses.

This year’s conference is held under the banner: “Africa Forward: Partnerships between Africa and France for innovation and growth”. The business start-up vibe is no coincidence.

Kenya has also stressed the groundbreaking nature of the meeting for its focus on Africa as a major partner for Europe. Europe is looking for new allies in the midst of a war in Ukraine; and the US is unreliable, with Donald Trump imposing tariffs and questioning the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

As a historian of global north-global south relations, I see the meeting less as groundbreaking, and more as a continuation of an older, mutually beneficial relationship between Kenya and France.

Kenya hopes its relationship with France will elevate its influence across Africa, allowing it to rival the diplomatic weight of South Africa, which hosted the G20 summit in November 2025.

By transcending the classic divide between French and British Africa, Nairobi can present itself as a continental leader and as a diplomacy city.

History of the relationship between France and Kenya

The economic and diplomatic relationship goes back to the 1960s and 1970s. Back in September 1970 France sent a little-known legal expert called Jaques Mollet to advise the Kenyan Ministry of Industry and Commerce on the newly-formed East African Community.

France also sought cooperation with institutions of the East African Community such as the East African Development Bank. By becoming a close partner of a newly established regional economic bloc in Africa, in which Nairobi played a pivotal role, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to weaken the British influence of Africa while strengthening its own position within the European Economic Community, now the EU.

Paris somewhat cynically justified its meddling as a way to strengthen continental unity since a French and a British sphere of influence in Africa would lead to unnecessary internal competition between the Commonwealth countries in Africa and Françafrique.

Kenya sought to strengthen its trade relations with France and the EEC in the 1960s. This was partly an attempt to become more independent of the Commonwealth. When negotiating with the EEC in 1963, an east African delegation that included Kenya’s Minister of Labour Tom Mboya stressed that maintaining the East African Common Market was key – not the Commonwealth.

Ruto and Macron’s shared understanding

The similarities between Kenya’s President William Ruto and Macron further strengthen this historical bond between Kenya and France. They share the same diplomatic goals. They are both focusing on climate change funding and security, and they share a preference for neoliberal privatisation as a mode for governance at home and abroad.

Ruto’s election campaign in 2022 touted the “hustler nation” – a focus on enabling small businesses. Macron has acted as a businessman-diplomat abroad, pushing small businesses as a solution for underdevelopment.

It’s no accident therefore that the 2026 summit will host a business forum and talks will focus on the potential benefits of artificial intelligence. AI, climate initiatives and weapons manufacturing, as well as the small-business ventures that have emerged through these priorities, are areas of cooperation and investment between African countries and the former colonial powers. Politicians like to flaunt this.

Part of the reason is that these are yet unproven ventures with no long history of unequal exchange between the two sides. They are natural common ground for two sides seeking a renewed relationship that is less burdened by the dark history of colonial oppression.

Yet France and Kenya’s agreement about the need to address security, climate change and artificial intelligence obscures the fact that both countries often find themselves on opposing sides of these issues.

As the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has shown, African and European leaders do not necessarily share the same analysis of the global security situation. European countries assumed they would get complete support from African countries but only 28 out of 54 African countries voted in favour of a United Nations resolution that condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Kenya abstained.

On issues like climate change and artificial intelligence, France and Kenya again agree on the broad principle that these issues require urgent action, but disagree on the form the action should take.

For instance, climate change has hit Kenya hard. Extended droughts require genuine climate action. At the same time, France and the EU have been talking about loosening climate regulations to address the energy crisis caused by the US war on Iran. This includes easing emission regulations for cars.

The same problem presents itself in relation to the AI economy, which is being championed by France. It is cheap labourers in Kenya that have been doing much of the legwork to keep AI applications going. Large language models and other applications need to be trained and monitored by humans and they are often trained in Kenya’s so-called “AI sweat shops”. Kenyans are doing much of the data labelling and content moderation AI work.

Long term relationship?

In essence, the summit illustrates how climate finance, security and AI are being used to bolster commercial interests in both Africa and France, a strategic attempt to redefine a relationship long shadowed by colonialism.

However, the future of this entrepreneur-led approach remains uncertain. Its success hinges on whether France and Kenya can ensure that the wealth generated by these emerging sectors is distributed broadly, or if it will merely enrich a small circle of tech elites.

