Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olayinka Ajala, Associate professor in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett University

The precarious security situation in Mali took a turn for the worse in late April 2026. Well coordinated attacks targeted several cities and claimed the lives of the defence minister, Sadio Camara, and several Malian soldiers.

The events are a culmination of increased attacks over the past few years on the military and state institutions in Mali.

We have been researching insecurity and politics in west Africa and the Sahel for over a decade. We believe the recent attacks trace back to grievances expressed by Tuaregs that the current military regime has not addressed. The Tuaregs are nomadic Berber communities in northern Mali.

First is the inability or unwillingness to address Tuareg discontent. Their grievances centre on political autonomy, marginalisation, cultural recognition, resource control, security and perceived state neglect.

Second, the continuous use of force by the military against rebels in the northern regions without regard for the collateral damage. The Tuaregs have long contested the militarisation policies of successive Malian governments.

Third, the uneven distribution of resources, which keeps the northern region marginalised. These include northern Mali’s resources such as gold deposits, salt mines, grazing lands, and strategic trade corridors. Revenues from these sources remain controlled by the state’s centre based in the south.

Addressing resource marginalisation could have a number of benefits. It could temper Tuareg grievances, restore trust in the Malian state, and shift conflict incentives away from rebellion towards political inclusion, stability, and sustainable peace in northern Mali.

The breakdown

In April 2026 the jihadist group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) joined forces with ethnic Tuareg rebels from the northern Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) to attack several cities in the country recently.

This mirrors a similar attack in 2012 when the Tuareg and al-Qaeda-affiliated militants launched an offensive against the state. The Tuareg-dominated National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) attempted to secede and initiated a rebellion.

The MNLA is a Tuareg‑dominated separatist movement. Founded in 2011, it is mainly composed of ex-Libyan war returnees and northern Malian Tuaregs. The organisation had about 10,000 fighters at its peak in 2012.

Despite their numbers, they lacked the military power to hold the territory. As a result they aligned with Islamists Ansar Dine, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). Shortly after pushing back Malian forces in late 2012, the alliance disintegrated.

The Islamist groups were better armed and funded. They forced the secular separatists out of major towns like Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. The intervention of French forces in 2013 helped the Malian government regain most of the lost territories.

AQIM and its allies then moved into the mountains and surrounding desert areas. They shifted to guerrilla tactics, including suicide bombings and landmines.

The withdrawal of French forces in 2022 seems to have emboldened the Islamist militants. It removed counter‑terrorism pressure, disrupted intelligence and logistics and created a security vacuum amid weak Malian state capacity. This allowed Islamist groups to expand operations, recruit locally and regain territorial influence.

Lessons unlearnt

The largely popular military regime of Assimi Goita has failed to address the demands of Tuareg separatists. The Tuaregs have historically complained about exclusion from power by the southern dominated Malian state. Since the country’s independence in 1960, Tuareg leaders have argued that the structure of the Malian state does not reflect their political identity, economic interests and governance traditions. The demand for self-rule or autonomy has been suppressed, often by force.

More recently, increased drought, desertification and climate variability has devastated Tuareg pastoral livelihoods. These grievances pre-date Islamic insurgency and are fundamental in understanding the approach of the group.

The second unaddressed issue is that counterterrorism operations use force which creates collateral damage. Recent analysis shows that counterterrorism operations in northern and central Mali have resulted in large scale civilian harm, displacement and collective punishments. These have included arbitrary arrests and mass killings.

These factors have created conditions which Islamist groups have exploited for recruitment, territorial control and legitimacy.

The blame for this has been put on successive Malian regimes and previous French operations. This has been a key reason for France’s interventions being labelled as failures.

The third major driver of violence in Mali relates to the uneven distribution of resources. Since independence, public investment, infrastructure, social services and political attention have been heavily concentrated in the southern parts of the country.

Previous peace agreements have promised decentralisation, funding and integration of northern elites and ex-combatants. But implementation have been slow or nonexistent.

Is there a way forward?

The Tuareg question must be answered to reduce the tension between the regions of the country. It can be argued that Tuareg actors have twice miscalculated by entering arrangements with jihadist groups. But this does not diminish the need to address the structural inequalities and long-standing grievances underpinning Tuareg demands.

To achieve this, the Malian regime can copy the blueprint of former president Mahamadou Issoufou of Niger. Prior to his presidency, the Nigerien Tuaregs were similarly aggrieved. When he became president in 2011, he:

• integrated Tuareg elites and former rebels into state institutions

• decentralised state authority by allowing administrative and budgetary control at the regional level

• introduced disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes.

Issoufou also invested in infrastructural development in the areas that directly affected the Tuaregs. This included pastoralism, education and livelihood support. Water access in arid pastoral areas was improved. And connectivity and road safety was expanded.

Addressing the Tuareg agitations would reduce tensions in Mali.

– Mali attacks: Tuareg grievances hold the key to peace
– https://theconversation.com/mali-attacks-tuareg-grievances-hold-the-key-to-peace-281832

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tolu Olarewaju, Economist and Postgraduate Supervisor, University of Lancashire; Keele University

Nigerians have no reliable way of scrutinising the national budget. The citizen’s portal of the Nigerian Budget Office of the Federation is often offline, and when it is online, it is highly technical and difficult for ordinary citizens to understand.

Data on the Nigerian budget sourced elsewhere online is also frequently hard to find and incomplete. As a result, the Nigerian budget is treated like a government secret and Nigerian citizens are unable to effectively scrutinise the government’s income and expenditure decisions.

My research shows that this disrupts the social contract between the citizens and the government of Nigeria and creates an opportunity for corruption.

The World Justice Project estimates that corruption has cost the Nigerian economy more than US$550 billion since 1960. And a report by the accounting firm PwC shows that corruption in Nigeria could cost up to 37% of the nation’s GDP by 2030 if it’s not dealt with immediately.

I am an economist whose research focuses on poverty and corruption reduction. In a recent paper, I show how secrecy fuels corruption in the management of Nigeria’s finances. I set out how citizen monitoring and digital engagement can enhance transparency and accountability.

I also identify some obstacles to making this a reality in Nigeria. These include technical capacity limitations, weak enforcement mechanisms, and political resistance.

To overcome these challenges, the government must invest in digital infrastructure. Fostering civic engagement and independent oversight, too, can ensure sustained accountability and effective implementation.

Budgetary secrecy and corruption in Nigeria

The Open Budget Survey is produced by the International Budget Partnership. It provides the main global assessment of budget accountability in the world and evaluates:

• public participation: formal and meaningful opportunities for the public to engage in the national budget process

• oversight: institutions such as the legislature, national audit office and independent bodies

• transparency: comprehensive budget information, made available to the public in a timely and accessible manner.

Nigeria performed poorly in the 2023 survey. It scored 19/100 in public participation, 61/100 in oversight, and 31/100 in transparency. It ranked 92 out of 125 countries. This was below several African peers and the global average of 45.