– Why Nairobi Africa-France summit bears the hallmarks of Macron and Ruto priorities
– https://theconversation.com/why-nairobi-africa-france-summit-bears-the-hallmarks-of-macron-and-ruto-priorities-282414

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Kenneth Nsah Mala, Expert in Environmental Humanities, Sustainability Science, Foresight and Futures Studies, University of Cologne

In the grasslands and highlands of western Cameroon, some animals are believed to be sacred. Within the region’s indigenous kingdoms (fondoms), many of these animals are also considered to be royal. They include wild cats (like cheetahs, leopards, lions, tigers), buffaloes, elephants, porcupines, cowries (sea snails), and a brightly coloured bird called the Bannerman’s turaco.

These species carry deep cultural and spiritual significance. They are, for example, often used to decorate royals (kings, queens and queen mothers) or to award royal distinctions to deserving individuals. Their body parts can be used to make crowns, bedding, footstools, bangles or necklaces for royalty. Red feathers from the Bannerman’s turaco are used to distinguish warriors and hunters.

Here, indigenous cultural practices can both sustain and decimate biodiversity. The names of some of these animals, especially wild cats, are used as praise names for kings. But custom dictates that when these animals are found, they must be killed and taken to the palace as a tribute.

Most are either locally extinct or critically endangered. Except for cowries and porcupines, all these animals are included on the red list of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature.

Biodiversity loss caused by humans is accelerating at alarming rates around the world. This includes biodiversity hotspots like the Congo Basin in central Africa, which Cameroon is part of. Thousands of species have been identified in the basin, 30% of which are endemic (native).

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Read more: Nuer people have a sacred connection to birds – it can guide conservation in Ethiopia and South Sudan

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I am a scholar who works across disciplines. These include the arts, literature and cultural studies; environmental humanities; sustainability science; anticipatory governance and future generations; strategic foresight and futures studies.

In a recent study, I explored how literary creativity combined with foresight workshops might help change how people view these animals. Could they offer more hopeful futures for these unique species?

The role of literature

Literary texts like plays, poems and novels offer insights into dealing with climate and ecological challenges in the Congo Basin. (Even in the case of less popular but highly important species such as insects.)

This is the case in many works by anglophone Cameroonian authors, like Athanasius Nsahlai, Kenjo Jumbam, J.K. Bannavti, and John Nkengasong.

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Read more: ‘A healthy earth may be ugly’: How literary art can help us value insect conservation

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Their stories have the potential to warn against the destruction of royal and sacred animals. They can also help shape new visions for the future of biodiversity conservation.

I draw on postcolonial ecocriticism (the relationship between literature, culture, the environment and history) and narrative foresight (what stories can reveal about the future) in my study. I analyse how these books engage with royal and sacred animals in ways that challenge environmentally unfriendly cultural practices, and how they propose new forms of relations between humans and other animals.

Jumbam’s novella, Lukong and the Leopard, for instance, tells the story of a young man called Lukong. The son of an outcast from the Nso kingdom, he helps capture a lion. Surprisingly the king demands it be brought to his palace alive. Just as Lukong is to be decorated by the king, his father sneaks in. Fearing for his son’s life, he sets the lion free.

In a sense, the story challenges the old cultural practice of killing royal animals. It invites readers to change how they see and relate with these animals in order to protect them.

Workshops

Stories like this can then be taken into foresight workshop sessions. Narrative foresight meets group participation to create what is called participatory foresight. Participants and stakeholders from diverse backgrounds are brought together to explore future scenarios, the challenges that shape them and what can drive change.

As part of my research, I organised a day of participatory foresight workshops on #CongoBasinFutures and #RoyalAnimalsFutures in Yaoundé, Cameroon.

Over 30 participants across a range of ages, genders and interests were brought together. They included teachers, researchers, environmentalists, farmers, nurses, writers, filmmakers, musicians, journalists, students, civil society workers, policymakers, and indigenous kings (fons).

Using foresight tools, participants were asked to discuss motivations as well as historical barriers while envisioning more hopeful futures for royal and sacred animals. The workshops were designed to include literary narratives on the plight of these animals.

They drew on current trends and signals of change, like climate change, biodiversity loss and indigenous cultural practices. They imagined new futures and then collectively proposed several policy interventions that could be practical solutions.

Shaping better policies

Cameroon does have environmental laws aimed at protecting biodiversity, but they are not effectively implemented. My study – and our workshop – seeks to complement these laws and contribute to their effective use in practice. Ideas coming out of the workshop include:

• Creative arts and education should be used to help raise awareness about protecting royal animals and biodiversity. This could include programmes like our workshop, creative competitions and updating educational curricula.

• Instead of decorating those who kill, local hunters should be rewarded when they spot and report the presence of royal animals for monitoring and preservation. The use of artificial animal parts for traditional ceremonies should be encouraged.

• Policy should encourage research into the controlled breeding of endangered royal and sacred animals and the promotion of ecotourism around these animals. Special parks and reserves could combine arts and royal animals to attract tourists. Revenue could improve livelihoods, sustain cultures, and promote environmental conservation.

• Environmental regulation should be strengthened through collaboration with all stakeholders, including indigenous authorities and local communities. Hunting of certain animals could be regulated. Hunting seasons and quotas for certain species could be in place. Indigenous leaders and communities could be engaged to adapt and modernise cultural practices in an era of environmental collapse.

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Read more: Literature from the Congo Basin offers ways to address the climate crisis

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But we must move from recommendations into action. Otherwise, ideas from studies like this will remain good on paper only, like most environmental laws in Cameroon. If so, royal animals and other species will continue to be threatened by extinction.

– Cameroon’s sacred and royal animals: could literature and futures thinking help save them?
– https://theconversation.com/cameroons-sacred-and-royal-animals-could-literature-and-futures-thinking-help-save-them-281160

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Santiago Zuluaga Castañeda, JdlC Researcher, Departamento de Ecología Evolutiva, Museo Nacional de Ciencias Naturales (MNCN-CSIC)

Birds of prey and vultures (raptors) play a vital role in ecosystems, both as top predators and key scavengers. However, compared to many other bird species, raptor populations are declining faster. This is because they need large areas to live in, have low population densities, and reproduce slowly. For these reasons they are vulnerable to human impacts like farming with pesticides, electrocution, collision with wind turbines, or poaching.

In many cases, by the time scientists and conservationists fully understand how bad the declines are, it may be too late to act. Thus, having good population monitoring is vital to act as an early warning system of declines. Many countries in the global south host important populations of raptors but lack effective monitoring programmes.

Africa is an important continent for raptor diversity. Several studies across Africa have used road counts (counting birds from repeated transects across routes) to monitor how raptor populations have changed over time. A recent study went one step further, combining trends from these different surveys from across Africa to better understand these changes at a pan-African scale. Unfortunately, no data from South Africa were available to be incorporated into this analysis.

In our recent study we took advantage of data that was collected by one dedicated fieldworker, Ronelle Visagie, who drove nearly 400,000 km (the distance from Earth to the moon) across the central area of South Africa (see map) between 2009 and 2025, while she worked for the Birds of Prey Programme of the Endangered Wildlife Trust.

During these 16 years, Ronelle counted all the raptors and large birds that she saw on these work trips. Comparing how the rate of these observations (numbers of individuals per 100km driven) changed over time allowed us to explore species population trends. We had enough data to examine trends for 18 raptors and eight other large bird species over this period. Unfortunately, we did not find a good news story.

These road counts revealed that 50% of the species (13 out of 26) declined significantly, while only three species (12%) showed significant increases. The remaining ten species (38%) showed no significant trends (see Figure 2).

The declining trends raise serious concerns about the conservation status of several species in a region known to host important raptor populations. Thus, urgent conservation actions are needed, especially for species declining by more than 50%. Given that several of these species are not currently listed as threatened either globally or regionally, their conservation status may need to be reassessed.

Trends in raptor populations

According to our results, 42% of the assessed species declined by more than 50% in the last 16 years.

Notable declines included all of the three migratory species assessed (lesser kestrel, amur falcon and steppe buzzard). These trends match other studies from their breeding grounds in the northern hemisphere, which also suggested declines. Protecting migratory species is especially challenging because action may be needed in breeding areas, non-breeding areas, and along migration routes, where the threats they face may differ.

We also found declines of several resident raptors, including jackal buzzard, Verreaux’s eagle and secretarybird. Populations of these species declined by over 50% in our study region.

In contrast, populations of white-necked raven, greater kestrels, and white-backed vulture increased. The latter is a critically endangered species, but seems to be increasing within our study area.

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Read more: Nigeria’s Hadejia wetlands are a vital stopover for migrating birds: new survey records species found in the park

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Some of the trends we detected were similar to a recent study that explored raptor population trends from across Africa using similar approaches to our study. For example, our findings of large declines for secretarybird and lesser kestrel were very similar to those reported in Kenya and Botswana. Additionally, similar population changes for secretarybird were detected during winter (but not summer) using road counts in the Nama Karoo (a major part of our study area) during the period just before our study (a 61% decline between the late 1980s and early 2010s). This suggests that the decline detected earlier may have continued into the mid-2020s.