This marks a decline from 2021. Nigeria scored higher then in public participation (26) and transparency (45), while oversight has remained unchanged.

The drop is largely due to the government’s failure to publish key fiscal reports on time. These include in-year reports and mid-year reviews.

The source of the problem

My research found that government budgetary secrecy and corruption in Nigeria have historical roots. They stem from the era of colonial taxation, when colonialists collected taxes but didn’t invest in the people’s wellbeing.

But these bad practices have intensified since independence. About 47% of Nigeria’s 232.68 million people live in multidimensional poverty. This is a clear sign that Nigeria is not spending its resources wisely. Development, job creation and service delivery are all lacking.

My research found that even when funds are budgeted, secrecy facilitates fraud in a number of ways.

The first way is through vaguely specified budgeted projects. Many projects are listed without quantity or location. They use terms like “empowerment and sensitisation” or “provision of infrastructure”.

Secondly, through the budgeting of non-beneficial initiatives. Nigeria’s approved federal budget for 2025 included US$1.5 billion for health, US$2.5 billion for education and US$1.7 billion for agriculture. However, a whopping US$17 billion was allocated for the presidency.

Thirdly, through inflated figures for budgeted items. For example, the purchase of a car for ₦375 million (US$278,000).

Fourth, through the under-delivery and abandonment of projects.

Nigeria’s budgetary corruption is reinforced by a complex three-tier system of budgeting at the federal, state, and local government levels.

• At the federal level, the budget is prepared by the executive (president and ministries). It is coordinated by the Budget Office, approved by the National Assembly, and enacted as the “Appropriation Act”. However, limited and delayed fiscal disclosures enable budget padding, vague allocations, and weak expenditure tracking.

• At the state level, budgets are prepared by governors and state ministries. They are approved by the State Houses of Assembly, focusing on state needs. However, inconsistent publication of budgets and reports at this level makes it difficult to monitor spending and creates room for misallocation.

• At the local level, budgets are prepared by local government officials. However, they are heavily influenced by state governments and approved by local councils. Here, a lack of financial autonomy and state control over funds leads to diversion, ghost projects, and minimal accountability to citizens.

The solution

The Nigerian government says it also has an Open Treasury Portal that provides transparency in its budgeting system. My research shows that this platform also suffers from technical glitches, incomplete data, and low enforcement.

BudgIT, a Nigerian civic technology organisation, uses data visualisation and storytelling to try to make the government budget more accessible to citizens, but its impact is also limited by insufficient data availability.

Advances in information technology make it possible for Nigeria to build a real-time online government budget system that the public can access and monitor. This would cover financial statements and reports across federal, state and local governments. Nigerians could also use a system like this to vote on projects the government should focus on.

South Korea has a similar model. Known as the Digital Budget and Accounting System (dBrain), it is a fully integrated system for budget planning, execution and monitoring of government finances across agencies in real time.

Another country, Georgia, has an e-budget transparency system. It provides real-time budget execution data and is integrated with the goverment’s e-procurement and treasury systems.

The US also has the USAspending.gov service, which tracks federal spending in real time and provides publicly accessible and searchable data on what the federal government spends.

Importantly, real-time online budget monitoring enables quick detection of corruption, but its effectiveness depends on clear and consistently enforced penalties.

What needs to be done

An online government budget system which the public could monitor would improve transparency and accountability in Nigeria. Technologies such as Enterprise Resource Planning systems and Integrated Financial Management Information systems enable real-time budget tracking and integrated financial management. Blockchain can further strengthen transparency through secure records. Also, cloud computing can improve accessibility and data security.

Data analytics and AI can enhance forecasting, automate monitoring, and improve decision-making. This would make budgeting more efficient, transparent and responsive.

The Nigeria Tax Administration Act has introduced a digital tax system requiring Nigerian taxpayers to keep accurate transaction records.

The Nigerian government aims to use this to improve efficiency, accuracy and transparency in its tax system. The government should implement a similar system for all its own financial transactions.

– Nigeria’s budget is treated like a government secret: how an online public monitoring system could fight corruption
– https://theconversation.com/nigerias-budget-is-treated-like-a-government-secret-how-an-online-public-monitoring-system-could-fight-corruption-280503

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Frank Quansah, Senior Lecturer, Educational Assessment, Measurement and Evaluation, University of Education, Winneba

Across Africa and beyond, education systems are shifting to curricula designed to build critical thinking and problem-solving skills.

Competency-based curricula put learners at the centre. They are meant to prepare students for a rapidly changing world, where success depends on the ability to adapt, think critically and solve complex problems.

Unlike traditional curricula, which often emphasise covering content and memorising facts, competency-based curricula focus on how students apply what they learn in real-world situations. For example, instead of simply recalling scientific definitions, students might be asked to use a concept to explain how diseases spread.

Much of the discussion around this shift in education has focused on familiar challenges, including teacher preparedness, availability of learning materials, and how faithfully the curriculum is implemented.

While these factors are important, they do not fully explain why reforms often fall short of their intended goals, particularly in improving how students learn and develop competencies.

In a recent study I co-authored, published in Discover Education, we reviewed evidence from different countries, including Ghana, Kenya and Vietnam, about what is undermining learner-centred education. We found that the main constraint to reforms in teaching is assessment systems. Teaching and testing systems are mismatched. While curricula promote skills like critical thinking and problem-solving, national exams want learners to memorise facts and follow routine procedures. So that’s what teachers concentrate on.

The misalignment is holding students back from success: being able to apply what they learn in real-world situations. This ability is essential for further education, employment and everyday decision-making.

Exams shape what counts

In our study, we set out to understand why learner-centred reforms, which are central to competency-based education, often fail to produce meaningful changes in classroom practice. We reviewed research and policy evidence from multiple countries across Africa, Asia and beyond, focusing on how national assessment systems interact with curriculum reforms.

We found a pattern: high-stakes exams do more than assess learning; they shape what teachers teach and what students focus on.

Our analysis shows that this creates a “double bind” for teachers. They are expected to promote critical thinking and problem-solving, while also preparing students for exams that reward recall and procedural accuracy. In practice, this often leads to surface-level reforms. New methods are introduced but teaching remains focused on memorisation.

In many African countries, examinations such as the West African Senior School Certificate Examination and Kenya’s National Secondary School Exams exert strong pressure on teachers.

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Read more: Ghana’s colonial past and assessment use means education prioritises passing exams over what students actually learn – this must change

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As a result, learning narrows to what can be tested. This limits the impact of reform.

In effect, exams become the real curriculum, regardless of what official documents say.

Rethinking what assessment does

The stakes are high.

If competency-based education is to succeed, assessment systems need to be rethought, not just adjusted at the margins.

This does not mean abandoning national exams. Rather, it means redefining what they are designed to measure.