We compared the direction of trends (whether species numbers were going up or down) from our road counts and the Southern African Bird Atlas Project (SABAP2). But only about half of the trends agreed between the two methods (road counts and the bird atlas). Species with consistent trends between the methods included amur falcon and lesser kestrel – both showing declines – and greater kestrel and white-backed vulture – both showing increases. Species with inconsistent trends all showed decreases according to our road counts but increases according to the bird atlas project. These included Ludwig’s bustard, blue crane, secretarybird, black-winged kite, and southern pale chanting goshawk.

If we assume that our road counts trends are reliable, these findings suggest that although the bird atlas project data can provide valuable information on the changes in distribution of birds, atlas data may be less well suited to capture changes in abundance at large spatial scales and across multiple species.

Across Africa, declines in birds of prey are often linked to human population growth, agricultural expansion and climate change. In our study area, there have been no major recent changes in land use or population density, but more subtle or long-term human impacts may be driving these changes.

Conflicts between people and raptors, including illegal killings, could play a role. Climate change and infrastructure like power lines and wind farms are adding further pressure by fragmenting aerial habitat and affecting survival and reproduction.

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Read more: Finding space for both wind farms and eagles in South Africa

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Trends in human populations

Human populations in Africa are expected to grow significantly over the next three decades, which will increase pressure on biodiversity.

Given the projected human population growth in Africa (79%), and a corresponding rise in demand for resources and energy, threats to vulnerable bird species are likely to get worse.

It is therefore essential that we have reliable tools to monitor species trends and better understand the impacts of these pressures.

This is crucial for understanding the current biodiversity crisis and preventing severe wildlife loss.

Ronelle Visagie and Gareth Tate of the Endangered Wildlife Trust contributed to this research.

– Birds of prey in South Africa are in trouble – a study analyses data from 16 years of road counts
– https://theconversation.com/birds-of-prey-in-south-africa-are-in-trouble-a-study-analyses-data-from-16-years-of-road-counts-281908

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Steven Gordon, Chief Research Specialist., Human Sciences Research Council

Anti-immigrant marches in several major South African cities (such as Tshwane and Johannesburg) in early May 2026 once again led to questions being asked about xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa.

In the wake of the protests President Cyril Ramaphosa called on South Africans to embrace solidarity with their African neighbours. For their part, foreign governments lodged their protests while police sought to curtail violence.

The tension in the country was palpable.

Are the recent outbreaks of anti-immigrant activism a harbinger of a wider uptick in anti-migrant sentiment amongst South Africans? Recent public opinion data from the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) suggests that this might be the case.

The HSRC’s South African Social Attitudes Survey is an important source of information on what ordinary South Africans think about international migration. The survey series consists of nationally representative, repeated cross-sectional surveys that have been conducted annually by the HSRC since 2003.

The latest data, from the 2025 survey, show that South Africans are more hostile towards immigrants than at any other time before since the survey began in 2003. An important dimension of the change has been an attitudinal shift and hardening of attitudes towards migrants among poorer and working-class adults. In addition, the recent growth of anti-immigrant sentiment has been geographically concentrated in four provinces: Mpumalanga, Gauteng, Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal.

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Read more: What research reveals about drivers of anti-immigrant hate crime in South Africa

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The rise in anti-immigrant sentiment is particularly concerning given that the country is due to hold local government elections on 4 November 2026. Aspirant political parties, in an attempt to maintain or gain power, may seek to exploit anti-immigrant sentiment for their own ends. In this way elections can provide a potential accelerant for xenophobia.

Growing hostility may even provoke xenophobic violence in a country that has a long history of collective anti-immigrant hate crime. and is home to more than two million international migrants.

Declining Hospitality

South African Social Attitudes Survey has included the following in its questionnaire since 2003:

Please indicate which of the following statements applies to you? I generally welcome to South Africa… (i) All immigrants; (ii) Some immigrants; (iii) No immigrants; and (iv) Uncertain.

In 2003 about a third (34%) of the South African adult population said that they would welcome all immigrants. The remainder indicated that they would accept either none (32%) or some (35%).

The proportion of the public that would be prepared to welcome foreigners tended to fluctuate within a narrow band over the 2003-2017 period.

But around the time of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, the research data began to show an upswing in anti-immigrant sentiment.

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Read more: Xenophobia is on the rise in South Africa: scholars weigh in on the migrant question

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About a quarter (26%) of those surveyed said that they would welcome all immigrants during the 2021 survey round. This was similar to figures in the mid-2010s.

But the share that held this hospitable attitude fell in subsequent survey rounds. In 2025 15% of adults said that they would welcome all foreigners.

Conversely, the proportion of the public adopting a hostile position (in other words ‘welcome no immigrants’) increased from 30% in 2021 to 42% in 2025.

Geography and class

The provinces with the highest growth in anti-immigrant sentiment – Mpumalanga, Gauteng, Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal – are ones through which most immigrants travel and often settle.

The situation has become particularly delicate in KwaZulu-Natal. The share of adults in the province who said that they would welcome no immigrants grew from 23% in 2021 to 45% in 2023 and then again to 60% in 2025.

The upsurge in hostility in KwaZulu-Natal could be linked to growing popular anger against the current economic and political status quo. A staggering 88% of provincial residents are unhappy with present economic conditions, and an equal proportion expect conditions to worsen over the next five years.

The notable attitudinal shift among poor people is also concerning.

South Africa is a highly unequal nation characterised by stark economic divisions. Most citizens can be found on the wrong side of these divides and could be classified as economically disadvantaged.

Historically, as research has shown, anti-immigrant sentiment in the country tended to cut across class divisions. But in the years following the COVID-19 pandemic, something changed.

Before the pandemic, South African Social Attitudes Survey data showed a linear relationship between economic disadvantage and anti-immigrant sentiment. In the years following the pandemic, however, a clear pattern emerged. As the lockdowns ended and the post-pandemic recovery began, most socioeconomic groups in South Africa became more and more hostile towards immigrants. But antipathy grew at a much more aggressive rate for the low and lower middle socioeconomic groups.

During the 2025 survey round, adults in these groups were much more hostile towards foreigners than those in the upper middle and high socio-economic groups.

The drivers

What could have caused the economically disadvantaged to become more antagonistic towards immigrants over the last five years or so?

It could be argued that the poor have become more likely to scapegoat foreigners for the failures and inequalities of the post-pandemic economic recovery. Poor people have been badly affected by a cost of living crisis and persistent deindustrialisation. They need someone to blame and foreigners have long provided a handy scapegoat.

The South African economy has struggled in the last few years, dealing with doggedly high unemployment. The country also has notoriously high crime rates. Such problems, as experts have argued again and again, cannot be directly laid at the feet of immigrants living in the country. But it would appear that they are getting blamed anyway.

What should be done?

The South African government has a National Action Plan to Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance.

Implemented in March 2019, one of its goals was to reduce public hostility towards migrants. Clearly, whether because of a lack of resources or government coordination, the plan has not succeeded.

The country needs to reinvigorate it and its associated processes. What’s needed is political, civic and community leaders to address legitimate socio-economic grievances without allowing immigrants to become scapegoats for deeper structural failures in society.

Efforts to strengthen social cohesion, improve economic inclusion, enhance public trust in governance and promote responsible political leadership are also crucial.

Well-provisioned and effective anti-xenophobia strategies are urgently required to address the worsening situation. The alternative is to allow hatred to flourish.

– South Africans are far less tolerant of migrants than before – hotspots, drivers and solutions
– https://theconversation.com/south-africans-are-far-less-tolerant-of-migrants-than-before-hotspots-drivers-and-solutions-282389

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jabulani Sikhakhane, Editor, The Conversation

Over the past 11 years, The Conversation Africa has published 12,961 articles by 8,257 authors, making the expertise of academics and researchers in Africa and other parts of the world accessible to the public, national and global policymakers, and other stakeholders. These articles are also republished by other media, making our work an important pillar of the media ecosystem.

It’s sometimes tough to gauge the true impact of the articles we publish. Replication by other news outlets – and readership on our site – help put numbers on their reach, but not how they might influence policy and opinion.

So it’s very gratifying when authors share stories that illustrate the ripple effect their articles have had. Here are some.

After the publication of her article on the pressures facing families that rely on social grants in South Africa, Nokukhanya Ndhlovu was invited by the country’s Public Protector to consult on hearings about child support and social assistance.

In Kenya, Joseph Ogutu’s analysis of a wildlife conservation policy fed directly into high-level discussions. The author was invited to make a presentation at an annual stakeholder meeting organised by the local governor’s office.

In west Africa, an article by Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood and Sayra van den Berg Bhagwandas on the central role women play in informal cross-border trade helped shift thinking among policymakers, helping gain broader recognition of women’s economic contributions. Following the article, the authors were invited to consult with policymakers at the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation.

Other stories demonstrate how impact can unfold through shifts in awareness and accountability. Coverage of issues ranging from social justice to agriculture have triggered consultations between researchers and policymakers, opening pathways for longer-term reform.