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Read more: Should Kenya abolish all school exams? Expert sets out five reasons why they’re still useful

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Assessment should focus less on what students can recall and more on what they can do with what they know. This could include tasks that require analysis, problem-solving and application in real-world contexts.

It also means moving beyond a single high-stakes test. Combining national examinations with school-based assessments (such as projects or portfolios) can provide a more complete picture of learning.

The challenge is to do this in ways that remain fair, reliable and scalable across entire education systems.

A practical way forward

In our study, we propose a practical way to address this misalignment. We call it the LEARN model (Learner-centred assessment design; Evidence of competence; Adaptive to context; Reflective and feedback oriented; Nationally relevant and scalable). It offers a system-level framework for policymakers and education systems to redesign assessment so that it supports curriculum reforms.

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Read more: Ghana’s high school system sets many students up for failure: it needs a rethink

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The model is built around five ideas:

• designing assessments that reflect how students learn, using tasks that require applying knowledge rather than simple recall

• focusing on evidence of competence rather than recall, emphasising what students can do with what they know

• allowing flexibility to adapt to different classroom and national contexts

• integrating feedback into assessment so that it supports learning, instead of just measuring it

• ensuring that systems remain nationally relevant while still being practical to implement at scale.

The model shifts the focus from standardising test formats to aligning what is assessed with what matters.

Our model shows it is possible to balance two goals that are often seen as competing: maintaining national standards while supporting meaningful learning.

– What’s stopping kids from learning useful skills? Short answer: exams
– https://theconversation.com/whats-stopping-kids-from-learning-useful-skills-short-answer-exams-281652

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Federico Donelli, Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Trieste

India’s engagement in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea basin was, until recently, largely limited to UN peacekeeping operations and anti-piracy patrols.

Since the second half of the 1990s, India has participated in nearly all peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Anti-piracy efforts emerged between 2008 and 2014 as piracy off Somalia and the Gulf of Aden spread across a vast maritime space. This spanned east Africa and the wider Indian Ocean, bringing threats close to India’s shores.

Indian trade routes were exposed to new security risks, so a more sustained maritime posture was needed.

From the mid-2010s, therefore, India expanded its engagement in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin to secure shipping lanes linking it to global markets. At the same time, it sought to counter China’s growing naval presence along the western Indian Ocean coast, protect its diaspora and investments, and position itself as a regional security provider.

When Prime Minister Narendra Modi took office in 2014, this shift accelerated. India placed greater emphasis on proactive diplomacy, expanding high-level engagement, and trade and infrastructure links. It also pursued strategic coordination through bilateral agreements and naval exercises across west Asia and the adjoining African coastline.

India, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin

This evolution reflects India’s transition from a post-colonial, non-aligned actor to a more assertive power with ambitions outside the region. It is now Africa’s third-largest trading partner. Economic interdependence is growing alongside geostrategic interests.

Drawing on our work on international security in the western Indian Ocean and sub-Saharan Africa, we argue that over the past decade New Delhi has redefined the Indian Ocean as a protective buffer and a primary theatre of influence linking the Indo-Pacific to the Red Sea. The Horn of Africa lies at the heart of this connective space.

In 2023, India declared itself the Indian Ocean’s “net security provider”. It introduced a framework to strengthen regional security, deepen economic cooperation and address shared maritime challenges.

Today, with shipping routes being recalculated and governments reconsidering their strategic partnerships, India’s position is being put to an operational test.

The Horn is a space where legitimacy, delivery and endurance determine who remains relevant after the headlines fade. For the first time, India’s quiet advance is visible. Next, it will have to solidify its presence.

Why the Horn of Africa is important for India

An initiative called the 2025 Africa-India Key Maritime Engagement, co-hosted with Tanzania, positions India as a security partner for African nations, particularly those along the Indian Ocean rim.

India is also involved in development and investment projects in the region. These include agricultural efforts to improve food security, infrastructure projects, and technical assistance in education and health. It also provides humanitarian assistance in Somalia, Kenya and Djibouti.

What distinguishes the past decade is the effort to align these activities within a broader strategic narrative – one that presents India as a partner offering technology and development without debt concerns or political conditions.

This narrative is attractive to local governments in the Horn. But it also creates a test: India must show that it can deliver consistently.

Ethiopia has an important role for India. It hosts the African Union, functions as a diplomatic centre and offers an entry point into African multilateral politics.

Somalia also matters. It sits close to critical sea lanes and is central to the security of the Gulf of Aden. External actors there can convert security assistance into political access.

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Read more: China’s military support for Somalia is on the rise – what Taiwan and Somaliland have to do with it

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India’s interest in Somalia and Somaliland has taken on a geo-economic dimension. Indian firms are focusing on gold and mineral resources, particularly in eastern Somaliland.

Although still limited in scale, this shift signals that India’s footprint in the Horn is no longer confined to security and development assistance. It is intersecting with resource access and supply chain strategies.

The competition

The corridor of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean has become a crowded arena for external powers over the past two decades.

Great powers have seen countries in the region as a platform for counterterrorism and naval reach. Small and middle powers (like Turkey, Iran and Gulf states) have sought to secure influence through ports, training missions, arms transfers, commercial access and selective mediation.

The result is a dense environment. Almost every external actor offers a package of security, finance, technology and diplomacy. Fragile local governments hedge among them.

India’s challenge is to deliver consistently through:

• creating defence and security training pipelines

• project delivery

• stable financing instruments

• sustained bureaucratic attention.

If India’s Africa policy is maritime-led, then things like naval exercises, information-sharing, coast guard cooperation and institutional training must become regular and visible.

If the strategy is also developmental and technological, then India must deliver flagship projects in digital infrastructure, health and agriculture.

From quiet influence to lasting power

India faces three constraints in growing its influence in the Horn of Africa.

1. Limited military capacity

India’s naval capabilities do not match the scale of China’s fleet or America’s technological edge and operational depth. This gap is not fatal if India’s aim is durable influence through partnership. It does mean that India’s leverage will depend on institutional cooperation and coalition-building.

2. Competitive density

The Horn’s architecture is made of foreign bases, port diplomacy and overlapping rivalries. India’s advantage is that it’s not overwhelmingly intrusive. But it could become just one more actor among many.

3. Institutionalisation

If India’s engagement depends too heavily on leader-level attention, it will remain vulnerable to distraction. Durable influence requires bureaucratic routines and financing mechanisms. It must survive political cycles and shifting crises. Ethiopia is a test case. High-level roadmaps will have to turn into visible digital infrastructure, health systems and agricultural support.

The broader point is that the Horn is not an empty theatre waiting for India to arrive.

– India’s Horn of Africa strategy has shifted: what it’s trying to do and how it could work
– https://theconversation.com/indias-horn-of-africa-strategy-has-shifted-what-its-trying-to-do-and-how-it-could-work-281252

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Stephanie Allais, Faculty member, Centre for Researching Education and Labour, University of the Witwatersrand

South Africa’s 50 public technical and vocational education and training (TVET) colleges are, in the main, struggling institutions.

In many, throughput rates – how many students qualify in the expected time – are low. Some lecturers are under-qualified and under-resourced. Relationships with employers, which are crucial for the type of training that these colleges offer, are uneven.

Colleges are hard pressed to provide training to young people with weak schooling behind them and no clear path to employment ahead. The youth unemployment rate is almost 44%.

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Read more: Life after school for young South Africans: six insights into what lies ahead

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The response to problems in the sector has been reform: rename the colleges, restructure them, give them new governance models, new qualification types, new funding arrangements. Over 30 years of democracy, South Africa has done all of these things, repeatedly. It has not worked.

And now there’s another round of changes being rolled out. There is little clearly documented explanation of what the new system is and how it will work in practice. But colleges have been instructed that most current qualification offerings will be phased out and replaced by new “occupational” qualifications.

In 2024 I wrote a paper tracing the history of the technical and vocational training sector, drawing on published literature, my research on skills development and my own involvement in South Africa’s education and training policy processes. The paper sets out why the sector is not working and what it needs to succeed.

In my view, based on the history of the sector, there is a serious risk that the latest reforms will make things worse.

Thirty years of the same mistake

South Africa’s policy vision and funding model for TVET colleges has, like that of many other countries, been to base funding on student enrolment for programmes that are linked to employer demand. It assumes colleges will respond to what employers want, and channel young people into jobs.

It has a long and largely unsuccessful track record, with problems in many countries – most extensively documented in Australia and the UK, the originators of the broad policy model.

The problem is structural. Funding institutions only through enrolments in specific programmes provides no institutional stability. It creates no incentive to invest in equipment, lecturers, or long-term relationships with employers. It treats colleges as if they were competing as private training providers.

When the programmes that attract funded enrolments change – as they do, repeatedly – colleges are left with stranded staff, obsolete equipment, and no financial buffer. And when new funding is made available, for new programmes, they don’t have lecturers who can teach them.

Private institutions tend not to offer manufacturing-related programmes – those are expensive. They focus on business-related programmes, which are cheaper.

Consider the National Technical Education Diploma (Nated) qualifications, the government-funded programmes that colleges have provided for decades. First, they were to be phased out. Then, when the National Development Plan created TVET enrolment targets, colleges were told to expand them. Colleges have built up staffing around them and enrolled students in them.

Now, the Department of Higher Education and Training has instructed colleges to phase them out. What replaces them are “occupational qualifications”.

The occupational qualifications problem

The department defines an occupation as

a set of jobs whose main tasks and duties are characterised by a high degree of similarity (skill specialisation).

The theory behind occupational qualifications is sound: link qualifications to specific occupations, make workplace experience part of the qualification, and graduates will have credentials that employers recognise and value.

The framework has thousands of occupations.

The problem – and here is where our new research (not yet published online) is indicating an uncomfortable finding – is that many of the “occupations” to which these new qualifications are linked do not really exist in workplaces and labour markets. And there is little publicly available information about them.

Some “occupations” have special skills that need special training, and others are really just jobs.

For example, in our research (not yet online) across 53 food and beverage manufacturing plants, we found that there are artisan trades like millwrighting, fitting and turning, and electrical work which fit the idea of an occupation. But machine operators don’t fit that description. Yet machine operators are among the new qualifications to be offered. The employers we visited don’t need those qualifications. They would rather hire someone they can train themselves, to use the equipment in their plant.

Training in a “knowledge module” like “personal mastery and interpersonal relationships” is not specific to the “occupation” of operating a machine.

You cannot create an occupation by developing a qualification for it. It works the other way: the occupation must exist before you create a qualification for it.

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Read more: Jobs of the future: South Africa has major gaps in skills needed to shape the green economy

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This is not an abstract concern. Colleges are now being instructed to gain accreditation to offer these qualifications, to hire staff to teach them, to find workplace placements for students doing them – all on the assumption that there is a real occupational destination at the end.

For artisans, this assumption holds: there are real occupations that translate to opportunities in the workplace. But for the majority of new occupational qualifications being developed, far more analysis is needed.

What institutions actually need

Colleges cannot become strong institutions through enrolment-driven funding alone, any more than a school can become strong by being paid per pupil with no base funding for teachers or classrooms. And calling qualifications “occupational” does not mean that they will lead to work where there is no meaningful occupation in labour markets or workplaces.

Institutions need a stable core – employed lecturers, maintained equipment, administrative capacity – that allows them to function as institutions rather than as collections of projects cobbled together from different funding streams.

Some of them may be better off offering second-chance matric (secondary school leaving certificate) programmes instead of narrowly focused programmes where there are few real opportunities for employment in the surrounding areas, and no way colleges can find work placements for their learners.

Pockets of genuine excellence exist in the current system: colleges with good employer relationships and real employment outcomes for graduates. What they have in common is principled management, experienced staff, and enough stability to build relationships over time. The system should be trying to replicate those conditions.

In my view, what needs to happen is this:

• colleges should be funded with a core institutional grant, and enabled to provide a mix of training that reflects their local economic contexts

• occupational qualifications should be rolled out only where employers need them.

Otherwise the latest reforms risk repeating the errors of the past 30 years. Colleges and young people deserve better than that.

– Reforms to South Africa’s technical colleges keep failing students and employers: why?
– https://theconversation.com/reforms-to-south-africas-technical-colleges-keep-failing-students-and-employers-why-278711

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ikechukwu (Ike) Nwaka, Assistant Lecturer, Business Economics, University of Alberta

Nigerian women of working age are mostly (90%) self-employed. By comparison, self-employment accounts for less than 16% of employment in high-income countries such as the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom. It is far lower in middle-income countries like South Africa and Turkey too.

Official statistics show that self-employment in Nigeria is concentrated in the northern regions. And there’s a gender difference: women make up the majority of those working for themselves (Figure 1).

What these numbers do not explain is why women are far more likely than men to operate businesses from their homes, or whether those businesses generate meaningful economic returns.

As economists working on labour, gender, energy and development, we addressed these questions in a recent paper.

Using nationally representative household data from 2010 to 2019, the study examines why Nigerian women run enterprises from their homes. These kinds of operations include selling goods from a front room, preparing food at home, or offering haircuts, beauty services, laundry and dry cleaning, and shoe repair. They also make textiles, crafts, garments, shoes and cosmetics at home rather than in shops, kiosks or workshops.

The findings challenge the idea that home-based self-employment is mainly about personal preference or flexibility.

Childcare responsibilities, housing access, electricity and cultural norms strongly shape women’s work location. These insights reveal that supporting women in business must go beyond training or microfinance, and remove structural barriers.