The impact of these articles, and thousands of others, is a reminder of why The Conversation Africa exists: to ensure that evidence informs debate, that African expertise shapes decisions, and that knowledge can help build better policy outcomes across the continent.

– The Conversation Africa: 11 years of impact
– https://theconversation.com/the-conversation-africa-11-years-of-impact-282317

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Sam Jones, Senior Research Fellow, World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), United Nations University

Mozambique is not in total crisis – but it is faltering. There has been no currency crash, no hyperinflation, no bank run. But over the past decade the main indicators of the country’s economic health have severely eroded.

An IMF assessment in early 2026 was remarkably blunt: public debt is unsustainably high, the external balance of payments is weak, and policy makers have limited options. Since then, tensions in the Middle East have further disrupted supply chains and dramatically raised global fuel prices. This is a major shock for small import-dependent economies, like Mozambique.

My analysis draws on over two decades of experience supporting economic research and policy analysis in the country. Currently, my work under the Inclusive Growth in Mozambique programme involves tracking the country’s economic performance through surveys of firms, students, and households.

The picture that emerges from this evidence is troubling. For ordinary Mozambicans, the deterioration in conditions over the past decade shows up in higher poverty, unreliable public services and a labour market that offers few decent opportunities – especially for the young.

My central argument is that muddling through is not a safe option. Without careful adjustments now and a deliberate shift toward growth and job creation outside extractives – the part of the economy that actually employs most Mozambicans – today’s pressures will keep building until a large economic correction becomes unavoidable and under far worse conditions.

A slow squeeze

The country’s present condition is one of vulnerable stagnation. Since the hidden debt crisis of 2016, real GDP growth outside the extractive sector has hovered around 2%, barely matching population growth. In per capita terms, the non-extractive economy has flatlined for a decade. Average real incomes outside mining and gas (or the public sector) have gone essentially nowhere.

Fiscal deficits of 4%-6% of GDP have been financed increasingly by domestic banks. But as both the IMF and World Bank have warned, that model is now reaching a breaking point. Banks can only absorb so much government debt before they run out of willingness – or capacity – to lend. When that happens, the government faces a choice between defaulting, printing money, or slashing spending abruptly. None is painless.

Evidence of these pressures is plain to see. Over a year ago, the global rating agency S&P classified local-currency debt as “selective default”. This is a formal determination that the government had failed to meet its obligations to domestic creditors on the original terms, even if it continued paying.

By late 2025, arrears had extended to short-term treasury bills – government IOUs that mature within months and are supposed to be the safest instruments in the domestic financial system. When a government struggles to repay even these, it signals serious fiscal distress.

On top of this, a decade of crisis management has displaced any serious thinking about growth. The government’s wage bill and debt service dominate spending, leaving chronic underinvestment in infrastructure, education, and agriculture. Schools and health facilities lack supplies, roads deteriorate, and social protection has weakened sharply.

Payments under the basic social subsidy programme have become highly irregular. Many elderly beneficiaries receive only a fraction of what they are owed. Poverty has increased, with around two thirds of the population now below the poverty line.

Demographic pressures are intensifying. Mozambique needs to absorb roughly 500,000 new labour market entrants annually by 2030, yet the formal sector generates a small fraction of new jobs. Informal work dominates and without a step-change in growth, it will only expand. Each year of stagnation adds another youth cohort to an already strained labour market. Delay does not preserve stability – it makes eventual adjustment larger and more costly.

The exchange rate question

The metical has been held stable against the US dollar since 2021, but in real terms it has appreciated by over 20%, eroding export competitiveness. Foreign exchange shortages are now pervasive. The parallel market premium reached around 14% by late 2025. Firms report severe and lengthening delays in accessing foreign exchange through formal channels.

The policy response has been administrative: raising exporter surrender requirements, tightening banks’ foreign exchange position limits, restricting overseas card usage. These measures treat symptoms, but the underlying misalignment only deepens.

The overvalued exchange rate functions as a tax on the non-resource economy. Recent fuel shortages and panic buying – driven in part by importers’ inability to secure foreign exchange and price uncertainty – provide a visible demonstration of the mounting costs.

The politics of adjustment

In practice, public sector employment has come to serve as a form of social protection for the urban middle class. Our research shows roughly half of all university graduates find employment in the public sector, and having a public sector job is one of the best predictors of not being poor.

The public sector wage bill underpins political legitimacy, which is why attempts to cut discretionary 13th-month salary payments were quickly reversed once key workers threatened to strike.