Childcare limits women’s workplaces

We first identified factors associated with operating home-based businesses, using data (2010-2019) from national surveys that follow the same households over time.

We then examined how individual, household and contextual factors shape the likelihood of operating a business from home. We found that childcare was the strongest factor influencing women’s choice of work location.

The presence of young children doesn’t much affect where men work. For women, however, having young children makes it more likely they will run a business from home.

In Nigeria, women shoulder most of the unpaid domestic labour, including childcare, cooking and cleaning. Home-based businesses allow women to earn income while doing that labour.

For many women, home-based work may not be the most attractive option. Rather, the patterns we saw in the data suggest that it’s a way to reconcile income-earning with unpaid domestic responsibilities. Other research into women’s experiences has also shown that working from home may be a necessity rather than a choice.

Why home ownership doesn’t benefit women equally

Homeowners who operate home-based enterprises are better positioned to use property as collateral, access credit, expand workspace, or invest in equipment. They are able to turn housing into productive capital.

However, these advantages are not equally accessible to women.

Only 8.2% of women aged 20-49 are sole owners of land, compared with 34.2% of men, according to World Bank research into gender disparities in property ownership in sub-Saharan Africa.

The Nigerian constitution grants women equal rights to own, inherit and manage property. But many face legal, financial and social barriers that limit their actual control over assets.

Even in owner-occupied households, customary and patriarchal practices can mean that ownership doesn’t translate into decision-making power. Consequently, the same asset generates different economic returns for men and women. It confines women to lower-return home-based activities.

We found that 67% of female homeowners operate home-based enterprises compared with 33% of male owners. Most men who own homes work away from home.

Geography and social norms matter

We found that home-based enterprises are concentrated in poorer regions where returns are low, particularly in northern Nigeria, as shown in figure 2.

Even after accounting for income and education, women in northern Nigeria are far more likely to run businesses from home than women in the south. Cultural and religious norms that restrict women’s mobility and public participation probably play a central role.

This complicates global policy narratives that frame home-based work as inherently empowering. In Nigeria, it often reflects the need to juggle paid work with household obligations under restrictive conditions. These businesses tend to cluster in low-entry sectors, offer limited skill development, and have little growth potential.

Education helps, but only up to a point

Education and household income do expand women’s options, but their effects are limited. Our study shows that better-educated women are less likely than equally educated men to remain in home-based businesses when alternatives are available.

As household income rises, women are also less likely to operate enterprises from home. Importantly, observable characteristics do not explain the full gender gap. The study finds that less than half of the difference in home-based self-employment can be attributed to education, household size, marital status and housing. The rest likely reflects deeper structural forces that shape outcomes differently for men and women. These are forces like social norms, unequal access to finance, gendered returns to assets, and expectations around unpaid care work.

What this means for policy

Promoting home-based self-employment as a route to women’s economic empowerment can be misleading. When women are pushed into home-based enterprises because childcare is expensive, institutions and property rights are weak, or finance is inaccessible, entrepreneurship becomes a response to constraint, not opportunity.

Policies that reduce childcare costs, strengthen women’s property and inheritance rights, and improve access to credit are likely to do more to expand women’s choices than entrepreneurship programmes alone.

Digital infrastructure can help some home-based businesses reach wider markets, but only if deeper barriers are addressed. And because constraints vary across regions, one-size-fits-all solutions are unlikely to work.

More than flexibility

Home-based self-employment in Nigeria reflects deeply gendered expectations about work and care. Many women work from home not to assert independence, but because they have limited options.

Recognising this distinction matters. Celebrating women’s “flexibility” without addressing the constraints behind it risks turning resilience into a permanent requirement. A more equal future is one in which women can choose where and how they work, rather than adjusting their livelihoods around structural barriers.

– Working from home in Nigeria: study finds women don’t have much choice
– https://theconversation.com/working-from-home-in-nigeria-study-finds-women-dont-have-much-choice-274792

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Norman Sempijja, Associate professor, Université Mohammed VI Polytechnique

Mali has been in a state of political turmoil since 2012. That year saw a military coup as well as armed groups taking over northern regions of the west African country. In the intervening years, efforts at establishing transitional governments have failed, culminating in the military junta dissolving and banning all political parties in May 2025.

In addition, the country has seen waves of military interventions by outside players like France, the US and most recently Russia. All have invested heavily in trying to contain the extremist threat in Mali.

But groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have continued to expand their influence. And in late April 2026 the military government found itself having to fend off coordinated attacks from separatists and jihadists across the country. The defence minister, General Sadio Camara, was killed.

Foreign interventions over the past decade have often misunderstood what was happening on the ground. Extremist groups have capitalised on issues such as land disputes, corruption, and resource competition to gain legitimacy, often aligning with the community’s tensions. The weakness of state institutions and security forces has allowed groups such as Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) to consolidate power.

These groups have adapted by forming alliances and tailoring their narratives to local grievances, prioritising immediate issues over ideological objectives.

We are political scientists who have researched the security situation in Mali and the Sahel. Our recently published paper showed that non-state armed groups in the Sahel, particularly in Mali, have emerged as key power brokers, shaping local governance by filling gaps left by weak state institutions.

While external actors such as France, the US and Russia have prioritised counter-terrorism and state-building, they often overlook the governance functions of non-state armed groups. These groups often provide essential services and gain local legitimacy.

Recognising the role of armed groups as local power holders does not mean accepting or legitimising their actions. However, ignoring this reality has led to policies that miss the mark. When interventions focus only on military solutions, they risk misunderstanding why people interact with these groups in the first place.

Our findings challenge conventional interventions that focus solely on defeating non-state armed groups or reinstating centralised state control. We argue that security solutions alone are insufficient. We advocate for a more nuanced approach that integrates the potential for non-state armed groups when it comes to governance, legitimacy and local agency. Non-state armed groups have provided governance over territories in countries like Colombia, Syria and South Sudan, among others.

Armed groups as de facto authorities

Armed groups in Mali are not just fighting forces. In many parts of the country, they play a more complex role. It is difficult to estimate the exact number of groups operating within Mali. The largest and best known, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen, is a coalition of five organisations and claims to have over 10,000 fighters in the country.

In central and northern Mali, bordering Algeria, the state is often distant, absent or mistrusted. Armed groups step into this vacuum. They settle disputes, enforce rules, collect taxes, and sometimes provide a basic sense of order.

For communities living with daily insecurity, these functions are not abstract; they shape everyday life.

Our study established that this does not necessarily mean the population agrees with these groups or supports their ideology. Many do not. However, when there are few alternatives, people adapt. They follow the rules because they need to survive, not because they believe in them.

This distinction is important. This helps explain why these groups are so difficult to dislodge. Their strength does not come only from weapons but also from how deeply they are embedded in local realities.

Why military strategies fall short

International efforts have largely focused on fighting these groups and rebuilding the authority of the Malian state. Although well intentioned, these kinds of interventions often overlook something essential: what happens to the spaces these groups leave behind?

An example is France’s 2013 intervention. The French army helped the Malian army to regain control of the northern part of the country from advancing Islamists during Operation Serval. The aim was to stop extremist forces from advancing to Bamako. This did not end the conflict. Many fighters moved to rural areas where the state had little presence and built ties with local communities.

In central Mali, where cattle farming is a key source of income, this dynamic contributed to the spread of violence between Fulani and Dogon communities, reinforcing grievances exploited by extremist groups.

Simultaneously, attempts to strengthen state institutions have struggled. In some places, security forces are seen as ineffective and even abusive.

Faced with this reality, people often turn to whoever can offer some level of predictability and protection, even if that actor is an armed group.

External involvement has also become increasingly fragmented. France’s withdrawal, rising anti-western sentiment, and the arrival of Russian-linked forces have created a crowded and sometimes conflicting intervention landscape.

Different actors bring different agendas, and their presence does not always translate into greater security. In some cases, it can even worsen things by reinforcing tensions or weakening trust in already fragile institutions.

Caught in the middle, civilians make difficult choices daily. Their decisions are rarely ideological but rather about survival.

Rethinking the response

We conclude from our findings that a more grounded approach would begin by listening to local realities. It would address the gaps that allow armed groups to take root. This means improving access to justice and security, supporting local institutions, and taking grievances seriously. It also means recognising that legitimacy is built from the ground up, not imposed from above.

Mali’s experience shows that there are clear limits to what military force can achieve on its own. As long as interventions overlook the everyday realities of governance and survival, they are unlikely to bring about lasting change. Until that shift happens, armed groups will remain hard to dislodge, not only because they can fight but also because, in many places, they have become part of how life is organised.

– Mali’s armed groups fill a government vacuum – addressing this is key to ending the violence
– https://theconversation.com/malis-armed-groups-fill-a-government-vacuum-addressing-this-is-key-to-ending-the-violence-281648

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Joshua Kumbani, Postdoctoral fellow, University of Tübingen

Rock paintings are found throughout Zimbabwe. They were made during the last 10,000 years by hunter gatherer groups and later by farming communities.

These came to the attention of the ERC Artsoundscapes project, based in Spain, in 2021. The project brings together experts in archaeology, ethnography, psychology and acoustic engineering to explore how humans understood sound in prehistoric times. Our team has studied some of the rock art of South Africa in which dance scenes are depicted, and we have begun work on documenting and analysing similar rock art in Zimbabwe.

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Read more: Dance scenes in South African rock art: a closer look at ritual, music and movement

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Zimbabwe’s rock paintings are concentrated in the country’s eastern provinces, which is where we’ve focused so far. More can be found in the Matobo World Heritage Cultural Landscape in Matabeleland South, which will be the focus of future study.

We have published an article describing dance scenes in this rock art and comparing them with information from ethnographic sources to understand what kinds of dances they depict. The ethnographic research was done by anthropologists and focused on hunter gatherer groups in the broader southern African region (Botswana and Namibia).

We found that all the kinds of dances that have been described in living cultures – dances for ritual, entertainment or special circumstances – are depicted in Zimbabwe’s rock art. But ritual is a central theme.

This points to the need to refine our classification of rock art scenes. We’ve been using features like the body posture of depicted figures to classify a scene as a dance. But ritual dances often involve going into a trance state – and this alters a person’s ability to control their body, move in synchrony with other people and follow “rules” of a dance. Therefore, it may be necessary to reconsider whether some rock art scenes in Zimbabwe, and in the whole of southern Africa, depict dances or not.

Here we will discuss some examples of the rock art in Zimbabwe and explain how we categorised them.

Analytical method

We reviewed published works by archaeology researchers such as the late Peter Garlake and university professor Ancila Nhamo. We also used online resources, including the British Museum online collection by rock art photographer and author David Coulson, which features rock art from Zimbabwe and other southern African countries.

Our inquiry aimed to determine whether all dances that have been recognised ethnographically, in living people, in Zimbabwe as well as in other countries of southern Africa, are also represented in Zimbabwe’s rock art.

We analysed the scenes by applying six attributes that have proved useful in studies in other parts of the world, such as the Middle East and the western Mediterranean. The attributes are divided into those related to the dancers themselves and those related to the type of dance. They are:

• dancers’ body posture (including bent figures, outstretched arms and flexed legs)

• items they hold, such as sticks, rattles, or headgear

• interaction between dancers

• evidence of synchrony

• direction of movement

• gender of the figures represented.

Dance scenes in Zimbabwe rock art

Using these attributes, we can say that a scene such as this one found at Lake Chivero is a dance because it has several men all wearing aprons, displaying the same body posture, and positioned in synchrony with outstretched arms.

Yet, in other scenes we encountered unexpected problems with the second group of attributes (type of dance). Those were designed to analyse dance scenes in other parts of the world with different belief systems. But they are not always valid when dancers engage in trance dances.

One example of this type of scene that does not follow the norm is found at a site called Chivhu. A series of therianthropes (figures with both human and animal features) were painted associated with a large snake bearing two animal heads. In the scene we analysed there, the interaction between dancers is irregular, their movements are not synchronised, and the direction of the dance is not homogeneous, as would be expected in a regular dance. But regular interaction, synchronisation and uniform direction are simply not possible when dancers are in an altered state of consciousness. So, this scene might not look like a dance but it probably is one, based on what we know from studies of living people in cultures associated with the makers of the rock art.

Other dances recognised ethnographically as being of ritual character are initiation dances. An example of a dancing scene which may indicate a boys’ initiation dance can be found at a rocky outcrop in Glen Norah, Harare. American anthropologist Lorna Marshall, who undertook fieldwork among the !Kung people of the Kalahari Desert in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, described how the !Kung boys from Nyae Nyae in Namibia in the 1950s sometimes bent their upper bodies into an almost right-angle posture while dancing. The dancers in the painted scene are accompanied by other men who are not participating in the dance. These kinds of initiation dances are not documented or practised in Zimbabwe, however. So although the painted scene looks like an initiation dance, it probably isn’t one.

Rock art may also depict eland dances, the girls’ initiation dance. For example, dancing scenes depicting only women that may be interpreted as eland dances are found in Chipinge and Mudadi in Zimbabwe’s Chivi district.

The Makonde dance from Mashonaland West, which features more than 30 performers, is not easy to interpret. It is not clear whether this represents a large dance scene or if the dancers can be divided into different groups. Some individuals are clapping, while others are dancing, which may indicate the presence of trance dancers (group labelled b). Additionally, there are female dancers with tufts on their legs and wearing back aprons (group labelled a). These could be dancing for entertainment, because in reality for an eland dance (a ritual) they would probably remove the aprons.