Exchange rate adjustment poses a parallel dilemma. A depreciation would raise the cost of imported food and fuel, hitting urban households directly, and any price increase would spark calls to hike minimum wages. With the memory of popular violence from the 2024 elections still fresh, there is a strong bias toward the status quo.

But as pressures mount, there is a growing risk of compounding distortions. So far the temptation has been to respond with new administrative controls, including import restrictions, tighter capital controls, and preferential credit allocation.

The ongoing handling of the fuel price shock illustrates the pattern. Rather than adjust pump prices promptly, the government has held prices fixed, leaving distributors to manage a mounting shortfall through supply rationing.

Each temporary fix may ease immediate pressures, but tends to deepen the underlying misalignment, push activity into informal channels, and narrow future options.

Feasible pathways

Path 1: Muddle through and wait for the gas. This is the current trajectory. Fiscal adjustment occurs passively, driven by financing constraints rather than strategy. The hope is that LNG revenues could materialise from the early 2030s. Mozambique’s Rovuma Basin holds an estimated 100 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas – among the largest discoveries globally in the past two decades. But only one offshore platform (Coral South) is currently producing. Even if the 2030 timeline holds, continued stagnation would further erode public services, weaken institutions, and deepen social frustration – and another general election must be managed. By the time resource revenues arrive, the state may lack the capacity and public trust to deploy them effectively.

Path 2: Gradual, growth-first adjustment. The most economically coherent path, though politically demanding. The central premise: restoring non-extractive growth must take priority, even at the cost of short-term macroeconomic discomfort. Key elements would include:

• a phased depreciation of the metical to restore competitiveness, supported by clear communication and strengthened social protection

• acceptance of temporarily higher inflation, with policy focused on preventing second-round effects rather than suppressing the initial price shift

• a fiscal framework centred on spending quality and revenue efficiency

• wage bill containment through hiring restraint, attrition, and systematic payroll audits to eliminate ghost workers and improper payments

• re-engagement with external partners under a credible IMF programme framework; and

• an evidence-based and financially viable medium-term growth strategy targeting agricultural productivity, labour-intensive exports and a predictable regulatory and macroeconomic environment.

Path 3: Forced correction. If external shocks bite deeper, a large adjustment may be imposed suddenly – involving disorderly exchange rate movement, abrupt fiscal contraction, and potential banking sector stress. The longer gradual adjustment is postponed, the higher this probability.

The narrow path

There is no easy option. Every adjustment has visible losers, while the benefits remain uncertain, delayed, and diffuse.

But one priority stands out: boosting growth beyond extractive sectors. Without it, fiscal consolidation is self-defeating, job creation will remain grossly inadequate, and social pressures will only intensify. Stabilisation pursued in isolation, or at the expense of growth, could be bad medicine.

This growth strategy must be grounded in data, evidence and honest debate. Mozambique has not lacked for projects or initiatives, but it has lacked consistent use of rigorous data to identify what drives productivity and job creation.

The window for a controlled, policy-driven adjustment is narrowing fast. The alternative is not stability. It is adjustment under far worse conditions, at higher cost.

– Mozambique’s economy is failing: the tough policy choices that need to be made urgently
– https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-economy-is-failing-the-tough-policy-choices-that-need-to-be-made-urgently-281679

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Irene Appeaning Addo, Associate Professor of African Architecture, University of Ghana

The call to prayer echoes across the neighbourhood as people congregate under the sweeping domes and tall minarets of Ghana’s National Mosque in Accra. For many, it is a place of faith, community and national pride. Yet, few pause to consider that this landmark – now firmly part of Accra’s skyline – was funded and built by Turkey.

This detail points to a bigger story. Some of Ghana’s most important public buildings are shaped by global relationships as much as local needs. And those relationships are not just economic; they are deeply political.

Therefore buildings are not just functional. They are powerful expressions of political power, used to describe and project ideas about hierarchy, state authority, solidarity and modernity.

As a result, architecture can be used to explore the identity and ideology of African states and international partners who choose to finance or donate new buildings to Africa featuring western architectural aesthetics.

I am a scholar of African architecture. I collaborated with scholars from different areas of expertise, including political scientists, on a project that studied the connection between architecture and power in Africa. From Ghana, two projects were used to illustrate international relations in architecture, highlighting the interplay of power and agency. One was the National Mosque and the other was the seat of Ghana’s government, Jubilee House, an edifice funded by the government of India.

Ghana and India’s ties can be traced to their co-founding of the Non-Aligned Movement. These were a group of states not formally aligned with major power blocs during the cold war. Ghana and Turkey’s relationship goes as far back as 1957. Turkey is one of the leading investors in Ghana’s economy.