Categorising certain dances can be challenging, and some may have been performed purely for entertainment purposes. For example, there is a dancing scene at Charewa that depicts women, men, and possibly children participating. We propose that this could represent an entertainment dance or a dance in some particular circumstance where everyone joined in.

Other elements emerging from the analysis of the dance scenes found in Zimbabwean rock art include the presence of musical instruments and a variety of artefacts associated with the dancers. Hand rattles frequently appear in dancing scenes and have been recognised as the most depicted musical instruments in Zimbabwean rock art, as we’ve discussed in an article about musical instrument representations.

Dancers are sometimes depicted with dancing sticks or other accessories, not only rattles. For instance, some figures appear to be holding round discs that are difficult to identify at Chikupu.

Moreover, dancers may be adorned with beads, as observed at Charewa Panel 2, and often wear distinctive headgear, typically resembling antennae, which may symbolise feathers as described in ethnographic accounts.

It’s important to accurately identify and describe these scenes. Our analysis highlights the valuable information that can be gleaned from close examination of the depictions, as well as from the use of ethnohistorical sources related to dance.

– Rock art, dance and ritual: what we learned from paintings in Zimbabwe
– https://theconversation.com/rock-art-dance-and-ritual-what-we-learned-from-paintings-in-zimbabwe-279266

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Narcisse Martial Yèdji, Sociologue politiste et enseignant-chercheur, University d’Abomey-Calavi de Bénin

Romuald Wadagni won the 2026 presidential election in Benin with over 94% of the vote. Wadagni, 50, is a technocrat who became an influential finance minister under Patrice Talon from 2016 until his election.

The Beninese political system is a pluralist democracy organised around a presidential system, with regular elections and political alternation. It is also characterised by a strict institutional framework governing electoral competition, particularly since recent reforms.

The outcome raises questions about the current dynamics of Benin’s political system. How should the 2026 presidential results be interpreted in a context marked by reforms to the party system and the electoral framework? Political sociologist Narcisse M. Yèdji offers some insights.

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How do you interpret the 94% result?

With the current national political climate, the landslide victory raises several questions. At first glance, the results suggest very strong support for the presidential majority. Statistically, this means a very low dispersion of votes between the two competing duos: the winning ticket formed by Romuald Wadagni and Mariam Chabi Talata, and the one formed by Paul Hounkpè and Rock Judicaël Hounwanou. More broadly, such a scenario is typical of electoral contexts where the opposition plays only a formal role and has no real chance of winning.

That said, the enormous margin between the two main candidates may also reflect strong support for the winning pair, giving the impression of a broad consensus in their favour.

Clearly, recent changes introduced to the country’s party system and the electoral code have tilted the balance in favour of the ruling party. Such a victory was predictable. The margin, however, was not.

A comparison with the 2021 presidential election places the 2026 result in a broader perspective. The 2021 election was won by Patrice Talon with 86% of the vote. The race was slightly more open. It involved a larger number of candidates: three pairs in total.

The statements are not contradictory. In a context where the political offer is restricted, voters have several options: either to stay at home, or to cast a default vote. Therefore, the 94% may reflect strong popular support. Or, given the limited set of choices, it may reflect the option of a default vote. The 2026 landslide victory can thus be read as a reflection of growing electoral support for the incumbent administration.

The latest complete overhaul of the rules of political competition left voters without meaningful and credible alternatives, thereby increasing the likelihood of people voting by default.

However, what might appear to be a gradual consolidation of electoral support for the ruling party could, in fact, be the effect of these reforms. The endorsement system, in particular, has played a key role in shaping how votes are distributed. It is a system that requires any presidential candidate to obtain the formal support of a certain number of elected officials (members of parliament or mayors) in order to be eligible to run. The threshold, initially set at 10% (16 endorsements), was raised to 15% in 2024 (28 endorsements), making it harder for the main opposition party to enter the race, as it was unable to secure the required number of endorsements.

It is therefore misleading to view the presidential ticket’s success as mere coincidence. A more realistic reading points to a long-matured political project, executed with cold calculation by those in power.

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Read more: Présidentielle au Bénin : comment les réformes politiques sous Patrice Talon ont remodelé la compétition électorale

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There are two issues at stake. First, avoiding any risk of retaliation from a resentful successor. The long siege of more than 50 days imposed by security forces on former president Thomas Boni Yayi’s residence after the controversial 2019 legislative election lends weight to this argument. Second, to enable reforms and economic transformation projects to continue, while reducing political uncertainty.

In 2025, Talon had, in fact, hinted at his wish to pass the baton to a successor who would “not undo” his reform programme.

From this perspective, Wadagni’s success is no accident. It is the planned outcome of political system designed to ensure its own continuity.

How do you interpret the voter turnout?

A comparison with previous presidential elections highlights a mixed trend in voter turnout. The 2026 turnout was 63.57%. That is higher than 2021’s 50.17% turnout. However, civil society disputes that 2021 figure, claiming it was actually 26.47%. These turnout rates (for the 2021 and 2026 presidential runs) contrast sharply with recent legislative elections. Turnout was 27.12% in 2019; 38.66% in 2023; 36.74% in 2026.

This contrast reveals a hierarchy among elections. Presidental elections draw stronger turnout, even without real electoral options. For many citizens, electing the head of state is a central political moment.

However, the higher turnout for 2026 (63.57%) should not be interpreted as a revival of political interest. Voter participation has steadily declined since 2006. It averaged at 74.85% in 2006 and 84.82% in 2011.

There is another important reading from the 2026 presidential elections. The relatively high voter turnout of 63.57% happened at the same time as the electoral choices narrowed. In other words, turnout does not appear to be conditioned by the perception of effective pluralism in the electoral process.

Ultimately, these changes reflect how citizens relate to elections. Presidential votes still hold some appeal. Yet, the broader electoral trend remains one of growing abstention and mistrust.

This trend can clearly be linked to a limited belief in the effectiveness of the voting process. It may also stem from a narrower range of electoral choices. If a restricted political offer appears not to affect electoral participation, this does not imply that those who went to vote fully trust the electoral process.

It is entirely possible to be distrustful of the system while still voting, especially when abstention is not perceived as the best option.

Finally, it may be indicative of shifting social expectations regarding political representation.

What are the main challenges facing the new president?

Several challenges await the new president. The first is political legitimacy. Many see his term as a direct continuation of Talon’s rule. For them, Wadagni is his designated successor.

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Read more: Au Bénin, le bilan de Patrice Talon à l’épreuve des élections législatives

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From this perspective, the new president appears to be both heir and hostage. He inherits the previous administration’s achievements. But he also inherits its liabilities. This raises a central question: can he build an independent authority of his own?

The central challenge of his term, therefore, is to distance himself from this divisive political legacy. He must build an image as an independent president. Wadagni has stated that his predecessor would “step aside” if he wins. But, doubts remain about whether this promised distance will become reality.