Our work established that when a country finances and constructs a major building abroad, it leaves a visible and lasting imprint on another nation’s landscape. The building becomes part of everyday life while reflecting the influence of its external sponsor. These buildings normalise the presence of the sponsoring nation and are a constant reminder of its political interests.

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Read more: Ghana and India: Narendra Modi’s visit rekindles historical ties

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History written in buildings

Foreigners have been shaping Ghana’s built environment for centuries, from colonial forts along the coast to post-independence modernist projects designed by international architects.

Ghana’s architecture tells a layered story of power and exchange. During the colonial era, Europeans constructed forts and castles that dominated coastal landscapes. These were not just military structures; they were symbols of control and gateways to global trade networks, including the transatlantic slave trade. Sections of these buildings were later repurposed as schools, embedding education within spaces marked by violence and coercion.

This dual legacy highlights how architecture can carry multiple, often conflicting meanings over time.

After independence, Ghana sought to project a new national identity through modern architecture.

Foreign architects were commissioned to design housing, universities and civic buildings that would signal progress and global relevance. This moment reflected both aspiration and dependence: a desire to appear modern on the world stage, combined with reliance on external expertise and resources.

‘Soft power’

Today, Ghana continues to engage with global partners through architecture and infrastructure development. The National Mosque is one example. Backed by Turkey with the active involvement of Ghanaian Muslims, it represents both religious solidarity and diplomatic outreach underpinned by local agency.

Its scale, design and prominence make it a visible marker of Turkey’s presence in Ghana. The National Mosque Complex is modelled after the Ottoman-era Sultan Ahmed Mosque in Istanbul, Turkey. The national mosque in Accra features domes, semi-domes and arcaded porticos. These are the characteristics of Ottoman architecture, a predominant classical style for mosques in Turkey and the Islamic world.

Another example of political “gift” is Jubilee House, the seat of government. While financed and constructed with support from India, it incorporates the form of the Akan stool, a deeply significant symbol of authority in Ghanaian culture. This blending of external funding with local agency and symbolism shows that these projects are not simply imposed. They are shaped through negotiation.

Across the continent, similar patterns can be seen. China has funded major government buildings, including the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa and the Zimbabwe parliamentary complex. These projects are often described as “gifts”, but they also reflect strategic relationships and long-term influence. Political scientist Innocent Batsani-Ncube has illustrated how China’s large-scale investment in the Zimbabwe parliament is used as a proxy for its sustained activities in and around African parliamentary institutions.

Ghana’s case

It is easy to view foreign-funded infrastructure as purely beneficial, especially given Ghana’s development needs. But architecture is never neutral. Buildings embody power relationships in terms of the scale, materiality, the architectural features and the location in urban areas.

They reflect who has the resources to design, finance and construct, and whose ideas are ultimately realised in physical form. A mosque, a parliament or a presidential palace is not just a functional space; it is a statement about identity, legitimacy and global belonging of both the sponsor and the recipient country. In this sense, architecture becomes part of diplomacy. It is a way of making relationships visible – and durable.

Describing these projects simply as soft power, however, does not capture the full picture. Soft power theory often assumes that influence flows smoothly from powerful countries to less powerful ones.

Ghana’s experience suggests something more complex. Buildings cannot simply be “exported” like films or fashion. They are rooted in specific places, histories and communities. This creates friction.

For example, Ghana’s engagement with foreign-built projects often involves negotiation over design, symbolism and use. Local government officials, religious leaders and communities play a role in shaping outcomes.

In the case of the National Mosque, Ghanaian Muslim communities were not passive recipients. Their advocacy and social influence were crucial to the project’s realisation. Similarly, the incorporation of the Akan stool in Jubilee House reflects an effort to assert cultural identity. These examples show that foreign influence is most often mediated by local contexts.

Ghanaian actors’ agency in these processes has limits, however. Many decisions about large-scale projects are made by political elites. As a result, the interests reflected in these buildings may not represent the broader population.

These examples point to broader questions. Do foreign-funded buildings contribute to long-term development, or are they primarily symbolic? How can Ghana ensure that such projects reflect local priorities and needs? And what does it mean to build a national identity in a world shaped by global partnerships?

The links among soft power, public and cultural diplomacy, and development across the continent will continue to be subjects of research.

International relations scholars Joanne Tomkinson and Julia Gallagher contributed to the research that this article is derived from.

– What Ghana’s foreign-built landmarks tell us about its global relationships
– https://theconversation.com/what-ghanas-foreign-built-landmarks-tell-us-about-its-global-relationships-279603