On the institutional front, the new president inherits a fragile executive branch. Parliament owes full allegiance to Talon. The Senate could also limit his room for action.

From the first challenge stems the second: restoring trust between politics and people. The outgoing president will sit in the Senate and is likely to remain, for years to come, one of the country’s most influential political figures. Meeting this challenge will undoubtedly depend on how the public will perceive Talon’s influence on government affairs from within the Senate.

Restoring trust between the political sphere and the people means winning back voters who have walked away from electoral processes. This will require credible actions that must prove renewed approach to governance.

The legitimacy of the new president’s policies may depend on this effort.

Beyond that, the deepest challenge might be national reconciliation. Recent political dynamics such as the electoral reforms appear to have contributed to deepening divisions among Beninese citizens. To ensure long term stability, the new president will need to take credible actions to ease tensions and rebuild social cohesion.

For this to happen, strong actions are expected quickly after his inauguration, especially on highly sensitive issues:

• security issues in the northern border regions exposed to terrorist threats

• economic and social issues, including the cost of living, improving purchasing power, youth employment, and reducing wage inequalities

• political and institutional issues, including “political prisoners”, exiles, and those in similar situations; easing the tax burden; and rebuilding public trust in institutions.

Amid the profound political and institutional changes underway, Wadagni’s ability to meet all these expectations will shape his legitimacy. It will also determine the overall success of his seven-year term.

– Benin election: Wadagni’s landslide win raises questions about his legitimacy
– https://theconversation.com/benin-election-wadagnis-landslide-win-raises-questions-about-his-legitimacy-281005

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Andrew McKechnie, Professor of Zoology and South African Research Chair-holder, University of Pretoria

Humans are not the only species negatively affected by increasingly hot and humid conditions. Intense heatwaves sometimes kill large numbers of wild animals. Eastern Australia’s giant fruit bats, known as flying-foxes, provide possibly the most dramatic illustration. In late 2018, two days of extreme heat in the far north of Queensland wiped out one third of Australia’s population of spectacled flying-foxes. The species is now red-listed as endangered.

Bat biologists have identified high humidity as a major risk factor for these mass mortality events.

In late 2020, South Africa saw its first documented heat-related mass mortality event involving wild birds. Air temperatures in the typically humid Phongolo Nature Reserve in northern KwaZulu-Natal exceeded 45°C, about 10°C higher than average conditions. Staff in the reserve started seeing dead and dying birds. Most of the victims were songbirds, which are known to be more sensitive to extreme heat than many other groups of birds.

Of these, the worst-affected species was the blue waxbill, a charming little finch with a powder-blue face and belly that spends most of its time foraging for grass seeds in small flocks.

Blue waxbills made up nearly half the carcasses found by field rangers when they searched part of the reserve after the heat had passed.

The Phongolo mortality event added to the urgency of our research programme on the effects of climate change on Africa’s birds. The blue waxbills’ prominence among the victims identified them as a bellwether of the impacts of extreme heat on birds in the wetter south-eastern parts of the continent.

Since 2009, we have been leading a research team spanning the universities of Cape Town, Pretoria and several other local and overseas institutions. The over-arching goal of our research is understanding how climate change is affecting birds and other wildlife and developing methods to predict future effects.

Our expertise is mainly in behavioural ecology (Susie Cunningham) and evolutionary physiology (Andrew McKechnie). This combination has proven ideal for investigating how rising temperatures affect animals’ survival and reproduction.

Why humidity can be a killer

During hot weather, humans and other animals depend on evaporation to offload heat. Evaporation may take place by sweating (the major cooling mechanism for humans), through panting (your dog on a hot day) or other pathways. The process of changing liquid water (sweat or saliva) into water vapour uses heat, so it cools the source of the water (the body). But the air is like a sponge: when it’s already humid (wet), the air can’t hold much more water vapour.

These conditions impede evaporation and thus heat loss. On a 40°C day in a desert like the Kalahari or Sahara, evaporative cooling is efficient because the air is dry and sweat can evaporate as soon as it reaches the skin’s surface. At the same temperature on a humid day in the coastal tropics, however, sweat cannot evaporate and forms drops on the skin. This severely reduces rates of heat loss.

If body temperature increases more than a few degrees above normal levels, nervous system function is compromised, organ damage starts to occur and proteins begin denaturing. This breakdown of physiological functioning can rapidly lead to death.

The journey

In early 2022, just over a year after the waxbill event, our Masters student Nazley Liddle set out to examine the role high humidity had played in the deaths of the waxbills. She also aimed to predict areas where risks of mortality will increase in future.

Nazley investigated the waxbills’ capacity to regulate their body temperature over a range of air temperatures and humidity levels. Her results confirmed that high humidity severely compromises the birds’ ability to avoid dangerous hyperthermia (getting too hot).

For example, she found that blue waxbills can tolerate air temperature up to 48°C under dry conditions, whereas under humid conditions similar to those on the day of the Phongolo mortality event they are unable to maintain a safe body temperature if air temperature exceeds 45.7°C.

Nazley then modelled how the waxbills will fare under hotter, more humid future conditions. The modelling showed that likelihood of mass mortality events for waxbills (and other birds with similar physiology) will increase greatly in coming decades. This ranged across much of Kruger National Park, south-eastern Zimbabwe and large parts of southern and central Mozambique, including the ferociously hot Zambezi Valley.

Predicted risk of mortality becomes three to seven times higher when humidity is taken into account, compared to increasing temperature alone. Many of these areas will simply become too hot and humid during the wet season for the species to persist.

The blue waxbill study should set alarm bells ringing. Most of Earth’s 11,000 bird species occur in the tropics, many experiencing hot, humid conditions for at least part of the year.

Another recent paper from our team reveals similar increases in projected future risks of lethal hyperthermia for trumpeter hornbills. This large, fruit-eating forest species found in southern Africa plays a critical role in seed dispersal. Although biologists have often viewed tropical lowlands as safe habitats for birds from the point of view of their physiological functioning, our work is showing that increasing humidity coupled with rising temperatures poses a serious threat to birds, bats and other animals of the tropics.

There are worrying signs that climate change has already caused widespread declines in tropical birds. During 2025, several teams of researchers reported substantial declines in bird abundance, even in intact rainforests that have not been affected directly by human activities such as slash-and-burn agriculture.

Most recently, population declines of 25%-38% since 1950 among tropical birds have been attributed to increasingly extreme heat events. Tellingly, these declines have been more pronounced in songbirds compared to other groups. Rising temperature and humidity is a global-scale problem. The only long-term solution is halting human-driven climate warming.

– Humidity and heat are killers for tropical birds – waxbill and hornbill studies highlight the dangers
– https://theconversation.com/humidity-and-heat-are-killers-for-tropical-birds-waxbill-and-hornbill-studies-highlight-the-dangers-271634